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This study examines the transformation of the Bulgarian political elite that took place with the 
transition from communist to post-communist society. Drawing on classical elite theory and 
contemporary research on East European elites, I argue that two sets of factors determine the 
nature of elite transformation – the presence of a counter-elite and the degree to which this elite 
is organized, and the effectiveness of the auto-transformative mechanisms of the ruling elite (i.e. 
intra-elite conflict and modes of recruitment). Using a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data gathering techniques, I analyze the nature and intensity of intra-elite conflict 
within the ruling communist elite; the emergence of an organized counter-elite; the extent to 
which the counter-elite was able to challenge the power of the ruling communist elite; and the 
difference in the composition and modes of recruitment of the communist and post-communist 
elites. In examining the process of elite transformation in Bulgaria, I address the wider and more 
important question of the role the elite played in the transition process and the impact it had on 
the transition outcome. East European transitions produced a variety of outcomes, with Bulgaria 
consistently lagging behind other countries from the region. Without viewing elite 
transformation as the sole explanatory variable, I argue that it significantly affected the outcome 
of the transition process. Elite action, more than anything, defines domestic and foreign policy 
choices, and hence, the direction and success of the transition process. Elite change in Bulgaria 
was defined by a strong and slowly reforming former communist party, unable to articulate a 
viable reform program; a weak and poorly organized opposition torn by internal conflict and 
lacking a unified vision of the transition and sound reform policy; and an opportunistic ethnic-
based party changing allegiance every so often. This particular combination resulted in a 
sequence of unstable governments and reform policies that were stalled or reversed with each 
change in government. The nature of elite transformation in Bulgaria and the country’s difficult 
transition pose the question of the link between elite change and transition outcome – a 
connection that renders the elite variable the more so important. 
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Emilia Zankina, PhD 
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1.0  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL ELITE IN THE 
PERIOD OF TRANSITION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 FRAMING THE ISSUE 
This study examines the transformation of the Bulgarian political elite that took place with the 
transition from communist to post-communist society. Such topic is closely related to the process 
of democratization in Eastern Europe and the variety of transitions that resulted. East European 
countries followed different paths of democratization, some being more successful than others. 
Elite change similarly varied from country to country, producing more stable to less stable 
governments and diverging domestic and foreign policies. Bulgaria was hardly the leader in 
democratization efforts, compared to Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic. Elite 
transformation in Bulgaria also significantly differed from that in other East European countries. 
By analyzing the process of elite transformation in Bulgaria, I aspire to address the wider and 
more important question of the role the elite played in the transition process and the impact it had 
on the transition outcome. 
A study of elite transformation in Bulgaria raises two immediate questions – why study 
Bulgaria and why study the elite. Bulgaria makes for a valuable case study for two main reasons: 
first, democratization in Bulgaria is part of a wider process encompassing entire Eastern Europe, 
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and, second, Bulgaria represents a largely understudied case. The events of 1989 have unleashed 
profound political, economic, and social changes, setting an entire region on the path of 
transition and producing a variety of outcomes. A study of any aspect of the Bulgarian transition 
should be viewed in this larger context, as it necessarily addresses the broader questions of how 
East European countries democratized and why, given a common communist past, were certain 
countries more successful in the process than others.  
Although East European transitions have been subject to detailed analyses from various 
disciplines, Bulgaria still remains a largely understudied case. The study of Bulgarian elites has 
particularly suffered from academic neglect. As Stephan Nikolov argues, the absence of any 
detailed analysis of how Bulgaria’s communist elites evolved is perhaps due to the repeated 
characterization of communist Bulgaria as “Moscow’s closest ally,” as if nothing more needed to 
be said.1
Why study the elite? The term elite originated with the work of Vilfredo Pareto who 
devoted most of his attention to the study of elites, as opposed to the masses, as he was 
convinced that social change is a great deal faster in the higher strata than in the lower strata of 
society, and decisions among the elites have more consequences for the history of society than 
events and decisions among its great masses.
 While there are numerous studies of Polish, Hungarian or Soviet elites, Bulgarian elite 
studies are limited to remote chapters in several edited collections and a few analytical, non-
empirically based works. Thus, the study of Bulgarian elites is not only valuable in itself but it is 
a much needed addition to comparative studies on East European transitions. 
2
                                                 
1 NIKOLOV Stephan, “Bulgaria: A Quasi-Elite” in John HIGLEY, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz 
WESOLOWSKI (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy In Eastern Europe, New York, NY, St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998, pp. 213-225, p. 213. 
 The role of the elite in transitions to democracy 
2 ZETTERBER Hans, “Pareto’s Theory of Elites” in Vilfredo PARETO, The Rise and Fall of Elites: An 
Application of Theoretical Sociology, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1991, pp. 1-22, p . 3. 
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has been subject to a prolonged debate between transitologists and area specialists (Bunce 1995, 
Huntington 1991, Linz 1978, Munch & Leff 1997, Nodia 1996, O’Donnel & Schmitter 1986, 
Schmitter & Karl 1994, Terry 1993, Welsch 1994, Wiarda 2002). In this debate, transitologists 
place exclusive emphasis on the elite variable, arguing that democratic transitions are moments 
of plasticity, during which actors (elites) are faced with an opportunity to shape the course of 
events (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). They focus on the strategic interactions among elites and 
treat democratization as a contingent process characterized by uncertainty. In emphasizing the 
elite factor, transitologists downplay the role of socio-economic pre-conditions in determining 
the outcome of a transition. They argue that countries follow similar paths of democratization 
which are primarily dependent on the composition and strategies of political elites (Huntington 
1991). Thus, the analysis of East European transitions should start with the concepts and 
hypotheses generated by earlier cases of democratization (Schmitter & Karl 1994). 
In contrast, area specialists put forward a structuralist argument focused on the social 
embeddedness of transition processes. They reject the assumption that political change can be 
separated from a wider social, economic, and cultural context (Bunce 1995). This is especially 
true in the case of Eastern Europe, where countries are facing dual-track transitions, having to 
simultaneously build democracies and market economies. Comparisons with earlier cases of 
democratization, such as Latin America and Southern Europe, they argue, are necessary, but they 
should not be limited to the “third wave” democratization framework in which factors such as 
political culture, fundamental economic differences, and socialist past are ignored (Nodia 1996, 
Wiarda 2002). The structuralist approach assigns an important role to the elite variable in 
democratic transitions, but it hardly treats it as the only factor in determining the outcome. In this 
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view, other explanations, such as economic diversity, previous experience with democracy, 
proximity to Western culture, even differences of religion, should be given equal consideration. 
The transitologist-structuralist debate demonstrates that, despite assigning various 
degrees of importance to the elite variable, both sides undeniably agree that political leadership, 
elite conflict and negotiation, and elite change play a role in determining the nature and outcome 
of transitions to democracy. An analysis of the elite variable, then, is a valid tool for examining 
the transition process itself. As Higley and Burton argue, democratic transitions and breakdowns 
can be best understood by studying basic continuities and changes in internal relations of 
national elites.3
Elite change in Bulgaria significantly differed from that in other East European countries. 
In the first place, the Bulgarian communist regime enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy. On the one 
hand, such legitimacy rested upon the unprecedented economic prosperity experienced with the 
advent of communist rule and the all-encompassing process of modernization that followed, and 
on the other hand, it was due to the close historical and cultural ties between the Bulgarian and 
Russian peoples and the lack of prevalent Russophobia found elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
Second, communist rule in Bulgaria was characterized by the absence of dissident movements 
and anti-communist protests. There were no organized forms of resistance even vaguely 
resembling the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the “Prague Spring” of 1968 or the Polish 
 Without viewing elite change as the sole explanatory variable, I argue that the 
study of elites addresses the question of variance. Focusing on the elite factor and the ways in 
which elite transformation differs from one country to another, is a legitimate avenue for 
examining why East European countries followed different paths and speeds of transition. 
                                                 
3 HIGLEY John and Michael BURTON, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns,” 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 1, (Feb., 1989), pp. 17-32, p.17. 
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“Solidarity” movement in the 1980s.4
1.2 THEORIZING ELITE TRANSFORMATION IN EASTERN EUROPE 
 In fact, the trigger of change in Bulgaria was an intra-party 
coup that removed the long-time communist leader, Todor Zhivkov. Third, the changes brought 
no meaningful lustration or any other significant form of transitional justice in Bulgaria. Hence, 
the communist elite was not challenged by an organized dissident movement before the changes, 
it was not prevented by transitional justice from participating in post-communist politics, and at 
the same time relied on large popular support. This combination of a strong and unreformed 
communist elite and a weak opposition produced a sequence of unstable governments that failed 
to implement meaningful reform. Bulgaria witnessed a difficult transition with an unclear 
direction for most of the 1990s and a stop and go reform effort that placed the country 
considerably behind its East European counterparts. The elite variable, I argue, is partly 
responsible for Bulgaria’s difficult transition.  
The study of East European elites has been dominated by the circulation vs. reproduction 
approach articulated by Sonia and Ivan Szelenyi (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995). The main focus 
of this approach is the extent to which the old communist elite retained its position of power. 
Reproduction, in these terms, refers to no significant change in the composition of elites, 
whereas circulation indicates changes both in the composition and mode of recruitment to the 
elite. Another approach applied to the study of postcommunist elites has been offered by Higley 
and Burton (Higley & Burton 1989). Concerned with the link between elite change and 
                                                 
4 KANEV Krassimir, “From Totalitarianism to A Constitutional State” in Jacques COENEN-HUTHER 
(ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads, New York, NY, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996, pp. 51-75, p.51. 
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democratization, Higley and Burton differentiate between consensually unified and disunified 
elites and argue that consensually unified elites are more likely to contribute to the emergence of 
stable democracy. Their model emphasizes the importance of intra-elite conflict and negotiation 
of power. Milada Anna Vachudova is similarly interested in strategic interactions among the 
elite. She examines the factors contributing to a successful transition to democracy and argues 
that whether states embarked on a liberal or illiberal pattern of political change after 1989 largely 
depended on the quality of political competition, in particular on the presence of an opposition 
and a reforming communist party before 1989 (Vachudova 2005). Vachudova’s argument is 
most valuable in emphasizing that changes initiated within the ruling elite are of no less 
importance than challenges from an opposition.  
Building upon these three approaches, I identify several factors that determine the nature 
of elite transformation – changes in elite composition and mode of recruitment, intra-elite 
conflict, and presence of an opposition. I then turn to classical elite theory to organize these 
elements in a conceptually unified framework. The founders of elite theory Mosca and Pareto 
pay a great deal of attention to the process of elite renewal. In their view, the elite at any point in 
time is subject to both change and continuity. “The governing elite is always in a state of slow 
and continuous transformation,” argues Pareto, “never being today what it was yesterday.”5
                                                 
5 PARETO Vilfredo, Mind and Society: A Treatise of General Sociology, A. Livingston (ed.), New York, 
NY, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935, sec. 2056. 
 Even 
in the absence of a counter-elite and critical junctures such as a revolution, a coup or an election, 
the elite is undergoing constant and gradual transformation. On the other hand, an elite is almost 
never completely replaced and a certain degree of continuity is always observable. There is a 
tendency, argues Mosca, which aims at stabilizing social control and political power in the 
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descendants of the class that happens to hold possession of it at the given historical moment.6
Circulation and reproduction, then, should not be viewed as mutually exclusive processes 
but as mechanisms of elite renewal which can occur simultaneously. In these terms, circulation 
does not refer to replacement of elite A with elite B but to renewal of the elite with members 
outside of the usual pool of recruitment with qualities different than those dominant in the elite. 
Reproduction, in turn, does not imply physical continuation of the elite, but rather that new 
members recruited into the elite have the same social characteristics as members of the ruling 
elite (subscribe to the same value system, have comparable education, come from elite families, 
etc.).  Circulation and reproduction then represent modes of recruitment that assure both change 
and continuity in the elite. The most desirable arrangement for society, in Mosca’s view, is one 
in which these two processes complement one another in a state of flexible equilibrium.
 
Even when the elite loses control of its power resources, its descendents are always in 
advantageous position in terms of education and connections and, thus, better equipped to enter 
the ranks of the new elite.  
7
When these mechanisms of elite renewal fail to fulfill their function, the opportunity for a 
counter-elite to form and organize increases. According to Pareto, revolutions come about 
through accumulations in the higher stratum of society – either because of a slowing-down in 
class-circulation, or from other causes – of decadent elements no longer possessing the qualities 
suitable for keeping them in power. In the meantime in the lower stratum of society elements of 
superior quality are gaining power.
 
8
                                                 
6 MOSCA Gaetano, The Ruling Class, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939, p. 395. 
  Mosca similarly argues that the ruling class may be driven 
from power by the advent of new social elements [in the lower strata] who are strong in fresh 
7 MEISEL James, “Introduction” in James MEISEL (ed.), Pareto and Mosca, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965, pp. 1-44, p. 8. 
8 PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2057. 
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political forces.9
No less important is the role of intra-elite conflict. The governing class, argues Pareto, is 
not a homogenous body. Its members hold no meetings where they congregate to plot common 
designs, nor have they any other devices for reaching common accord.
 A counter-elite is formed when these new social elements in the lower stratum, 
possessing qualities different than those dominant in the elite, manage to organize. The ability of 
the counter-elite to challenge the power of the ruling elite depends to a large extent on the degree 
to which the counter-elite is organized. An organized counter-elite is a powerful agent of elite 
change.  
 10
Combining classical elite theory with contemporary approaches, I argue that two sets of 
factors determine the nature of elite transformation – the presence of a counter-elite and the 
degree to which this elite is organized, and the effectiveness of the auto-transformative 
mechanisms of the ruling elite (i.e. intra-elite conflict and modes of recruitment). To examine 
elite transformation in Bulgaria then, I need to determine whether there was intra-elite conflict 
within the ruling communist elite; the nature and intensity of that conflict; whether there was an 
organized counter-elite; where the counter-elite came from and how it organized itself; the extent 
to which the counter-elite was able to challenge the power of the communist ruling elite; the 
difference in the composition and modes of recruitment of the communist and post-communist 
elite; and the change in the mechanisms of elite recruitment. The answers to these questions 
 If there is an agreement 
among the elite, it derives from a set of shared circumstances and personal goals. The nature and 
intensity of intra-elite conflict could be just as powerful an agent of change as challenges from a 
counter-elite. Intra-elite conflict is particularly important in the context of one-party systems 
where the only legal contestation of power could come from within the party. 
                                                 
9 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 67. 
10 PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2254. 
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would explain why elite transformation in Bulgaria took its particular form and what impact it 
had on the outcome of transition. An elite transformation in which the communist elite is faced 
with an equally or more powerful counter-elite would result in a very different process of 
negotiation of power and policy direction than a situation in which elite transformation is defined 
by a strong, unified communist elite and a weak, disorganized counter-elite. Similarly, intra-elite 
conflict that brings about the dominance of a reformist wing within a former communist party 
would position that party rather differently in post-communist politics than a party in which 
reformists had been suppressed. 
1.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The elite variable is an important factor in determining the outcome of democratic transitions. 
Such influence is to a considerable degree exercised through the elite’s power to design and 
implement policy. With the collapse of communism, East European governments were faced 
with numerous dilemmas both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. These included: how to 
liberalize the economy, how to privatize state enterprises and which enterprises to privatize, what 
kind of land reform to implement, how to maintain social services, how to reform the healthcare 
and education systems, how to reform the banking system and liberalize capital markets. In 
addressing these issues, East European countries followed various paths, from shock therapy in 
Poland to the attempted social-democratic model of gradual change in Bulgaria. The results 
similarly varied, from painful but successful reform in the Czech Republic to economic crises in 
Bulgaria and Romania. Foreign policy required even more immediate attention. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact, East European 
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countries had to redefine their foreign policy orientation, e.g. were they to continue to rely on 
Russia for protection or were they to look for support to the West? The Visegrad three (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland) made a clear and immediate stance in expressing their desire to join 
NATO and the EU. Bulgaria, in contrast, was changing its position with every change of 
government. When the Socialist (formerly communist) Party was in power, NATO membership, 
argues Linden, was not as eagerly pursued.11
The nature of elite transformation in Bulgaria had a consequential effect in determining 
domestic and foreign policy choices, and hence, the direction and success of the transition 
process. The Bulgarian elite during the transition was not committed to a common vision of post-
communist society and did not share a common value system. Whether Bulgaria should pursue a 
full transition to market economy and whether it should seek membership in NATO and the EU 
were points of contention until the late 1990s. The unstable political situation, with frequent 
change of governments, led each new government to focus on short-term goals and adopt 
policies benefiting its particular party. Consequently, every policy initiative was either stalled or 
reversed with each change in government. Since Bulgaria witnessed nine governments between 
1990 and 1997, this practice proved devastating to the success of the transition. Bulgaria 
struggled with land reform and restitution. Slow privatization allowed for draining of state 
enterprises and appropriation and export of state capital. Corruption schemes spread quickly, 
benefiting members of the old nomenklatura. Inflation exceeded 1,000%. Emerging small 
businesses were subjected to racketeering. An inefficient and corrupted judicial system prevented 
 Conflicting views on foreign policy orientation 
further delayed reform preventing Bulgaria from joining the EU and NATO with the first wave 
of Eastern expansion. 
                                                 
11 See Ronald H. LINDEN, “Twin Peaks: Bulgaria and Romania between the EU and the United States,” 
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.) 2004, pp. 45-55, p. 46. 
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legal action. Since there was no long-term policy objective and no consistent policy, similar 
problems were left without solution.12
Examining the policy implications of elite transformation reveals why the elite variable 
matters. Elite action, more than anything, defines policy choices in terms of legal and 
government structure, economic and social reform, and international alliances. Elite change 
directly affects the transition process. The link between elite transformation and transition 
outcome renders the study of the elite all the more important. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
To examine the patterns and mechanisms of elite transformation, I use a combination of data 
gathering techniques: compiling and comparing elite rosters; interviewing former and present 
members of the political elite and other relevant individuals such as journalists, dissidents, and 
intellectuals; and analyzing archival documents and media sources. Elite rosters offer an 
extensive and unavailable before database that allows analyzing elite change at the individual, 
positional, party and aggregate levels. Interviews supplement the quantitative data with rich 
narrative on elite transformation, including mechanisms of elite recruitment, organizing of the 
opposition, and internal conflict within the communist elite. Analysis of the archives of the 
Bulgarian Communist Party and newspaper archives of the main political newspapers offers an 
insight into intra-elite conflict, dissident activity before the fall of the communist regime, the 
public political debate during the transition, and communication strategies of the opposing 
                                                 
12 For a concise account and statistical data on Bulgaria’s transition process, see, Transition Report 1999: 
Ten Years of Transition, EBRD, November 1999. 
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political players. Combining elite rosters, interviews, and archival and media sources produced a 
comprehensive set of empirical data that addresses the various aspects of elite transformation.  
The study utilizes Higley and Burton’s most widely used operational definition of elite as 
“persons whose strategic position enables them to regularly and substantially affect national 
political outcomes” (Higley and Burton 2006). In the studies of East European elites, the 
dominant terminology is that of an elite and a counter-elite, rather than elites. A counter-elite is 
defined as a group of people who are able to mobilize resources and challenge the power of the 
elite with the purpose of taking its place or, at least, sharing in its power. This terminology is 
very appropriate for the East European context, where there are two groups that are clearly 
distinguishable and fundamentally opposed to one another, and where one group is easily defined 
as a counter-elite for it is, at least initially, completely excluded from the political process. The 
study is confined to the first decade of the transition which provides a long enough period to 
study the patterns and mechanisms of transformation of the transition elite. 
The work is structured in nine chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by a review 
of the literature focusing on East European elites and Bulgarian elites in particular and a 
discussion of the various theoretical approaches applied to the study of post-communist elites. 
Chapter Three presents a brief historical overview of the 1989-2000 period, it compares the 
process of democratization in Bulgaria to similar processes in other East European countries, and 
outlines the factors that define elite transformation in Bulgaria. The forth chapter reviews the 
main concepts of classical elite theory and proposes a model of elite transformation that can be 
useful for the study of post-communist elites. Data gathering and data analysis techniques are 
reviewed in Chapter Five. Chapter Six presents the empirical findings, focusing on elite 
composition, mode of recruitment and intra-elite conflict of the transition elite. Chapter Seven 
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examines the role of the former secret service in the political transformation of the country, 
offering a first attempt to forward a scientific inquiry into the subject and separate myth from 
fact. Chapter Eight examines the impact of elite transformation on the transition outcome by 
focusing on specific policy areas. Chapter Nine concludes the study by commenting on its 
importance and the applicability of the proposed model of elite transformation to a wider 
context. 
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2.0  APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF EAST EUROPEAN ELITES: INFERENCES 
FROM THE LITERATURE 
East European transitions have attracted enormous scholarly attention and are the subject of a 
large and continuously growing body of literature. The last two decades have produced extensive 
research on the topic from a variety of perspectives both in terms of comparative and country 
studies. The role of elites in Eastern Europe and their transformation in the period of transition 
have figured prominently in the literature. Scholarly attention, however, has been unevenly 
divided with clear preference from all disciplines towards larger countries such as Poland and 
Russia and noticeable neglect of smaller countries, including Bulgaria. This review of the 
literature outlines scholarly achievements in the field and offers a concise summary of the major 
theoretical approaches. Its purpose is not a lengthy account of every study of East European 
elites, but a categorization of the various works based on their respective theoretical frameworks. 
The circulation vs. reproduction approach, which focuses on the composition of postcommunist 
elites, is examined first. Its main concern is to what degree the communist elite managed to 
preserve its power in the transition period and which parts of the elite, political, economic, or 
cultural, experienced most elite turnover. The circulation vs. reproduction approach emerged 
with the unfolding of events in Eastern Europe and has been formulated in response to the 
variance in outcomes of postcommunist transitions. It has been the dominant approach in 
conceptualizing East European elite transformations and as such has influenced the work of 
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many scholars. The second approach applied to the study of postcommunist elites examines the 
connection between elite change and regime form. Arguing that a particular kind of elite change 
leads to a particular regime type, it attempts to determine what type of elite is most likely to 
contribute to the emergence of stable democracy. This approach originates with contemporary 
elite theory and was only later applied to the East European context. It has been most noted for 
incorporating East European cases into comparative elite studies and articulating why the elite 
variable matters. The role of elites in transitions to democracy, though often implicitly examined, 
has been the underlying rationale of most studies on East European elites. Hence, the influence 
of this approach goes beyond the authors who explicitly utilize it. Studies on Bulgarian 
postcommunist elites are presented last. Since such studies are very limited in number, they are 
not grouped in theoretical or methodological categories. A summary of the few available works 
on the subject examines their main arguments and contributions to the general field and to the 
study of Bulgarian elites in particular. 
2.1 CIRCULATION VS. REPRODUCTION 
The extent to which the old communist elite retained its elite status has become the main focus in 
the study of East European post-communist elites.13
                                                 
13 ADAM Frane and Matevz TOMSIC, “Elite (Re)configuration and Politico-Economic Performance in 
Post-Socialist Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2002, pp, 435-454, p. 435. 
 Theorizations of elite change in Eastern 
Europe have been dominated by the circulation vs. reproduction framework, an approach 
articulated by Sonia and Ivan Szelenyi (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995). In questioning whether 
there was a change in the composition of East European elites with the transition to post-
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communism and if so, what happened to the old cadres and where did the new elites come from, 
Szelenyi and Szelenyi find two competing answers. The first they term elite reproduction theory, 
the second, elite circulation theory. Reproduction theory, in their view, suggests that 
revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe did not affect the social composition of elites, as the old 
nomenklatura elite managed to survive at the top of the class structure, becoming the new 
propertied bourgeoisie. In contrast, circulation theory defends the claim that the transition to 
post-communism resulted in a structural change at the top of the class hierarchy, whereby new 
people were recruited to command positions based on new principles.14
The dominant view of elites in Eastern Europe, argue Szelenyi and Szelenyi, is one of 
reproduction. Early scholarship on the topic posits that privatization and marketization of the 
economy would benefit the communist political class, which would use its political power to 
accumulate wealth and thus would easily retain its position at the top of the class structure 
(Hankiss 1990, Staniszkis 1991). Thus, although the socioeconomic system is changing 
radically, the people at the top remain the same, only altering the principles by which they 
legitimate their power.  
 
Szelenyi and Szelenyi offer a competing argument, i.e. circulation. They suggest there 
would be limits to the extent to which the former communist elite will be able to maintain its 
privileged position. Some members, they argue, will be downwardly mobile, some will stay in 
the social space they occupied before, and some will be upwardly mobile.15
                                                 
14 SZELENYI Ivan and Szonja SZELENYI, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the 
Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe: Introduction,” Theory and Society, Special Issue on 
Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 
24, No. 5, (Oct., 1995), pp. 620-621, p. 616. 
 Utilizing Bourdieu’s 
conceptualization of the different forms of capital, Szelenyi and Szelenyi hypothesize that the old 
15 Ibid., p. 618. 
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elite, which based their power mainly on political capital, is likely to be downwardly mobile, 
while the technocracy, which combined cultural and political capital, will be better positioned to 
acquire economic capital.16 Consequently, the authors argue, one may expect a high degree of 
elite reproduction in countries where the technocracy was co-opted by the nomenklatura, such as 
Hungary, as well as in countries where there was no counter-elite, such as Russia. Circulation, in 
turn, can be expected in countries where the co-optation of the technocracy did not take place or 
in countries with a well-formed counter-elite, like Poland.17
Empirical results of Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s study demonstrate that the distinction 
between circulation and reproduction is a relative one, and the two theories do not necessarily 
contradict one another.
  
18
                                                 
16 The technocracy, according to Szelenyi and Szelenyi, represents a distinctive stratum in socialist 
societies which combines cultural and political capital and is thus better positioned to accumulate 
economic capital in the post-communist environment. The authors claim that their approach is based on 
Pierre Bourdieu’s distinction between economic, cultural and social capital, and his proposition that social 
and cultural capital can be converted into economic capital and vice versa. Szelenyi and Szelenyi extend 
Bourdieu’s framework based on the assumption that political capital is a form of social capital. In 
Bourdieu’s view, social capital consists of all actual or potential resources linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. Nobility 
titles are a good example of social capital, as they represent a durable network of recognition from which 
potential resources could be derived. Although one can argue that political capital also includes access to 
certain networks, equating political and social capital in Bourdieu’s terms is erroneous. See, BOURDIEU 
Pierre, “The Forms of Capital” in John RICHARDSON (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, New York, Greenwood Press, 1986, pp. 241-258. 
 The authors observe a considerable degree of elite reproduction as a 
result of the marketization of the socialist economy. At the same time, however, they witness a 
significant amount of elite circulation. There is substantial change at the top of the class 
structure, argue Szelenyi and Szelenyi, as some of the old elites are pushed out of their positions 
of power. Yet, these changes do not represent a revolutionary break but rather a path-dependent 
17 SZELENYI and SZELENYI, op.cit., p. 621.  
18  Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s approach exhibits a major conceptual inconsistency. The authors present 
reproduction theory and circulation theory as separate and distinctive theories, arguing at the same time 
that the two processes are interdependent. It remains unclear whether they are speaking of a unified 
framework within which both reproduction and circulation processes are at work, or whether 
reproduction and circulation are two distinctive theoretical approaches. Their interchangeable use of 
“theory” and “process” when referring to reproduction and circulation renders this theoretically important 
distinction the more so confusing. 
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transformation of the composition of the elite with a distinctive move of people from middle to 
top positions. Contrary to their expectations, Szelenyi and Szelenyi find greater rates of 
circulation of elites in Hungary than in Poland, which they attribute to “administered social 
mobility.”19
Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s conceptual framework influenced many scholars who attempted 
in various degrees to fit their scholarship within the circulation vs. reproduction model, 
producing much valuable and original research. In a study of Russian elite, Hanley, Yershova, 
and Anderson observe substantial reproduction of the elite between 1988 and 1993 and little 
change in the mode of recruitment (Hanley, Yershova & Anderson 1995). Gorbachev’s tenure as 
first secretary, they argue, was accompanied by extensive circulation in the elite between 1983 
and 1988, which contributed to the high rates of reproduction in the 1990s. In their view, elite 
circulation is closely related to institutional change. Thus, they expect that institutional inertia in 
the economic sphere, contrasted with institutional dynamism in the political sphere, would 
translate into higher rates of circulation in the political than in the economic elite. Furthermore, 
the devaluation of political capital and short supply of economic capital would increase the 
importance of cultural capital in granting entry into the elite. Results of Hanley, Yershova, and 
Anderson’s study, however, demonstrate that former party members constitute over three-
 As predicted by their model, they report high rates of reproduction in Russia. 
Similar results are also supported by Fodor, Wnuk-Lipinski, and Yershova, who find a 
significant degree of elite circulation in Poland and Hungary and overwhelming reproduction in 
Russia (Fodor, Wnuk-Lipinski, & Yershova 1995).  
                                                 
19 “Administered mobility,” in Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s terms, refers to the tendency of the new Hungarian 
political elite to distrust subordinates who carried over from the communist regime and to prefer to 
appoint less-experienced but trusted people who were not associated with the regime.  See, SZELENYI 
and SZELENYI, op.cit., pp. 629-633. 
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quarters of the 1993 elite. Hence, the authors conclude that although political capital has become 
deinstitutionalized with the disintegration of the Communist Party, it retains a great deal of its 
value in the form of durable networks.  
In a comparative study of economic elites in Hungary, Poland and Russia, Rona-Tas and 
Borocz further explore the link between institutional change and elite formation (Rona-Tas & 
Borocz 1995). They argue that the formation of the new economic elite is to a large degree 
dependent on the institutional mechanisms of property change. As the communist state collapses 
and delegitimizes itself as a property owner, it faces the difficult task of transferring its property 
to other, real owners. This leaves managers of state enterprises, who possess the economic and 
technical knowledge as well as valuable social network assets, in an advantageous position in the 
transformation process. Their knowledge and connections easily translate into acquiring 
ownership rights through management buy-outs. Consequently, the authors report that the 
overwhelming majority of the economic elite in all three countries came from top or other 
managerial positions. Rona-Tas and Borocz further make an important distinction between the 
“private” and the “privatized” sectors. The new private sector, they argue, is formed by capital 
savings or investment from abroad, whereas the privatized sector emerges as a result of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. They report significantly higher degree of reproduction 
of the elite in the state and privatized sectors in comparison to the private sector. The authors 
attribute the overall high degree of reproduction in the economic elite to the absence of radical 
institutional changes. 
Elaborating on the issue of the advantageous position of the old elite, Kryshtanovskaya 
and White examine the process by which the Soviet nomenklatura managed to convert its 
political power into economic (Kryshtanovskaya & White 1996). They describe in detail the 
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various mechanisms through which the nomenklatura benefitted from the privatization process 
and managed to appropriate state property, such as establishment of joint enterprises and 
privileges in import-export operations in the late 1980s, advantageous credits and licenses for 
property dealings in the privatization process, conversion of assets into cash, etc. As the future of 
the regime became uncertain, the nomenklatura deemed it necessary to protect their position of 
power through the accumulation of property and wealth. According to Kryshtanovskaya and 
White, this accumulation of capital resulted in a bifurcation of the once monolithic elite which 
now controlled assets both in the political and economic spheres. Their analysis of the Brezhnev, 
Gorbachev, and Yeltzin elites, however, point to both change and continuity. A broader 
continuity coexisted, argue Kryshtanovskaya and White, with circulation within the elite as a 
younger and less compromised cohort rose to leading positions, a process termed “the revolution 
of the deputies” by Andrei Grachev, advisor and press secretary to Michail Gorbachev.20
In another study, Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Kovach elaborate on the circulation vs. 
reproduction framework by offering a third theory of elite transformation, which they term the 
“empty places” thesis (Szelenyi, Szelenyi & Kovach 1995).
  
21 This approach focuses on the class 
positions that determine the social structure rather than on the characteristics of the individuals 
occupying those positions. Applied to the East European context, the authors argue that a 
difference in elite personnel does not constitute a substantive change in the stratification of post-
communist societies, as long as elites continue to have the same degree of power as under 
communism and are selected on the basis of the same criteria as before.22
                                                 
20 Quoted in Olga KRYSHTANOVSKAYA and Stephen WHITE, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian 
Elite,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, (Jul., 1996), pp. 711-733, p. 729. 
 Their analysis of 
21 Here again it remains unclear whether the “empty places” thesis is a distinct theory or an elaboration on 
the circulation vs. reproduction framework. 
22 SZLENYI Szonja, Ivan SZELENYI and Imre KOVACH, “The Making of the Hungarian Postcommunist 
Elite: Circulation in Politics, Reproduction in the Economy,” Theory and Society, Special Issue on 
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Hungarian post-communist elites indicates reproduction in the economic elite and circulation in 
the political elite. The change of the cultural elite, however, fits neither the circulation nor the 
reproduction theses. The authors observe significant change of personnel in the cultural elite, but 
no change in the selection criteria. The “empty places” thesis, they argue, best explains the 
transformation of the cultural elite. 
In a study of Polish elites, Wasilewski and Wnuk-Lipinski argue that the reproduction vs. 
circulation concept has two aspects – intergenerational and intragenerational (Wasilewski & 
Wnuk-Lipisnki 1995). Intergenerational reproduction, in their opinion, takes place either when 
members of the new elite are the offspring of the former communist elite, or when they are the 
children and grandchildren of the pre-war elite. Intragenerational reproduction, in turn, could 
take the form of simple reproduction, when incumbents of command positions under 
communism succeed in maintaining the same positions in the post-communist context, or 
reproduction by conversion, when incumbents of command positions under communism succeed 
in maintaining their elite status, but transfer to another fraction of the elite, i.e. from political to 
economic.23 Wasilewski and Wnuk-Lipinski also report a move from middle to top positions, 
which they term vertical reproduction.24
                                                                                                                                                             
Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 
24, No. 5, (Oct., 1995), pp. 697-722, p. 700. 
 Their results indicate that intragenerational reproduction 
in the economic elite is much higher than in the cultural and political elite. Simple reproduction, 
in turn, is prevalent over reproduction by conversion in the economic and cultural elite. The 
political elite exhibits overall circulation rather than reproduction. The authors conclude that 
Poland represents a case of both circulation and reproduction.  
23 WASILEWSKI Jacek and Edmund WNUK-LIPINSKI, “Poland: Winding Road from the Communist to 
the Post-Solidarity Elite,” Theory and Society, Special Issue on Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites 
during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 24, No. 5, (Oct., 1995), pp. 669-696, p. 
684. 
24 Also known in the literature as “revolution of the deputies.”   
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Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s approach to the study of East European elites has posed some 
very important questions, i.e., who were the people who held command positions under 
socialism, and how were these people affected by the transition process? Was there a change in 
the composition of East European elites, and if so, what happened to the old cadres and where 
did the new elites come from? The extensive empirical research their approach has stimulated 
demonstrates that one cannot speak of pure reproduction or circulation of the elite, but rather of a 
greater inclination to one form or the other in each of the East European countries.25 As Sharon 
Rivera asserts, the assessment of circulation or reproduction largely depends on three 
fundamental questions: 1) which segment of the elite is being studied; 2) how are circulation and 
reproduction defined; and 3) what is meant by “member of the old elite.”26
Our review shows that the degree of reproduction, and respectively circulation, differs 
among various segments of the elite. Generally speaking, economic elites tend to exhibit a higher 
degree of reproduction, whereas political elites are closer to circulation (Hanley, Yershova & 
Anderson 1995; Fodor, Wnuk-Lipinski & Yershova 1995; Szelenyi, Szelenyi & Kovach 1995; 
Wasilewski & Wnuk-Lipisnki 1995). As Rona-Tas and Borocz argue, the degree of reproduction 
may also vary within different segments of the economic elite, with higher rates in the state and 
privatized sectors and lower rates in the private sector (Rona-Tas & Borocz 1995). It has been 
argued that the amount of reproduction and circulation among various segments of the elite may 
be an indicator of the institutional changes in each particular sphere. The generally higher degree 
of circulation among political elites suggests that changes in the political sphere preceded and 
were more radical than those in the economic sphere (Hanley, Yershova & Anderson 1995; 
  
                                                 
25 ADAM and TOMISC, op.cit., p. 439. 
26 RIVERA Sharon Werning, “Elites in Post-Communist Russia: A Changing of the Guard?, Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000, pp. 413-432, p. 416. 
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Rona-Tas & Borocz 1995). A significant amount of circulation in the political elite, however, 
may also indicate that the political sphere, dominant in the communist context, has become less 
relevant with the increased importance of the economic sphere (and private property), which has 
resulted in a shift of the former communist elite from the political to the economic realm.27
Another question of utmost importance is the way circulation and reproduction are 
defined. Many scholars understand reproduction in terms of physical continuity, i.e. the same 
individuals holding power. The concept of intragenerational vs. intergenerational reproduction 
challenges this view and suggests that physical continuity could refer to both individuals and 
families (Wasilewski & Wnuk-Lipinski 1995). Thus, a case in which children of former 
nomenklatura members are presently occupying top political positions could be interpreted as 
either reproduction or circulation depending on one’s definition of the terms. Some authors 
further argue that physical continuity does not exhaust the concept of reproduction and 
consideration should be also given to changes and continuities in the aggregate social 
characteristics of the elite (Kryshtanovskaya & White 1996). Studies comparing the social 
composition of communist and post-communist elites point to lack of significant differences 
between the two groups in terms of social characteristics and social origins (Eyal & Townsley 
1995; Szelenyi, Szelenyi & Kovach 1995). A lot of circulation at the individual level, argue Eyal 
and Townsley, may mean nothing more but the reproduction of privileges and advantages 
 The 
various degrees of circulation and reproduction among various segments of the elite render 
imperative a clear indication of which part of the elite is being studied. 
                                                 
27 Kryshtanovskaya and White recall that such argument was also made by Trotsky in his Revolution 
Betrayed. See KRYSHTANOVSKAYA and WHITE, op.cit., p. 716. 
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institutionalized during the communist period.28
What is understood by “member of the old elite” also significantly affects the analysis. In 
more than one study of post-communist elites, party membership is equated to membership in 
the old elite (Hanley, Yershova & Anderson 1995; Wasilewski & Wnuk-Lipinski 1995). 
Wasilewski and Wnuk-Lipinski, for example, report a high degree of reproduction in the 
economic elite, based on their finding that more than half of the members of the new economic 
elite used to be party members.
 Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Kovach’s elaboration on 
the circulation vs. reproduction framework supports this view by drawing attention to changes 
and continuities in selection criteria and mode of recruitment to the elite (Szelenyi, Szelenyi & 
Kovach 1995). A change of personnel, they argue, does not necessarily indicate circulation if 
people are selected based on the same principles and according to the same criteria. The 
operational definition, therefore, is decisive in evaluating the degree of circulation and 
reproduction.  
29
                                                 
28 EYAL Gil and Eleanor TOWNSLEY, “The Social Composition of the Communist Nomenklatura: A 
Comparison of Russia, Poland, and Hungary, Theory and Society, Special Issue on Circulation vs. 
Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 24, No. 5, 
(Oct., 1995), pp. 723-750, p. 746. 
 Prior membership in the Communist party or even the 
nomenklatura, however, is not an accurate indicator of “membership in the old elite,” argues 
Rivera (Rivera 2000). In 1989 the Bulgarian Communist Party, for example, numbered one 
million members out of a total population of eight million. Clearly, party membership is too 
broad of a category to be equated to membership in the elite. Adopting a narrow definition 
including only the very top political positions, however, would inevitably overlook a crucial 
characteristic of elite transformation in Eastern Europe, i.e. the revolution of deputies. What 
Wasilewski and Wnuk-Lipinski label “vertical reproduction,” refers to the cases when the new 
29 WASILEWSKI and WNUK-LIPINSKI, op.cit., p. 681. 
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elite consists of people who under Communism did not belong to the nomenklatura elite, but 
were on the trajectory to achieve such positions and had the assets at their disposal necessary to 
reach this goal.30 Those were the people, argue Krysthanovskaya and White, who were the 
beneficiaries of the transition. They were not high enough to be swept away by the changes but 
high enough to take over the positions and privileges of the old elite.31 Elite renewal in such 
cases is confined to the junior ranks and could be interpreted as either reproduction or circulation 
depending on what is meant by “member of the old elite.” Expanding the definition of elite, 
though, could also lead to faulty conclusions. Urusla Hoffman-Lange cautions us against easily 
stretching the elite concept. Even after a regime change, she argues, elites tend to be recruited 
from a pool of persons who occupy lower ranks in the hierarchies of the same institutions and 
organizations (Hoffman-Lange 1998). In her view, if one would consider those individuals as 
part of the old elite, as is frequently done, the usefulness of the elite concept would suffer, since 
by definition no elite transformation would ever be possible.32
It is only logical that assessment of the degree of circulation and reproduction largely 
depends on the operational definitions. Though, even after those have been carefully considered, 
we are still facing a yet more fundamental question, namely why does it matter whether a certain 
case exhibits inclination towards circulation or reproduction? The “empty place” thesis has 
clearly demonstrated that a change of players does not necessarily change the rules of the game. 
If the rules of the game have changed, one might question, does it matter that the players have 
remained the same? Valerie Bunce argues that countries which initially excluded their former 
 
                                                 
30 Ibid., p. 685. 
31 KRYSTHANOVSKAYA and WHITE, op.cit., p. 729. 
32 HOFFMAN-LANGE Ursula, “Elite Transformation and Democratic Consolidation in Germany after 
1945 and 1989” in John HIGLEY, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz WESOLOWSKI (eds.), 
Postcommunist Elites and Democracy In Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s press, Inc., 1998, pp. 
141-162, p. 143. 
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leaders from political power have shown the most progress in economic and political reform 
(Bunce 1998). East European countries were faced with the challenge of dismantling an entire 
system and crafting a new vision for their societies. The elite in this process had the important 
task of finding the proper strategies and instruments that would take those countries on a 
different path. It matters a great deal then, who those people are and whether they have the 
proper mix of expertise and new ideas. Adam and Tomsic argue that the appropriate proportion 
between elite reproduction and circulation, as a core element of the democratization process, has 
a major influence on the socioeconomic performance of each particular country.33
Elite change in Bulgaria has been mostly categorized as reproduction rather than 
circulation. Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia are often grouped together in that regard, as countries 
in which communist party elites managed to retain their power even after the first democratic 
elections and to reform to a much lesser extent.
 Although the 
circulation vs. reproduction framework focuses on the composition of the postcommunist elite 
and does not explicitly explore the link between elite change and transition outcome, its 
underlying assumption is that elite change, circulation, and reproduction, have an overall impact 
on the democratization process. In other words, the rules of the game would hardly change 
without some change of players. Further below we examine another theoretical approach which 
explores this link and argues that the nature of elite transformation affects the outcome of the 
transition process. It is this relationship that renders the elite variable the more so important, an 
argument which will be reinforced throughout this work. 
34
                                                 
33 ADAM and TOMISIC, op.cit., p. 447. 
 No empirical study of Bulgarian elites, or a 
comparative study including Bulgaria, utilizes the circulation vs. reproduction framework. 
34 Ibid., p. 436. 
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Szelenyi and Szlenyi’s comparative study on circulation and reproduction in Eastern Europe 
included large-scale surveys in Bulgaria as well. The results of this effort, however, were 
inconclusive and Bulgaria was ultimately excluded from the final research report.35
Despite certain lack of theoretical rigor and clarity, Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s approach is 
very useful in delineating general patterns of elite change. The authors deserve credit even if 
only for being the first to attempt to theorize elite change in post-communist societies. It is 
expected that such early theorization could benefit from further elaboration. Szelenyi and 
Szelenyi’s concept of reproduction and circulation is extremely valuable and worthy of 
incorporating into a broader theory of elite change. The circulation vs. reproduction framework 
could be viewed as a first step toward formulating a theory of elite change in East European 
transitioning societies.  
  
2.2 ELITE CHANGE AND REGIME FORMS 
The relation between elite type and regime form has been the focus of John Higley and Michael 
Burton’s work. First articulated in 1987, Higley and Burton have continuously elaborated on 
their model which has been critical in bringing East European cases to the comparative study of 
elites (Higley & Burton 1987, 1989, 1998, 2001, 2006). Higley and Burton also offered the most 
widely used operational definition of elite, almost unanimously adopted by contemporary elite 
theorists, including scholars of East European elites. In their view, “Political elites can be 
defined as persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations 
                                                 
35For the full report see, Ivan  SZELENYI and Szonja SZELENYI, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites 
During Post-Communist Transformation in Russia and Eastern Europe,” The National Council for Soviet 
and East European Research, council contract number 806-29, 1995 
  28 
and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially.”36
The main argument Higley and Burton make is of a correlation between elite unity and 
regime stability. A similar argument is forwarded by the classical theorists Mosca and Pareto, as 
well as by prominent contemporary scholars such as Putnam and Huntington. All of them 
strongly argue that elite unity or disunity is one of the most important determinants of regime 
forms (Huntington 1984, Mosca 1939, Pareto 1935, Putnam 1976). In their earlier work, Higley 
and Burton differentiate between consensually unified and disunified elites (Higley & Burton 
1987, 1989). In their view, a disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces 
a series of unstable regimes which oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over 
varying intervals. A consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, 
produces a stable regime which may evolve into a modern democracy.
 “Regularly” and 
“substantially” are the core elements of this definition. A lone political assassin, Higley and 
Burton contend, can affect political outcomes substantially but not regularly. By the same token, 
a voter in a representative democracy can affect political outcomes regularly but not 
substantially. It is the ability to regularly and substantially affect political outcomes that 
distinguishes the elite from the non-elite. Such definition expands beyond the notion of “power 
elite,” limited to top political, military and business leaders, and takes into account other sources 
of political power such as trade unions, professional organizations, interest groups and more.  
37 Disunity, the authors 
argue, appears to be the generic condition of national elites, and disunity strongly tends to persist 
regardless of socioeconomic development and other changes in mass populations.38
                                                 
36 HIGLEY John and Michael BURTON, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Oxford, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, p. 7. 
 Higley and 
37 HIGLEY John and Michael BURTON, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns,” 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 1, (Feb., 1989), pp. 17-32, p. 17. 
38 Here the authors seem to imply that political stability could be independent from socioeconomic 
development. While they provide examples of consensually unified elites establishing regimes other than 
  29 
Burton define an elite as consensually unified when its members share a consensus about the 
rules and codes of political conduct and participate in an integrated structure of interaction that 
provides them access to each other and to the most central decision-makers.39
                                                                                                                                                             
modern democracies, they fail to point to examples in which a disunified elite rules over a society with 
high level of socioeconomic development. 
 In contrast, an elite 
is disunified when its members do not share a consensus about the rules and codes of political 
conduct and when interactions across the various factions and segments of the elite are limited 
and sporadic. In reviewing major political changes in the West since the 1500s, the authors posit 
a connection between elite disunity and regime instability. Their findings indicate that well-
functioning democratic regimes are characterized by consensually unified elites. Thus, a 
transformation of the elite from disunity to consensual unity is a necessary condition, though not 
necessarily a pre-condition, for a successful transition to democracy. According to Higley and 
Burton’s earlier works, such transformation could occur either through elite settlements or two-
step elite transformations. Elite settlements, in their terms, are relatively rare events in which 
warring elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating 
compromises on their most basic disagreements (Higley & Burton 1987). The authors quote 
Britain’s Glorious Revolution and post-Franco Spain as examples of elite settlements which 
entailed a transformation from disunified to consensually unified elite. A two-step transformation 
(termed “elite convergence” in Higley and Burton’s later work) is a process by which, in step 
one, some of the warring factions enter into sustained, peaceful collaboration in order to mobilize 
a reliable electoral majority and win elections repeatedly, and in step two, major opposing 
factions, tired of losing elections, gradually abandon their distinct ideological and policy stances 
and adopt those of the winning coalition. Two-step transformations, according to Higley and 
39 Higley and Burton, 1989, op.cit., p. 19. 
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Burton, occurred in France and Italy in the 1960’s and 1970s, as the electoral dominance of 
center-right elite coalitions gradually forced left-wing factions to abandon socialist orthodoxies 
and adopt their opponents’ principles of liberal democracy and capitalist economy.40
A further elaboration of Higley and Burton’s approach adds another variable to the model 
– elite differentiation (Higley, Pakulski & Wesolowski 1998). The revised model considers elite 
unity and elite differentiation to be crucial determinants of the stability and main characteristics 
of political regimes. Elite differentiation is defined by the authors as the strong tendency of elites 
to become socially heterogeneous, organizationally diverse, and partly autonomous, enjoying 
relative freedom from mass pressures and extra-national controls.
 
41
In applying their analysis to the East European context, the authors argue that up to the 
1980’s East European elites were characterized by ideocratic unity. Although communist elites 
have never been monolithic, they all abided by Marxist-Leninist ideology which constituted the 
 Differentiation varies from 
wide to narrow according to the degree in which elites are heterogeneous and autonomous. 
Based on the various configurations of strong or weak unity and wide or narrow differentiation, 
Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski identify four ideal types of elites, relating each of them to a 
particular type of political regime. A consensual elite, found in stable democracies, has strong 
unity and wide differentiation. An ideocratic elite, in contrast, has strong unity but narrow 
differentiation and is typical of totalitarian regimes. Unstable democracies are characterized by a 
fragmented elite of weak unity and wide differentiation. Weak unity and narrow differentiation, 
in turn, produces a divided elite most common to authoritarian regimes. 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 27. 
41 HIGLEY John, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodimierz WESOLOWSKI, “Introduction: Elite Change and 
Democratic Regimes in Eastern Europe” in John HIGLEY, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz 
WESOLOWSKI (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy In Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc., 1998, pp. 1-33, p. 27. 
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political formula. By the late 1980’s this formula became completely discredited even to the 
most zealous communists and a transformation from ideocratic to other types of elite followed. 
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic witnessed a change to consensual elites. Elite 
negotiations and transformation in these countries created favorable conditions for rapid political 
and economic change, leading to stable democratic regimes. Partly negotiated but limited regime 
liberalizations, in contrast, produced fragmented elites and unstable democratic regimes in 
Bulgaria and Slovakia. Post-communist elite configurations in Bulgaria and Slovakia, argue the 
authors, are strikingly different than those in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Pre-
emptive coups and lack of elite contestations or negotiations led to divided elites in Romania and 
Ukraine, where democratization efforts were far from successful and regimes bore more than few 
characteristics of authoritarian rule. The case of Russia poses a challenge to the authors, who are 
unable to unilaterally determine whether elite change was toward a fragmented, divided or 
consensually unified type. In their view, the implosion of the Soviet regime, followed by 
significant turnover in the political elite and a scramble for positions in nearly all elite sectors, 
has made for a bewildering combination of change and continuity in elite composition within an 
overall pattern of increased elite differentiation.42
In a study of Soviet elites, David Lane disagrees with the categorization of communist 
elites as ideologically unified (Lane 1998). According to Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski, 
 Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski conclude 
that the extent and direction of elite change from ideocratic elites during communist rule to new 
post-communist configurations are the most important determinants of democracy’s prospects in 
the region. Stable democracy, they argue, is unlikely where elite unity is weak and/or elite 
differentiation is limited. 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 25. 
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state socialist society exhibited an ideological elite with strong elite unity and narrow 
differentiation. Although the authors acknowledge that communist elites were never monolithic, 
they consider ideological unity to be their chief characteristic. This typology, argues Lane, may 
have been useful for the discussion of the system of state socialism in its formative periods, but 
by the time of Gorbachev it was no longer appropriate.43
A study comparing West European, Latin American and East European cases, equates 
some East European round-table negotiations to elite settlements (Higley & Burton 1998). 
Higley and Burton classify the round-table negotiations in Hungary and Poland as elite 
settlements, but not those in Bulgaria and Romania. Persistence of ex-communist elites in 
Bulgaria and Romania has been marked, the authors argue, and no basic accommodation with 
weak and fragmented opposition elites has occurred.
 Elite differentiation was narrow, he 
concurs, but the appearance of ideological unity was deceptive and there were major 
disagreements and ideological splits between elite constituents. Lane defines the Soviet elite as 
fragmented, arguing that the Soviet regime had higher levels of differentiation and had much 
weaker unity than is commonly acknowledged. Lane makes a valuable contribution by bringing 
to our attention the internal conflicts and splits within the communist elite, an often neglected 
aspect in the analysis of communist societies. 
44
                                                 
43 LANE David, “Elite Cohesion and Division: Transition in Gorbachev’s Russia,” in John HIGLEY, Jan 
PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz WESOLOWSKI (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern 
Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998, pp. 67-96, p. 71. 
 Unlike the Polish and Hungarian cases, 
round-table negotiations in Bulgaria and Romania did not involve as significant and 
consequential compromises on behalf of the ruling elite and did not represent negotiations on 
comparable footing. Furthermore, elite transformations in those countries did not result in 
44 HIGELY John and Michael BURTON, “Elite Settlements and the Taming of Politics,” Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 33, (Winter 1998), pp. 98-115, p. 111. 
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consensually unified elites and stable democratic regimes. Because of pronounced holdover of 
ex-communist elites and fragmented opposition elites, the round-table negotiations in Bulgaria 
and Romania may approximate elite settlements in form but not in substance.  
In another study of East European elites, Higley and Lengyel explore the link between 
elite circulation and the configurations that elites have displayed after state socialism (Higley & 
Lengyel 2000). The key aspects of elite circulation, they argue, are its scope and its mode. In 
terms of scope, circulation is narrow when only the most prominent and politically exposed 
position-holders are replaced, or wide when holders of elite positions are changed across the 
board. The scope of circulation further varies between shallow, when new members of the elite 
are drawn from deputy positions within existing political and social hierarchies, and deep, when 
they come from down or outside political and social hierarchies. The horizontal and vertical 
scope of circulation tend to co-vary, producing either wide and deep circulation or narrow and 
shallow one. The mode, in turn, refers to the speed and manner in which circulation occurs. It 
could be sudden and coerced, as in violent revolutions, or gradual and peaceful, with elites being 
replaced incrementally. Based on the various combinations of the scope and mode of circulation, 
Higley and Lengyel distinguish between four patterns. Classic circulation, which Mosca and 
Pareto consider essential for elite renewal, is wide and deep in scope and gradual and peaceful in 
its mode. Replacement circulation is similarly wide and deep in scope, but sudden and coerced in 
its mode. It usually involves ousting of the ruling elite by a violent revolution or foreign 
conquest. Reproduction circulation, in turn, is narrow and shallow in scope and gradual and 
peaceful in its mode, entailing no major change in the composition of elites. Quasi-replacement 
circulation is also narrow and shallow in scope, but sudden and coerced in its mode. It is typical 
of court coups which replace one elite clique with another, but produce no broad elite turnover. 
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Higley and Lengyel then relate the various patterns of elite circulation to the different elite 
configurations and regime forms. They argue that classic circulation results in consensual elites 
and is typical of stable democracies. Reproduction circulation, in contrast, produces fragmented 
elites and unstable democracy. Ideocratic elites, in turn, are a result of replacement circulation 
and are common to totalitarian regimes. Finally, divided elites are a product of quasi-
replacement circulation resulting in authoritarian regimes.45
The authors then proceed to apply their model to the East European context. They find 
relatively strong features of consensual elites and classic circulation in Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. Roundtable negotiations in these countries were preceded by political 
articulation of opposition elites under state socialism which gradually altered elite composition. 
The roundtable negotiations, in turn, produced broad elite consensus on democratic reforms. 
Clearly fragmented elites and reproduction circulation in Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Russia, in 
contrast, failed to achieve broad elite consensus on reform policies. Members of the former 
communist elites in these countries continued to dominate, though not monopolize, elite 
positions and postsocialist regime orders.  Divided elites, involving quasi-replacement in Serbia 
and Croatia, relied heavily on nationalist ideology to justify their ascendancy to power. The 
replacement of socialist ideology with nationalism obviated the need for accommodation with 
opposition elites and produced transitions that were neither of negotiated nor consensual type. 
  
Higley and Lengyel further examine the relation between elites and institutions. In their 
view, institutions limit elite unity or disunity, differentiation, and circulation, but elite 
configurations, in turn, influence the operation of institutions. Elites play an important role in 
                                                 
45 See fig. 1.3 in John Higley and Georgy Lengyel, “Introduction: Elite Configurations after State State 
Socialism” in John HIGLEY and Gyorgy LENGYEL, Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis, 
Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, pp. 1-21, p. 7. 
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crafting institutional designs, they argue, but particular institutional mechanisms influence the 
channels for elite competition and recruitment. Institutional designs, in their view, refer to the 
structural elements of social reproduction, such as constitutions, whereas institutional 
mechanisms are the instruments for implementing designs, such as electoral rules. Thomas 
Baylis also emphasizes the interdependence between the emergence of new political elites and 
the shaping of new political institutions in Eastern Europe (Baylis 1998). Although elites are 
paramount in shaping new institutions, he argues, institutions have an impact on elite 
composition and recruitment, favoring the rise of some groups and individuals to power over 
others.46
A somewhat similar argument is put forwarded by Milada Anna Vachudova. In a 
comparative study of East European transitions, she examines the factors contributing to a 
successful transition to democracy (Vachudova 2005). She argues that whether states embarked 
on a liberal or illiberal pattern of political change after 1989 largely depended on the quality of 
political competition, in particular on the presence of an opposition and a reforming communist 
 Wasilewski further suggests that the role of elites in institution-building is much greater 
during rapid and profound changes of political structures (Wasilewski 1998). It is only logical to 
believe, he opines, that the emerging institutions in Eastern Europe would reflect the attributes of 
their architects. Higley and Lengyel’s main argument is that despite variation in elite 
configurations in Eastern Europe, it was elites that bore the primary responsibility for shaping 
the postsocialist orders. Thus, whether communist, ideocratic elites transitioned to consensual or 
fragmented type greatly determined the nature of institutions and the regime form. 
                                                 
46 BAYLIS Thomas, “Elites, Institutions, and Political Change in East Central Europe: Germany, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia” in John HIGLEY, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz WESOLOWSKI (eds.), 
Postcommunist Elites and Democracy In Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998, pp. 
107-130, p. 109. 
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party before 1989.47
Bulgaria and Romania, in contrast, are examples of weak opposition and unreconstructed 
communist parties. Opposition in these countries was so weak that they could not wrest power 
from the communist parties in the first democratic elections. The lack of opposition, in turn, 
meant that there was no need for the Bulgarian and Romanian communist parties to formulate a 
liberal democratic reform program. Instead, they stalled domestic reforms to prevent political 
pluralism and marketization reforms from undermining their power.  
 Despite the common start to democratization, the trajectories of 
postcommunist states diverged immediately after 1989, a variation, in Vachudova’s view, due in 
part to the quality of political competition. In countries where the opposition was strong, 
communists were forced to yield power and opposition leaders wrote new rules and shaped 
institutions that helped install political and economic reform. In countries where the opposition 
was weak and divided, unreconstructed communists managed to win elections and maintain 
power, stalling democratization efforts. Furthermore, a reformed communist party helped 
establish a moderate left-wing alternative that encouraged lively competition and alternation of 
power. Alternation of different political parties in power, argues Vachudova, has a positive effect 
on the democratization process. She groups East European countries according to the nature of 
opposition to communism and the nature of the communist party. Poland and Hungary represent 
a case of strong opposition and reforming communist party. They were most successful in 
embarking on a road to liberal democracy. A strong opposition confronting the communist 
regime in these countries had prepared the ground for a dialog and reform already in the 1980s. 
Reformed communist parties in Poland and Hungary checked the power of post-1989 right-wing 
governments and assured a healthy alternation of power in the transition years.  
                                                 
47 VACHUDOVA Milada Anna, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after 
Communism, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 2-19. 
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Slovakia, with its weak opposition but reforming communist party, and the Czech 
Republic, with a strong opposition and unreconstructed communist party, pose interesting cases. 
The absence of a strong opposition in Slovakia opened the door for nationalists and opportunists 
who used Slovak independence as their core strategy to gain power. They managed to take 
complete control of all parliamentary committees and exclude opposition parties from oversight 
bodies, establishing a regime closely resembling authoritarian rule. Slovakia is an example of 
concentration of political power and illiberal political change. The case of the Czech Republic 
demonstrates the importance of political competition. The absence of a reformed communist 
party led to a sequence of right-wing governments that had too much freedom and too few 
checks on their political power. This absence of political competition resulted in major mistakes 
in reform policies and zealous devotion to neoliberal reform. Consequently, the Czech Republic 
lacked a moderate alternative to help dampen the social cost of economic reform.  
Vachudova’s main contribution is in acknowledging the role and importance of a 
reformed communist party in East European transitions. Few studies focus beyond the role of a 
counter-elite in triggering elite change and carrying out democratization efforts. Vachudova’s 
argument proves that changes initiated within the ruling elite are of no less importance both to 
the nature of elite transformation and to the outcome of the transition. Her model suggesting a 
link between political competition and liberal democracy echoes Higley and Burton’s model of a 
relationship between consensual elites and stable democratic regimes. Both models single out 
negotiation and political consensus as major factors in establishing and sustaining functioning 
democracies. They both offer a complex and dynamic understanding of elite change, expanding 
the concept beyond the elite/counter-elite dichotomy.  
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In the most recent revision of their model, Higley and Burton classify elites based on 
their structural integration and value consensus (Higley & Burton 2006). Structural integration 
refers to the “relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication and 
influence among the persons and factions making up the political elite,” whereas value consensus 
refers to “the relative agreement among all persons and factions about norms of political 
behavior and the worth of existing governmental institutions.”48 According to the degree of 
structural integration and value consensus, Higley and Burton distinguish between consensually 
united, ideologically united and disunited elites.49 In disunited elites structural integration and 
value consensus is minimal. By contrast, consensually united and ideologically united elites both 
exhibit extensive structural integration and value consensus. The difference between the two is 
that consensually united elites are interlocked in overlapping communication and influence 
networks, whereas ideologically united elites are integrated in a single communication and 
influence network. Furthermore, consensually united elites, while regularly and publicly 
opposing each other, adhere to established norms of political behavior. Ideologically united 
elites, though not impervious to internal conflict, do not express public disagreement and appear 
monolithic. Value consensus among ideologically united elites is more apparent than real, argue 
the authors, with frequent behind the scenes opposition to the official line by dissenting 
factions.50
                                                 
48 HIGLEY and BURTON, 2006, op.cit., p. 9. 
  
49 Notice that the authors have replaced the terms “unified” and “disunified,” arguing that “unified” 
implies oneness or a systematic whole and overlooks the conflicting character of elite relations in most 
countries and times. 
50 Carl Beck et al. similarly argue that when elite competition takes place among totalitarian type elites, it 
is best characterized as factionalism. Such factionalism is due to the fact that the communist party 
penetrates and envelopes all dissenting factions which could never gain full autonomy. See Carl BECK, 
James MALLOY and William CAMPBELL, A Survey of Elite Studies, Research Memorandum 65-3, 
American University, Washington, DC, March 1965, p. 23. 
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Higley and Burton stress upon two very important points. In the first place, they 
recognize that elites in liberal democracies interact through complex formal and informal 
networks spreading across sectors (government, business, trade unions, media, etc.). Second, the 
authors acknowledge that “monolithic” communist elites are often subject to intense internal 
conflict.51 Placing consensually united and ideologically united elites in the same category of 
extensive structural integration and value consensus, however, raises some doubts about the 
construct validity of the model.  Although explaining the differences between the two elite types, 
the authors fail to address why similar values of the independent variables can produce such 
categorically different results. It appears a third variable should be sought to explain the 
covariance in their model.52
Higley and Burton proceed to identify four regime types based upon two variables – 
representation and stability. Consensually united elites, in their view, contribute to the 
emergence of stable representative regimes, such as liberal democracies and liberal oligarchies. 
Ideologically united elites, in turn, are found in stable unrepresentative regimes, namely 
totalitarian regimes, theocracies and ethnocracies. Disunited elites, in contrast, are typical of 
  
                                                 
51 An argument made as early as 1966 by Gordon Skilling. See, Gordon SKILLING, “Interest Groups and 
Communist Polities,” World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, (Apr., 1966), pp. 435-451. 
52 In an early review of elite studies, for example, Carl Beck et al. classify elites based on three variables – 
elite structure, elite etiquette (elite-elite and elite-constituency behavioral patterns), and techniques of 
control. The constitutional democratic type is described as divided and highly permeable in terms of elite 
structure; in terms of etiquette it is characterized by open competition and non-violent conflict; and it 
exercises control through checks and balances, i.e. its legitimacy is based on meeting of demands 
articulated and pressed by organizations representing sectors of the society. The totalitarian type, by 
contrast, is highly united and basically impermeable in terms of structure; internal conflict takes the form 
of behind the scenes factionalism with no formal mechanism for regulating it; techniques of control take 
the shape of periodic purges through which conflicts are resolved, as well as systemic terror and mass 
manipulation through secret police organizations, control and manipulation of mass media. The 
authoritarian type is divided but highly impermeable with clear distinction between elite and non-elite 
based on class or caste; it is characterized by strong and frequent intra-elite conflict erupting in violence 
and/or coups d’état; its goal is not mobilization but preservation of the status quo, therefore its 
techniques of control are deference and repression. The last category is labeled “non-crystallized 
societies,” where the authors place most developing countries which, as they argue, could move towards 
one or another form of elite type. See Carl BECK et al., op.cit. 
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unstable regimes both representative (illiberal democracies) and unrepresentative (monarchial, 
authoritarian, sultanistic, post-totalitarian, theocratic, ethnocratic).53
According to this latest study, elite settlements that resulted in transformation from 
ideologically united to consensually united elites operating in stable representative regimes 
occurred only in Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
ideologically united elites transformed to disunited, with subsequent gradual convergence to 
consensually united elites. All other countries that emerged from Soviet domination or directly 
from the Soviet and Yugoslav disintegrations, argue the authors, exhibit disunited elites and 
unstable democracies. Although in this latest elaboration of the model, we observe some 
differences in the classification of Russia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Higley and Burton, 
continue to describe Bulgaria and Romania as cases of disunited elites and unstable regimes. The 
election of the exiled Bulgarian king, Simeon II, to prime minister in 2001
 Transition from disunited to 
consensually united elites could occur through elite settlements or elite convergences (already 
discussed above). Transformations from disunited to ideologically united elites occur either 
through the imposition of an ideologically united elite by a conquering country (Eastern Europe 
after World War II) or by a revolution (Chinese Communist revolution, Cuban revolution). With 
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, a third type of transformation was observed.  
54 and the ability of his 
party to oust the main elite camps, argue the authors, suggests that elite convergence in Bulgaria 
has not taken place.55
                                                 
53 HIGLEY and BURTON, 2006, op.cit., p. 19. 
 In their view, the vulnerability of the main elite camps to an outside force 
like Simeon and the sudden change in the configuration of political forces are both a symptom of 
divided elites and an unstable regime. 
54 For a brief account of Simeon’s party and its coming to power see, BARANY Zoltan, “Bulgaria’s Royal 
Elections,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, (April 2002), pp. 141-155. 
55 HIGLEY and BURTON, 2006, op.cit., p. 172. 
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Higley and Burton’s model and its further elaborations offer an elite-centered approach to 
the study of transitioning societies. According to them, democratic transitions and breakdowns 
can be best understood by studying basic continuities and changes in internal relations of 
national elites (Higley and Burton 1989). This approach has been criticized for placing too much 
emphasis on the elite factor. The claim that fundamental explanations for global patterns of 
political stability and the emergence of preconditions for democracy are themselves political 
rather than social, economic, cultural, or structural, argues Cammack, is questionable to say the 
least.56
Cammack’s critique falls within the familiar transitologists-structuralists debate on the 
role of elites in transitions to democracy (See Chapter One, pp 3-5). Following the structuralist 
argument, Cammack focuses on the social embeddedness of transition processes and the 
importance of the wider social, economic, and cultural context. But Higley and Burton do not 
 In his view, Higley and Burton fail to establish the priority of political explanations over 
social structural explanations and they fail to develop a theory with wide explanatory power. 
Elite settlements, he posits, appear to come at the end of a larger process, rather than being its 
point of origin. They seem to be more than a deliberate reorganization of elite interaction, but 
also a result of particular political, economic, and social configurations. Higley and Burton 
further argue that disunified elites tend to persist regardless of socioeconomic conditions. They 
define elite settlements as events which transform a disunified elite into a consensually unified, 
but struggle to explain how consensual unity is maintained and the tendency for disunity 
overcome. The emphasis on elite settlements, Cammack argues, turns out to be empirically 
ungrounded regarding the originating event, and theoretically deficient regarding the 
mechanisms by which stability is sustained over time. 
                                                 
56 CAMMACK Paul, “A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm,” American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 55, No. 3, (Jun., 1990), pp. 415-420, p. 415. 
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claim exclusiveness of the elite factor. Without viewing elite change as the sole or primary 
explanatory variable, elite theory examines the role of the elite in state transitions and 
breakdowns. Higley and Burton’s model, in particular, attempts to determine what type of elite is 
most favorable for the emergence of stable democracy. Their approach, however, remains strictly 
within the limits of elite theory. Although the authors make an important contribution to the 
study of democratization, they do not aspire nor claim to exhaust all the factors in 
democratization processes. Criticizing elite theorists for placing too much emphasis on the elite, 
then, misinterprets what they set out to do in the first place. The intent of elite theorists studying 
transitioning societies has been and continues to be the focus on one particular aspect of state 
transitions, namely elite change, without declaring its primacy over other factors. 
The review of the various theoretical approaches applied to the study of East European 
elites reveals a pronounced preoccupation with the link between elite change and transition 
outcome. Underlying assumption of both comparative and country studies is the correlation 
between elite change, elite composition, and mode of recruitment to the elite and each country’s 
performance in democratization efforts. Several factors, in terms of the nature of elite 
transformation, have been emphasized as contributing to a successful transition to a stable 
democracy. In the first place is the presence of an organized opposition or counter-elite which 
manages to wrest power from communist elites and win the first democratic elections. Second is 
a reformed communist party offering a left alternative to neo-liberal policies with high social 
cost and contributing to the appropriate proportion of elite circulation and reproduction.  
Negotiation and consensus on reform policies between communist elites and the opposition elites 
has also been singled out as particularly important in assuring peaceful transition and alternation 
of power as dictated by election results. 
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Review of the literature has further strongly affirmed that change of rules alone is not 
sufficient for successful transition to democracy unless there is also some change of players. 
Romania and Bulgaria are often referred to in that regard as countries where changes in the 
structure of the political system have not been accompanied by change in the composition of the 
elite and democratization efforts have consequently been slow and frequently obstructed. 
Hungary and Poland, by contrast, are quoted as models of successful transition from communism 
as they exhibited a well-formed counter-elite, a reformed communist party, negotiations and 
consensus between elite groups on reform policies achieved through round-table negotiations, all 
of which contributing to a smooth transition to democratic politics and market economy. 
Analysis of the literature further suggests that the elite variable can be treated both as an 
outcome and a cause. Elite change is contingent upon a number of factors including, the 
presence/absence of a counter-elite, a reformed/non-reformed communist party, the degree of 
consensus and negotiation between various elite groups, the nature of intra-elite conflict and the 
different mechanisms for resolving it, the structure of government institutions within which the 
political elite operates, as well as other broader characteristics such as the level of socio-
economic development. But elite change significantly affects the outcome of state transitions. In 
other words, we treat the elite variable as a dependent variable when examining the nature of 
elite transformation and as an independent or causative variable when inquiring about the 
consequences of elite transformation. Elite transformations follow various patterns and are 
dependent upon a number of factors. It is the consequences of elite change, however, that render 
the elite variable important and worthwhile studying. This is especially true when analyzing 
societies in transition, where elites are responsible for molding political and economic systems. 
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2.3 STUDIES OF BULGARIAN ELITES 
Though East European transitions have been subject to extensive analysis from various 
disciplines, Bulgaria still remains a largely understudied case. The study of Bulgarian elites has 
particularly suffered from academic neglect. As Stephan Nikolov argues, the absence of any 
detailed analysis of how Bulgaria’s communist elites evolved is perhaps due to the repeated 
characterization of communist Bulgaria as “Moscow’s closest ally,” as if nothing more needed to 
be said.57
A brief but unique analysis of the transformation of the Bulgarian elite is offered by 
Nikolov in Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski’s edited collection (Nikolov 1998). In his view, 
elite transformation in Bulgaria led to what he terms a “quasi-elite.” At the end of communist 
rule, Nikolov argues, Bulgaria lacked even the embryos of alternative cadres that could replace 
the communist elite. There are several reasons why there was no basis for a new elite to form in 
Bulgaria. In the first place, there was no power structure other than the communist nomenklatura 
 While there is an abundance of studies on Polish, Russian or Romanian elites, studies 
of Bulgarian elites are limited to a few books and chapters in edited collections. Except for some 
studies of economic elites (Kostova 1996, 2000, 2003), such works are mostly analytical and do 
not rely on empirical data (Minev and Kabakchieva 1996, Nikolov 1998, Pachkova 2003). 
Furthermore, unlike Bulgarian ethnography, musicology, linguistics or history, which have 
enjoyed popularity among scholars throughout the world, the study of Bulgarian elites has failed 
to attract attention from Western scholars beyond cursory accounts in a few comparative studies. 
Thus, the works reviewed here are exclusively by Bulgarian scholars. 
                                                 
57 NIKOLOV Stephan, “Bulgaria: A Quasi-Elite” in John HIGLEY, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz 
WESOLOWSKI (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy In Eastern Europe, New York, NY, St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998, pp. 213-225, p. 213. 
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that could serve as a breeding ground for potential elites. Such an alternative structure was the 
Catholic Church in Poland, for example, which could shelter opponents to the regime. Second, in 
comparison to other East European countries, Bulgaria was in extreme isolation from the West. 
Western influence and support never reached Bulgarian dissidents to the extent they did Soviet, 
Czechoslovak or Yugoslav opposition figures. Third, small and dispersed Bulgarian immigrant 
communities had little interest and resources to support dissident activity in or outside of the 
country. By contrast, Russian and Polish immigrant communities were heavily involved in 
organizing and subsidizing samizdat publications and raising awareness in the West. Due to this 
combination of factors, Nikolov contends, there was no possibility for a new elite to emerge in 
Bulgaria, except from within the all-embracing nomenklatura itself.58
An additional problem in Bulgaria was the lack of significant evolution of the 
nomenklatura. The events of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and 1980s in Poland 
produced major changes in the composition of the nomenklatura in these countries. By contrast, 
as late as 1989, nomenklatura members in Bulgaria were still recruited from the same dogmatic 
families which established communist power in the late 1940s. In Nikolov’s estimate, there were 
some 1,000 to 2,000 families around the country that were bound together through common 
political backgrounds and kinship, who formed the higher levels of the nomenklatura. Thus, not 
only were postcommunist elites recruited from the former nomenklatura, but the nomenklatura 
itself experienced little change in terms of aggregate social characteristics in its over 40-year-
long existence. 
  
Most former members of the nomenklatura remained in elite positions after the collapse 
of communism. In exchange for a peaceful regime transition, argues Nikolov, they received 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 217. 
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guarantees that their political capital would be converted into economic capital in relatively 
trouble-free fashion. Being strategically positioned at the time of the regime’s collapse and 
having access to important assets and networks that replaced defunct organizational connections, 
former nomenklatura members were able to successfully compete for top positions in the 
postcommunist order. For that reason, in Nikolov’s view, the majority of the nouveaux riches in 
Bulgaria come not from the ranks of the old economic elite but from the ranks of the Komsomol 
and the secret police.59
Nikolov’s analysis resonates with a number of studies reviewed above, all of which 
emphasizing the importance of a counter-elite and a reformed communist elite. Though not 
relying on original data, Nikolov’s contribution is valuable in stressing that transformation of the 
elite is by definition an ongoing process that becomes more volatile and unpredictable during 
periods of transition. Nikolov concludes that new patterns of elite change and elite recruitment 
have not yet settled in post-communist Bulgaria. 
 Postcommunist elite configuration in Bulgaria, according to Nikolov, can 
be described as no longer nomenklatura but not yet a national elite typical of democratic political 
systems, i.e. a quasi-elite. This quasi-elite is characterized by a lack of stability in its 
composition and frequent turnover in very top positions. 
Minev and Kabakchieva advance an approach to the study of elite transformation in 
Bulgaria that draws on elite theory, class theory, world systems theory, and theories of social 
stratification (Minev & Kabakchieva 1996). The authors combine elite and class concepts and 
treat elite change in relation to the process of modernization. They argue that the elite carries the 
characteristics of a class and is similarly influenced by changes in the relations of production. 
Attempts to bring together elite and class theory have been made by many scholars (Etzioni-
                                                 
59 Ibid., p. 222. 
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Halevy 1998, Higley, Hoffman-Lange, Kadushin & Moore 1991; Lazic 2000). Minev and 
Kabakchieva further bring Wallerstein’s world systems theory into the mix, arguing that the 
transformation of national elites is affected by global economic relations.  
Minev and Kabakchieva’s main argument is that the transition represents a process of re-
concentration of political and economic power. In their view, the events of 1989 do not mark the 
beginning of a transition to market economy and democratization, as such was already underway 
since the early 1980s. The changes between 1989 and 1994, then, represent measures for 
reinstating the eroding power of the communist elite and for reestablishing the economic power 
that was lost in the period of industrial development.60
Minev and Kabakchieva then proceed to offer an analysis of the transition based on world 
systems theory. By the 1980s, they argue, increasing economic relations between socialist and 
Western countries started to break the ideological borders dividing Europe and these borders 
started to erode. The economic integration and convergence of interests of the elites to the East 
and the West required rejection of the socialist order and its replacement with another type of 
order that would allow economic integration of Eastern and Western Europe. Such integration, of 
course, required “liberalization and transition to market economy and democracy.”
 The so called “transition”, the authors 
posit, is in fact a process of re-concentration of economic and political power and is only an 
interruption of the ongoing development in order for the elite to restore its position of power.  
61
                                                 
60 MINEV Duhomir and Petya KABAKCHIEVA, Transition – Elites and Strategies, Sofia, St. Kliment 
Ohridski University Press, 1996 (in Bulgarian), pp. 15-16, p. 65. 
 Following 
this argument, the authors view the transition as an integration of national elites into the global 
economy whereby economic power flows from national political elites to global economic elites. 
The elite’s attempts to incorporate the country into the global economic system, in turn, led to 
61 Ibid., p. 140. 
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destratification of large parts of the Bulgarian population, destratification in the authors’ terms 
meaning unemployment and poverty.  
Minev and Kabakchieva’s approach is rather confusing and suffers from numerous 
inconsistencies, circular arguments, and theoretical redundancy. The authors view the transition 
as deliberate strategy on behalf of the communist elite to reestablish its political and economic 
power, but fail to spell out the process by which elite power was diminished in the first place. 
They attribute the erosion of elite power to the industrial development, while simultaneously 
arguing that the industrialization policies carried out during communism necessitated 
overconcentration of political power. Minev and Kabakchieva further contend that during the 
transition the elite gave up its political power in return for an opportunity to completely and 
openly concentrate its economic power. At the same, the authors posit that the elite had complete 
control of economic resources both before and after the changes and the transition entailed no 
redistribution, since there was no change of ownership of economic resources. With the return of 
the reformed communist party to power in the mid 1990s, the authors argue, the former 
communist elite formally assumed political power, since the transition itself was a restoration of 
its economic and ideological power.62
There are a number of additional unclear aspects in Minev and Kabakchieva’s approach, 
such as their distinction between authentic and pseudo-elite and their concern with “natural” 
changes in the elite. The authors define an authentic elite as one that could be labeled national, 
not only because of its ethnic characteristics, but because of its tendency to combine its group 
interest with the national interest or to look for strategies of achieving its group interest that are 
not in conflict with the national interest. The pseudo-elite, in contrast, often adopts decisions that 
  
                                                 
62 Ibid., p. 90. The term “ideological power” is used here, but is not mentioned or discussed anywhere else 
in the text. It remains unclear what the authors mean by “ideological power.” 
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are against the national interest.63 Minev and Kabakchieva fail to elaborate on their notion of 
national elite and national interest or to explain how to determine whether a certain elite action 
goes against or in accordance with the national interest. They argue that whether a country 
exhibits authentic or pseudo-elite is a function of its size and its role in the world economy. 
Small nations, in their view, are much more prone to suffer from lack of democracy and pseudo-
elites than large nations.64 The authors contend that the Bulgarian postcommunist elite is a 
pseudo-elite. In their view, changes of the elite during the transition were not “natural,” that is, 
they did not reflect the “tendencies of the developments taking place before the actual change of 
power.”65 By “natural” Minev and Kabakchieva understand changes in the composition of the 
elite that entail inclusion of groups in the elite that were previously excluded.66
If there is any value in Minev and Kabakchieva’s study, it is in their account of the intra-
elite conflict of the late 1980s. The dividing line within the communist elite, they argue, was 
between reformers and hard-liners. Part of the communist party elite, especially younger 
 The change of 
power in Bulgaria was unfavorable, because the groups formed through the social restructuring 
had not acquired group identity and had no experience in contesting the power of the elite. The 
new group which entered economic and political structures was “not singled out by the process 
of development,” but was selected by the old elite, i.e. the transformation of the elite was 
“unnatural.” Consequently, the change was not towards a polyarchical elite, but towards an 
oligarchical, conclude Minev and Kabkachieva,  
                                                 
63 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
64 Minev and Kabakchieva do not elaborate on this argument and fail to explain why, opposite to their 
prediction, a large nation such as Russia suffers from lack of democracy, while a small nation like Estonia 
does not. 
65 Ibid., p. 92. 
66 The authors label changes in the Bulgarian elite “unnatural” despite the fact that in the process groups 
who were previously excluded from the elite (such as ethnic Turks and non-communists) gained access to 
elite positions. Thus, Minev and Kabakchieva contradict their own definition of “natural” and “unnatural” 
elite change. 
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members and those connected to domestic economic and international networks, clearly 
recognized that the system cannot be reformed since all reform options have been exhausted. 
What was needed instead was a transformation which translates into economic openness to the 
West and adoption of market mechanisms. Reformers in the party were supported by managers 
of state enterprises and secret service employees who, because of their access to large national 
economic resources, had strong interest in a transition towards market economy, which they 
viewed as more personally beneficial than stimulation of the national market economy. The 
advocates of reform were opposed by another group consisting of older party members, strictly 
upholding communist ideology, who insisted on reformation within the communist ideological 
framework rather than transformation. While the reformers were building a powerful 
international economic network, proponents of the status quo were engaging various groups in 
ideological battles in a hope to restore the lost unity of the party through instruments of terror. 
The former clearly prevailed and entrusted secret service employees, who had an enormous 
potential to exercise influence over their environment, with the burden of re-concentrating 
economic power. Thus, Minev and Kabkachieva posit, secret service employees became the 
recruiting ground for the “new” political elites.67
Minev and Kabakchieva’s analysis lacks methodological consistency. On the one hand, 
the authors treat elite action as decisive in directing political, economic and social changes. One 
the other hand, they adopt a Marxist approach in regarding politics as the outgrowth of 
economics and treating elite change as a function of domestic and global economic processes. 
Their ambitious attempt to combine numerous theories renders the argument unclear and weakly 
substantiated. A second major problem with Minev and Kabkachieva’s study is their weak 
 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 106. For a discussion on the secret service see Chapter 7. 
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empirical grounding.68
In her study of the Bulgarian postcommunist elite, Pachkova applies a classic Marxist 
approach (Pachkova 2003). She treats the transition as a third stage of capitalism in Bulgaria, the 
first being early capitalism after WWI and the second being socialism, which she defines as state 
capitalism. She further argues that there is no revolutionary change of the ruling class in the 
Bulgarian transition, but transformation of the nomenklatura bourgeois class from nomenklatura 
capitalists into independent proclaimed capitalists. In other words, the transformation was from a 
class that informally inherited property into a class that formally inherits it – a transformation 
from nomenklatura capitalism into real capitalism, of nomenklatura bourgeoisie into real 
bourgeoisie.
 Although they offer an extensive literature review of the discussed 
theories, their conclusions are not derived from original data. Minev and Kabkachieva deserve 
credit for their attempt to depart from Marxist theory, which for long dominated social science in 
Bulgaria, and apply a more elite-oriented approach to the study of elites. Considering that the 
study of elites has attracted the attention of the Bulgarian academic community only in the last 
two decades and that most analyses utilize a class approach, Minev and Kabkachieva’s 
contribution should not be completely discarded. 
69
                                                 
68 Minev and Kabakchieva use the results of an earlier content analysis comparing the political platforms 
of the Socialist and Democratic parties. According to them, these findings demonstrate that neither the 
Socialist not the Democratic parties were concerned with the national interest and therefore, were 
examples of pseudo-elites. See MINEV and KABACHKIEVA, op.cit., pp. 114-133. 
 The transformation was initiated by the nomenklatura. Facing the threat of losing 
its power resources, the nomenklatura had greater interest in change than any other part of 
society. The reformers from the old elite chose democratization only after they were convinced 
that they had the necessary power resources for competing and winning in the new political 
69 PACHKOVA Petya, Елитът на Прехода, София, ИК М8М издателство, 2003, p. 229. Pachkova 
invents the term “nomenklatura bourgeoisie”, which she considers to be self-explanatory. 
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context. Dissident movements and civil protests, Pachkova argues, would have been prevented, 
even drowned in blood, if the nomenklatura was not ready for transformation.70
Echoing Minev and Kabkachieva’s analysis, Pachkova affirms that the logic of the 
transition was re-concentration of the economic power, not transformation of the political power 
into economic, since the elite never gave up its monopoly over political power. The main 
differences and struggles among the elite, in her view, concerned the distribution of economic 
and political power, not the manner in which to acquire it. Although acknowledging the intra-
elite conflict, Pachkova disagrees with Higley’s characterization of the Bulgarian elite as 
fragmented. On the contrary, she argues, the elite was rather united during the transition. This is 
especially true of the economic elite whose main goal was to circumvent public control over 
economic processes. The political elite provided great support for the economic elite – legislative 
power provided the necessary laws, executive power assured inaction on behalf of the state, and 
judicial power guaranteed evasion of prosecution.
 
71
According to Pachkova, there is both change and continuity in the process of formation 
of the postcommunist elite. The economic elite was recruited mainly from the former 
nomenklatura and the children of former nomenklatura members. Other sources of economic 
elites were people with restitution capital and people from the grey economy. The sources for 
recruitment of the political elite, on the other hand, were the party nomenklatura, the security 
services, intellectuals, and immigrants. Change and continuity was also the mark of the system 
transformation in Pachkova’s view. The transformation was from one type of market economy to 
 Political pluralism, she posits, was used as a 
façade to mask elite unity. 
                                                 
70 Ibid., p. 230. 
71 Ibid., p. 267. 
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another, whereby the bulk of state property was transformed into a collection of private 
properties. 
In comparing Bulgaria with other East European countries, Pachkova argues that the 
similarities in the processes exceed the differences. The strategy of the elites was similar in all 
countries and it consisted in directing the transition process in a way that would affirm their 
privileged status and grant them greater influence over societal processes. The difference, in her 
view, is that some elites enriched themselves at a lower economic and social cost to their 
societies, whereas others led their countries into catastrophes in order to acquire what they 
desired. The global economic system and international organizations particularly contributed to 
the crash of the Bulgarian economy, thereby increasing the transition cost.72
Pachkova’s study provides a detailed summary of Bulgarian scholarship on the transition. 
Her contribution to the study of Bulgarian elites, however, remains doubtful. Her reprise on 
Marxist theory focuses mainly on economic processes and offers no original conceptualization of 
elite change in Bulgaria. More importantly, the analysis is not grounded in empirical data and 
rests upon literature review limited to Bulgarian scholarship. The author frequently drifts away 
from her argument into lengthy reflections, normative statements, and personal, overtly biased 
opinions,
 
73
With her studies on postcommunist economic elites in Bulgaria, Kostova makes a major 
contribution both to comparative studies of East European elites and the study of Bulgarian elites 
(Kostova 1996, 2000, 2003). Her work focuses on examining the social composition, values and 
 all of which put unto question the academic rigor of her study. 
                                                 
72 Pachkova does not elaborate on this argument. 
73 This criticism is based on Popivanov’s review of the book, who similarly questions the academic value of 
Pachkova’s analysis and her ability to express an unbiased opinion. See, Boris POPIVANOV, „По пътя 
към елитите,” Култура, Брой 36, 01 октомври 2004 г. 
  54 
attitudes, policy orientation and identity of postcommunist economic elites. Although not 
offering a new theoretical framework, Kostova’s analysis is extremely valuable in presenting 
large empirical data. Studying economic elites poses a particular challenge in the Bulgarian case. 
The transition period proved disastrous in terms of maintaining public registers of private and 
state firms. As obtaining empirical data on economic elites was extremely difficult in the early 
1990s, scholars either turned to other fields of study or at best produced analyses that were not 
empirically grounded. Kostova has put great effort in gathering her empirical data which not 
only benefits her analysis but provides the ground for future research in the field. 
The questions Kostova addresses are: to what extent have actors holding top economic 
positions changed during the transition period? Have social origins become more or less 
important? Has professional expertise played a larger role in elite careers? She argues that the 
1990s were a period of significant change in the Bulgarian economic elite in terms of aggregate 
social characteristics and elite turnover. The elite became more heterogeneous in its composition, 
generally younger, and unbound politically (Kostova 2000). Patterns of elite recruitment 
displayed continuity and some discontinuity with elite configuration under state socialism, yet, 
newcomers accounted for up to 60% in the mid 1990s (Kostova 1996).74
                                                 
74 In a comparative study of Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish business elites, Rona-Tas and Borocz 
argue that despite important differences among the four countries, the recruitment of the new business 
elites followed a surprisingly uniform pattern. Continuities with the presocialist past, they posit, were 
evident everywhere and people whose grandparents were successful businessmen were more likely to 
pursue a business career. See Akos RONA-TAS and Jozsef BOROCZ, “Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland: Presocialist and Socialist Legacies among Business Elites” in John HIGLEY and 
Gyorgy LENGYEL, Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis, Oxford, Rowman &Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2000, pp. 209- 227, p. 223. 
 Significant 
differentiation of economic and political elites occurred. Political and economic elites became 
more clearly separated from each other, yet interdependent, displaying a rough parity in power 
and influence (Kostova 2003).  
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A significant finding Kostova reports is that within the economic elite party affiliation, as 
measured by party membership, has greatly decreased in importance. Under state socialism, she 
argues, political loyalty and Communist Party ties were given priority over wealth and other 
economic and social attributes in selecting elites. The virtual disappearance of members of the 
Communist (later Socialist) party from the economic elite during the 1990s resulted from two 
developments. The first was the party’s declining influence and overall social control. The 
second was a spreading recognition among elite persons that membership in the Socialist or 
some other party did not provide much protection for economic activities.  
Kostova concludes that changes in politics and political institutions were rapid and 
fundamental, however, the economic system changed more slowly. Dismantling of the old 
socialist economy was limited which, according to her, is to a large degree due to the makeup 
and actions of the economic elite. During the 1990s old and new elites merged, and in doing so, 
she argues, they truncated the transition from state socialism.  
The review of Bulgarian scholarship reveals several recurring theses. In the first place, 
Bulgarian scholars unanimously agree that the former nomenklatura preserved its position of 
power during the transition and became the main pool of recruitment of post-communist elites 
(Minev & Kabakchieva 1996, Nikolov 1998, Pachkova 2003). While some authors argue for a 
grand design intended to preserve the power of the former nomenklatura (Minev & Kabakchieva 
1996, Pachkova 2003), others view the nomenklatura simply as being in an advantageous 
position allowing its members to act quickly when presented with an opportune moment 
(Nikolov 1998). A major focus of the reviewed works is the conversion of power thesis. While 
Nikolov argues that the former nomenklatura converted its political capital into economic, 
Pachkova posits the nomenklatura concentrated economic power in addition to the political 
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power it already held. There is a firm agreement among scholars, however, that the former 
nomenklatura acquired economic power and became the new class of capitalists and nouveaux 
riches. The reviewed authors further agree that the secret services took active part in the 
transition and became, next to the nomenklatura, the recruiting ground for postcommunist elites. 
There is a difference of opinion as to the structure of post-communist elites. Pachkova argues 
that those remained united during the transition, making concerted efforts to concentrate political 
and economic power. Nikolov, in turn, views post-communist elites as unstable in terms of 
composition, with frequent turnover in top positions. Minev and Kabakchieva see the 
composition of the elite as more predictable with the old elite controlling the recruitment of the 
new elite. Kostova posits the old and the new elites merged, which slowed the transition 
processes.  
Overall, Bulgarian scholars see little change in the elite and argue that although the rules 
of the game have changed with the fall of the communist regime, there has been no significant 
change of players. However correct such conclusions may be, they are not empirically grounded 
and have not been tested against original data. The first task in a study of Bulgarian elites, then, 
is to gather original data so that these and other assumptions could be tested. Another gap in the 
studies of Bulgarian elites is the lack of rigorous theoretical framework. As noted above, the 
Marxist-based models of Minev and Kabakchieva as well as Pachkova suffer from theoretical 
redundancy and inconsistency. Consequently, they do not forward a theory that allows for 
empirical testing. The review of the literature demonstrates that there are several theoretical 
approaches that have been applied to the study of East European elites and have produced an 
impressive empirically-grounded body of knowledge. Although some aspects of these 
approaches are criticized below, such as the circulation vs. reproduction framework for example, 
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applying them to the Bulgarian context would yield invaluable data on the process of elite 
change in Bulgaria. Thus, the study of Bulgarian elites in the period of transition would greatly 
benefit from an empirically-tested theoretical model. 
This study aspires to fill gaps in the literature and offer an analysis of elite change in 
Bulgaria based on large and varied empirical data. Its goal is to go beyond applying the already 
existing theoretical frameworks and formulate a modified model of elite change. The study uses 
the various theoretical approaches as a starting point and further brings in classical elite theory to 
which we turn next. 
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3.0  THEORIZING ELITE TRANSFORMATION: REVISITING MOSCA AND 
PARETO 
East European transitions have been the subject of a large body of literature on elites. 
Theorizations on East European elites have been dominated by the circulation vs. reproduction 
approach – reproduction suggesting no significant change in the social composition of the elite, 
circulation implying changes both in the composition and mode of recruitment of the elite (see 
Chapter Two, pp. 16-27). The circulation vs. reproduction approach offers a useful framework 
and a valuable first step in conceptualizing post-communist elite transformations that could 
nevertheless benefit from further elaboration. The concept of circulation and reproduction 
originates with classical elite theory. The circulation vs. reproduction approach, however, makes 
no reference to the classical elite theorists and utilizes their concepts in a manner divorced from 
the original theoretical framework. East European elite theorists are not the only ones guilty of 
overlooking the classical texts. As Robert Nye argued in 1977, contemporary research on elites 
suffers from ignorance of and misinterpretation of the classical elite theorists: 
Some of the operating presumptions of prime importance to the ‘founders’ have been 
ignored or trivialized, with two results: first, recent historical accounts have reached 
incorrect or imprecise interpretations of the meaning of the “classic” texts, and secondly, 
by overlooking the often clearly stated assumptions of the ‘minor patriarchs’ [Pareto, 
Mosca, and Michels], democratic elitists have incorporated, willy-nilly, these 
assumptions into the structure of recent theory where they continue to serve necessary, if 
unacknowledged, roles.75
                                                 
75 NYE Robert, The Anti-Democratic Sources of Elite Theory: Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Contemporary 
Political Sociology Series, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1977, p. 1. 
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The dominant approach in the study of East European elites has similarly borrowed concepts and 
assumptions from the classical texts, without acknowledging their complexity and theoretical 
richness, thus producing an oversimplified account of elite transformation in Eastern Europe that 
neglects a number of important factors. Echoing Nye, I argue that classical elite theory offers 
sound theoretical grounding that could be successfully applied to the study of post-communist 
elites. In my view, the shortcomings of the circulation vs. reproduction approach could be 
addressed by accurately incorporating concepts from the classical texts. The circulation vs. 
reproduction approach represents a respectable attempt to systemize the process of elite change 
in Eastern Europe. This approach has sparked the curiosity of many scholars who have produced 
numerous studies of East European elites and have accumulated an unprecedented amount of 
empirical data. The zeal for empirical grounding, however, has often been accompanied by a 
lack of theoretical rigor. Turning to classical elite theory would provide the necessary theoretical 
foundation and anchor the empirical data. Three decades ago Zuckerman forwarded a similar 
argument. The literature on elites, he contended, “is characterized by conceptual confusion and 
research divorced from theoretical questions, particularly and most significantly from those of 
Mosca and Pareto…[W]hat is required is a return to a mode of analysis exemplified by Mosca 
and Pareto in which political elite finds its meaning within a theoretical system and is put to 
work in the analysis of specific research problems.”76
                                                 
76 ZUCKERMAN Alan, “The Concept ‘Political Elite’: Lessons from Mosca and Pareto,” The Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, (May, 1977), pp. 324-344, p. 325. 
 Following Zuckerman’s lead, I attempt to 
reconcile the discrepancy between theory and empiria and place classical elite theory at the base 
of empirical research. In this chapter, I review key concepts developed by the founders of elite 
theory, Mosca and Pareto, and criticize the way in which such concepts have been utilized in the 
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study of East European elites.  Building on the classical theorists, I propose a dynamic model of 
elite transformation that may prove useful for the study of post-communist elites. 
3.1 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
The circulation vs. reproduction approach characterizes elite change in Eastern Europe as either 
circulation or reproduction. A major problem with such characterization is its dichotomous 
nature implying mutually exclusive processes. Although empirical studies demonstrate that one 
is unlikely to find circulation or reproduction in a pure form but rather elements of both, scholars 
come short of treating the two concepts as ideal-types whose primary function is analytical. 
Instead, they continue to view circulation and reproduction in an either-or fashion and fuse them 
with empirical categories. Consequently, authors speak of “circulation in the political elite and 
reproduction in the economic elite” (Szelenyi, Szelenyi & Kovach 1995) or “significant amounts 
of elite circulation in Poland and Hungary, and overwhelming reproduction in Russia” (Fodor, 
Wnuk-Lipinski & Yershova 1995). Few attempts have been made to examine the interplay 
between the two processes and explore the possibility that they may be occurring simultaneously. 
Empirical results indicating, for example, that “[i]n postcommunist Poland, elites are formed 
both ways,”77
                                                 
77 WASILEWSKI Jacek and Edmund WNUK-LIPINSKI, “Poland: Winding Road from the Communist to 
the Post-Solidarity Elite,” Theory and Society, Special Issue on Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites 
during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 24, No. 5, (Oct., 1995), pp. 669-696, p. 
625. 
 have forced Szelenyi and Szelenyi to admit that their “two stories (reproduction in 
terms of outflow rates and circulation in terms of inflow rates) do not necessarily contradict one 
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another.”78
Classical and contemporary elite theorists alike have argued that change and continuity 
are inextricable elements of elite transformation which occur simultaneously. According to 
Pareto, “[t]he governing elite is always in a state of slow and continuous transformation. It flows 
like a river, never being today what it was yesterday. From time to time sudden and violent 
disturbances occur…. Afterwards, the new governing elite resumes its slow transformation.”
  Consequently, the authors have posited that the distinction between circulation and 
reproduction is a relative one, but have failed to elaborate on the analytical implications of such 
conclusion.  
79 
Mosca similarly contends that, “[o]ne can almost always observe that a slow and gradual renewal 
of the ruling class is going on through infiltration into the higher strata of society of elements 
emerging from the lower.”80 Michels in turn argues that the ruling class is subject to frequent and 
partial renewal.81
On the other hand, an elite is almost never completely replaced. Certain degree of 
continuity in the elite is always observable. This is true of political parties as it is true of states, 
argues Michels, and applies no less in time of peace than in time of war.
 Change in the elite is underway at all times. Even in the absence of critical 
junctures such as a revolution, a coup or an election, the elite is undergoing constant and gradual 
transformation.  
82
                                                 
78 SZELENYI Ivan and Szonja SZELENYI, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the 
Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe: Introduction,” Theory and Society, Special Issue on 
Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 
24, No. 5, (Oct., 1995), pp. 620-621, p. 690. 
 Continuity is present 
even in cases of violent and abrupt changes in the elite such as those caused by a revolution or a 
79 PARETO Vilfredo, Mind and Society: A Treatise of General Sociology, ed. A. Livingston, New York, NY, 
Harcourt, 1935, sec. 2056. 
80 MOSCA Gaetano, The Ruling Class, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939, p. 414. 
81 MICHELS Robert, Political Parties: A sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, New York, NY, Dover Publications, Inc., 1959, p. 390. 
82 Ibid., p. 103. 
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foreign invasion. Kautsky points to the fact that colonial powers rely on local aristocracy to 
maintain law and order, thus suggesting that new colonial elites tend to co-opt rather than 
eliminate local elites.83 Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski argue that to the surprise of most 
observers, the collapse of communist rule involved no comprehensive turnover of elites, but was 
instead marked by continuity in elite composition.84 Completely replacing an elite is impossible 
for very practical purposes, i.e. the need for people with knowledge and experience. Hence, a 
new elite would always look for those favorable elements in the old elite who could be co-opted 
and whose experience in governing is much valued. The need for expertise, however, is not the 
only source of continuity. There is a tendency, argues Mosca, which aims at stabilizing social 
control and political power in the descendants of the class that happens to hold possession of it at 
the given historical moment.85 An elite may be ousted in one way or another, but this seldom 
results in immediate and total relinquishing of power. Even when the elite loses control of its 
power resources, its descendents are always in advantageous position in terms of education and 
connections and, thus, better equipped to enter the ranks of the new elite.86
Change and continuity are interrelated both conceptually and empirically. They are both 
essential and concurrent elements in the process of elite transformation. It is only logical, then, 
that a degree of continuity exists between communist and postcommunist elites. The elite at any 
point in time is subject to both change and continuity, it is almost never completely replaced by a 
  
                                                 
8383 KAUTSKY John, “Patterns of Elite Succession in the Process of Development,” The Journal of Politics, 
Vol. 31, No. 2, (May, 1969), pp. 359-396, p. 368. 
84 HIGLEY John, Judith KULLBERG and Jan PAKULSKI, “The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites,” 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, pp. 133-147, p. 135. 
85 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 395. 
86 The Bulgarian experience certainly proves this to be true. As Emil Koshlukov points out in an 2007 
interview, “The prime minister today is the son of a Politburo member, the general attorney is the 
grandson of a Politburo member, the European commissioner is a daughter-in-law of a member of the 
Central Committee of BCP, the director of the national television is the daughter of the same member of 
the Central Committee.” Interview with Emil Koshlukov, Sofia, March 21st, 2007. 
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counter-elite, but neither is it ever static. The circulation vs. reproduction framework, by contrast, 
provides an oversimplified view of the elite as either unaltered in terms of composition, or as 
caught in a violent dynamic resulting in complete change of guard. Thus, it ignores the interplay 
of change and continuity in elite transformation and treats such transformation as marked by 
critical junctures in between which the elite is relatively unchanging. Empirical studies have 
proved the fallacy of such approach. Studies of Czech managerial elite (Clark & Soulsby 1996), 
Russian managerial elite (Hanley, Yerhsova, & Anderson 1995) and Baltic elites (Steen 1997) 
indicate both change and continuity in post-communist elites.  
3.2 CIRCULATION OF ELITES 
The terms reproduction and circulation originate with classical elite theory and the writings of 
Mosca and Pareto. Pareto’s circulation of elites theory, in particular, remains a widely 
acknowledged and commonly referenced milestone in elite theory. In their formulation of the 
circulations vs. reproduction approach, however, Szelenyi and Szelenyi do not discuss classical 
elite theory nor do they mention the classical theorists. Instead, they argue that the circulation of 
elites theory is not clearly formulated in the literature.87
                                                 
87 SZLENYI Szonja, Ivan SZELENYI and Imre KOVACH, “The Making of the Hungarian Postcommunist 
Elite: Circulation in Politics, Reproduction in the Economy,” Theory and Society, Special Issue on 
Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Vol. 
24, No. 5, (Oct., 1995), pp. 697-722, p. 698. 
 Without acknowledging Pareto’s theory 
formulated over a century ago, Szelenyi and Szelenyi propose their own “circulation of elites” 
theory. They equate the process of circulation to elite turnover, i.e. physical change of the 
members of the elite, and reproduction to the lack thereof. In this new context, the use of the 
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term “circulation” is reduced to mean replacement of elite A with elite B. Although Pareto 
contends that the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of certain elites: as 
one ascends, another declines,88
Pareto viewed society as divided in two groups, an elite and a non-elite, or “a higher 
stratum, which usually contains the rulers, and a lower stratum, which usually contains the 
ruled.”
 his theory hardly merits such a simplified interpretation. 
Szelenyi and Szelenyi’s version of “circulation of elites” theory is in sharp contrast to the 
complex processes of elite change to which Pareto’s theory of circulation of elites refers. 
89 The two groups are heterogeneous in that they consist of a dynamic and stable 
component. The dynamic component is brought by what Pareto labels speculators or innovators 
– adventurous individuals with entrepreneurial spirit, who are ever on the look-out for new 
opportunities. The component of stability, on the other hand, is delivered by the rentiers or 
consolidators – individuals who are less adaptable and more prone to use force in order to 
preserve the status quo.90 The distribution of the two components is generally uneven between 
the higher and the lower strata. When the governing elite is dominated by speculators (dynamic 
component), society is subject to rapid change, in contrast, when rentiers dominate (stable 
component), change takes place slowly.91
                                                 
88 PARETO, The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology, New Brunswick, NJ, 
Transaction Publishers, 2003, p. 36. 
 There is a natural tendency, Pareto holds, for elites of 
the two types to rotate in positions of power. An elite rich in speculators is reluctant to use force 
89 PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2047. 
90 The dynamic and stable components, proxy terms which I adopt here for reasons of clarity and 
parsimony, are what Pareto refers to respectively as Class I and Class II residues. Residues, in his view, 
correspond to certain human instincts, but are not to be confused with instincts or sentiments. They are 
the manifestation of such instincts and sentiments, in the same way mercury in a thermometer is 
manifestation of the temperature. Hence, residues are basic social representations of the sentiments and 
inclinations that orient and determine human action. Class I residues correspond to combination or the 
tendency to invent and embark on adventures. Class II residues refer to the preservation of aggregates or 
the tendency to consolidate and make secure. For a concise summary of the Paretian system and his 
circulation of elites theory see, Nicholas S. TIMASHEFF, “The Social System, Structure and Dynamics” in 
James MEISEL, Pareto and Mosca, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Prentice Hall, 1965, pp. 63-70. 
91 TIMASHEFF, op.cit., p. 67. 
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in order to preserve its power and eventually yields to rentiers to whom the use of force comes 
naturally. An elite predominant in rentiers, in turn, gradually absorbs speculators in an attempt 
to overcome its natural resistance to new ideas and change. Saturation with speculators happens 
automatically, as even a rentier elite once in power attracts speculators to gain profit, whereas 
the advent of rentiers usually occurs by force as the elite saturated with speculators is unwilling 
and unable to use force to prevent its demise. This is what Pareto labels “circulation of elites.” 
Circulation of elites does not refer to replacing elite A with elite B, but to oscillation in the 
relative distribution of the stable and dynamic components among the elite. 
Society, according to Pareto, is best viewed as a system in dynamic equilibrium. It is 
characterized by heterogeneity as the dynamic and stable components, or residues to use Pareto’s 
term, are differently distributed among the higher and the lower strata. Heterogeneity is the 
driving force of the social dynamic, as it is at the core of social change and social equilibrium. 
The uneven distribution of residues accounts for the amount of circulation among the social 
strata. Every system is heterogeneous, holds Pareto, and the most striking aspect of this 
heterogeneity is the distinction and interchange between the rulers and the ruled.92 The social 
equilibrium then depends on the balance of the residues among the two strata. The more an elite 
consists of innovators alone, or consolidators alone, the less it is able to meet normal 
exigencies,93
                                                 
92 BOBBIO Norberto, On Mosca and Pareto, Genève, Librairie Droz, 1972, p.63. 
 and the harder it is to preserve the social equilibrium. A crisis, in Pareto’s terms, 
occurs when the elite is homogenized. Pareto is convinced that history proceeds by cycles or 
undulations. His entire theory is build upon the idea of uneven distribution and circulation of 
93 ZETTERBURGH Hans L., “Pareto’s Theory of Elites” in Vilfredo PARETO, The Rise and Fall of Elites: 
An Application of Theoretical Sociology, New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 1-22, 
p.9. 
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residues among societal strata. Although critical of his theory, Ginsberg offers a clear and 
concise summary of Pareto’s central thesis: 
Pareto thinks that changes in the proportions between Class I [dynamic component] and 
Class II [stable component] residues in the elite do not continue indefinitely in one 
direction, but are sooner or later checked by movements in a counter-direction. In this 
way the modifications of the elite are shown to be among the major factors determining 
the undulatory form of social change. They are correlated, it is claimed, not only with 
political transformations but also with economic cycles and with oscillations in thought 
and culture. Thus in periods of rapidly increasing economic prosperity the governing 
class comes to contain greater numbers of individuals of the speculator type, rich in Class 
I residues, and fewer of the opposite type; while the converse is the case in periods of 
economic depression or retrogression.94
It is not my purpose to debate Pareto’s concept of residues and their relation to economic cycles 
and changes in thought and culture. It suffices to point out that Pareto understands residues to be 
basic social representations that are not independent from other factors such as economic and 
social characteristics. My goal is to clarify Pareto’s theory of circulation of elites and to argue 
against reducing its meaning to physical replacement of elite A with elite B. Circulation of elites 
theory accounts for processes of slow transformation as well as of sudden and drastic change of 
the governing elite. Both processes are understood in terms of distribution of residues among the 
social strata. The dynamic and stable components are not to be viewed as pertaining exclusively 
to one social strata or another – both are to be found in all strata of society. It is the relative 
distribution of the components that is important. The circulation of elites theory, more than 
anything, refers to circulation of dynamic and stable components between the higher and the 
lower strata.  
 
                                                 
94 GINSBERG Morris, “The Sociology of Pareto” in James  MIESEL, ed., Pareto and Mosca, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965, pp. 89-107, p. 104. 
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3.3 ELITE RENEWAL 
Elite renewal plays a key function in any political system. Mechanisms of elite recruitment, 
Seligman argues, determine avenues for political participation, influence policy choices, effect 
the distribution of status, and influence the rate of social change.95
Mosca argues that governments are organized according to two basic principles – the 
autocratic, when power is transmitted from above, and the liberal, when power is transmitted 
from below.
 Every theorization of elite 
change ought to account for the manner in which elites renew their membership. The various 
ways in which ruling classes renew themselves pose a central concern in Mosca’s theory of the 
ruling class. Mosca relates renewal to the organization and formation of the ruling class, social 
type and political formula – all of which essential elements in his theoretical system. 
96 The two principles may be fused and balanced in various ways, and although it is 
difficult to find a political system that precludes one of the two principles, a predominance of 
autocracy or liberalism is certain to be found in any political organization. Closely related to the 
form of government is the mode of replenishing the ruling class. Mosca distinguishes between 
two tendencies – the “democratic” aims to replenish the ruling class with elements deriving from 
lower classes, the “aristocratic” aims to stabilize social control and political power in the 
descendants of the class in power.97
                                                 
95 SELIGMAN Lester, “Elite Recruitment and Political Development,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, No. 
3, (Aug., 1964), pp. 612-626, p. 612. 
 The autocratic principle, cautions Mosca, does not 
96 Mosca’s categorization is based on Plato’s distinction between monarchy and democracy. Mosca clearly 
rejects Montesquieu’s classification of governments into absolute or despotic monarchies, limited 
monarchies, and republics, as well as Aristotle’s distinction between monarchies, aristocracies, and 
democracies. Mosca concludes that government, which, according to Aristotle, can be of the one, of the 
few, or of the many, is always of the few. What Aristotle called democracy, he argues, was simply an 
aristocracy of fairly broad membership. See, Renzo SERENO, “The Anti-Aristotelianism of Gaetano 
Mosca and Its Fate,” Ethics, Vol. 48, No. 4, (Jul., 1938), pp. 509-518. 
97 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 395. 
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necessarily favor the aristocratic tendency, and the same can be said of the liberal principle and 
the democratic tendency.98 The democratic tendency is constantly at work with greater or lesser 
intensity in all human societies. As noted earlier, “one can almost always observe that a slow and 
gradual renewal of the ruling class is going on through infiltration into the higher strata of 
society of elements emerging from the lower.” Similarly, the democratic tendency is constantly 
being offset by the aristocratic. There are certain qualities necessary for a ruling class to maintain 
its power and function properly, that could only develop when certain families hold high social 
positions for a number of generations. In Mosca’s view, the soundness of political institutions 
depends upon an appropriate fusing and balancing of the differing but constant principles 
(autocratic and liberal) and tendencies (aristocratic and democratic) which are at work in all 
political organisms.99
Mosca further identifies three principles of renewal of the ruling class – heredity, 
election, and cooption. He devotes particular attention to the first of those, arguing that all ruling 
classes tend to become hereditary in fact if not in law. Mosca contends that “all political forces 
seem to possess a quality that in physics used to be called the force of inertia. They have a 
tendency, that is, to remain at the point and in the state in which they find themselves.”
 
100 
Qualities necessary for important office are easily maintained in certain families by moral 
tradition and heredity, and therefore are much more easily acquired when one has familiarity 
with them from childhood.101
                                                 
98 Mosca gives as examples the Chinese empire which was based on an autocratic principle but did not 
recognize hereditary privileges to governance, and the Venetian state based on elected government made 
up entirely of hereditary ruling classes. Mosca, The Ruling Class, op.ci., p. 396.  
 Even the principle of election, Mosca argues, cannot escape such 
hereditary tendencies. Candidates who are successful in democratic elections are almost always 
99 Ibid., p. 428. 
100 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 61. 
101 Ibid., p. 61. 
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the ones who possess certain qualities and political forces, which are very often hereditary. 
Despite Mosca’s focus on heredity, it is important to reiterate his conviction that both the 
aristocratic and democratic tendencies of renewal are constantly at work in all societies. In 
human societies, he argues, “there prevails now the tendency that produces closed, stationary, 
crystallized ruling classes, now the tendency that results in a more or less rapid renovation of 
ruling classes.”102 It is very difficult, in fact almost impossible to eliminate completely the action 
of either of these two tendencies, since an absolute prevalence of the aristocratic one would 
presuppose no change in the thought and conditions of life in society, whereas an absolute 
prevalence of the democratic tendency could occur only if children did not inherit the means, 
connections, and knowledge that allowed their predecessors to attain positions of power.103 The 
highest degree of social utility is achieved in the equilibrium between the two tendencies.104
Social type and political formula constitute two other essential elements in Mosca’s 
theoretical system. Mankind, in Mosca’s view, is divided into social groups each of which is set 
apart from other groups by beliefs, sentiments, habits and interests that are peculiar to it. The 
individuals who belong to one such group are held together by a consciousness of common 
brotherhood and held apart from other groups by passions and tendencies that are more or less 
 
Hence, the ability of the elite to preserve its power depends to a degree on its success in 
balancing the two tendencies and recruiting the right amount of people from the higher and lower 
classes, as necessitated by the particular social context – a view echoing Pareto’s equilibrium. 
                                                 
102 Ibid., p. 66. 
103 MOSCA Gaetano, A Short History of Political Philosophy, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1972, p. 255.  
104 FIOROT Dino, “Potere, Governo e Governabilita in Mosca e Pareto” in Ettore ALBERTONI (ed.), 
Governo e Governabilita nel Sistema Politico e Giuridico di Gaetano Mosca, Milano, Universita degli 
Studi di Milano, 1983, pp. 79-102, p. 84. 
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antagonistic and mutually repellent.105 The common consciousness and characteristics unique to 
a particular group form the social type. The social type has the important function of 
distinguishing one group from another and of determining the form of political organization or 
political formula of a given society. The political formula is the moral principle justifying the 
rule of a particular class. Ruling classes, Mosca argues, never stop at the brute fact of holding 
power.  They do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it, but try to find 
moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the logical consequence of doctrines and beliefs 
that are generally recognized and accepted.106 Michels concurs that every government endeavors 
to support its power by a general ethical principle.107 The political formula has to be based upon 
the social type of a society or at least upon the dominant social type, when the state is made up of 
a mixture of social types. Every social type has the tendency to concentrate into a single political 
organism, and the political organism in expanding always aims at spreading its own social 
type.108
3.3.1 Technocratic and Populist Function 
 Thus, a political formula based upon communist ideology would serve better a society 
where egalitarian principles are highly valued and encounter more challenges in a society 
valuing social differentiation. 
Similarly to the aristocratic and democratic tendencies, circulation and reproduction could be 
viewed as mechanisms of elite renewal that are constantly and simultaneously at work. 
Reproduction, in these terms, implies replenishing the elite with individuals from the same social 
                                                 
105 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 71. 
106 Ibid., p. 70. 
107 MICHELS, op.cit., p. 15. 
108 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 103. 
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type and would therefore correspond to the aristocratic tendency. Circulation, in turn, 
corresponds to the democratic tendency and refers to selecting individuals with qualities different 
from those dominant in the elite. Reproduction is quasi-automatic, as it recruits new elite 
members from governmental schools, military academies, elite families, etc, thus satisfying the 
technocratic needs of the elite. Circulation, in contrast, involves recruiting individuals with 
specific qualities not supplied by the very academies and families. Its function is to absorb new 
elements from the lower stratum and legitimize elite power on a populist level. Although not 
subject to conscious and deliberate control by the elite, the two processes could be viewed as 
auto-transformative mechanisms of the elite. Let us examine them in more detail. 
In order to maintain its power, an elite has to simultaneously fulfill two important 
functions – a technocratic and a populist. In other words, an elite needs to have the expertise to 
govern and, at the same time, have the support of the masses.  The process of reproduction in 
these terms serves mainly a technocratic function. It is a mode of recruitment based on certain 
selection criteria or qualities, which purpose is to supply qualified cadres.  By definition such 
process favors recruitment of new members from the higher rather than the lower stratum and, 
thus, corresponds to Mosca’s aristocratic tendency. It replenishes the elite with individuals from 
the same social type (Mosca), or with individuals strong in the same component as the one 
dominant in the elite (Pareto). As a mechanism of elite renewal, reproduction reinforces qualities 
and tendencies already present in the elite and it ensures continuity.  
Ruling classes, Mosca argues, are usually so constituted that the individuals who make 
them up are distinguished from the mass of the governed by qualities that give them a certain 
material, intellectual or even moral superiority.109
                                                 
109 Ibid., p. 53.  
 It is the function of governmental schools, 
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military academies, and elite universities to prepare cadres nurturing those very qualities valued 
and exhibited by the elite. According to Mosca, such qualities vary with time and societies. In 
primitive societies, for example, military valor grants access to the ruling class, whereas in more 
advanced societies it is wealth or specialized knowledge. Selection criteria, in other words, are 
determined by the political formula. Reproduction represents an institutionalized mode of 
recruitment, whereby selected institutions have the task of preparing and providing a healthy 
supply of expert cadres imbued with the principles at the core of the political formula. The 
French “Grandes Ecoles,” which as a rule facilitate access to higher positions in the state 
machinery and corporate leadership, represent a case in point.110 The “Ecole Libres des Sciences 
Politiques,” for example, provided France with a diplomatic, administrative, and managerial elite 
until the second world war.111
If reproduction is a universalistic mechanism of renewing the elite in that it is based on 
selection criteria determined by the political formula, how could it favor recruitment primarily 
from the higher strata? Individuals from the higher stratum, Mosca contends, by definition 
possess certain qualities and characteristics which give them access to positions of power.  Even 
when academic degrees, scientific training, special aptitudes as tested by examinations and 
competitions, open the way to public office, there is no eliminating that special advantage in 
 In the East European context where communist ideology 
constituted the political formula, party schools and certain higher education institutes became the 
breeding ground for communist elites. Bulgarian career diplomats during the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
for instance, were predominantly educated in Moscow’s State Institute for International 
Relations. 
                                                 
110 TOMUSK Voldemar, “Reproduction of the ‘State Nobility’ in Eastern Europe: Past Patterns and New 
Practices,” British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Jun., 2000), pp. 269-289, p. 271. 
111 CLIFFORD-VAUGHAN Michalina, “Some French Concepts of Elites,” The British Journal of Sociology, 
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favor of certain individuals which the French call the advantage of positions déjà prises.112 
Those include not only education and family tradition, but connections and kinships, which set 
one on the right road and enable him to avoid the blunders that are inevitable in unfamiliar 
environment. Thus, it is not surprising that many skilled politicians in Bulgarian post-communist 
politics come from elite communist families. Even though the selection criteria for entering the 
elite have changed in the post-communist context, these individuals were better equipped both to 
access and serve in high government positions.113
In contrast to reproduction, circulation is a mechanism of elite renewal that replenishes 
the elite with members of the lower stratum, corresponding to Mosca’s democratic tendency. Its 
main function is to supply the elite with individuals possessing qualities different from those 
dominant in the elite. Selection is particularistic – it is not based on established, institutionalized 
criteria, but rather on an arbitrary choice of specific individuals possessing particular qualities, 
popular appeal, or charisma. Circulation is a process by which individuals from different social 
type (Mosca), or rich in component different than the one dominant in the elite (Pareto), are 
granted access to positions of power. In allowing new elements from the lower stratum to enter 
the elite, circulation serves a populist function. The elites, according to Pareto, cannot endure 
without renewing themselves from the lower classes who are the “dark crucible in which the new 
elites are being formed. They are the roots which feed the flower blossoming into elites”.
 
114
                                                 
112 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 61. 
 By 
absorbing ideas and social forces already fermenting in the lower stratum, the elite prevents such 
elements from organizing independently and assures popular support. The Bulgarian Communist 
113 Bulgaria’s first EU commissioner Meglena Kuneva poses a good example. Married into a Politburo 
family, Kuneva gradually rose into post-communist politics. Her performance as an EU Commissioner for 
Consumer Protection gained her a well-deserved respect in the EU Commission. 
114 MIESEL James, “Introduction” in James MEISEL (ed.), Pareto and Mosca, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965, pp. 1-44, p. 12. 
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Party heavily recruited peasants to high-rank party positions during the early years of its rule, 
which helped it secure popular support, consolidate power, and enforce controversial policies 
such as nationalization of the land. Such strategy clearly satisfied the populist function of 
recruitment. 
Pareto argues at length of the importance of absorbing new elements from the lower 
stratum. In his view, this is essential both for the preservation of power of the elite and 
preservation of the social equilibrium. An elite declines and loses power because it becomes 
softer, milder, more humane and less apt to the use of force. Elites, in Pareto’s view, often 
become effete. They preserve certain passive courage, but lack active courage.115
An elite often brings its own ruin. It readily accepts individuals who are well supplied 
with Class I residues [dynamic component] and devote themselves to economic and 
financial pursuits, because such people as a rule are great producers of wealth and so 
contribute to the well-being of the governing class. The first effects of their coming to 
power are therefore favorably felt by many people and they strengthen the hold of the 
governing class; but gradually, as time goes on, they prove to be borers from within, by 
divesting the class of individuals who are rich in Class II residues [stable component] and 
have an aptitude for using force.
 He explains the 
process in the following way: 
116
As force is diluted, the social equilibrium has to be restored by elements to which the use of 
force comes naturally.
  
117 Once such elements have been absorbed from the lower stratum and the 
equilibrium has been restored, the opposite tendency resumes its course. Or in Pareto’s words, 
“in the higher stratum of society stable components gradually lose in strength, until now and 
again they are reinforced by tides upwelling from the lower stratum.”118
                                                 
115 PARETO, The Rise and Fall, op.cit., p. 60. 
 What needs to be 
considered then is the velocity of circulation in relation to the supply and demand for certain 
social elements. Thus, various circumstances call for different social elements. In periods of 
116PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2048. 
117 MIESEL, op.cit., p. 8. 
118 PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2048. 
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stagnation, for example, speculators would be more needed than rentiers. Similarly, the speed 
with which the relative distribution of social elements in the elite is changing varies with each 
situation. There comes a period of renovation, Mosca argues, “during which individual energies 
have free play and certain individuals, more passionate than others, more energetic, more 
intrepid or merely shrewder than others, force their way from the bottom of the social ladder to 
the topmost rungs. …[T]his molecular rejuvenation of the ruling class continues vigorously until 
a long period of stability slows it down again.”119 According to Mosca, circulation among the 
two strata of society guarantees consensus. It assures that the elements lacking among the elite, 
but necessary for maintaining its power are absorbed. Circulation cannot be understood as a 
simple replacement of one elite group with another. In most cases what we observe, Michels 
argues, is a continuous process of intermixture, the old elements incessantly attracting, absorbing 
and assimilating the new.120
As mechanisms of elite renewal, circulation and reproduction ought to be viewed in terms 
of a dynamic equilibrium rather than isolated and self-exclusive processes. Circulation, then, 
allows for the absorption of new members into the elite, outside of the usual pool of recruitment, 
with popular appeal and qualities different than those dominant in the elite. Reproduction, in 
turn, does not imply physical continuation of the elite, but rather that new members recruited into 
the elite have the same social characteristics as members of the ruling elite (subscribe to the same 
value system, have comparable education, etc.).  Circulation and reproduction are modes of 
recruitment which assure both change and continuity in the elite. The most desirable arrangement 
for society, in Mosca’s view, is one in which these two processes complement one another in a 
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state of flexible equilibrium.121
3.4 COUNTER ELITE 
 A central thesis in classical elite theory is that the elite loses 
power when it fails to recruit the right people with the right proportion of social elements. In 
these terms, circulation and reproduction satisfy two important functions imperative for the 
elite’s ability to maintain its power; one technocratic – supplying individuals with expertise to 
govern, and another, populist – supplying individuals who appeal to the masses. Circulation and 
reproduction are constantly and simultaneously at work, whether or not the elite is being 
challenged by a counter-elite. As such they represent auto-transformative mechanisms of the 
elite.  
When the auto-transformative mechanisms of the elite fail to fulfill their technocratic and 
populist functions, there is greater opportunity for a counter-elite to form and organize. It is quite 
imaginable, posit Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, that the political instability of socialism 
was linked to the inability of its elite to reproduce itself.122 According to Pareto, revolutions 
come about through accumulations in the higher stratum of society – either because of a slowing-
down in class-circulation, or from other causes – of decadent elements no longer possessing the 
qualities suitable for keeping them in power. In the meantime in the lower stratum of society 
elements of superior quality are gaining power. 123
                                                 
121 MEISEL, op.cit., p. 8. 
  Ruling classes, Mosca similarly argues, 
decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to 
122 SZELENYI Ivan and Balazs SZELENYI, “Why Socialism Failed: Toward a Theory of System Breakdown 
– Causes of Disintegration of East European State Socialism,” Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, Special 
Issue on the Theoretical Implications of the Demise of State Socialism, (Apr., 1994), pp. 211-231, p. 219. 
123 PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2057. 
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power, when they no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their 
talents and the services they render lose in importance in the social environment in which they 
live.124 The ruling class may be driven from power by the advent of new social elements [in the 
lower strata] who are strong in fresh political forces. 125
Organization is paramount to Mosca’s theoretical system. His entire theory is based on 
the premise that organized minorities rule over unorganized majorities. The dominion of an 
organized minority, obeying a single impulse, over the unorganized majority is inevitable.
 A counter-elite is formed when these 
new social elements in the lower stratum, possessing qualities different than those dominant in 
the elite, manage to organize.  
126 The 
minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority. Political organization, Michels 
similarly argues, leads to power.127
…within the lower classes another ruling class, or directing minority necessarily forms, 
and often this new class is antagonistic to the class that holds possession of legal 
government. When this class of plebeian leaders is well organized, it may seriously 
embarrass the official government.
 A counter-elite, then, poses the greatest challenge to the 
ruling elite by virtue of being organized. In Mosca’s words: 
128
Pareto states that new elements are constantly rising among the lower strata which are the “dark 
crucible in which the new elites are being formed.” Unless organized, however, these elements 
are easily absorbed or suppressed by the elite. In order to gain an influence proportionate to its 
real importance, Mosca argues, every political force has to be organized.
 
129
                                                 
124 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 65. 
 When a faction 
struggles for political power, it necessarily organizes internally in order to achieve a stable 
125 Ibid., p. 67. 
126 Ibid., p. 52. 
127 MICHELS, op.cit., p. 366. 
128 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 116. 
129 Ibid., p. 145. 
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mechanism of decision-making.130 Mosca’s concept of counter-elite is derived from his 
proposition that the contest for control is not between the many and the few but between one 
elite and another. Meisel argues that “Mosca would readily grant the fact that the masses, too, 
may – and indeed do – organize, but he would insist that the organized mass will, in turn, be led 
by an elite.”131 In his iron low of oligarchy, Michels advances an argument which resonates with 
Mosca’s power struggle among opposed elite groups. Michels contends that class struggles 
consist merely of struggles between successively dominant minorities.132
Once a counter-elite organizes, it is in a position to challenge the power of the ruling 
elite. This new elite, argues Pareto, seeks to supersede the old one or merely to share its power 
and honors.
  
133 The attack it mounts could contest the process of reproduction, that of circulation 
or both. As already pointed, every ruling class justifies its rule by certain theories or principles, 
i.e. the political formula. Whether the political formula is monarchical, based on the sovereign’s 
divine right to rule, democratic, based on popular rule, or communist, based on the leading role 
of the party, it is accepted in the society in which it functions and is used by the elite to 
legitimize its power. A counter-elite could contest the political formula, i.e. the legitimizing 
principle, by denouncing its validity and proposing a competing principle or ideology. Attempts 
to overthrow the legal government, argues Mosca, are often accompanied with conversion to a 
new political formula.134
                                                 
130 MIGLIO Gianfranco, “Classe Politica’ e ‘Ideologia’: Due Superabili Frontiere nella Teoria Mosciana del 
Rapporto Governanti-Governati,” in Ettore ALBERTONI, ed., Governo e Governabilita nel Sistema 
Politico e Giuridico di Gaetano Mosca, Milano, Universita degli Studi di Milano, 1983, pp. 11-18, p. 14. 
 In the Eastern European experience, this took the form of contesting 
communist ideology, with the entailing leading role of the communist party and one-party rule, 
131 MEISEL, op.cit., p. 7. 
132 MICHELS, op.cit., p. 377. 
133 PARETO, The Rise and Fall, op.cit., p. 36. 
134 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 117. 
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and proposing a democratic form of government. Such contestation is universalistic as it does not 
question particular aspects of elite rule but attacks its very foundation. It challenges the process 
of reproduction, which is necessarily grounded in the political formula, since the qualities valued 
by the elite and granting access to positions of power are derived from the political formula. In 
communist Eastern Europe, such qualities were party membership, communist family 
background, education in one of the party institutions, etc., all of which aimed at securing loyalty 
to the communist regime, loyalty being a quality valued to a much higher degree than expertise. 
The struggle between the elite and the counter-elite in that case takes the form of contestation 
and negotiation of the legitimizing principle of rule. The counter-elite demands the adoption of 
new principles of rule, which in turn would redefine the mode of recruitment to the elite and the 
criteria or qualities which would give access to positions of power. In the East European context 
that meant a struggle for the abolishment of communist ideology and adoption of democratic, 
representative system of government, whereby membership in the governing elite is attained 
through popular elections. 
Elite power could also be challenged on another level, targeting the process of 
circulation. In this case, the counter-elite is not contesting the legitimizing principles of rule, but 
is struggling for membership in the elite. Such form of contestation is particularistic as it does 
not question the political formula; instead, it bargains for access to positions of power or co-
optation in the elite. There is no demand for redefining the mode of recruitment and the criteria 
giving access to power; rather there is bargaining and negotiation over partaking in the spoils of 
political power. The argument is illustrated below: 
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Table 1. Mechanisms of elite renewal 
 REPRODUCTION 
Technocratic function 
CIRCULATION 
Populist function 
NO 
CONTESTATION 
- Selection of new elite members 
based on criteria (universalistic) 
 
 
-  Process controlled by the elite 
- Selection of new elite members 
based on search for specific 
individuals with particular 
qualities (particularistic) 
-  Process controlled by the elite 
CONTESTATION - Contestation and negotiation 
of the legitimizing principles of 
rule  
- Universalistic attack upon 
process of reproduction  
- Power struggle between the 
elite and a contesting 
group/counter elite 
- Contestation and bargaining for 
membership in the elite; no attack 
on the legitimizing principles of 
rule 
- Particularistic attack upon the 
process of circulation  
- Power struggle between the elite 
and a contesting group/counter 
elite. 
 
Although the table separates contestation of the process of reproduction and that of circulation, 
the two processes can, and most often do, occur simultaneously. The round table negotiations in 
East European countries represent variations in degree.135
                                                 
135 Round Table Talks took place in several East European countries and constituted a series of 
negotiations between communist elites and the newly formed oppositions on the smooth an peaceful 
transition to democracy. Round Table Talks were held in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, and Bulgaria. For a detailed account of the Round Table Talks in Eastern Europe see, Jon 
ELSTER (ed.), The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, Chicago, IL, University of 
Chicago Press, 1996. 
 The Polish round table, for example, 
reached an agreement granting the presidency to communist leader Jaruzeslki and scheduling 
free elections in which the Communist party would be guaranteed 65% of the seats in the lower 
house of the Seijm. Although communist ideology and one-party rule was abolished in all East 
European countries, the outcome was not guaranteed at the outset. Round table negotiations 
consisted both in debating the legitimizing principles of rule and bargaining for positions of 
power. Pareto argues that in its struggle for power, a new elite does not admit its intentions 
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frankly and openly. Instead it assumes the leadership of all the oppressed and it claims to defend 
the rights of almost the entire citizenry.136
Whether the counter-elite would pursue full-scale contestation or would opt for 
cooptation in the elite, largely depends upon the political influence at its disposal. In 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany where communist elites were completely discredited, the 
counter elite pursued a strategy of full contestation. The round table talks in these countries, 
Elster argues, essentially produced a civilized and total capitulation of the communist regimes, 
with no concessions given to the former elite.
 Thus, almost any attack on the power of the ruling 
elite carries some ideological justification. 
 137
An important point to be made is that the auto-transformative mechanisms (reproduction 
and circulation) of the elite continue to be at work even, and especially so, when the power of the 
elite is being challenged by an organized counter-elite. On the one hand, the elite could adapt its 
reproduction mechanism either by emphasizing the political formula on which it is based or by 
altering it. The transformation of East European communist parties into social-democratic parties 
is an example of the latter, whereas the normalization
 In contrast, the Bulgarian counter-elite which 
was poorly organized and had marginal influence, especially outside of major cities, could not 
hope for ousting the communist elite. At best, it was able to negotiate the rules of political 
participation, which would grant it a share in political power. 
138
                                                 
136 PARETO, The Rise and Fall, op.cit., p. 36. 
 period in Czechoslovakia following the 
Prague Spring illustrates the former. On the other hand, the elite could react to the attack through 
137 ELSTER Jon, “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction,” The University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe, (Spring, 1991), 
pp. 447-482, p. 458. 
138  “Normalization” refers to the complex policies developed and fostered by the Soviets, under specific 
national conditions and a over a long period spanning a decade or more, to partly or fully reverse 
revolutionary change in a given country. See Jiri VALENTA,“Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, 
and ‘Normalization’ in East-Central Europe,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. (2, Jan., 1984), 127-151. 
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its circulation mechanism by attracting people with reformist ideas and popular appeal. This 
could entail strategies of bringing to the front new faces from the party youth organizations or 
even attracting prominent figures from the counter-elite, both of which a common practice in 
Bulgarian transition politics. Contestation could not be viewed as an isolated process; it is 
usually offset by strategic responses and adaptive auto-transformative mechanisms of the ruling 
elite. Power is conservative, cautions Michels. The influence exercised upon the government 
machine by an energetic opposition is subject to frequent interruptions and is always restricted 
by the nature of oligarchy.139
3.5 INTRA-ELITE CONFLICT 
 Except in cases where the elite is too weak to respond as was in 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1989, contestation is usually countered by the ruling elite. 
Regrettably, in cases where an organized counter-elite is present, the function and importance of 
auto-transformative processes tends to be overlooked by scholars, assigning changes in the elite 
only to the counter-elite factor. 
Intra-elite conflict is an important factor in elite transformation. The governing class, argues 
Pareto, “is not a homogenous body. They hold no meeting where they congregate to plot 
common designs, nor have they any other devices for reaching common accord.” 140
                                                 
139 MICHELS, op.cit., p. 367. 
 If there is an 
agreement among the elite, it derives from a set of shared circumstances and personal goals. 
Despite his emphasis on organization, Mosca makes no argument that ruling classes will always 
140 PARETO, Mind and Society, op.cit., sec. 2254. 
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be (by definition or as a constant tendency) organized and cohesive.141 He views organization 
and cohesion as variables which define ruling classes and explain particular political phenomena. 
The varying structures of ruling classes, as defined by their form or organization, has a 
preponderant importance in determining the political type, and also the level of civilization, of 
the different peoples.142
Conflict is an inherent element in intra-elite relations. Whenever the power of the leaders 
is seriously threatened, points Michels, it is because a new leader or a new group of leaders is on 
the point of becoming dominant, and is inculcating views opposed to those of the old rulers of 
the party.
  
143 Communist elites were not impervious to conflict. On the contrary, Gordon Skilling 
has argued in 1966 that “the Soviet system is far from being “conflictless” and that behind the 
façade of the monolithic party a genuine struggle has been taking place among rival groups or 
factions.”144 Such conflict, Skilling argues, is sometimes a mere struggle for power, largely 
divorced from issues of policy or ideology and designed to secure control of the main institutions 
of power. In other cases however, the struggle is linked with major issues of public policy and 
related to narrowly defined groups such as the central or peripheral party organizations, 
economic management, the military, etc. David Lane argues that intra-elite conflict within the 
communist party was a powerful driving force in East European transitions. Although he 
disagrees with “journalistic categories of ‘hard-liners’ and ‘soft-liners,” he contends that the 
transitions were led by a faction of the political elite.145
                                                 
141 ZUCKERMAN Alan, op.cit., p. 333. 
 The ascent of Gorbachev to power and 
the reforms he introduced, he argues, resulted in a divide among political elites about the 
142 MOSCA, The Ruling Class, op.cit., p. 51. 
143 MICHELS, op.cit., p. 164. 
144 SKILLING Gordon, “Interest Groups and Communist Polities,” World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, (Apr., 
1966), pp. 435-451, p. 440. 
145 LANE David, “The Transformation of Russia: The Role of the Political Elite,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 
48, No. 2, (Jun., 1996), pp. 535-539, p. 547. 
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viability of the Soviet system. Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi present the same point in 
arguing that inner differentiation of the elite played a major role in system breakdown in Poland, 
Hungary and Yugoslavia. In their view, one important consequence of the inner division of the 
elite was that it began to lose its appetite for repressive measures against the intelligentsia.146 
Here the authors relate to Pareto’s argument of the equilibrium between the power a social class 
possesses and its willingness to use force to defend it. Intra-elite conflict, in this view, has 
diminished the ability of the elite to use force, thereby contributing to its downfall and disturbing 
the social equilibrium. Studies of the causes of revolutions similarly point to the importance of 
intra-elite conflict. Skocpol argues that intra-elite conflict plays at least as important a role in 
revolutions as participation from below.147 Goldstone in turn contents that intra-elite conflict, 
financial crisis, and popular uprisings are the main factors in bringing about revolutions.148
In analyzing elite transformation in Eastern Europe, scholars have justly focused on 
examining the role of the counter-elite. Yet, much too often they have discounted the importance 
of intra-elite conflict. The nature and intensity of the intra-elite conflict within the Communist 
party, both before and during the transition period, are important factors in the process of elite 
transformation. Such conflict could be just as powerful agent of change as challenges from a 
counter-elite. Intra-elite conflict is particularly important in the context of one-party systems 
where the only legal contestation of power could come from within the party. We can recall 
Nikolov’s argument which states that in Bulgaria there was no basis for a new elite to emerge, 
  
                                                 
146 SZELENYI Ivan and Balazs SZELENYI, op.cit., p. 227. 
147 SKOCPOL Theda, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
148 GOLDSTONE Jack, Revolutions and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, Berkeley, CA, University of 
California Press, 1991. 
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except from within the all-embracing nomenklatura itself.149 Thus, it is not surprising that the 
collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria was facilitated by a group within the party. Moser 
keenly illustrates this point in arguing that, “[s]ince the Bulgarian Communist Party had never 
permitted non-communist political organization within the country, it was almost inevitable that 
a reform movement could appear only within the BCP itself, and that if anti-communist political 
structures were to be created, they would probably initially be formed within the communist 
apparatus, as contradictory as this may seem. In fact, the removal of Todor Zhivkov from his 
position as First Secretary of the Party was engineered from within the party itself.”150 In 
describing the various power struggles within the Party, Kalinova and Baeva demonstrate that 
intra-elite conflict has accompanied the Bulgarian communist regime throughout its existence.151
It is apparent, however, that the rigidity of the system and the intensity of conflict within 
it are not independent of each other. Rigid systems which suppress the incidence of 
conflict exert pressure towards the emergence of radical cleavages and violent forms of 
conflict. More elastic systems, which allow the open and direct expression of conflict 
within them and which adjust to the shifting balance of power which these conflicts both 
indicate and bring about, are less likely to be menaced by basic and explosive alignments 
within their midst.
 
The importance of intra-elite conflict in one-party systems is also emphasized by Coser who 
suggests that “rigid” systems, such as East European communist regimes, tend to be more 
vulnerable to the effects of internal conflict: 
152
The fact that communist power was challenged from within in the Bulgarian case raises the 
question of the difference between counter-elite and intra-elite conflict. Such distinction might 
 
                                                 
149 NIKOLOV Stephan, “Bulgaria: A Quasi-Elite” in John HIGLEY, Jan PAKULSKI and Wlodzimierz 
WESOLOWSKI (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy In Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s 
press, Inc., 1998, pp. 213-225, p. 217. 
150 MOSER Charles, Theory and History of the Bulgarian Transition, Sofia, Free Initiative Foundation, 
1994, p. 84. 
151 See Evegeniya KALINOVA and Iskra BAEVA, Българските Преходи: 1939-2005, Парадигма, 2006, 
pp. 125-238. 
152 COSER Lewis, “Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change,” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
8, No. 3 (Sep., 1957), pp. 197-207, p. 202. 
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be difficult to make in pluralistic political systems with multiple political actors, such as parties, 
interest groups, civil organizations, etc., but it is fairly straightforward in the case of communist 
systems.  Conflict within the Bulgarian Communist Party was limited to the top leadership, 
namely members of the Politburo and the Central Committee (See Chapter Six, p. 179). This is 
not to preclude that there were no conflicts among the lower echelons of the party. Such 
conflicts, however were inconsequential and personal for the most part and never grew into 
organized factions. It was the reformist wing that formed within the Politburo that organized the 
coup against Zhivkov. Thus, internal conflict in the Bulgarian case was confined to the very top 
ranks of the party, where there were clearly distinguishable opposed groups. The counter-elite, 
by contrast, did not include top party officials. While some of the early dissidents were members 
of the communist party, they were rank-and-file members with no influence over party affairs. 
What I define as a counter-elite in the Bulgarian context, is a group that at the offset of the 
transition was completely excluded from the political process and prophesied anti-communist 
ideology as opposed to reforming communism. 
A final point to be examined in relation to intra-elite conflict is the link between conflict 
and cohesion, i.e. the proposition that external conflict increases internal cohesion. According to 
Daherndorf, “it appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by 
increased internal coherence”153 Coser sees conflict as leading to the mobilization of the energies 
of the members of the group, which brings about increased cohesion and sometimes involves 
centralization.154
                                                 
153 Quoted in Arthur STEIN, “Conflict and Cohesion,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
(Mar., 1976), pp. 143-172, p, 145. 
 Despite critiques of this thesis, Stein argues that there is a clear convergence in 
the literature in both the specific studies and in the various disciplines (sociology, anthropology, 
154 COSER Lewis, The Functions of Social Conflict, New York, Free Press, 1956. 
  87 
psychology, and political science), which suggests that, under certain conditions, external 
conflict does increase internal cohesion.155 Based on this thesis, we can argue that the intensity 
of intra-elite conflict is related to the presence of an organized counter-elite. Hence, we can 
expect group cohesion to increase when faced with an organized counter-elite and intra-elite 
conflict to heighten when a challenge by an organized counter-elite is absent. Or to use Sumner’s 
words as a metaphor, “The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside.”156
Intra-elite conflict is a powerful mechanism of elite change. The ever-present struggle 
among the elite assures a continuous negotiation of the political formula and a constant 
readjustment of the processes of reproduction and circulation. Such negotiation and readjustment 
are under way even in the absence of a counter-elite. It is especially in cases where a counter-
elite is absent, that the role of intra-elite conflict becomes particularly important in bringing 
about change in the selection criteria and composition of the elite. As such, it also constitutes an 
auto-transformative mechanism of the elite. That is not to say that it is deliberately adopted, but 
rather that it is a constant characteristic of the elite. 
 
3.6 ELITE TRANSFORMATION AND TRANSITION OUTCOME 
Review of the literature reveals that a significant number of elite studies argue for a connection 
between elite transformation and the outcome of transitions to democracy (See Chapter Two, pp. 
2?-4?). Notable in this respect is Higley and Burton’s approach, and its further elaborations, 
focusing on the correlation between elite unity and regime stability, as well as Vachudova’s 
                                                 
155 STEIN Arthur, op.cit.,  p. 165. 
156 SUMNER William G., Folkways: A Study of the Sociological importance of Usages, Manners, 
Customs, Mores, and Morals, Boston, MA, Ginn & Company, 1906, p. 12. 
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study of East European transitions. As we have already noted in our review of Higley and 
Burton’s work, a disunified national elite produces a series of unstable regimes which oscillate 
between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals, whereas a consensually 
unified national elite, produces a stable regime which may evolve into a modern democracy 
(Higley & Burton 1989). In examining the factors contributing to a successful transition to 
democracy, Vachudova in turn argues that whether states embarked on a liberal or illiberal 
pattern of political change after 1989 largely depended on the quality of political competition, in 
particular on the presence of an opposition and a reforming communist party before 1989 
(Vachudova 2005). Bunce also suggests a connection between the elite change and the success of 
democratization efforts. She contends that those postcommunist countries which initially 
excluded their former leaders from political power have shown the most progress in economic 
and political reform.157
I am similarly concerned with the link between elite transformation and transition 
outcome. My study treats elite transformation as a dependent variable with regard to the 
Bulgarian transition. As I further argue, elite change in Bulgaria significantly differed from that 
in other East European countries. This difference is due to several factors which constricted the 
process of elite transformation and to a large extent determined its nature. Elites, in turn, played 
an important role in the transition process. The stop and go pace of the Bulgarian transition and 
its unclear direction particularly in the early 1990s is, to some degree, a result of a divided elite, 
not committed to common values and not sharing a common vision of the future post-communist 
society. Thus, I consider elites as an explanatory factor, or an independent variable, in terms of 
their impact on policy and transition outcome. Bulgaria lagged behind other East European 
 
                                                 
157 BUNCE Valerie, “Regional Differences in Democratization: The East Versus the South,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1998, pp. 187-211. 
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counties in reform efforts (See Chapter Eight), which I argue could be partly accounted for by 
the elite variable. As Higley and Burton argue, democratic transitions and breakdowns can be 
best understood by studying basic continuities and changes in internal relations of national 
elites.158
3.7 A MODEL OF ELITE TRANSFORMATION 
 Thus, in studying the elites and what happened to them during the transition, I treat the 
elite variable as dependent. In studying the impact elites have on policy and the outcome of the 
transition, I treat the elite variable as an independent. 
Drawing on classical elite theory, I have argued that change and continuity are inseparable 
elements in the process of elite transformation. Circulation and reproduction are not self-
excluding processes but mechanisms of elite renewal which occur simultaneously. Circulation 
per se does not indicate the presence of an organized counter-elite. Elite change occurs even in 
the absence of a counter-elite. Circulation and reproduction, therefore, could be viewed as auto-
transformative mechanisms, which assure both change and continuity in the elite. When the auto-
transformative mechanisms of the elite fail to fulfill their function, there is greater opportunity 
for a counter elite to organize.  The ability of the counter-elite to challenge the power of the 
ruling elite depends to a large extent on the degree to which the counter-elite is organized. 
Challenges from a counter-elite are usually countered by strategic actions of the elite that 
readjust the processes of reproduction and circulation. Intra-elite conflict is another important 
factor in elite transformation. The nature and intensity of intra-elite conflict could be just as 
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powerful an agent of change as challenges from a counter-elite. When faced with an organized 
counter-elite, intra-elite conflict among the ruling elite tends to decrease and internal cohesion 
increases. Based on these conclusions, I argue that two sets of factors determine the nature of 
elite transformation – the presence of a counter-elite and the degree to which this elite is 
organized, and the effectiveness of the auto-transformative mechanisms of the ruling elite (i.e. 
intra-elite conflict and modes of recruitment).  
Based largely on the classical writings of Mosca and Pareto, my argument also takes into 
account contributions by contemporary scholars such as Vachudova and Higley, who present a 
multi-factorial, dynamic model of elite change and emphasize the importance of auto-
transformative mechanisms and intra-elite conflict. In my view, this combined approach offers a 
useful framework for the study of post-communist elites. Classical elite theory with its emphasis 
on lower and higher strata, aristocratic and democratic tendencies of elite renewal, and velocity 
of circulation may seem dated at first. Indeed, classical elite theorists were referring to 
nineteenth-century Italy, where the class structure was clear and rigid and where counter-elites 
were seen as coming from the lower classes. Nevertheless, the concepts they developed are quite 
appropriate for examining post-communist societies. The communist elite was the dominant if 
not the only elite group in East European communist societies. Communist regimes, particularly 
in the case of Bulgaria, successfully destroyed or co-opted rival elite groups such as intellectuals, 
industrialists or clerics. While the old class structure was destroyed, a new structure emerged 
where the main distinction was between those who enjoyed privileges under the communist 
regime and those who did not. The counter-elites that emerged in the late 1980s in Eastern 
Europe, in that sense, was clearly outside of the privileged communist elite group. Thus, in terms 
of their access to power, they could be viewed as the lower stratum, the non elite, or the lower 
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class. Party membership restrictions imposed on certain education fields and positions of power 
in all fields assured party control over elite positions and the process of elite renewal, thus 
creating a clear boundary between the communist elite and the non-elite. Although in the East 
European context we cannot talk about classes in the traditional sense, the analytical concepts of 
Mosca and Pareto fit rather well with the structure of East European communist societies. 
In order to examine elite transformation in Bulgaria, following an approach that 
combines classical elite theory with contemporary scholarship, I need to determine: 1) whether 
there was intra-elite conflict within the ruling communist elite and what was the nature and 
intensity of that conflict; 2) whether there was an organized counter-elite; where the counter-elite 
came from and how it organized itself; the extent to which the counter-elite was able to challenge 
the power of the communist ruling elite and in what way – through contestation, cooptation or 
both; 3) the difference in the composition and modes of recruitment of the communist and post-
communist elite; and the change in the mechanisms of elite recruitment. The answers to these 
questions would indicate why elite transformation in Bulgaria took its particular form and how 
did it impact the outcome of the transition. An elite transformation in which the communist elite 
is faced with an equally or more powerful counter-elite would result in a very different process 
of negotiation of power and policy direction than a situation in which elite transformation is 
defined by a strong, unified communist elite and a weak, disorganized counter-elite. Similarly, a 
communist party with strong reformist wing where internal-conflict becomes a driver of change 
would enjoy a very different role in post-communist politics than a party where reformist 
factions were repressed or non-existent. By the same token, a situation in which a weak counter-
elite is facing a discredited and weakened communist elite would result in a sequence of electoral 
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stalemates and lack of political will and capacity for reform efforts. Elite transformation matters 
a great deal, as it is among the most important factors shaping post-communist realities. 
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4.0  DEMOCRATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BULGARIAN 
TRANSITION: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe came as a surprise to scholars and East 
Europeans alike. In a matter of months the over 40-year long communist rule in the region had 
disintegrated, and East European countries were free to chose their future. Despite the common 
start to democratization, the trajectories of East European states diverged immediately. Bulgaria 
was not among the fortunate and successful ones in democratization efforts. Between 1990 and 
2000, Bulgaria witnessed nine governments, four parliamentary and two presidential elections. A 
series of electoral stalemates between the unreconstructed communists and the inexperienced 
opposition produced weak, often incompetent, Bulgarian governments, argues Vachudova, 
bringing neither systematic economic reform nor the entrenchment of a liberal democratic 
state.159
This chapter provides a brief overview of the start of the democratization process in 
Eastern Europe and traces the events in Bulgaria between 1989 and 2000. I point to the ways in 
which the course of the Bulgarian transition differed from transition processes in other East 
European countries and examine the characteristics that defined the process of elite 
 It was not until 1997 that the first government to complete its full mandate stepped into 
power and was able to enact a more consistent and continuous reform policy. 
                                                 
159 VACHUDOVA Milada Anna, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after 
Communism, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 43. 
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transformation in Bulgaria and distinguished it from its East European counterparts. The 
specificities of the Bulgarian context, I argue, benefitted the former communists in their ability to 
preserve a strong position of power in post-communist politics. 
4.1 DEMOCRATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The year 1989 witnessed the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe. One by one 
communist regimes across the region yielded to opposition movements and an aroused citizenry. 
Reform processes in the USSR were decisive for the changes that took place in the region. 
Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika empowered voices of opposition and shook 
the foundations of the already illegitimate communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s 
rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine was perhaps the most important factor. Unlike in 1956 and 
1968, the Soviet Union was no longer willing to support East European communist regimes 
neither economically nor politically. Founding themselves on their own, communist governments 
yielded to the sweeping wave of liberalization. Soviet domination in the region ended and 
democratic governments took power. Two years later the Soviet Union itself collapsed. The Cold 
War was over and democratization was irreversibly underway in Eastern Europe.  
The popular political upheavals of 1989 began in Poland and Hungary, which according 
to Goldman were always less tightly controlled by party leaders and the Kremlin than other 
Central and East European countries.160
                                                 
160 GOLDMAN Minton, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Political, Economic, and 
social Challenges, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997, p. 29. 
 In Poland, deteriorating economic conditions and 
increased political tension, with worker’s strikes starting in the spring of 1988 and continuing 
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into the early weeks of 1989, pressed communist leaders to negotiate some form of power 
sharing with the opposition movement Solidarity. Conceding to Round Table Negotiations that 
took place between February and April of 1989, the communists demanded a guaranteed position 
of power in exchange for liberalization. The two sides agreed on partially free elections in which 
the communist coalition (including the Communist Party, the satellite Peasant and Democratic 
parties, and pro-regime Catholic groups) was guaranteed 65% of the seats in the Sejm (the Polish 
Parliament), but had to compete for all of the hundred seats in the newly created Senate. In the 
June elections, Solidarity scored a sweeping and unexpected victory, winning 99 seats in the 
Senate and all contested seats in the Seijm. The newly elected Sejm, where the Communist 
coalition still held a majority, had to vote on a government and a president. In mid-July, the 
incumbent communist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected for president by only one vote, 
because of a revolt among members of the communist-allied parties. By August, these parties, 
constituting 27% of the coalition’s built-in majority, defected, leaving the Communist Party with 
only 38% of the Seijm’s 460 seats.161 No longer controlled by the Communist Party, the 
parliament entrusted Solidarity’s Tadeusz Mazowiecki with forming the first non-communist 
government. His finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, launched Poland’s famous “shock 
therapy” program on January 1st
In Hungary, it was reformers within the party that took the initiative in liberalizing the 
Hungarian communist system, hoping, as Goldman argues, that by acting in a timely fashion 
they could strengthen public support of the party and hold on to leadership.
, 1990.   
162
                                                 
161 BROWN, J. F., Surge to Freedom. The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, Durham, NC, Duke 
University Press, 1991, p. 91. 
 Reformers such as 
Rezso Nyers and Imre Pozsgay worked carefully to gradually decrease conservative influence 
162 GOLDMAN, op.cit., p. 191. 
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within the party. Their initiatives in 1988 and 1989 led to changes in the Communist Party 
leadership and to the emergence of opposition political groups. Following Poland’s example, in 
March 1989, the Communist Party started Round Table Negotiations with nine opposition 
groups already organized in the so-called Opposition Round Table. A Round Table Agreement 
was signed in September 1989, scheduling free democratic elections for March 1990. Despite its 
reformist orientation, the Communist Party (now renamed Hungarian Socialist Party) performed 
very poorly at the elections, largely because of its failure to defend the Hungarian minority in 
Transylvania during the Romanian revolution of December 1989.163
Events took on a different course in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Communist 
regimes there did not negotiate with opposition forces but instead were brought down by mass 
pressure. In East Germany, the conservative regime of Eric Honecker rejected Soviet policies of 
glasnost and perestroika and continued to crush any sign of opposition. Because it was repressed 
for so long, argues Goldman, when opposition did appear it was all the more explosive.
 Instead, it was competition 
among the anti-communist parties that took center stage in the run-up to the 1990 elections. The 
main contenders were the Hungarian Democratic Forum, advocating gradual changes, and the 
Alliance of Free Democrats, favoring a rapid transition to a free-market economy. The Forum 
won the elections, whereas the Alliance came in second. Thus, Jozsef Antall, who gained 
popularity during the Round Table negotiations, proceeded to form Hungary’s first post-
communist democratically elected government. 
164
                                                 
163 Ibid., p. 194. 
 
Massive emigration of disgruntled young people, disillusioned with prospects of political 
liberalization and improved living conditions, marked the beginning of the end of the GDR 
regime and the GDR itself. In August 1989, Hungary removed border restrictions and opened its 
164 Ibid., p. 162. 
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border with Austria.165 In a couple of months more than 13,000 people left East Germany 
through Hungary and onto Austria and West Germany. 166  This was in addition to the thousands 
East Germans piling in front of the West German embassy in Prague. In September, the Monday 
demonstrations started in Leipzig. Prayers for peace at the Lutheran Nikolaikirche in Leipzig 
grew into regular protests against the regime gathering as much as 320,000 people. By October 
mass demonstrations had spread to Dresden and Berlin with public anger building up as the 
celebrations of GRD’s 40th anniversary approached. At the festivities, Gorbachev criticized 
Honecker for his failure to follow the tide of political liberalization and stated that “the USSR 
does not impose models for development. With the new realities each country is free to choose 
its path. GDR’s problems are solved in Berlin, not in Moscow.”167 Gorbachev’s speech 
unleashed another wave of demonstrations that did not subside even after Honecker resigned and 
was replaced by the slightly more liberal Egon Krenz. On November 9th, 1989 sections of the 
Berlin Wall were opened and thousands of East Germans crossed into Western Berlin. Following 
the fall of the Wall, the Communist party (SED) resigned and free elections were scheduled for 
March 1990. The East German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), an opposition party in 
support of German reunification established as a branch of the governing West German Christian 
Democratic Union, won the elections. The SED (renamed to Party of Democratic Socialism) 
scored only 16.45% of the vote. CPU’s victory, argues Goldman, was a signal to West German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl to move ahead with reunification.168
                                                 
165 Allowing GDR citizens to cross to Austria, was the most significant foreign policy decision any 
Hungarian communist government had made since Imre Nagy’s fateful declaration of neutrality in 1956, 
argues Brown. BROWN, 1991, op.cit.,  p. 120. 
 The CDU formed a coalition 
166 The Berlin Wall (1961-1989), German Notes, available online at:  
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government headed by Lothar de Maiziere who started negotiations for the German reunification 
that took place on October 3rd
Similarly to the GRD, the Czechoslovak leadership was dominated by hardliner 
communists, known as the “normalization” bloc. Events in neighboring Poland and Hungary 
made it increasingly difficult for the Czechoslovak regime to repress opposition forces, but the 
final blow came with the deteriorating situation in the GDR. The thousands of East Germans in 
front of the West German embassy in Prague in the summer of 1989 demoralized the 
Czechoslovak regime and encouraged its opponents. In August, there were already 
demonstrations in Prague commemorating the 1968 invasion. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
resignation of Eric Honecker further boosted the confidence of Czechoslovak people. 
Demonstrations spread to other cities, including Bratislava. The brutal repression of a peaceful 
student demonstration in Prague on November 17, 1989 gave a decisive impulse to opposition 
forces. In the following days, Vaclav Havel founded the Civic Forum, an organization designed 
to direct and coordinate the growing popular surge, and called a demonstration in Prague that 
gathered three quarter of a million people.
, 1990. 
169
                                                 
169 BROWN, 1991, op.cit., p. 178. 
 The series of cabinet changes and steps to liberalize 
the political system undertaken by the Communist party failed to appease the crowd. Popular 
pressure led to the resignation of Gustav Husak as state president and the election of Vaclav 
Havel by the Prague Parliament as his replacement on December 29, 1989. The first post-
communist democratic elections were scheduled for June. The Civic Forum and its counterpart in 
Slovakia, Public Against Violence, won a majority both at the federal and republic levels. 
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Discredited by their failed leadership of the country, the communists received only 15% of the 
votes in the Czech Federal Republic and 13% in Slovakia.170
Bulgaria and Romania found themselves lagging behind the wave of political 
liberalization spreading across the region. A day after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bulgarian 
Communist Party took preemptive action by removing its long-time leader Todor Zhivkov. 
Though this act was initiated within the Party itself, subsequent events discussed below, took on 
a momentum beyond the party’s control, eventually leading to the end of communist rule in 
Bulgaria. 
 
In Romania, demonstrations against the regime started in December in the largely 
inhabited by ethnic Hungarian population town of Timisoara, over the attempted arrest of a 
Hungarian Reformed Church pastor and defender of Hungarian rights, Laszlo Tokes. The 
demonstrations were met with police brutality resulting in nearly 100 dead. Instead of restoring 
order, the brutality further provoked popular unrest that spread to other parts of the country, 
including Bucharest. Oblivious of the growing level of popular hostility, Romanian party leader 
Nicolae Ceausescu called a pro-communist rally in Bucharest demanding an end to anti-
government protests. At the rally, Ceausescu was met with unprecedented jeers and left in 
confusion. Street fighting erupted when the security services attempted to suppress the 
protestors. At this key moment, the army joined the protestors causing serious fighting between 
members of the security service and the armed forces. Civilians were caught in the crossfire, 
leaving at least 1,104 dead.171 Former Ceausescu lieutenant, Ion Illiescu, took the opportunity to 
seize power. He formed the National Salvation Front (NSF) on December 21st
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171 VACHUDOVA Milada Anna, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after 
Communism, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 41. 
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and his wife Elena were captured and executed following a quick show trial. The execution 
ordered by Illiescu was broadcasted on national television. Illiescu’s National Salvation Front 
took the role of an interim government, committing to organize free elections in May 1990. The 
weak and fractious opposition was unable to advance an alternative program to the FSN. The 
FSN won both the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections and Illiescu won the 1990 and the 
1992 presidential elections with 85% and 61% of the vote respectively.  Illiescu kept the bulk of 
Ceausescu’s apparatus and protected members of the much feared Securitate secret service, 
including those responsible for the December 1989 violence. Using economic populism and 
nationalism, Vachudova contends, Illiescu and his National Salvation Front “kidnapped” the 
Romanian Revolution.172
Initial excitement over the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe gradually gave way 
to frustration with the high social cost of the transition and the rise of communist nostalgia. In 
Poland, the reformed communist party, SLD, won the 1993 elections with 37% of the vote and 
formed a coalition with the ex-communist satellite Polish Peasant Party (PLS). Together they 
controlled 66% of the Sejm until the 1997 elections.
  
173
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 In 1994, former communists won absolute 
majorities both in Hungary and Bulgaria. The Hungarian Socialist Party chose to invite the 
centrist liberal Alliance for Free Democrats in a coalition that controlled parliament until the 
1998 elections. Though its name changed twice, Illiescu’s party of former communists held 
continuously power in Romania until 1996, when its extreme right-wing rhetoric caused it an 
electoral loss to Emile Constantinescu and his Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR). After 
Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce in 1993, Slovakia fell victim to nationalist rhetoric. The 
173 Ibid., p. 29. 
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discredited leader of the opposition movement Public Against Violence, Vladimir Meciar, 
formed his own party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and returned to power in 
1994, establishing a nationalist government. With Vaclav Klaus’s government in power, 
supported by two post-Civic Forum parties controlling 53% in parliament, the Czech Republic 
seemed to be the only one staying on the reform track. The return of former communists to 
power in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria meant a shift away from shock therapy and towards a 
gradual reform that translated into a slowdown, even reversal of reform efforts. The right-wing 
rhetoric of the Iliescu and Meciar’s governments further threatened the future of democratization 
in Eastern Europe. Many analysts reported that the region was under a real threat of re-
communization.  
Despite setbacks in reform policies, some countries visibly progressed in their 
democratization efforts. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic moved considerably ahead, 
gaining NATO membership in 1999 and joining the European Union in 2004. Even Slovakia 
managed to recover from the damaging Meciar rule and joined the EU and NATO in 2004. 
Bulgaria and Romania were once more lagging behind. Despite new reform-oriented democratic 
governments in Romania and Bulgaria, taking power in 1996 and 1997 respectively, the two 
countries were slow in their reform policies which were continuously obstructed by inefficient 
judicial systems and wide-spread corruption. Although Bulgaria and Romania were granted 
NATO membership in 2004 and EU membership in 2007, they remain behind other East 
European countries in their level of political and economic development. 
  102 
4.2 EVENTS IN BULGARIA 1989-2000 
The wave of popular unrest across Eastern Europe inevitably influenced the situation in Bulgaria. 
Bulgarians were anxiously following the events in Eastern Europe, reported by BBC, Deutsche 
Welle, and Radio Free Europe, which were no longer jammed.174 Emerging dissident 
organizations were growing bolder and broadening their support. The communist regime, by 
contrast, was increasingly under pressure. In addition to the threat of popular unrest spreading to 
Bulgaria as well and continuous criticisms from Moscow of Zhivkov’s failure to follow the 
Soviet reform path, the Bulgarian regime was under fierce attacks from the international 
community for its treatment of the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Zhivkov’s assimilation 
campaign (a.k.a. the renaming process) of the ethnic Turks launched in 1984 provoked a growing 
unrest among the Turkish minority.175 In May 1989, tension escalated with hunger strikes, mass 
protests, and clashes with the militia, where people on both sides were wounded and killed.176 
The government responded by issuing exit visas and encouraging ethnic Turks to “return” to 
Turkey. The so-called “long excursion” forced some 850,000177
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resulting in a severe crisis in Bulgarian-Turkish relations and an outcry from the international 
community.178
In an attempt to repair Bulgaria’s international image, Zhivkov decided to allow 
unofficial opposition groups more latitude than ever before during the ecological conference 
under CSCE auspices scheduled in Sofia between October 16 and November 3, 1989 –  a serious 
miscalculation on Zhivkov’s part according to Brown.
 
179 The dissident ecological movement, 
Ecoglasnost, took advantage of the presence of CSCE delegates and Western journalists and 
organized an ecological protest on October 26th. The militia encountered the protest with 
brutality – exactly what Ecoglasnost was hoping for – resulting in another publicized pounding 
of the Bulgarian regime in Western media. Empowered by the reaction in Western media, 
Ecoglasnost gathered a much larger crowd on November 3rd.180
At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) on 
November 10, 1989, Todor Zhivkov was removed from his position as General Secretary of the 
Party, putting an end to his 35-year rule.  Much as the Zhivkov leadership may have been shaken 
by the unprecedented demonstration, Brown argues, it was not the demonstration that caused its 
downfall.
 This time, the protesters were not 
prevented from marching to parliament and submitting their petition. Fearing a growing wave of 
protests, the communist regime opted for preemptive action. 
181
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 Zhivkov’s removal, coming a day after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was organized by 
a group of reform-oriented members of Politburo and is therefore characterized by many as a 
“court coup.” Such decision was not made without Moscow’s blessing. According to Nikita 
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Tolubeev, Soviet diplomat in Bulgaria at the time, the deposition of Zhivkov was actively 
supported by Soviet diplomats and KGB agents.182 Zhivkov’s reluctance to follow Gorbachev’s 
policy of glasnost and perestroika had placed him at odds with Soviet leadership, which in turn 
created an opportunity for his opponents within the BCP to organize. Zhivkov was replaced by 
Petar Mladenov, formerly a Minister of Foreign Affairs, who exemplified reformist views and 
was favored both by Moscow and by a large part of the Bulgarian population. Mladenov initially 
envisioned a reform of the party, not of the system. Bulgaria, he claimed, had long ago chosen 
the path of socialism, and would not now depart from it.183 His group of reformers attempted to 
preserve the hegemony of the Communist party by means of changes in personnel and through 
the introduction of limited economic and political liberalization. Their initial program, 
Karasimeonov argues, did not intend the abolition of socialism.184
4.2.1 First Post-Communist Governments, 1989-1991 
 The events set in motion, 
however, proved to be beyond the Party’s control. 
The party plenum of November 10, 1989 unleashed a wave of excitement and euphoria. The 
removal of Zhivkov came as a surprise to the mass population and Bulgarian dissidents alike. In 
contrast to dissidents in other East European countries, Baeva argues, Bulgarian dissidents were 
more of observers than participants in these early days of the transition.185
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by the BCP signaled opposition forces in the country to take immediate action. In a matter of 
days, an array of opposition groups emerged. In addition to already existing dissident 
organizations such as the Club for Glasnost and Perestroika and Ecoglasnost, pre-communist 
political parties were reinstated and new organizations were founded. These seemingly scattered 
formations quickly coordinated their actions and started organizing mass protests. Not more than 
a week after Zhivkov’s deposition the first large political rally took place. A major demand at the 
rally was repealing Article 1 of the Constitution, granting the BCP monopoly over political 
power. Similar rallies and demonstrations were spreading across the country, showing an aroused 
citizenry eager for change. Whether Zhivkov’s removal signaled an intention for real reforms or 
whether it was a desperate action on the part of the Party to preserve socialism with a few quick 
fixes, was no longer relevant. The crowd was in the streets in the thousands and opposition 
forces were organizing.  
On December 7, 1989,  14 organizations including the newly reinstated parties and 
existing dissident movements came together to form the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), 
which was to become the face of the organized opposition in the subsequent years. The UDF 
consisted of organizations representing the entire political spectrum, from a left-wing Social-
Democratic Party to a right-wing Republican Party. They were united under the banner of 
democratization and the understanding that they stood as political opposition to BCP and were 
not its partner in perestroika.186 According to its founding declaration, UDF stood for civil 
society, political pluralism, multi-party system, rule of law, and market economy.187
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establishing of the UDF meant that the Communist party was now facing a unified opposition 
which was determined to disband the totalitarian system and which demanded a stake in the new 
political arrangements. As Melone points out, communist leaders were faced with two choices – 
either pursue the Chinese solution of brutal repression or seek accommodation with the emerging 
forces.188 In marked distinction to the situation in 1944, Moser contends, nobody in a position of 
authority was willing to resort to the use of force.189
Following the example of other East European countries, the Communist party and the 
newly formed opposition agreed on Round Table Negotiations to discuss the terms of the 
transition to a new political system. Participation in a Round Table was the main reason for 
founding the UDF, recounts Simeonov. “We knew very well that the Round Table would 
legitimize us as the opposition political force by the mere fact that we were sitting opposite the 
BCP.”
 In light of the events in other East European 
countries and the obvious unwillingness of Soviet leadership to maintain military and political 
hegemony in Eastern Europe, communist leaders chose negotiation. 
190
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 By choosing the road of negotiation, in turn, BCP sought to secure its future in a multi-
party system. What followed from January through March 1990 in Bulgaria was something like 
“government by Roundtable,” as Moser defines it. Agreements reached at the Round Table were 
passed on to the National Assembly which, as agreed, was granting them formal approval. The 
Round Table had two main tasks – to guarantee peaceful transition to a parliamentary democracy 
and to negotiate the terms of the first free democratic elections. For the purpose, all sides of the 
Round Table agreed upon a code of conduct that would assure a civilized and non-violent 
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transition to a democratic political system. Convinced of its victory in a free election run-off with 
BCP, UDF forwarded the idea of electing a Great National Assembly, as opposed to an ordinary 
National Assembly, the purpose of which would be to craft a new democratic constitution. UDF 
envisioned that constitution as the foundation of the new democracy and a necessary step in 
disbanding the totalitarian regime. Thus, Bulgaria became the only East European country to tie 
the first democratic elections to the adoption of a new constitution. The timing of the election 
was a major point of contention. The Communists were pushing for an early date in order to give 
little time to the opposition to organize. UDF, possessing nothing comparable to the communist 
party structures, favored delay so that it would be able to establish a nation-wide network. The 
compromise date of June 10th
Since the deposition of Zhivkov and throughout the Round Table Negotiations, BCP was 
undergoing a continuous and significant transformation. As early as December 1989, the Party 
issued a formal apology for the “renaming process” of 1984-1989 and voted a resolution for 
reinstating the original names of ethnic Turks.  In January, the communist Parliament repealed 
Article 1 of the Constitution on the leading role of the Party. BCP further proceeded to exclude 
from the party many of its high-ranking members who had “discredited themselves” and who 
were conveniently held “as directly responsible for the crisis, deformations and crimes 
perpetrated within the party and in society.”
, 1990 was fairly close to the communist demand and ultimately 
proved to BSP’s electoral advantage. 
191 Leadership positions were distributed among the 
November 10th 
                                                 
191 Bulgarian Socialist Party: Documents – 1991-1993, Sofia, Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council, 
1993, pp. 32. 
plotters – Petar Mladenov becoming head of state, Andrei Lukanov prime-
minister, and Alexander Lilov leader of the party. At its extraordinary congress in February 
1990, the Party adopted a Manifesto for Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria, which outlined the 
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steps for radically transforming BCP into a new party of democratic socialism.192 In April that 
year the Bulgarian Communist Party renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and 
declared its willingness to join the socialist international. By the time of the June elections, the 
Communist party had managed to refurbish itself with a new name, new platform, and new 
leadership. During the election campaign, BSP presented itself as the defender of the “national 
interest,” protector of the Bulgarian voter from the harsh consequences of market reform, and 
pioneer in democratization efforts. To quote BSP’s official documents, “The overall 
democratization of the Bulgarian society is the major political merit of the BSP,” since “[a]fter 
November 10th 1989, reformer party leaders restored the free political life, democratic rights and 
freedoms, and repealed the constitutional provision on the leading role of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party in society.193
The elections for Great National Assembly were won by a large margin by BSP. The 
opposition, who in Vachudova’s view considered the elections a simple referendum on 
communist rule and expected a sweeping victory, was taken by surprise and dismay.
 As election results demonstrated, this interpretation of events 
appealed to the majority of Bulgarian voters.  
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international observers did report some abuses, particularly intimidation in the countryside, the 
elections were declared fair and the results made official. With 47.15% of the vote, the former 
communists received 211 seats in parliament, the democratic opposition – 114, and the ethnic 
Turkish party, Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) – 24. Thus, Bulgaria joined Romania 
in becoming the only two East European countries where former communists won the first 
democratic elections. BSP’s victory also meant that the new constitution was to be crafted by a 
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parliament dominated by former communists, a fact which later on caused a considerable number 
of UDF deputies to boycott the vote on the new constitution. As several authors have argued, the 
BSP appeared embarrassed to a degree by the outcome of the election, as it did not wish to form 
a government by itself but share the burden of governing (Kalinova & Baeva 2006, 
Karasimeonov 1997, Moser 1994). Consequently, the BSP repeatedly sought to bring other 
political forces into a “government of national consensus.” Proposals for coalition were rejected 
by UDF as well as all other political forces in Parliament, who wished neither to be associated 
with BSP nor to relieve it of the responsibility for the imminent economic and political crisis. 
The former communists found themselves in isolation. 
Executive power during the Round Table Negotiations and after the elections remained in 
the hands of the perpetrators of the change of November 10th. Andrei Lukanov formed the first 
exclusively communist government195 in February 1990, and in April, Petar Mladenov was 
appointed president by the communist parliament with the consent of the Round Table 
participants. Mladenov’s appointment was short-lived as he was forced to resign in July due to a 
political scandal implicating him.196
                                                 
195 Previous communist governments were nominally a coalition between BCP and the Bulgarian Agrarian 
People’s Union (BAPU), though BAPU was not actually an independent political organization. 
 After much deliberation in the new Great National 
Assembly, a compromise was reached and Zhelyu Zhelev, the leader of UDF and a well-known 
dissident, was elected president by parliament. Despite a communist-dominated parliament and a 
communist government, the appointment of Zhelyu Zhelev as president was symbolically 
important since it gave the opposition an active participation in state institutions and, in 
196 Petar Mladenov was forced to resign as head of state on June 6, 1990. His resignation was brought 
about by mass student protests, after a tape was released catching Mladenov uttering the notorious “bring 
the tanks” phrase at a December 14, 1989 demonstration in front of the parliament building. Mladenov 
repeatedly denied having uttered these words, which is what spurred the public protest. 
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Castellan’s words, “marked the official end of the communist period in Bulgarian history.”197 
Soon after Zhelev’s appointment, Lukanov resigned his position as prime-minister due to 
worsening economic conditions in the country and his inability to gather support for his 
economic reform program. Lukanov was immediately given a mandate to form another 
government. Given BSP’s absolute majority in parliament and the unwillingness of other 
political forces to participate in a BSP-led coalition, this second Lukanov cabinet was also 
strictly communist.198
The fiasco of the second Lukanov government and the deepening political and economic 
crisis forced political forces to reach a compromise. Ultimately, Dimitar Popov, a politically 
independent municipal court judge, was entrusted with forming a coalition government to 
include representatives from BSP, UDF, and BAPU. The main task of this government was to 
carry out reforms while the new constitution was being crafted and prepare elections for an 
ordinary National Assembly. The Popov government quickly enacted painful but necessary 
reforms to promote a free market economy such as an interest rate increase, price liberalization, 
and liberalization of the trade and currency regime. Although such policies resulted in rising 
inflation rates and a decreasing standard of living, the country witnessed relative political 
 This government was no more successful in initiating reform than the 
previous one. An economic crisis leading to food shortages and a rationing (coupon) system, 
continuous mass demonstrations, and a general strike organized both by the pro-socialist and 
pro-democratic labor unions, resulted in the fall of the government in November, 1990. A two-
month governing crisis ensued during which Bulgaria had no official government.  
                                                 
197 CASTELLAN Georges, Histoire Des Balkans, Librairie Artheme Fauard, 1999, Bulgarian translation: 
Plovdiv, Hermes, 2002, p. 545. 
198 Communist and socialist are used interchangeably when referring to the early stages of the transition. 
BSP insisted on calling itself socialist in order to emphasize its change of platform, whereas the 
opposition continued to refer to the party and its members as communist. 
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stability and was moving along with the reforms. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the 
Comecon gave the Popov government an opportunity to pursue a new international orientation. 
Bulgaria started discussions with the European Community, NATO, IMF, the World Bank, 
EBRD, as well as a number of Western countries. During its ten-month rule, the Popov cabinet 
made significant progress towards disbanding totalitarian structures and placing the country on 
the reform track. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Assembly continued its work on the new 
constitution. The Constitution was signed on July 12, 1991 by 309 out of 400 total deputies. 80 
deputies from UDF and the ethnic Turkish party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF), denounced the constitution for having “too many loopholes” and refused to sign it. 
Despite the controversies around it and its considerable shortcomings, the constitution was based 
on general democratic principles.199
The October 1991 elections were won by the UDF, which scored a narrow victory of 110 
seats in parliament as opposed to BSP’s 106. Short of parliamentary majority, UDF sought the 
support of the ethnic Turkish party. MRF did not demand ministerial posts in return for its 
support. Filip Dimitrov, who headed the UDF soon after Zhelev’s appointment as president, 
formed the first UDF government.
 Parliament adjourned as a Constitutional Assembly but 
continued its work on preparing the ordinary National Assembly elections in October. 
200
                                                 
199 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., pp. 273-277. The full text of the Constitution is available online at: 
http://www.online.bg/law/const/const1_b.htm 
 Despite the narrow margin, UDF was ecstatic about its 
victory and eager to embark on a policy of radical reforms. Its confidence and determination was 
further boosted by the outcome of the January 1992 presidential elections whereby the 
incumbent democratic president, Zhelyu Zhelev, defeated the independent candidate Velko 
200 Zhelev was succeeded by Petar Beron as UDF leader. Beron resigned this position after BSP publicized 
his involvement with the former security services. 
  112 
Vulkanov, who was backed up by BSP.201
4.2.2 Governments under the New Constitution 
 With the election of Zhelev for president, UDF was 
assured firm control over executive power.  
De-communization became the main theme of Dimitrov’s government. Its economic reform was 
based on restitution of land and property nationalized during the communist regime (See Chapter 
Eight, p. 272-28?). This strategy proved slow and ineffective in stimulating economic growth 
and still today is harshly criticized for fragmenting the land and destroying large-scale 
agriculture. Another objective of Dimitrov’s government was purging bureaucratic structures of 
the communist nomenklatura. Although the several de-communization bills submitted to 
parliament were never voted into law, extensive purges were conducted in the state 
administration, particularly the foreign ministry, the police, and the army.202 Dimitrov also 
attempted to prosecute a number of former high-ranking party functionaries, including Lukanov 
who spent five months in the arrest until criminal charges against him were being investigated.203
                                                 
201 BSP’s decision not to nominate its own candidate is another indication of BSP’s unwillingness to bear 
the burden of governing in a time of crisis. 
 
Dimitrov’s strong anti-communist stance alienated some of his sympathizers, including the 
president. Zhelev openly criticized the government for “pursuing a strategy of confrontation,” a 
criticism which triggered a split within UDF. Labor Unions, whose role in UDF’s electoral 
202 These purges were limited to political appointments and their effect was quickly reversed with the next 
change of government. 
203 “Lukanov’s passport was confiscated following Tatarchev and Sokolov’s orders. The diplomatic 
passports of 47 other former high-ranking party and state officials will be confiscated in order to prevent 
them from leaving the country, as they are related to No. 4 trial,” Rabotnichesko Delo, March 10, 1992.  
“Andrei Lukanov is arrested,” Rabotnichesko Delo, July 10, 1992. 
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victory was crucial, retrieved their support for the government as did high-ranking army officers 
alarmed by the prospects of purges in the military. 
By October 1992, Filip Dimitrov was facing a confrontation with the UDF president 
Zhelev and a split within his party, a withdrawal of support by the labor unions and threats of a 
general strike, deteriorating relations with MRF who felt they had not been rewarded for their 
loyal support, and repeated requests on behalf of BSP for a non-confidence vote in parliament. 
As a solution to the governing crisis, Dimitrov decided to ask for a vote of confidence which, if 
passed, would secure the government’s legitimacy and allow it to continue with its reforms. The 
government lost the vote and was forced to resign, prematurely ending UDF’s rule in a little over 
a year.204
After the collapse of the UDF government, the mandate to form a new cabinet fell onto 
the second party in parliament, BSP. The Socialists had little desire to govern over a Parliament 
where they held no majority. Making several unacceptable proposals for prime minister, they 
passed the mandate to MRF, the third political force. MRF formed a coalition with the Socialists 
and 19 members of parliament who had left UDF’s parliamentary group, gathering enough votes 
to assure approval of its cabinet on December 30, 1992. The MRF proposed a government under 
the leadership of Lyuben Berov, an economic historian and former advisor to president Zhelev. 
 Despite criticisms, Dimitrov’s government introduced essential market reforms and 
greatly improved Bulgaria’s relations with the West. During its rule, Bulgaria was accepted into 
the Council of Europe, submitted candidacy for association with the European Community, and 
developed close relations with the US. Bulgaria was also the first country to recognize 
Macedonia’s independence, a bold but logical step in assuring stability in the region.  
                                                 
204 Dimitrov lost the vote of confidence by 111-120. In his own view, it is possible that MRF had voted 
against him but he does not discount the possibility that members of his own party brought him down, 
whereas MRF deputies supported him. Interview with Filip Dimitrov, Sofia, June 15th, 2007. 
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Though carrying an MRF mandate, Berov’s cabinet had only one MRF representative (of 
Bulgarian ethnicity) and claimed to be an expert government with wide political support. Berov 
announced his intent to continue to follow UDF’s strategy for economic transition to a market 
economy and declared privatization of state property and attracting foreign investment the main 
goals of his cabinet. Without stable party and parliamentary support, however, Berov was unable 
to implement his policies. BSP was firmly against his plan to privatize state enterprises, and his 
economic reform program, condemned by the IMF, failed to attract foreign investment. Thus, 
Berov’s rule became characterized by a slow-down of reforms, blossoming of economic and 
criminal power cliques, drastic increase in crime, and further deterioration of economic 
conditions.205
By 1994 the government fell increasingly under the influence of the Socialists, who 
managed to dictate changes in government to their advantage. Due to its weak political power, 
Berov’s government never escaped domination by group and corporate interests (Kanev & 
Karasimeonov 1997, Moser 1994) and its rule became synonymous with mafia-linked 
corporations such as Multigroup.
 
206
                                                 
205 Compared to 1989, by 1994 GDP had decreased by 24.4%, industrial production by 49.3%, 
construction by 72%, agricultural production by 30% (Quoted in KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 291). 
Meanwhile, unemployment had reached 20.5% and the inflation rate for 1994 was 121%. The situation 
was further exacerbated by the embargo on Yugoslavia which cost Bulgaria a loss of some $2 billion 
(Quoted in CASTELLAN, op.cit., p. 546). 
 In light of the divisions in UDF and the resulted decrease of 
its parliamentary group from 110 to under 80 members, BSP was looking forward to early 
elections and thus declared that Berov’s cabinet had exhausted itself. Since the president had also 
withdrawn his support of the government, Berov was forced to resign in September 1994. Early 
elections were scheduled for December. In the meantime the country was governed by a 
206 For a detailed and accurate description of Multigroup and its activities, see Venelin GANEV, Praying 
on the State, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2007, pp. 100-112. 
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provisional government of non-party functionaries appointed by the president, under the 
premiership of Reneta Indzhova, chair of the Agency for Privatization.  
Deteriorating economic conditions and high crime rates led to communist nostalgia 
among the population, which translated into a decisive electoral victory for the Socialists, 
winning 125 of the 240 seats in parliament. Many Bulgarians, Baeva argues, hoped that BSP 
would be able to bring back socialism along with the calmness and security of life before the 
transition.207 The new government headed by BSP’s young new leader, Zhan Videnov, indeed 
tried to do just that. Despite assurances that reform towards market economy would continue, 
Western observers soon warned against the threat of re-communization. As Castellan puts it, 
instead of “wild capitalism,” BSP’s “golden boy” preferred “market socialism,” based on 
relations with Russia.208
Re-subsidizing losing state enterprises put heavy weight on the state budget and resulted 
in budget imbalances that ultimately pressed IMF to break its agreement with the country. Re-
subsidizing also created the opportunity for draining state enterprises through entrance-exit 
strategies,
 Videnov’s promise to increase the standard of living entailed a policy of 
re-subsidizing unprofitable state enterprises, slowing down of the restitution process, reversing 
the privatization of agriculture, and excluding foreign investors from privatization deals.  Such 
policies were accompanied by purges in the public media and a return of Zhivkov-era party 
functionaries to ministerial positions.  
209
                                                 
207 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op. cit. p. 294. 
 allowing state enterprise managers and their associates to harvest considerable 
208 CASTELLAN, op.cit., p. 546. 
209 Entrance-exit strategy refers to the practice of setting up firms at the “entrance” and “exit” of a state 
enterprise. Those firms are usually owned by family members or associates of the manager of the state 
enterprise. Firms at the “entrance” of the state enterprise supply production materials at a price above the 
market value. Firms at the “exit” of the state enterprise buy out the finished product at a price below the 
market value. The losses are covered by state subsidies, whereas the profit is collected by the “entrance” 
and “exit” firms.  
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profits at the expense of the state. BSP’s policy of mass privatization210 excluded foreign 
investors, depriving the country of much needed foreign capital, and gave favorable state credits 
to Bulgarian business, thus catering to the former communists who, according to Vachudova, 
controlled much of the private economy.211 Lenient policy towards the banking sector led to the 
uncontrolled export of capital, unsecured loans to shady financial-industrial establishments, and 
financial pyramids exploiting the high interest rate. In the meantime, the Bulgarian lev was 
losing 30% of its value weekly.212
The BSP government had clearly failed in fulfilling its campaign promises. The 
population was impoverished and disillusioned causing about 650,000 young people to emigrate 
to between 1989 and 1996.
 By March 1996, the country was in the middle of a deep 
banking and currency crisis. 
213
                                                 
210 Mass privatization programs refer to transferring state assets to the population at large through a 
voucher system entitling every citizen to participate in the privatization process. Mass privatization in 
Bulgaria defeated its purpose as privatization funds succeeded in buying out 80% of the voucher books 
from the population at very low price and acquired 87% of shares purchased at auctions. For a detailed 
account of mass privatization in Bulgaria, see Jeffrey MILLER, “Evaluation of Mass Privatization in 
Bulgaria,” William Davidson Institute Working Paper # 814, March 2006.  
 The results of the second presidential election in November 1996 
became a vote on BSP’s rule. The UDF candidate Petar Stoyanov, who had defeated the 
incumbent president Zhelev in the country’s first open primaries, scored a convincing victory 
over the Socialist candidate. While the UDF was celebrating its victory, the Socialists suffered an 
internal split with 19 BSP deputies demanding Videnov’s resignation. To make matters even 
worse for Videnov’s cabinet, in December the country was hit by a severe wheat crisis. A poor 
harvest and illegal exports caused a serious grain shortage and a twenty-fold increase in bread 
prices. This unprecedented economic crisis and a rampant hyperinflation which led to massive 
211 VACHUDOVA, op.cit., p. 51. 
212 CASTELLAN, op.cit., 547. 
213 BROWN J. F., The Groves of Change. Eastern Europe at the Turn of the Millennium, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 2001, p. 98. Emigration, argues Brown, is the most tangible expression of the 
dolefulness and pessimism that pervade the whole country. 
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pauperization of a vast majority of Bulgarian citizens,214
Emboldened by its convincing victory in the presidential elections, UDF demanded early 
parliamentary elections and started organizing mass demonstrations in the capital. In the 
meantime, the pro-democratic labor union “Podkrepa” declared a general strike. After a month of 
protests, with crowds barricading MPs in the parliament building, blockades in the center of the 
city, and no public transportation, the new president Stoyanov agreed with the Socialist-
dominated parliament on early elections in April. Once again the country found itself governed 
by a provisional government appointed by the president. The task of the new premier Stefan 
Sofiyanski, former UDF mayor of Sofia, was to take immediate steps for taming the crisis and to 
prepare the early elections. Due to the crisis situation, Sofiyanski’s provisional government was 
given unprecedented political power. Sofiyanski wasted no time. During its two-month rule, his 
government signed an agreement with IMF, imposing a currency board still in place today, 
which put the banking and currency crisis under control, and submitted an application for NATO 
membership.  
 forced the BSP government to resign in 
the face of wide-spread street protests and riots outside the parliament building. Videnov’s 
prematurely ended rule, is remembered also for taking an important step in submitting Bulgaria’s 
application for membership to the European Union. With the expiring mandate of president 
Zhelev, a government in resignation, and a Parliament on Christmas break, Bulgaria met the 
New Year literally without a government. 
In preparation for the early elections, political forces in the country underwent some 
important changes. The new UDF leader, Ivan Kostov, who had served as financial minister in 
                                                 
214 The consumer price index shot up to 43.6% in January and 242.7% in February, the exchange rate 
reached a record level of 3,000 BGL = $1 in mid-February, a four-fold increase from December 1996. See, 
Garabet MINASSIAN, “The Road to Economic Disaster in Bulgaria,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2 
(Mar., 1998), pp. 331-349, p. 342. 
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the Popov and Dimitrov governments, managed to unite center-left, center-right, and right-wing 
opposition forces in a coalition, the United Democratic Forces (UnDF). The UDF, in turn, 
transformed itself into a centralized party of Christian-democratic type. In the meantime, 
dissenting members of BSP’s parliamentary group, critical of Videnov’s rule, came together to 
form the Euroleft, a party, as suggested by its name, with left, but pro-European orientation. The 
disastrous outcome of BSP’s rule predetermined the election results. The United Democratic 
Forces scored a sweeping victory with 52.26 % of the vote, gaining an absolute majority in 
parliament with 137 of the total 240 seats. By contrast, BSP’s parliamentary group shrank to 58 
MPs and the Euroleft party won 14 seats. The MRF-led coalition, Alliance for National 
Salvation, received 19 seats. 
With the 1997 elections Bulgaria entered a new era in its development. The new 
Democratic government of Ivan Kostov became the first Bulgarian post-communist government 
to fulfill its four year term. Kostov was faced with the urgent need for rapid reform of the 
Bulgarian economic and social sectors and restoring international credibility to Bulgarian 
institutions. Supported by the president and enjoying tremendous legitimacy among the 
population, Kostov’s cabinet started strict market-oriented economic and financial policies that 
turned around the Bulgarian economy from a negative growth and hyperinflation in 1996 to an 
impressive 4% growth and 9% inflation rate in 1998.215  Kostov’s policies laid the foundations 
for stable economic growth and brought political and financial stability to the country. UDF’s 
firm reform policy, argues Vachudova, moved the country visibly into qualifying for EU 
membership.216
                                                 
215 “The Wrong Job?, The Economist, U.S. Edition, July 21, 2001. 
  
216 VACHUDOVA, op.cit., p. 203. 
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Despite its undeniable success in repairing the economy and orienting the country 
towards NATO and EU memberships, Kostov’s government fell short of its promises to bring 
justice to the people responsible for the large-scale speculations that occurred during the 
hyperinflation period.217 Though government policies brought about a gradual and steady 
improvement in the standard of living, people loathed seeing well-connected crooks prosper 
apparently without Kostov doing much to restrain them.218 Consequently, the government was 
never able to dissipate critiques of corruption, clientelism, and illegal privatization deals lacking 
transparency. Nine months before the 2001 elections, government approval ratings fell to a 
record low of 28%.219  Public opinion polls similarly showed the share of Bulgarians expressing 
distrust of their government more than doubling from 25% in 1997 to 52% in 2000.220 Relying 
on its record of having saved the country from economic disaster, UDF received a severe blow in 
the 2001 elections receiving a mere 18.18% of the vote (BSP scored even lower with 17.15%).221
                                                 
217 During the hyperinflation many of the large debtors of Bulgarian banks profited by borrowing large 
amounts of money (official estimates place the total amount around 2 trillion leva – roughly the 
equivalent of annual payments of the Bulgarian pension system at the time - and the list of debtors 
around 11 000), not without help from within the banking system and the inaction of the Central Bank 
(The Bulgarian National Bank). Those people, known as the “credit millionaires,” never repaid more than 
a fraction of their debts and were never subject to any serious and broad legal persecution.  
 
Nevertheless, Kostov’s rule marks a cornerstone in political development in Bulgaria. During 
that period, political stability was firmly established as well as a common vision of Bulgaria’s 
future – political forces, including BSP which previous opposed alliance with NATO, agreed that 
membership in NATO and the EU should be Bulgaria’s main priorities. 
218 “The Wrong Job?, The Economist, U.S. Edition, July 21, 2001. 
219 Source: National Center for Research on Public Opinion (NCIOM). 
220 BARANY Zoltan, “Bulgaria’s Royal Elections,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 
141-155p. 148. 
221 The 2001 elections were won by the National Movement Simeon Second (NDSV), a party established 
shortly before the election and headed by Bulgaria’s exiled king, Simeon Saxcoburgotski. Electoral results 
source: Bulgarian National Assembly Archive, available online: 
http://parliament.bg/?page=archive&lng=bg&nsid=8 
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4.3 THE DIFFERENT CONTEXT OF ELITE TRANSFORMATION IN BULGARIA 
The course and pace of the Bulgarian transition significantly differed from that in other East 
European countries. Change in Bulgaria was initiated from within the Communist party, which 
preemptively reacted to democratization processes spreading throughout Eastern Europe, as 
opposed to being the result of popular pressure. Bulgaria was one of the two countries where 
former communists won the first democratic elections and the only country to tie the first 
democratic elections to a new constitution. According to Vachudova, these were factors that 
sidetracked and considerably delayed reform.222
There are several factors related to the process of elite transformation that distinguish the 
Bulgarian case from its East European counterparts. The first two, legitimacy of the communist 
regime and dissident movements, pertain to the nature of communist rule in Bulgaria. The 
communist regime in Bulgaria, I contend, enjoyed a relatively high degree of legitimacy for two 
reasons: 1) communist rule in Bulgaria coincided with the process of modernization and 2) the 
Soviet-imposed and nurtured communist regime was not viewed by the majority of the Bulgarian 
population as a form of Soviet invasion, due to the lack of prevalent anti-Russian sentiments in 
the country. Furthermore, the communist period in Bulgaria was marked by a lack of organized 
 Continuous and consistent reform policy was 
not initiated until 1997 when the first government with a clear mandate came to power. Such 
differences in the course of the Bulgarian transition in comparison to other East European 
countries are directly related to the process of elite transformation. Therefore, it is logical to 
expect that elite transformation in Bulgaria would also significantly differ from elite change in 
other East European countries.  
                                                 
222 VACHUDOVA, op. cit., p. 50. 
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dissident activity and contestation of communist power both within and outside the party. High 
legitimacy and lack of dissidence, I argue, are two factors that define the parameters of the 
process of elite transformation in Bulgaria and foreshadow its nature and direction.  
A third characteristic distinguishing Bulgaria from other East European countries is the 
lack of meaningful transitional justice in the post-communist period. Failure to deal with the 
communist past and “cleanse” the political sphere of former high-ranking communist officials is 
a function of the particular nature of elite change in Bulgaria rather than its determining factor. 
Hence, this characteristic differs from the other two not only in pertaining to the post-communist 
context but also in its relationship to elite change. All three characteristics, however, favor the 
status of the former communist elite and indicate that in the Bulgarian case we are most likely to 
find this elite playing a major role in post-communist politics.  
4.3.1 Legitimacy 
One feature distinguishing the communist regime in Bulgaria from similar regimes in Eastern 
Europe was its high degree of legitimacy.223
                                                 
223 Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on 
the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that 
right. STENBERGER Dolf, "Legitimacy," in D.L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1968, Vol. 9, p. 244. 
 In the first place, such legitimacy rested upon the 
unprecedented economic prosperity experienced with the advent of communist rule and the all-
encompassing process of modernization that followed.  On the eve of the Second World War, 
Bulgaria's economy and institutions were dominated by agriculture, which accounted for roughly 
65 percent of national income, occupied 70 percent of the labor force, and accounted for nearly 
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all exports.224 The country was in the initial stages of an industrial revolution with a few food 
processing, tobacco, and textile industries, but no heavy industry, machine manufacturing, or 
chemical industry. Immediately after taking power, the Communist party declared 
industrialization one of its main political tasks.225
Table 2. Population in Bulgaria 1946-1989 (in %) 
 Pursuing an extensive growth strategy 
modeled closely on the Soviet experience, Bulgaria witnessed rapid industrial and agricultural 
growth, structural transformation in favor of industry, and substantial rural-urban migration (see 
table 2 and table 3). 
     1946     1960     1970     1980     1985     1989 
Cities & towns    24.7%    38.0%    53.0%    62.5%    64.9%   67.6% 
Villages    75.3%    62.0%    47.0%    37.5%    35.1%   32.4% 
Source: People’s Republic of Bulgaria 1989, A short Statistical Yearbook, Sofia, Central Statistical Office, 1990. 
Table 3. Structure of GDP and National Income by Branches 
     GDP/Year     1946     1960     1970     1980     1985     1989 
total    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100% 
industry    30.3%    57.0%    62.4%    63.9%    69.1%    69.6% 
agriculture    45.5%    32.6%    16.0%    12.4%    11.0%    10.5% 
construction      8.5%      8.9%      9.0%      9.2%      8.6%      7.8% 
other branches    15.7%      9.6%    12.6%    14.5%    11.3%    12.1% 
Nat’l Income/Year     1946     1960     1970     1980     1985     1989 
total    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100% 
industry    30.2%    45.6%    49.1%    48.5%    59.6%    58.5% 
agriculture    50.9%    31.5%    21.9%    16.6%    13.5%    12.6% 
construction      5.2%      7.1%      8.7%      9.3%      9.8%      9.3% 
other branches    13.7%    15.8%    20.3%    25.6%    17.1%    19.6% 
Source: People’s Republic of Bulgaria 1989, A short Statistical Yearbook, Sofia, Central Statistical Office, 1990. 
                                                 
224 LAMPE John and Marvin JACKSON, Balkan Economic History 1550-1950, Bloomington, IN, Indiana 
University Press, 1982, pp. 531-559.  
225 TCHALAKOV Ivan, “Industrial Development and Ecological Risks,” in Jacques COENON-HUTHER 
(ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads, New York, NY, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996, pp. 245-258, p. 247. 
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This policy of rapid urbanization and heavy industrialization came with all of its accompanying 
modernization effects: a mass literacy campaign, mechanization of labor, sanitation campaign, 
cultural development, etc. “The fork, the bed sheet, the shower, the broiler chicken, they all came 
with communist rule. There was starvation in Bulgaria until 1960s, I remember it,” recounts 
Petko Simeonov, a distinguished sociologist and dissident, “It seems the Communist party was a 
modernizing force. The least we can say is that the period of communist rule and the process of 
modernization in Bulgaria coincided.”226 It appears, Tchalakov similarly posits, that by the mid 
1970s the process of industrialization was completed in its essential features.227 Whether one 
assigns a positive role to the communist regime in Bulgaria in terms of modernization and 
development or blames it for imposing a socialist framework on the development process, 
indicators undeniably point to a significant improvement in all sectors. By 1980, agriculture 
accounted for 15% of GDP, agricultural labor was below 20% of the adult population,228 and the 
literacy rate was above 95%.229 Industrial production almost quadrupled between 1960 and 
1988.230 During the rapid urbanization process of the 1950s and 1960s, more than 1.5 million 
people left their villages never to return.231 Population of the average Bulgarian city grew by 
three to four times between 1950 and 1990.232
                                                 
226 Interview with Petko Simeonov, Sofia, April, 2007.   
 The quality of life of the average Bulgarian was 
irreversibly transformed in one short generation, and in many cases for the better. Many people 
credited the Communist party with this achievement.  
227 TCHALAKOV, op.cit. p. 248. 
228 FiFo Ost country statistics. Available online at:  
http://www.fifoost.org/EU/statistik/bulgarien.php  
229 Earth Trends 2003 country profile: Bulgaria. Available online at: 
 http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/pop_cou_100.pdf 
230 Statistical Yearbook, New York, United Nations, 1988/89. 
231 BRUNNBAUER Ulf, “Making Bulgarians Socialist: The Fatherland Front in Communist Bulgaria, 1944-
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There is ample evidence to show, argue Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, that the 
economies of the East European countries made great strides during the first decades of the 
socialist epoch. The more backward the East European countries under consideration, the more 
dramatic the improvements were.233 Furthermore, socialist countries, especially those that 
became socialist at a lower level of economic development, the authors contend, were gradually 
closing the gap with the West up to the mid 1970s. In his account of Bulgarian economic 
development, Lampe leaves no doubt that Bulgaria made great strides in industrializing, 
diversifying agriculture, and raising standards of living during its communist rule.234 It seemed 
that at least in the first decades of communist rule Bulgaria was not only rapidly developing but 
was also catching up with the West. Bulgarian men in 1930, for example, could expect to live 
about 10 years less than their peers in the more advanced countries of the West. In 1960 
Bulgarian men could expect to live longer than Austrian men and they were likely to live as long 
as the French, the West Germans, and the British.235
A second source of the regime’s legitimacy was the overall positive attitude of 
Bulgarians towards Russia. Although the communist coup in 1944 was designed and supported 
by Moscow,
 Similar developments gave reason to 
believe that socialism was working and the policies of the Communist party were producing 
visible, positive results. 
236
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 and the communist regime in Bulgaria was a Soviet offshoot, the regime was not 
perceived by the population at large as a form of Soviet invasion as, one could argue, was the 
case in Poland or East Germany. Compared to prevalent Russophobia elsewhere in Eastern 
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Europe, anti-Russian sentiments in Bulgaria were not the norm, due to the historical and cultural 
ties between the two peoples.  On the contrary, argues Castellan, the Bulgarian population was 
for the most part traditionally Russophile.237
This prevailing positive view of Russia does not solely rest upon the common cultural 
heritage between the two peoples in terms of Orthodox Christianity, Slavic ethnicity and 
language. It is largely due to the fact that Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878 
was gained with the help of Russian forces in the Russo-Turkish War. In the nineteenth century 
Bulgarians had looked upon Orthodox Russia as the bigger brother who would one day liberate 
them from the Turks. The brutal suppression of 1876 Bulgarian uprising by the Ottoman bashi-
bazouks
 
238 caused very strong public reaction all over Europe, but most notably in Russia. 
Widespread sympathy for the Bulgarian cause led to a nationwide movement in support of 
Russian involvement in the conflict. This reaction further fueled the already rising idea of Pan-
Slavism which coincided with Russian interests in the region. The 1878 Russo-Turkish War put 
an end to Ottoman domination in the Balkans and secured strong Russian presence on the 
peninsula. In the course of the war, 12,000 volunteer Bulgarian troops (Opalchenie) fought 
alongside by Russian regiments. Following the end of the war, Russia set up a governmental 
system in the new Bulgarian state under the rule of prince Dondukov. Russian forces remained in 
Bulgaria for nine months, as specified by the Berlin Congress,239
                                                 
237 CASTELLAN, op.cit., p. 476. 
 during which time Dondukov 
assisted in the creation of a Bulgarian government administration and the crafting of the first 
238 Irregular soldiers in the Ottoman Empire noted for their lack of discipline. Bashi-bazourks were 
deployed in the suppression of the April uprising because regular troops were engaged in other conflicts at 
the time. 
239 The 1878 Berlin Congress was a meeting between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire which 
purpose was to revise the San Stefano Treaty settling the peace terms after Russian victory in the Russo-
Turkish War. The Congress returned to the Ottoman Empire certain Bulgarian territories, specifically 
Macedonia, that the San Stefano treaty had given to the Principality of Bulgaria. 
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Bulgarian constitution. Due to Russia’s role in Bulgaria’s liberation, argues Jackson, Soviet 
support of the Bulgarian communist regime was rather seen as a continuation of Russian 
protective policy towards Bulgaria and an insurance against hostile neighbors.240 Whether one 
supports this argument or not, the fact is that Russian and Bulgarian soldiers never fought each 
other. Despite being a German ally in World War II, Bulgaria refused to send any troops to the 
Eastern front. The public attitude towards the Russians, argues Castellan, was extremely positive 
for the government to dare go against it by supporting the Eastern front.241
The lack of a pronounced anti-Russian sentiment in Bulgaria throughout communist rule 
is also due to the fact that Bulgaria was the only one of the Soviet satellite states which did not 
have permanently stationed Soviet troops. Perhaps such policy on the Soviet part is related to 
Bulgaria’s standing as USSR’s most trusted ally. The Red Army entered Bulgaria on September 
8
 Today Russia is still 
portrayed as “the Liberator” in Bulgarian textbooks and the statute of Alexander II dominates the 
parliament square. 
th, 1944. In 1947, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Bulgaria, and a small military force, 
estimated at two or three thousand men, was left behind temporarily.242 By contrast, Soviet 
troops were stationed in Poland from the end of World War II to the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union in 1993. In East Germany, there were permanently stationed Soviet troops from 1949 to 
1994. The Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in the 1968 Prague Spring led to the 
“temporary” settlement of major Soviet headquarters and four ground divisions which remained 
in the country until 1987.243
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was increased in 1957 after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A treaty between Hungary and 
USSR of the same year established permanent Soviet presence on Hungarian soil.244 Soviet 
troops stationed in Romania since 1944 were ultimately withdrawn in 1958 as a result of 
Khrushchev’s shift towards a new Soviet policy and the transition to a post-Stalin power 
structure.245 Western estimates of Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe in the late 1950s point to 
a number between 3.8 million to 4.2 million.246 During that period Soviet troops in Bulgaria 
numbered no more than 2,000 soldiers. Gornev and Boyadjieva argue that since the prevailing 
public attitude towards Russia was positive, Russia, and the USSR respectively, were not 
regarded by most of the population as a threat to national sovereignty.247
In addition to the Russian factor, Karasimeonov points to two more characteristics 
contributing to the high degree of legitimacy of communist rule in Bulgaria.
 The lack of large Soviet 
troop deployments in Bulgaria also contributed to this more favorable view of Soviet domination 
over the country. Furthermore, the role Russia had played in Bulgarian history and the place it 
occupied in the awareness of the Bulgarian people were important factors in legitimizing the 
Soviet-imposed communist regime in Bulgaria. 
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 In the first place, 
he argues, an underdeveloped capitalist state with small-scale private ownership and large rural 
agricultural population, as was pre-war Bulgaria, is prone to left-wing political ideas. Second, the 
failure to establish a viable basis for liberal democracy after the liberation and in the inter-war 
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period made such ideas more appealing. Karasimeonov’s argument that underdeveloped 
capitalist countries are more prone to communist ideology than developed countries is somewhat 
questionable. Historically, left-wing ideology has been the prerogative of intellectuals, not rural 
agricultural populations. The rural population is hardly supportive of collectivization of the land 
and nationalization of private property, both policies propagated by communist ideology. 
Furthermore, communist ideology originated and became popularized in the advanced countries 
of Western Europe – Germany, England, and France – not in underdeveloped capitalist states. 
Karasimeonov is correct, however, in pointing out that inter-war politics in Bulgaria and the 
disillusionment with democracy they entailed may have rendered communist ideology more 
salient. The inter-war period in Bulgaria was dominated by right-wing parties and governing 
coalitions, who were discredited as a consequence of joining yet another war on the wrong side.  
Pantev also suggests an inclination to communist ideology. The mass of the Bulgarian 
population, he argues, shared an egalitarian outlook, and thus found socialism, with its 
guaranteed employment, free education, free medical service, price control, and social benefits, 
quite appealing.249 Communist nostalgia witnessed during the transition could support such an 
argument. In fact, argues Moser, since 1989 BSP has continuously relied on the egalitarian thrust 
of Bulgarian culture. The Socialists have pushed for a relatively evenly spread privatization as 
opposed to restitution, exploiting rural fears that privatization will result in domination by large 
landowners and great social inequality.250
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 BCP’s political clout in the interwar period, most 
noticeable in the 1920 parliamentary elections where BCP came in second after the Agrarians, 
also indicates popular support for communist ideology. Thus, there were a number of factors 
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contributing to the fact that communist rule in Bulgaria enjoyed much more popular support than 
any other East European communist regime.  
4.3.2 Dissidence 
Another feature of communist rule in Bulgaria was the lack of dissident movements and anti-
communist protests. There were no organized forms of resistance even vaguely resembling the 
Hungarian uprising of 1956, the “Prague Spring’ of 1968 or the “Solidarity” movement in 
Poland in the 1980s.251 There was some artistic and literary leeway in Bulgaria, but not with 
respect to political expression, Raymond Garthoff, a U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria between 1977 
and 1979 points out. In Bulgaria in the 1970s, he further contends, there was virtually no 
discernible political dissidence. Any sign of it was promptly quashed, but even that was rare.252 
This is not to conclude that there was no political dissatisfaction and acts of dissent were 
completely absent throughout the communist period. “Of course there was some opposition to 
the regime or there wouldn’t have been political prisoners,” argues Emil Koshlukov, a dissident 
and once a political prisoner himself.253 Opposition to the regime, however, never exceeded 
isolated acts of protest by a few well-known dissidents.  One notable example is the publication 
in 1982 of Zhelyu Zhelev’s book Fascism, a work analyzing the fascist totalitarian state in a 
manner implicitly emphasizing its resemblance to the socialist state.254
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 The book was 
immediately stopped from circulation and its author subjected to political repression and police 
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surveillance. However brave and honorable, such isolated acts failed to raise awareness and 
mount organized opposition to the regime. As Hristova points out, later efforts by Bulgarian 
dissidents to establish contacts with the West and disseminate information through the Bulgarian 
emissions of BBC, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, and Voice of America, still left those 
dissidents unknown to the large Bulgarian public until late 1989.255 Kalinova similarly argues 
that, “Bulgarian dissidents were better known in the West than at home. Their influence on 
society was indirect, through Western media. Thus their message did not reach much further than 
the few daring, clandestine listeners of BBC, Deutsche Welle and Radio Free Europe.”256 
Throughout the communist period dissident activity in Bulgaria was very modest and limited to a 
narrow circle of intellectuals. Intellectuals and other remote dissidents had some impact, posits 
Melone, but that was very different from an organized opposition.257
Organized dissident movements did not appear in Bulgaria until 1988, after Gorbachev’s 
glasnost was well under way in the Soviet Union. They gathered around ecological and human 
rights issues, taking advantage of the “July Concept”
 Despite the fact, the regime 
had an inordinate fear of dissidence, as illustrated by the assassination in London of Bulgarian 
émigré writer, Goergi Makrov, who openly criticized the Bulgarian regime.  
258
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 of the Communist party which, in 
response to Moscow’s pressure for reforms, allowed for the establishment of “informal 
organizations,” i.e. outside of the official party and state structures. The “informals,” as they 
began to be called, included five or six organizations with overlapping membership of no more 
256 Interview with Dr. Evgeniya Kalinova, Sofia, February, 2007. 
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than 200 people.259 “We were participating in all informal organizations, regardless of their title 
and declared purpose,” recalls Baeva, “We were all the same people.”260 It is perhaps for this 
reason that Zhelev characterizes the Bulgarian dissident movement as the most organized in 
Eastern Europe, something most analysts would disagree with.261 These 200 people were mainly 
from the ranks of the academic and artistic intelligentsia and could be categorized in two groups. 
On the one hand were people who, because of family history or repression against them, were by 
definition anti-communist and against the communist regime. On the other hand there were party 
members who opposed Zhivkov’s regime and wanted reform within the party. Given the 
regime’s repressive apparatus, it is not surprising that dissidence came from among party 
members. They were the ones who could engage in some degree of dissident activity without the 
threat of persecution and repression.  “We purposefully listed party members as chairs and 
organizers of the informal organizations, so that they would not appear as threatening to the 
regime and would not be banned,” recounts Alexander Karakachanov, one of the early dissidents 
with a communist background.262
Since the Bulgarian Communist Party had never permitted non-communist political 
organization within the country, it was almost inevitable that a reform movement could 
appear only within the BCP itself, and that if anti-communist political structures were to be 
created, they would probably initially be formed within the communist apparatus, as 
contradictory as this may seem. And in fact the deposition of Todor Zhivkov from his 
 Party members constituted at least half of the informals’ 
membership and were among its most energetic activists. Moser argues that such development is 
all too natural: 
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position as First Secretary of the Party was engineered from within the party itself. 
Furthermore, many of the early “dissidents” were party members, some of whom before long 
openly reverted to the ranks of the party.263
Although growing increasingly organized in the course of 1988-1989, the dissident movement in 
Bulgaria did not translate into mass protests until a couple of weeks before Zhivkov’s removal 
from power. The informals were mainly engaged in writing declarations and accusing the regime 
of not abiding by its own “July concept” and the “Helsinki Declaration on Human Rights,” 
which were then sent to Western media. Such actions had some impact as they attracted attention 
to Bulgaria and placed international pressure on the regime, but they did not qualify as mass 
protest. The first small-scale demonstrations occurred in Russe in 1987, where an ecological 
crisis due to gas air pollution from a Romanian factory across the Danube River gave both a 
reason and an excuse for protest. These demonstrations did alarm the regime as they attracted the 
attention of prominent Bulgarian public figures and members of the Party who subsequently 
established the Committee for Defense of Russe. The protests were confined to Russe, however, 
and never reached a larger scale. 
 
The first major challenge in terms of mass protests came in May 1989 from ethnic Turks, 
who were renouncing the renaming campaign. Despite efforts to suppress protests resulting in 
the loss of human lives, demonstrations were spreading in cities all over the country and 
persisted for several months. Demonstrations first started in North East Bulgaria and then spread 
to other regions with mixed population. Although the dissident movement expressed its support 
for the ethnic Turks by signing a declaration demanding equal rights for minorities and 
submitting it to Parliament, it could not take credit for the May demonstrations. The first mass 
protest organized by the dissident movement took place on October 26, 1989 during the 
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mentioned above CSCE ecological conference. Taking advantage of the presence of international 
representatives and hoping this would deter repressive action, activists gathered in the city park 
“Crystal,” close to the Parliament building, to protest a government project which entailed 
destroying large areas of national forest. The gathering was quickly dispersed and the 
participants brutally beaten by special militia forces. The “Crystal” incident was followed by the 
first legal mass demonstration264 on November 3, 1989 when all the informals gathered around 
the ecological movement, “Ekoglasnost,” in protesting the infamous government project. Several 
thousand people marched through the center of the city to the Parliament building to submit a 
petition with some 12,000 signatures in support of the environmental protest.265
Despite these belated activities, dissidence in Bulgaria could not be compared to the 
movements in other East European countries. The scale of dissident activity in Bulgaria was 
small and its role in shaking the foundations of the regime was very limited. Except for the one 
demonstration immediately preceding the fall of the regime, mass protest was completely absent. 
The belated dissident movement in Bulgaria was riding the wave of the events in Central Europe 
at the time rather than taking the initiative in challenging the regime. It is not surprising then that 
the informals were deprived of the opportunity to topple the communist regime and change was 
initiated from within the Communist party. As Ekaterina Mihailova, a former UDF leader and 
long-term MP, argues, “These informal organizations were very weak and fragile. They were too 
weak to be a decisive factor in the transformation. In my view, the transformation was a result of 
world-wide processes at the time.”
 The procession 
grew into a full scale demonstration with slogans like “Freedom” and “Democracy.” 
266
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the Bulgarian dissidence. However weak, dissident activities in 1989 provoked preemptive 
action by the regime which in turn unleashed democratic change. 
4.3.3 Transitional Justice 
Another feature that distinguishes the Bulgarian transition from transition processes in other East 
European countries is the lack of meaningful transitional justice. Transitional justice originated 
after World War II with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
and the adoption of various denazification laws. With the collapse of communist regimes across 
Eastern Europe, focus on transitional justice reemerged. Dealing with former high-level 
communists and security apparatuses, Welsh points out, was among the central tasks facing 
governments immediately after communism disintegrated in much of Central and Eastern 
Europe.267 The particular forms transitional justice took on in Eastern Europe could be divided, 
according to Lavinia Stan, in three main categories: 1) trials and court proceedings against 
communist officials and secret service agents; 2) access for ordinary citizens to the files 
compiled on them by the secret services; and 3) lustration – legislation which aims at excluding 
previous regime’s high political officials and secret police personnel and collaborators from a 
range of public offices for a specified period of time.268
Among the three categories, lustration clearly gained precedence in Eastern Europe.
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268 STAN Lavinia, “The Politics of Memory in Poland: Lustration, File Access and Court Proceedings,” 
Studies in Post-Communism Occasional Paper No. 10 (2006), Center for Post-Communist Studies, St. 
Francis Xavier University. 
269 The term “lustration” originates from the Latin lustrare, meaning “to purify.” 
  135 
World War II both in Europe and Japan, encountered limited support in post-1989 Eastern 
Europe.270 There were trials and prosecutions in every East European country, the execution of 
Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu representing the most drastic example, but their scope and impact 
was limited in comparison to post-World War II cases. For instance, the number of people 
prosecuted after World War II was about 100,000 in Belgium, 110,000 in the Netherlands, and 
130,000 in France. Death penalties numbered 6,763 in France, 2,940 in Belgium, and 152 in the 
Netherlands.271 By contrast, in the Czech Republic, the country that most avidly pursued 
transitional justice, investigation of over 3,000 cases of crimes associated with the previous 
regime resulted in only 9 prosecutions, entailing light sentences. Almost 2,000 cases were 
dropped because of presidential amnesties, statute limitations, or the death of witnesses or 
suspects.272
With the exception of the execution of Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu in the heat of the battle 
and the few listless attempts at punishing some former top leaders such as Eric Honecker and 
Todor Zhivkov, few important communist officials anywhere have suffered punishment for 
their misdeeds of the past, whether it be for the liquidation of thousands of ‘enemies of the 
people’ or for the destruction of the national economy.
 Moser similarly argues that: 
273
In Eastern Europe lustration became the main strategy of dealing with the communist past. As 
Cohen argues, though merely a variation in the repertoire of responses to past abuses, lustration 
as a policy (and the term itself) has been confined to the East European context.
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 Lustration has 
not only been the most widely adopted form of transitional justice, but the one with the widest 
impact. Lustration laws included vetting over 20,000 public officials in Poland, 15,000 in the 
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Czech Republic, and 10,000 in Hungary. The lustrati were not only exposed but in some cases, 
particularly in the Czech Republic, banned from public office. Lustration has been closely 
related to the access of ordinary citizens to their secret service files. Though not entailing any 
legal sanctions, public access to the files constituted an important stage in dealing with the past, 
what Cohen labels the “truth phase.” To come to terms with the past, he argues, is to know 
exactly what happened, to tell the truth, and to face the facts.275 The truth phase in Eastern 
Europe took the dramatic form of opening the files. Most East European countries opened their 
secret service files to the public. Most notable was the East German case where angry crowds 
stormed Stasi (East German Secret Police) headquarters in several cities in early 1990 and seized 
and exposed the files.276
Although the East European countries followed a similar approach to transitional justice, 
particular policies and the level of impact significantly differed across the region. The former 
East Germany and the Czech Republic made the greatest efforts to come to terms with the 
communist past. The Czech Republic has the longest record of continuous lustration in the post-
communist world. Czechoslovakia was the first post-communist state to pass a lustration law in 
1991. The law was extremely extensive, applying to public offices in the civil service, the 
judiciary and procuracy, the security service, high-ranking army positions, management of state-
owned enterprises, the central bank, the railways, high academic positions, and the public 
electronic media.
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 Its original duration was five years but, after the Velvet Divorce in 1993, the 
Czech Parliament had twice extended its period of enforcement despite President Havel’s two 
vetoes. In 1993, the Czech Republic passed a law of the Illegality of the Communist Regime and 
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set up a framework for the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed during communist 
rule. Furthermore, two consecutive laws, in 1996 and 2002, granted access to all Czech citizens 
over 18 to their personal files compiled on them by the StB (the former Czechoslovak Secret 
Police).278
Germany, according to Timothy Garton Ash, has fared even higher in the degree of 
lustration than the Czech Republic and has demonstrated the most systematic and comprehensive 
policy towards “treatment” of the past.
  
279 The Annex of the Unification Treaty between the two 
German states, which took effect on October 3rd 1990, declared active involvement with the East 
German security service and involvement in crimes against humanity to be a “reason for 
exceptional dismissal” in the public sector.280 A bill passed by the Bundestag in January 1992 
provided the logistics for security checks of people occupying, applying for, or being elected to 
state offices. The bill also enabled all citizens to see, copy and publicize their personal Stasi 
files.281 Furthermore, border guards and several communist leaders have been brought to trial 
and convicted for manslaughter and co-responsibility for the “shoot to kill” policy at the border. 
Finally, Germany was the only one from the former communist countries to establish a 
functioning “truth commission.” The commission has produced a detailed and voluminous report 
titled, “Treatment of the Past and Consequences of the SED-Dictatorship in Germany.”282
In comparison to the Czech Republic and Germany, Poland and Hungary pursued a more 
lenient policy of transitional justice. Although decommunization has been one of the most 
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divisive issues in Polish political life, argues Lavinia Stan, Poland adopted limited transitional 
justice much later than its neighbors Germany and the Czech Republic.283 The government 
debated six bills before passing a lustration law in 1997. The Polish law was not aimed at 
excluding former communist party functionaries from public office. It was directed solely 
towards individuals with links to the former security services and it did not impose automatic 
sanctions for those who worked or collaborated with the security apparatus.284 The secret service 
archive was also opened to the public in 1997, and by 2005 some 14,000 Poles had been allowed 
to read their files.285 Trials resulted in 12 prosecutions for the 1970 Gdansk strike suppression.286 
Despite such achievements, Lavinia Stan contends that in comparison to the Czech model, Polish 
lustration was modest in scope and had minimal impact.287
Hungary has a somewhat better record than Poland in excluding communist-era 
collaborators from post-communist politics. Its lustration law passed in 1994 required more than 
10,000 public officials to be vetted for previous involvement with the former secret police, the 
World War II-era fascist Arrow cross, and the squads that suppressed the Hungarian Revolution 
in 1956.
 
288 People found to have been involved with one of these organizations were required to 
resign within 30 days or risk public exposure.289
                                                 
283 STAN, op.cit., p. 1. 
  On the other hand, Hungary granted much 
more limited and delayed access to its security files than Poland did. It was not until 2003 that 
Hungarians were allowed to access their own secret service files. Trials have also had limited 
284 SZCERBIAK Aleks, “Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in 
Post-Communist Poland,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2002, pp. 553-572, p. 567. 
285 Quoted in STAN, op.cit, p. 30. 
286 Wojciech Jaruzelski  was put on trial in 1996 and again in 2008 for his decision to impose a martial law 
in 1981. The trials attracted a lot of attention, but resulted in no conviction. 
287 STAN, op.cit., p. 69.  
288 NEDELSKY, op. cit. p. 104. 
289 ELLIS Mark, “Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc,” 
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, No. 4, (Autumn, 1996), pp. 181-196, p. 184. 
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impact. After much debate, the Constitutional court classified the 1956 crimes as “war crimes” 
and “crimes against humanity,” thus providing the legal framework for prosecution of 
participants in the suppression of the 1956 events. 
Slovakia’s lustration policy could also be characterized as lax. While still part of 
Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Parliament approved the 1991 lustration law. After the law’s 
passage, however, Czech and Slovak responses to the previous regime diverged. Slovakia’s 
leaders have shown little interest in cleansing the political sphere. The lustration law was never 
seriously enforced in Slovakia and quietly expired in 1996. Few efforts have been made to 
prosecute former officials, and Slovakia was the last post-communist state in Central Europe to 
grant in 2004 its citizens access to the secret police files. Compared to its Czech counterpart, 
argues Nedelsky, the lustration law in Slovakia “had only a formal effect.”290
Several authors have argued that, although a central issue in post-communist politics, 
lustration and other decommunization efforts such as trials and file access have had limited 
impact in Eastern Europe (Holmes 1994, Rivera 2000, Welsh 1996).  Former elites, argues 
Holmes, continued to wield considerable influence and worked to stifle the decommunization 
process.
  
291 Despite differing policies, Welsh contends, in all countries the extent of 
decommunization was quite limited in nature.292
                                                 
290 NEDELSKY, op.cit, p. 77. 
 Beyond a doubt, transitional justice policies 
failed to meet initial expectations. But even the limited impact seen in other postcommunist 
states was not witnessed in Bulgaria and Romania. Political exploitation of the subject in these 
countries was particularly pronounced and policy initiatives were often stalled or obstructed. 
291 HOLMES Stephen, “Explaining the Downfall of Historical Justice,” East European Constitutional 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3-4, Summer/Fall 1994, pp. 33-36, p. 34. 
292 WELSH, op.cit., p. 414. 
  140 
Romania had no lustration law, which is not surprising given the low rate of elite 
turnover, argues Nedelsky.293 Aside from the staged trial and execution of the Ceausescus, 
prosecution of crimes and screening of security personnel have been absent. Instead, Welsh 
points out, security police files are manipulated and used for political purposes, and only 
relatively few former communist party officials and security officers have been tried.294 In 1999, 
the government set up a commission to review the Securitate (former Romanian secret service) 
files for collaborators among politicians and other public figures, though until recently, 
Securitate files failed to be submitted to the commission. The 1999 law also allowed people to 
access their own files and to request investigation of prominent officials. It was not until 2005, 
however, that the Securitate archives were actually opened to the public. A major step in 
instituting transitional justice was the establishment of a  presidential commission to document 
the crimes of the Communist regime. The Tismaneanu Report produced a detailed analysis of the 
crimes of the regime, demonstrating unprecedented political will for transitional justice.295
Transitional justice in Bulgaria was similarly minimal if not virtually absent. Conflicting 
interests in the Bulgarian Parliament have continuously prevented any legislative action aimed at 
vetting, exposing, or banning from public office any former communist functionaries. Access to 
secret service files has been a particular point of contention in Bulgarian politics. The issue still 
remains a subject of speculation and black mailing, used on more than one occasion by political 
figures from the Left and the Right to discredit an opponent.  
 
                                                 
293 NEDELSKY, op.cit., p. 105. 
294 WELSH, op.cit., p. 418. 
295 See Cosmina TANASOIU, “The Tismaneanu Report: Romania Revisits Its Past,” Problems of 
Postcommunism, Vol. 54, No. 4, July/August 2007, pp. 60–69. 
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In February 1990 the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party issued an 
apology to the Bulgarian people for its past crimes and announced the expulsion of several high-
ranking party members. It created a Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities and 
Deformations of the Communist Regime, focusing mainly on identifying the perpetrators of the 
infamous renaming process of the Turkish ethnic minority. The commission conducted an 
internal party investigation resulting in at most expulsion from the party and entailing no legal 
sanctions or ban on holding public office. Hence, this act, motivated to a large degree by a desire 
to change the image of the party and preserve its place in the political arena, could not be 
classified as transitional justice. Ellies points out that, despite the establishment of the 
Commission, the aggressive pursuit of former Communist functionaries was blocked regularly 
by members of Parliament and government ministries.296
In early 1990, trials were initiated against several Politburo members, including Todor 
Zhivkov. The purpose of the trials was to blame several selected individuals for the crimes 
associated with the communist regime, thus relieving the Party itself from responsibility.
 
297
                                                 
296 ELLIES, op.cit., p. 187. 
 
Zhivkov was accused on several accounts – the forceful renaming and resettlement of Bulgarian 
ethnic Turks between 1985 and 1989, overstepping his authority as a head of state for the period 
1962-1989, embezzlement of state property, responsibility for the communist death camps, and 
more. In 1992, he was convicted only on one account, embezzlement, and sentenced to seven 
years in prison. The sentence was changed to house arrest for health reasons and was ultimately 
revoked in 1996. The prime-minister between 1986 and 1989, Georgi Atanasov, was the only 
member of the former communist elite to be incarcerated. He was sentenced in 1992 to ten years 
297 Kalinova and Baeva similarly argue that Todor Zhivkov’s trial served as a channel of public discontent 
rather than a quest for justice. See KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 271. 
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in prison for misuse of state funds, but in 1994 was pardoned by the President and released. A 
number of other former communist leaders were charged with alleged abuses during the 
communist regime. In 1996 the Prosecutor General’s Office suspended the investigation of 43 
cases involving Communist party leaders who were indicted in 1994. The cases were suspended 
because many of the accused held immunity as deputies of the Bulgarian Socialist Party.298
Lustration in Bulgaria was even less successful than prosecution of former communist 
officials. In 1992, four draft laws were submitted to Parliament, which aimed at banning 
individuals who occupied leadership positions between September 1944 and January 1990 from 
holding public office for a period of five years. Not one of the four draft laws made it to a vote. 
In December of that year, the National Assembly passed the controversial “Panev” law, which 
excluded former Communist party officials and individuals linked to the former security 
apparatus from occupying leading positions in universities, such as provost and dean, for a 
period of five years.
 
299 The “Panev” law represented an ineffective and misguided attempt at 
lustration which evoked a considerable amount of ill-feeling among university faculty.300
Access to the secret service files has been the most debated aspect in dealing with the 
communist past. In 1990, the Communist-dominated Parliament insisted on sealing the files for 
thirty years or outright destroying them. A compromise was reached which, for a brief period, 
 
“Cleansing” academia from communist functionaries and secret service collaborators, while still 
allowing such people to participate in political life and occupy public positions, rendered such 
policy meaningless.  
                                                 
298 Ibid., p. 189. 
299 The “Panev” law was named after Georgi Panev, the UDF deputy who introduced it.  
300 MOSER, op.cit., p. 104. 
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allowed deputies to open their own files in front of parliamentary caucus leaders.301
The lack of transitional justice in Bulgaria has without doubt benefitted the former 
communist elite. This fact, however, should not lead us to the hasty conclusion that this elite 
managed to preserve its power because there was no policy banning it from post-communist 
politics. A closer examination of the subject reveals that policy dealing with the communist past 
constitutes, to use Szczerbiak’s term, the “politics of the present” and is contingent upon the 
 The files 
have been sealed since then despite numerous attempts to readdress the issue. It was not until 
early 2007 that Parliament passed the law for Access to the Files of the Secret Services, 
providing for the creation of a Committee for disclosing the documents and announcing 
affiliation of Bulgarian citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the 
Bulgarian National Army (a.k.a. the Files Commission). The Files Commission was to examine 
the files of all elected officials and political appointees to date and publicly declare the names of 
those affiliated in the past with the secret services. Regrettably, such legislation came much too 
late and is much too limited as it does not entail any sanction or reproof other than public 
exposure. Furthermore, the legislation does not grant ordinary citizens access to their own files. 
Hence, Bulgaria is the only East European country that has not opened the archive of the former 
security apparatus to the public. It is also one of two countries, Romania being the other, which 
failed to adopt any lustration law limiting access of former communist functionaries to the 
political sphere. Former communist officials and people linked to the security apparatus were 
able to escape both public reprimand and legislative sanction and were free to continue their 
political careers. 
                                                 
301 BERTSCHI Charles, “Lustration and the Transition to democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria,” 
East European Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, (Winter, 1994), pp. 435-452, p. 441. 
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choices, interests, and power struggles of post-communist elites. The lack of transitional justice 
in Bulgaria, then, would rather indicate that the former communist elite has prevailed in blocking 
and stalling decommunization efforts. In other words, the lack of transitional justice in Bulgaria 
is directly related to the strong position former communist functionaries retained throughout the 
transition. 
Several authors have examined this relationship and have similarly argued that 
transitional justice is dependent upon, among other factors, elite change and elite composition 
(Ash 2000, Letki 2002, Nedelsky 2004, Welsh 1996). According to Welsh, in countries where 
lustration has been moderate or conspicuously absent, this has not happened from a desire for 
reconciliation but because prevailing power arrangements have prevented lustration. The weaker 
the electoral strength of the former communists, she further argues, the easier it has been to move 
ahead with decommunization efforts. 302 Nedelsky in turn posits that the political orientation of 
post-communist elites is a critical factor in shaping the approach to transitional justice.303 Letki 
contends that lustration is not only dependent on the interest of the elites but also on their 
composition, i.e. anti-communist governments are more likely to pass lustration laws.304
The higher a society’s view of the previous regime’s legitimacy, the lower its motivation to 
pursue justice for its authorities and the higher the likelihood, in a democratic context, that it 
will allow elites associated with the former regime to return to the political stage. These 
elites, in turn, would not be particularly likely to support vigorous transitional justice. 
 
Nedelsky takes the argument a step further accounting for factors such as public opinion and 
legitimacy of the communist regime: 
                                                 
302 WELSH, op.ci., pp. 422-424. 
303 NEDELSKY, op.cit., p. 92. 
304 LETKI Natalia, “Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 
54, No. 4, 2002, pp. 529-552, p. 545. 
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Therefore, the more quickly they regain power, the less likely a legal framework will be 
established to screen such elites out of the political sphere over time.305
The Bulgarian case certainly supports Letki’s argument. Given the high legitimacy of the 
Bulgarian communist regime and the continued role of the communist-successor party in post-
communist political life, it is not surprising that there was no meaningful transitional justice in 
Bulgaria. 
   
Thus far, I have established that transitional justice is dependent upon the nature of elite 
change and elite composition, whereas the legitimacy of the previous regime and presence or 
absence of organized dissident movements are factors which set the stage for elite transformation 
and foreshadow its nature and direction. Despite the different causal relationship to elite change, 
all three factors are indicators that could help us predict the outcome of elite transformation. 
Rivera for example argues that continuity in post-communist political elites will be lower in 
countries where the transition experience has included an organized opposition elite, exclusion 
mechanisms such as lustration, high dissatisfaction with the previous communist regime, and 
minimal effort by communist successor parties to reposition themselves as social democrats.306
Thus, in the Bulgarian case we can postulate that the former communist elite preserved 
its position of power and played a major role in transition politics. Indeed, the lack of organized 
dissident movements during communism and absence of transitional justice in the post-
communist period, along with the high degree of legitimacy the former communist elite enjoyed, 
 
By the same token, we would expect that a lack of organized opposition elite, absence of 
exclusion mechanisms such as lustration, and high legitimacy of the previous communist regime 
would lead to a considerable degree of elite continuity. 
                                                 
305 NEDESLKY, op.cit., p. 88. 
306 RIVERA Sharon Werning, “Elites in Post-Communist Russia: A Changing of the Guard?,” Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000, pp. 413-432, p. 427. 
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placed this elite at a much more advantageous position than its East European counterparts. The 
communist elite was not challenged by an organized dissident movement before the changes, it 
was not prevented by transitional justice from participating in post-communist politics, and at the 
same time retained large popular support. Therefore, the Bulgarian communist elite had a much 
greater opportunity to preserve its position of power throughout the transition and to establish 
itself as a major political actor in the post-communist context. In preserving its power, the former 
communist elite exercised great influence over the direction and outcome of the transition 
process. It is not surprising then that former communists won the first democratic elections in the 
country and became the ones to craft the new constitution. The framework they imposed on the 
transition process placed Bulgaria considerably behind other East European countries in terms of 
economic and political reform, as well as NATO and EU memberships. 
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5.0  DATA GATHERING AND SAMPLES 
To examine the patterns and mechanisms of elite transformation, the present study utilizes a 
combination of data gathering techniques: compiling and comparing elite rosters, interviewing 
former and present members of the political elite, and analyzing archival documents and media 
sources. The choice to mix qualitative and quantitative methods was guided by the 
methodological triangulation approach (Denzin 1978). Methodological triangulation involves 
using more than one method to gather data in order to counterbalance the deficiency of a single 
strategy or to strengthen validity and reliability by multi-method verification of the results. The 
study of elite change in the context of profound political, economic, and social transformation 
necessitates such a mixed approach. In such a context, elite change could be very rapid and 
chaotic and, thus, hard to capture by a single research strategy. Interviews or statistical analysis 
of elite rosters alone are unlikely to capture all the relevant aspects of elite transformation, such 
as mode of recruitment, intra-elite conflict, and change of elite composition. By contrast, the use 
of both quantitative and qualitative strategies, as argued by Thurmont, is a viable option to obtain 
complementary findings and to strengthen research results.307
This chapter offers a brief review of terminology and a detailed account of data analysis 
procedures. The results of the data analysis, in turn, are presented in Chapter Six. 
 
                                                 
307 THURMONT Veronica, “The Point of Triangulation,” Journal of Nursing Scholarship, Vol. 33, No. 3, 
2001, pp. 253-258, p. 257. 
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5.1 ELITE AND COUNTER-ELITE 
The concept of elite has, in Zuckerman’s words, “an obvious and powerful intuitive appeal.”  
Few would argue the proposition that most societies are characterized by an asymmetrical 
distribution of power. Yet, defining the elite has been continuously debated among elite theorists. 
While arguments have moved away from normative questions, theoretical and methodological 
challenges still remain. As Zuckerman argues, “Attempts to locate its empirical referents and, 
thereby, to specify the occupants of the ‘data container’ political elite have led to a morass of 
conflicting definitions.”308
Putnam identifies three approaches in defining the elite – positional (based on occupying 
an elite position), decision-making (based on decision-making powers), and reputational (based 
on nomination by others to the elite category) (Putnam 1976). In determining national elite 
samples in complex, industrial societies, Hoffman-Lange observes the positional approach to be 
the one most widely used (Hoffman-Lange 1987). Adopting the positional approach still requires 
addressing horizontal and vertical issues. The horizontal aspect refers to the proximity of top 
positions to the center of power and is best illustrated by the regional vs. national elites 
dichotomy. The vertical aspect, in turn, refers to the “depth” of the elite stratum or the question 
 Indeed, the elite category has often suffered from definitions either 
too restrictive or too all-embracing, depriving the concept of analytical value (Hoffman-Lange 
1998, Moyser & Wagstaffe 1987).  
                                                 
308 ZUCKERMAN Alan, “The Concept ‘Political Elite’: Lessons from Mosca and Pareto,” Journal of 
Politics, vol. 39, No. 2, (May 1977), pp. 342-344, p. 324. 
  149 
of deputies. In other words, as Moyser and Wagstaffe ask, at what point does the top give way to 
the middle or the bottom?309
Acknowledging the various theoretical and methodological issues, the present study 
utilizes Higley and Burton’s most widely used operational definition of elite as “persons whose 
strategic position enables them to regularly and substantially affect national political outcomes” 
(Higley and Burton 2006). Such definition, argues Hoffman-Lange, still leaves a wide range of 
choices to the discretion of the researcher in sampling an elite population.
  
310
Elite theorists often use interchangeably the terms elite and elites. Some authors 
purposefully use elites in order to emphasize that the elite is not a monolithic, homogenous group 
and that within the elite there are conflicting groups with diverging interests, i.e. elites. In the 
studies of East European elites, the dominant terminology is that of an elite and a counter-elite, 
rather than elites. A counter-elite is defined as a group of people who are able to mobilize 
resources and challenge the power of the elite with the purpose of taking its place or, at least, 
sharing in its power. This terminology is very appropriate for the East European context, where, 
 Adopting a 
positional approach with a narrow horizontal and vertical scope, the present study limits elites to 
national top-level government officials whose positions require either popular election or 
appointment by the president or parliament, as well as top Communist Party officials up to the 
first democratic elections. Such a narrow definition is most suitable for the study of societies 
transitioning from a totalitarian system, in which alternate power centers such as society-based 
interest groups have not yet developed. 
                                                 
309 MOYSER George and Margaret WAGSTAFFE, “Studying Elites: Theoretical and Methodological 
Issues,” in George MOYSER and Margaret WAGSTAFFE, Research Methods for Elite Studies, 
Winchester, MA, Allen & Unwin Inc., 1987, pp. 1-24, p.10. 
310 HOFFMAN-LANGE Ursula, “Surveying National Elites in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in 
MOYSER and WAGSTAFFE, op.cit., pp. 27-47, p. 29. Hoffman-Lange refers to an earlier formulation of 
the elite as “persons with power individually, regularly, and seriously to affect political outcomes at the 
macro level of organized societies” (Higley at al, 1979). 
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1) there are two groups that are clearly distinguishable and fundamentally opposed to one 
another, i.e. the communist elite and the democratic opposition; and 2) one group, the democratic 
opposition, is easily defined as a counter-elite for it is, at least initially, completely excluded 
from the political process. Thus, when speaking of a counter-elite, we are referring to the 
democratic opposition and the dissident movements that came to form it. 
5.2 CADRE 
The terms cadres, recruitment of cadres, training of cadres, and cadre policy, figure prominently 
in the text. Cadre is a military term311
                                                 
311 The word cadre originally referred to “the permanent skeleton of a military unit, the commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers, etc., around whom the rank and file may be quickly grouped,” Chambers 21st 
Century Dictionary, Glasgow, Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd., 2009. 
 subsequently applied in other fields, referring to an elite or 
select group that forms the core of an organization and is capable of training new members. 
Nineteenth-century Liberal and Conservative parties, the oldest parties in West European 
political systems, are categorized as cadre parties (Duverger 1954, Van Biezen 2003, 2008). 
Operating under restricted suffrage, these early parties represented small wealthy groups and 
relied on revenue from rich contributors. In contrast to the mass party the emergence of which is 
related to the organizing of labor and the subsequent extension of suffrage, cadre parties were 
‘nothing but federations of caucuses’ (Duverger 1954). The term cadre, however, is more often 
associated with Lenin’s idea of a “vanguard” party (Lenin 1902) than with nineteenth-century 
political systems. Lenin argued that Russian conditions rendered a mass party inappropriate for 
raising class consciousness among the workers. What was needed instead, as Binns summarizes, 
was a small, highly disciplined party of “professional revolutionaries,” recruited from among the 
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most active and “conscious” elements of the working class and the intelligentsia.312 Despite 
growing membership and radical changes in the Party following the Bolshevik Revolution, Binns 
further argues, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)313
The cadre terminology (and philosophy) was utilized in all East European communist 
regimes. It is most curious that in the Bulgarian case, such terminology was preserved in post-
communist politics and was adopted by the newly emerged opposition parties. Members of the 
former communist elite and the democratic opposition alike speak of training cadres, cadre 
policy, “cadrovik” (person in charge of cadre policy), etc. – all terms originating with the 
communist past. This dated terminology is not simply an odd choice of words but is symptomatic 
of the communist legacies in political development. Although Bulgarian parties across the 
political spectrum seek formal association with their West-European counterparts and aspire to 
imitate Western models, the concept of political party and the political party discourse are very 
much burdened by communist-era notions.  
 and its East European 
counterparts remained essentially cadre parties. As illustrated by the Bulgarian case discussed in 
the following chapter, East European communist parties relied on restricted and highly selective 
recruitment, elaborate mechanisms for training of cadres, and a high degree of mobilization of 
party cadres, all of which intended to maintain a hard core of loyal and active party 
professionals. 
 
                                                 
312 BINNS Christopher, “The Study of Soviet and East European Elites,” in MOYSER and WAGSTAFFE, 
op. cit., pp. 216-231, p. 216. 
313 The Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) which carried out the Bolshevik revolution went through 
several name changes, being re-named to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952, a name it 
preserved until its dissolution in 1991. 
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5.3 TIME PERIOD 
This study is confined to the first decade of the transition. It takes 1988 as the starting point, for 
it marks the last “status quo” year of the communist regime. By mid-1989, international 
pressures and domestic opposition (primarily by Ethnic Turks protesting the renaming process) 
had already set off changes in the communist elite. Thus, 1988 provides us with a snapshot of the 
communist elite intact. The removal of Todor Zhivkov as Secretary General of the Party on 
November 10, 1989 is taken as the start of the transition period. Despite the heated debate on the 
significance of this date (see Chapter Six, pp. 183-185) and the lack of agreement among the 
political elite on the actual start of the transition, November 10th
The study traces the transformation of the elite up to 2000, the year preceding the fifth 
democratic parliamentary elections of July 2001. While it is not argued that 2000 marks the end 
of the transition,
 represents a turning point that 
triggered major changes within the communist elite and jumpstarted the organizing of the 
opposition.  
314
                                                 
314 Similarly to the debates on the start point of the transition, there is stark disagreement among the 
political elite on whether or not the transition is over. While many consider NATO and EU memberships 
as proof of Bulgaria’s graduation from the transition, others argue that the transition has not concluded.  
Some, such as Vladimir Manolov for example, even consider EU membership as the start of the transition. 
Interview with Vladimir Manolov, Sofia, February 12, 2007. 
 it represents an endpoint to the founding period of electoral politics. 
Elections throughout the 1990s resulted in a sequence of unstable governments that could be 
viewed as a set of “founding elections,” as defined by Linz and Stepan (Linz & Stepan 1996). 
The 1997 election produced the first post-communist government to fulfill its four-year mandate. 
Following elite change through 2000 allows us to examine the course of the first full term of 
governing of an electoral victor and trace a decade of democratic politics – a period long enough 
to study the patterns and mechanisms of transformation of the transition elite. One could argue 
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that elite changes after 2000, with the return of Bulgaria’s exiled king and his election for prime 
minister in 2001 or the rise of Todor Zhivkov’s former body guard Boiko Borisov to the 
premiership in 2009, represent critical junctures in elite transformation in Bulgaria. Though 
extremely important in terms of elite change, in my view, such developments are no longer part 
of the formative period of the post-communist elite (nor part of the set of founding elections) but 
are a function of the peculiarities of Bulgarian democratic politics. 
While data gathering was guided by a fixed timeframe, some aspects of the data, 
interviews in particular, allow for the analysis to expand beyond that frame. For example, based 
on interviews and archival sources, the internal conflict within BCP was traced back to the early 
years of the communist regime, demonstrating certain continuities in intra-elite conflict as well 
as changes in the nature of that conflict in the last years of the regime. Similarly, the parties 
dominating the first decade of the transition (BCP, UDF and MRF) were examined all through 
the present day in order to give a long-term perspective to the results of their recruitment 
mechanisms, party structures, and policy orientations. Such extended analysis places the study in 
a historical context and relates it to current political developments. The empirical results reported 
in the following chapter, however, are related almost entirely to the focus period of the study. 
5.4 ELITE ROSTERS 
Elite rosters provide an extensive database on the transition elite, giving quantitative grounding 
to the study. Elite rosters were compiled by the author for the beginning year of the study (1988) 
and each election year thereafter (1990, 1991, 1994, and 1997). Each roster includes information 
on the individuals occupying positions that require popular election or political appointment. 
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This category includes the president and vice-president, ministers and first deputy ministers, 
members of parliament, judges of the Supreme Court, members of the Supreme Judicial Council 
(established in 1991), judges of the Constitutional Court (established 1991), the Attorney 
General, the director and deputy director of the Bulgarian National Bank, the directors of the 
Bulgarian National Television, the Bulgarian National Radio and the Bulgarian Telegraph 
Agency, the ambassadors to the US, Canada and all European countries (other ambassadorial 
positions are considered peripheral and less influential), the permanent representatives to the UN 
and OSCE, the mayor of Sofia, the directors of the Privatization Agency (established 1992) and 
the Foreign Aid Agency (established 1991). In addition, the 1988 roster includes members of the 
Politburo and the State Council. All positions in that roster were subject to political appointment 
de facto if not de jure. Each roster includes the name, position, party affiliation, place and year of 
birth of each individual occupying an elite position, as well as any relevant miscellaneous 
information. Rosters vary from 375 to 536 entries depending on the year.315
                                                 
315 By comparison, Ursula Hoffman-Lange’s 1981 study of West German elites, utilizing the same 
positional approach of defining the elite, identified 539 political elite positions. See, HOFFMAN-LANGE, 
op.cit., p. 32. 
 The rosters for 1988 
and 1990 are larger as the last communist National Assembly and the 1990 Great National 
Assembly consisted of 400 representatives. The Great National Assembly reduced the number of 
the regular National Assembly from 400 to 240 representatives, hence, the smaller number of 
entries in the 1991, 1994, and 1997 rosters. Additional variation in the size of the rosters is due 
to changes in political appointments (government, specific ministers, judges, etc.) in between 
parliamentary elections or changes in the government structure (ministries and government 
agencies). Data for the rosters was collected from the Parliamentary Library’s parliamentary 
lists, Darzhaven Vestnik (State Newspaper), and official government agencies’ sources. 
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This massive database allows for analysis at the individual, positional, party and 
aggregate level. Using the database, we could trace the career of a single member of the elite or 
trace a single position: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We could further examine trends at the party or aggregate level such as elite renewal rate, 
defined as the percent of new members in the elite: 
Table 4. Elite renewal rate 
Renewal rate 1990 1991 1994 1997 
BSP 190/225 (84.4%) 57/118 (48.3%) 70/158 (44.3%) 35/71 (49.3%) 
UDF N/A 125/160 (78.0%) 36/77 (46.7%) 122/163 (74.8%) 
MRF N/A 19/27 (70.4%) 7/15 (46.7%) 7/14 (50.0%) 
Total 447/511 (87.5%) 354/481 (73.6%) 196/375 (52.3%) 230/381 (60.3%) 
Transferring the data from Excel to SPSS allowed us to run statistical analysis. Coding the Excel 
data provided us with one quantitative and four categorical variables: 
 
Emilia Maslarova (BSP), former minister of Labor and Social Policy (2005-2009): 
1990 – Round Table participant, Minister of Labor and Welfare in the 2nd Lukanov government 
1991 – Minister of Labor and Welfare in Dimitar Popov’s government 
1994 – Director of the Foreign Aid Agency 
1997 – Member of Parliament 
 
Director of the Foreign Aid Agency (established January 1991) 
1990 – Teodor Tzvetkov, no party affiliation 
1991 – Petko Simeonov (1991-1992), UDF 
             Sefan Chanev (1992-1995), UDF 
1994 – Emilia Maslarova (1995-1997), BSP 
1997 – Vladimir Abadziev (1997-2002), UDF 
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The nature of the variables (all but one being categorical) limited the available options for 
analysis to detailed descriptive statistics. These statistics allowed us to examine differences and 
changes in the demographic characteristics of the elite both at the party and aggregate level. We 
compared the average and modal age and examined the place of birth by party: 
Table 5. Place of birth by party 
BSP 1990 1991 1994 1997 
Sofia 19 (8.4%) 18 (15.3%) 26 (16.5%) 5 (7.0%) 
Big city 37 (16.4%) 20 (16.9%) 25 (15.8%) 16 (22.5%) 
Small city 66 (29.3%) 42 (35.6%) 54 (34.2%) 21 (29.6%) 
Village 93 (41.3%) 33 (28.0%) 50 (31.6%) 14 (19.7%) 
Abroad 5 (2.2%) 4 (3.4%) 3 (1.9%) 2 (3.4%) 
Missing 5 (2.2%) 1 (.8%) 0 13 (18.3%) 
Total 225 118 158 71 
UDF 1990 1991 1994 1997 
Sofia 40 (27.0%) 38 (23.8%) 23 (29.9%) 22 (13.5%) 
Big city 27 (18.2%) 32 (20.0%) 24 (31.2%) 24 (14.7%) 
Small city 37 (25.0%) 43 (26.9%) 20 (26.0%) 23 (14.1%) 
Village 42 (28.4%) 28 (17.5%) 7 (9.1%) 12 (7.4%) 
Abroad 2 (1.4%) 0 1 (1.3%) 0 
Missing 0 19 (11.9%) 2 (2.6%) 82 (50.3%) 
Total 148 160 77 163 
MRF 1990 1991 1994 1997 
Sofia 1 (4.5%) 3 (11.1%) 0 2 (12.5%) 
Big city 4 (18.2%) 2 (7.4%) 2 (13.3%) 2 (12.5%) 
Small city 4 (18.2%) 8 (29.6%) 6 (40.0%) 5 (31.3%) 
Village 12 (54.5%) 14 (51.9%) 7 (46.7%) 5 (31.3%) 
Abroad 1 (4.5%) 0 0 0 
Missing 0 0 0 2 (12.5%) 
Total 22 27 15 14 
Variables: 
Name   nominal 
Position   nominal 
Elected vs. Appointed categorical (values: 0=elected, 1=appointed, 2=elected and appointed) 
Party Affiliation  categorical (values: 0=BSP, 1=UDF, 2=MRF,…..9=no party affiliation) 
Year of Birth  quantitative  
Place of Birth  categorical (values: 0=Sofia, 2=big city, 3=small city, 4=village, 5=abroad) 
DS agent  categorical (values: 0=no affiliation with DS, 1=confirmed affiliation with DS) 
Miscellaneous  nominal 
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Table 6. Average and modal age by party 
Year of birth 1990 1991 1994 1997 
BSP                  mean 
                         mode 
1939.84 
1938 (62 yrs. old) 
1946.48 
1948 (43 yrs. old) 
1946.82 
1949 (45 yrs. old) 
1950 
1960 (37yrs. old) 
UDF                 mean 
                         mode 
1940.11 
1938 (62 yrs. old) 
1944.50 
1949 (42 yr. old) 
1947.95 
1952 (42 yrs. old) 
1948.84* 
Multiple 
MRF                mean 
                         mode 
1946.64 
1954 (36 yrs. old) 
1946.30 
1942 (49 yrs. old) 
1953.53 
1961 (33 yrs. old) 
1953.29 
Multiple 
Total                mean 
                         mode 
1940.17 
1938 (62 yrs. old) 
1944.96 
1949 (42 yrs. old) 
1947.10 
1952 (42 yrs. old) 
1949.25 
Multiple 
Based on this data, we were able to make conclusions about the patterns of recruitment of the 
various parties. For example, we noticed that in the Great National Assembly, BSP and MRF 
recruited people predominantly from the villages, whereas UDF had an even distribution of 
people from small and big agglomerates: 
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small party
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Figure 1. Place of birth by party 1990 
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In the subsequent parliament, BSP decreased by more than half its village-born members, 
whereas UDF attracted a lot of people from small cities. By contrast, there were no significant 
changes in the recruitement pattern of MRF: 
PSBSP
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MRF
BAPU
independent
no party affiliation
1991 Party Affiliation
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Figure 2. Place of birth by party 1991 
We also noticed that MRF members of the elite are younger on average than those from BSP and 
UDF. This is particularly true of the 1990 Great National Assembly, but is also observable at the 
aggregate level for the entire period. The boxplots below represent the distribution for “year of 
birth” by party. The black thick line indicates the mean value, whereas the box indicates the 
cluster of values. In both boxplots, MRF has an observably higher mean values and cluster of 
values.  
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Figure 3. Year of birth by party 1990 
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Figure 4. Year of birth by party (cumulative 1990 – 2001) 
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We were further able to examine differences between elected and appointed officials. For 
example, we noticed that members of parliament are predominantly from small agglomerates, 
whereas political appointed (judges, directors of government agencies, etc.) are overwhelmingly 
Sofia-born. 
Elected Appointed Elected and 
Appointed
Elected vs. Appointed
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Figure 5. Place of birth by position (elected vs. appointed) 
 
Finally, we examined the elite for affiliation with the former secret service. The question of the 
secret service and its role in the transition emerged from the interview data. The main concern in 
the continuous debate on the secret service has been the presence of former secret service agents 
among the political elite. To investigate this question, elite rosters were matched against reports 
of the commission on the secret service files (see Chapter Seven). Consequently, we were able to 
calculate the number and percentage of former secret service agents within each party for the 
duration of the examined period. As illustrated below, BSP exhibits the highest number of 
former secret service agents among its elite, while the highest percentage of secret service agents 
is found in the MRF elite. Appointees with no party affiliation, in turn, exhibit the second highest 
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number of former secret service agents. Detailed examination of the Excel data indicates those to 
be primarily deputy ministers and members of the judicial system. Also visible from this graph is 
the composition of the transition elite, over 1/3 of which (42.2%) are BSP members: 
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Figure 6. Former secret service agents within each party 
 
The rosters represent a valuable new database that is, however, not free from limitations. The 
1988 roster, for example, has a large percentage of missing data on the place and year of birth 
variables. Consequently, we were unable to run descriptive statistics for the 1988 roster. Excel 
data, however, still provided valuable information that allowed us to estimate the renewal rate of 
BSP for the first democratic election, calculate the number and percent of former secret service 
agents, and trace particular members of the elite or specific positions. The 1997 roster has large 
amount of missing data on the same variables (place and year of birth) for the UDF elite. Thus, 
the results for UDF derived from this roster were inconclusive. A significant percentage of data 
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on these variables is also missing for appointed positions in all rosters. Demographic information 
proved much harder to locate for political appointees than for members of parliament. Thus, 
comparison of demographic characteristics between elected and appointed positions needs to be 
treated with caution. 
5.5 INTERVIEWS 
The quantitative approach is supplemented by qualitative methods, including 35 interviews with 
members of the elite, scholars, and journalists. Given the restricted access to elite members, a 
snowball sample was used, relying on a gradually expanding network of elite contacts.316
                                                 
316 Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling method especially useful when the desired sample 
characteristic is rare, as is the case with elites. Snowball sampling relies on referrals from initial 
subjects/informants to generate additional subjects/informants. Saturation is reached when no new 
viewpoints are obtained from new informants. 
 In 
order to reduce sampling bias, a snowball chain (initial contact) was initiated from several points, 
each with different party affiliation. The final sample included, among others, President Zhelyu 
Zhelev, former Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, present and former members of Parliament, a 
constitutions court judge, a cassation court judge, a presidential advisor, diplomats, and party 
functionaries. The sample consisted of 17 members of the elite listed in the elite rosters, 4 
members of the elite not listed in the rosters (part of the elite either before or after the examined 
period), 10 scholars, and 4 other informants (1 journalist and 3 lower-rank party members). In 
terms of political orientation, 15 informants were affiliated (either currently or in the past) with 
UDF, 10 with BSP, and 10 had no declared party affiliation. The sample does not include 
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informants from MRF, due to numerous failed attempts to gain access to the MRF elite. 
Interview data on MRF is still provided by non-MRF representatives of the elite. 
Interviews followed an in-depth, semi-structured format, including a core set of open-
ended questions supplemented with questions tailored to the specific member. The order of 
questions varied in order to match the flow of the interview. Information and insights gained 
from earlier interviews were incorporated to inform supplementary questions asked in later 
interviews. According to Sinclair and Brady, this sort of hybrid, flexible approach appears 
optimum for studies of elites that require some quantifiable data but also a good deal of in-depth 
interpretative material.317
Analysis of interview data was guided by the grounded theory method (Glaser & Strauss 
1967, Strauss 1987). Grounded theory is an inductive methodology aimed at the generation of 
theory in intimate relation with data. It is a set of rigorous procedures leading to the emergence 
of conceptual categories that are “grounded” in empirical data. As such, the grounded theory 
approach is best suited for this study which goal is not to test a hypothesis but to examine a 
 Interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, though most of the 
informants gave permission to be quoted. The majority of interviews were recorded. With 
increased experience in interviewing, recording was substituted in later interviews with note-
taking which made informants more relaxed and willing to share information. Two BSP 
informants did not allow either recording or note-taking, in which case notes and recordings 
were made immediately after the interview. Interviews varied between 30 minutes to 2 hours, 
taking place at the informant’s office or at a quiet restaurant or café. On rare occasions 
interviews were interrupted by a phone call or conversation with staff, which had negligent effect 
on the flow of the interview. 
                                                 
317 SINCLAIR Barbara and David Brady, “Studying Members of the United States Congress,” in MOYSER 
and WAGSTAFFE, op.cit, pp. 48-71, p. 67. 
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process, namely elite transformation. In addition to providing rich narrative of the transition and 
a collection of personal life histories, the purpose of the interview analysis is to generate 
concepts of the process of elite transformation in Bulgaria. The analysis revealed diverging 
conceptualizations of the transition and the transformation of the elite based on the political 
affiliation of the informants. This discovery alone proves the usefulness of the grounded theory 
approach in analyzing rich data and generating theory. 
The analysis of interview data was conducted in four steps:  
1) Translating and transcribing the interviews: conducted simultaneously  
2) Open coding: extracting key points from the data and marking them with a series of 
codes.318
3) Axial coding: grouping the codes into similar concepts. In this process several new 
concepts were identified in addition to those addressed in the core interview questions. 
 This process included grouping codes according to the core interview questions and 
identifying codes that were not addressed by the core questions. 
4) Selective coding: grouping the concepts into categories which become the basis for 
generating theory. Codes were grouped in 13 categories which were then examined for 
differences based on party affiliation. 
 
 An example of the step-by-step coding procedure would best illustrate the method: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
318 Coding is a general term for conceptualizing data. It includes raising questions and giving provisional 
answers (hypothesis) about categories and their relations. A code is the term for any product of this 
analysis (whether category or a relation among two or more categories). Category refers to 
dimensionalizing distinctions (Thus, a machine-body connection is a category). See, Anselm STRAUSS, 
Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.p. 20-21. 
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Once categories were identified, concepts were grouped according to party affiliation: BSP, 
UDF, and independent. We can see that categorized codes for “how did you get into politics” 
(channels of entry to the elite) are very different for BSP respondents: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, conclusions were drawn based on the diverging codes within the category: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question:  
How did you get into politics? 
Open coding:  
“I was surrounded by free thinking people at the BAS Institute of Literature.” 
“Then at Stomana Pernik, I started re-organizing the existing professional union.” 
“While preparing to flee the country, these idiots deposed Zhivkov and we thought 
something big had happened.” 
“I got involved with the new structures in Petrich and became the first chair of the 
local UDF club.” 
Axial coding: 
 “UDF - I became an activist and founder of UDF Petrich” 
Selective coding (including categorized codes of all UDF respondents) 
“involved with the informals” 
“activist that got invited by certain opposition group” 
“activist looking for a way to get involved” 
 
Selective coding (including categorized codes of all BSP respondents) 
“long career within the party” 
“involved with the informals but disappointed by the anti-
communist extremism of UDF” 
“activist in the youth organization” 
Channels of entry to the elite 
BSP - people within BSP structures and from BSP families, dissidents 
who have turned away from UDF; both formal and informal channels; controlled 
process; 
UDF – activists, dissidents, people who drew attention to themselves by 
being in the right place at the right time; random process. 
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As illustrated by this example, interview analysis provided invaluable information on elite 
transformation, including mechanisms of elite recruitment, organizing of the opposition, internal 
conflict within the communist elite, etc. The combination of this analysis with quantitative data 
from elite rosters gives the study sound empirical grounding as well as rich narrative. 
5.6 NEWSPAPERS AND ARCHIVES 
Analysis of archival and media sources constitutes the final component of the empirical data. 
The archives of the Bulgarian Communist Party were examined in order to detect intra-elite 
conflict as well as indications of dissident activity. Newspaper archives of BSP’s Rabotnichesko 
Delo, renamed Duma in April 1990, and UDF’s Democraziya were further examined with the 
purpose of following the public political debate during the transition and analyzing the 
communication strategies of the opposing political actors. Since MRF does not have an official 
daily publication, media analysis of MRF is limited to coverage of MRF both in Duma and 
Democraziya.  
Archival research entailed reviewing all archives of the Central Committee of BCP for 
1988 and 1989 (Central State Archives, fund B, descriptions 67-100). Materials included minutes 
from meetings of the Politburo of the CC of BCP, decisions and directives of Politburo, reports 
from international meetings of various ministers, and intelligence reports on domestic and 
international activities. A large part of this archive is unavailable and reported either “in 
process,” “missing,” “destroyed in fire,” or “destroyed in flood.” The available material was 
reviewed; relevant archives were copied and used to inform the narrative on the renaming 
process, early dissident activity, and internal conflict. Materials on the renaming process 
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(minutes form Politburo meetings, intelligence reports, directives to security services, etc.) are 
most heavily represented in the archive. Materials on early dissident activities also figured 
prominently. There were no reports, however, indicating internal conflict. The only indication of 
such conflict (which was no doubt present) are protocols with cadre (personnel) changes in the 
economic and foreign ministries. The most valuable document found was minutes of a 
November 21, 1989 meeting of Petar Mladenov with the leadership of the Sofia Committee of 
BCP,319
Analysis of newspaper archives included reviewing every issue of Rabotnichesko Delo 
(January 1988 – April 1990), Duma (April 1990 – December 1995),
 which clearly demonstrates the degree of confusion and fear among party members. 
Overall, the analysis of BCP archives proved counter-productive, taking enormous amount of 
time due to lengthy bureaucratic procedures for obtaining archive materials and providing 
limited information that was not already available from other sources. 
320
                                                 
319 Central State Archive, ЦДА ф. 1”Б”, оп. 100, а.е. 36. 
 and Democraziya 
(February 1990 – December 1995) for the period 1988-1995. Instead of random or selective 
sampling of newspapers for 1988-2000, a thorough review for a shorter timeframe was chosen. 
Thorough review is a more appropriate strategy for observing the shaping and evolution of the 
political debate and the communication strategies of BCP and UDF. Because of the tumultuous 
nature of early post-communist politics, random sampling risks omitting key events the coverage 
of which is indicative of communication strategies. Selective sampling, in turn, might be 
overemphasizing particular aspects of the debate while omitting others. Extending the review to 
2000 would have consumed enormous amount of time with little value added. While the chosen 
timeframe is shorter than the one covered by the study, it is long enough to capture the shaping 
of political debate and communication strategies.  
320 Due to financial problems, Duma was not issued in 1994. 
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The thorough review led to the emergence of several analytical categories: indications of 
internal conflict, indications of censorship and misrepresentation, representations of the party, 
representations of the opponent party, electoral campaigns, coverage of key events, etc. The two 
newspapers were compared in each of these categories which allowed us to reach conclusions 
about communication strategies and the construction of political debate. The abbreviated 
examples below illustrate this technique of comparison: 
 
 
 
Key events (fire at BCP headquarters on August 26, 1990): 
Democrazyia: August 28, 1990: (front page) The page burned before it was read: if we 
have Goering we will have Van der Lube – UDF will participate in the parliamentary commission 
examining the arson at BSP’s headquarters on August 26th. UDF condemns the fire.  
Duma: August 27, 1990: (front page) Fire hard to extinguish, democracy is burning – in 
front of the militia fanatical crowd set fire on the party headquarters. The president condemns the 
action and calls for refrain from violence. 
Duma: August 28, 1990: (front page) Address by BSP’s chairmanship condemning the fire. 
Declaration of the Council of Ministers condemning the fire. Interview with Lilov – I found plans 
of the party building in the “city of truth,” certainly it wasn’t I who gave it to them.  
Notes: UDF refers to the Reichstag fire which has been a central event in constructing 
communist rhetoric. BSP blames UDF extremists in an attempt to spur public discontent against 
the “Truth city.” 
 
Censorship and Misinformation: 
Rabotnichesko Delo: March 18, 1989: (front page) Decision of Politburo – the congresses 
of the intellectual and art organizations have been a success  
Rabotnichesko Delo: November 10, 1989: No issue!!! 
Notes: Congresses: 1. there is no actual decision, 2. we know that those congresses scared 
BCP because many people expressed dissident views, 3. no mention of the “great danger” which 
was discussed at length at politburo meetings as indicated by the party archives. Fall of the Berlin 
Wall: no coverage whatsoever!!! 
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Analysis of newspaper archives proved extremely useful, particularly in comparing internal 
conflicts in BCP and UDF, levels of expertise among BCP and UDF elites, diverging visions of 
reform policies, and overall ability of each party to articulate and communicate its goals and 
strategies. 
Combining elite rosters, interviews, and archival and media sources produced a 
comprehensive set of empirical data that addresses the various aspects of elite transformation. 
With this data, the questions driving this study were investigated, as described in the following 
chapter. The dataset further represents a valuable resource in documenting the Bulgarian 
transition and a solid foundation for comparative studies on elites, democratization and transition 
societies. 
Internal conflict: 
Democraziya: May 14, 1992: (front page) The 39! – They returned us to the change. While 
the president was taking care of his favorite [Dimitar Ludzhev], UDF was helping all the working 
people – Zhelev insists on leaving Ludzhev in a ministerial position. MRF is in coalition with the 
UDF – it approves the cabinet changes. 
Democraziya: October 7, 1992:  (front page) Dimitar Ludzhev lost UDF’s political trust. 
Democraziya: October 20, 1992: (front page) The intelligence, President and the 
government  
Duma: July 5, 1993: (front page) Tomov leaves BSP’s supreme council, he wrote a farewell 
letter – there were no protests on “Positano” 20 yesterday. Lyuben Berov thanks UDF for the 
prudence – the “Truth city” was removed within the deadline specified by the president. The 
premier also thanked Edvin Sugarev for ending his hunger strike.   
Notes: Internal conflict within UDF is very strong and visible. UDF does not even make an 
attempt to look united, but is instead publicly attacking its own. Internal conflict within BSP is 
contained. Great care is given not to make such conflict public. 
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6.0  TRANSFORMATION OF THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL ELITE: EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
I have argued that two sets of factors determine the nature of elite transformation – first, the 
presence (absence) of a counter-elite, and the degree to which this elite is organized, and second, 
the quality of the auto-transformative mechanisms of the ruling elite, i.e. intra-elite conflict and 
modes of recruitment. To examine elite transformation in Bulgaria then, we need to determine 
whether there was intra-elite conflict within the ruling communist elite; the nature and intensity 
of that conflict; whether there was an organized counter-elite; where the counter-elite came from 
and how it organized itself; the extent to which the counter-elite was able to challenge the power 
of the communist ruling elite and in what way – through contestation, cooptation or both; the 
difference in the composition and modes of recruitment of the communist and post-communist 
elite; and the change in the mechanisms of elite recruitment. 
Based on analysis of elite rosters, interviews and party newspapers, I examine the 
structure and mode of recruitment of BCP/BSP before and during the transition, as well as the 
process of organizing, structuring, and recruiting of the opposition (UDF). I pay particular 
attention to the internal conflict within both the BCP/BSP and the UDF. I further analyze the 
structure and mode of recruitment of the ethnic Turkish party (MRF) and its role in transition 
politics. I then compare BSP, UDF, and MRF, examine the aggregate characteristics of the elite, 
and offer an analysis of elite transformation in Bulgaria. 
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6.1 BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP)/BULGARIAN SOCIALIST PARTY 
(BSP) 
6.1.1 Structure and Mode of Recruitment until 1989 
The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was a highly-structured and strictly hierarchical 
organization reaching one million members in 1989, out of an 8-million total population. 
Organized according to the authoritarian Soviet model of democratic centralism, the BCP had a 
pyramidal structure mirroring its Soviet counterpart: general secretary, Politburo, Central 
Committee, regional committees, city committees, party clubs, etc. The general secretary was 
elected by the Politburo, which was elected by the Central Committee (CC), which in turn was 
elected by the party congress. Whereas the CC consisted of less than two hundred members, the 
Politburo hardly ever exceeded ten people. While democratic electoral procedures nominally 
existed, all major decisions (particularly acceptance to Politburo and CC) were dictated by the 
General Secretary, followed by unanimous “votes” of party organs. Apart from the highly-
centralized command structure, the Party had a dense network of local party organizations 
functioning on several levels – workplace (also known as primary party organizations), place of 
residence, and educational institutions. Party structures had completely penetrated the state 
apparatus, eliminating the functional distinction between party and state. In addition to hijacking 
the state, the BCP exercised tight control over all important social organizations such as trade 
unions, women’s organizations, youth movements, and professional associations. They were all 
affiliated and overseen by the Fatherland Front, the largest mass organization in socialist 
Bulgaria which was under the complete control of the Party and a key instrument in its ability to 
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maintain control over all aspects of political, economic, and social life.321 The result, Crampton 
argues, was that almost every individual in the country was subject to communist power.322
Recruitment into the party leadership was based first and foremost on loyalty. Under state 
socialism, argues Kostova, political loyalty and communist party ties were given priority over 
wealth and other economic and social attributes in selecting elites.
   
323 Membership into the party 
was granted only by invitation or approved membership request. Although in its first years of 
power the Party adopted a more open approach to membership and access to leadership 
positions,324 by the 1970s high-rank party positions were reserved almost exclusively for people 
with communist family background and/or demonstrated loyalty. In a comparative study of 
recruitment into East European communist parties, Eric Hanley finds strong evidence supporting 
the argument that having a father in the party significantly increased one’s odds of joining the 
party. The correlation, he argues, is particularly strong in the Bulgarian case.325
                                                 
321 The Fatherland Front was an anti-fascist coalition that organized the 1944 communist coup. Though 
nominally consisting of several parties, after 1947 when the new socialist constitution was adopted, the 
Fatherland Front was under total communist control. Most adult Bulgarians were members of the 
organization whose main function during the communist regime was to promote a “socialist way of life.” 
For more on the Fatherland Front’s role in Bulgarian socialist society, see, Ulf BRUNNBAUER, “Making 
Bulgarians Socialist: The Fatherland Front in Communist Bulgaria, 1948-1989,” East European Politics 
and Societies, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Winter 2008), pp. 44-79. 
 Communist 
322 CRAMPTON Richard, Bulgaria, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 328. 
323 KOSTOVA Dobrinka, “Bulgaria: Economic Elite Change during the 1990’s” in John HIGLEY and 
Gyorgy LENGYEL (eds.), Elites After State Socialism: Theories and Analysis, Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, pp. 199-208, p. 204. 
324 This initial open approach was followed by massive purges in the Party as indicated by BCP 
membership figures – 460,000 members in 1948 and 360,000 in 1956. Source: Eric HANLEY, “A Party of 
Workers or a Party of Intellectuals? Recruitment into Eastern European Communist parties, 1945-1988,” 
Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 4, (Jun., 2003), pp. 1073-1105, p. 1076. 
325 HANLEY, op.cit., p. 1094. Andrei Lukanov and his notorious statement, “I am a third generation 
communist,” certainly support Hanley’s findings. Andrei Lukanov’s father, Karlo Lukanov, was a 
prominent communist who worked for the Communist International in Moscow. After the 1944 
communist coup, Kalro Lukanov returned to Bulgaria and occupied numerous top party and state 
positions, including that of vice premier and foreign minister. Todor Lukanov, Andrei Lukanov’s 
grandfather, was a member of the Central Committee and one of the founders of the communist 
organization in Pleven, an administrative center in Northern Bulgaria. 
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families, primary party organizations, and the youth communist organization (Komsomol) 
formed the main pool of recruitment for leadership positions.  
Professional advancement was often contingent upon party membership and promotion in 
the party hierarchy. Under communist rule, Eric Hanley contends, a system of “centrally 
administered mobility” was established under which promotion to higher educational levels and 
higher office came to be based, at least in part, on political criteria such as class background and 
loyalty to the Party.326 Loyalty to the party, Nikolov concurs, was considered a more important 
criterion for promotion than professional credentials.327 Since party membership was a highly 
desirable if not necessary requirement for high-ranking positions in most fields, in many cases 
the Party offered the only avenue for professional career advancement. Thus, many capable 
experts, in their ambition for career advancement, were lured into the Party. This included 
scholars, artists and intellectuals, who in other East European countries provided the backbone of 
political dissent.  This combination of a cooptation strategy on the one hand and individual 
strategies for career advancement on the other resulted in an abundance of professionals among 
party ranks. It was the ability of the Party to reward political loyalty with material advantage, 
Hanley posits, that assured Party leaders a steady stream of new recruits.328
Education was similarly subject to party control. Quotas in all fields were reserved for 
students with communist family background both in the prestigious high schools and the 
universities. Certain fields such as international relations and international economic relations, 
were reserved almost exclusively for children of high party functionaries, not to mention 
education abroad, which became a privilege of the offspring of communist families. Through its 
 
                                                 
326 HANLEY, op.cit., p. 1073. 
327 NIKOLOV, op.cit., p. 216. 
328 HANLEY, op.cit., p. 1078. 
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strict selection criteria, control over professional advancement, restricted access to certain 
“reserved” fields of education, and a policy of co-optation, the Party secured a healthy supply of 
experts among its cadres and assured that positions of authority were occupied by party loyalists.  
Many scholars argue that, loyalty notwithstanding, as communist regimes consolidated 
power, increased importance was being placed on technical competence in party recruitment and 
promotion (Jowitt 1992, Lane 1982). But Hanley finds no empirical data pointing to such “shift 
towards meritocracy.” Still, he reports a positive effect of education and professional status on 
the likelihood of entering the party, which nevertheless remained stable over time.329 His 
findings, he argues, suggest that party leaders were able to impose educational standards on new 
recruits even during the first decade of their rule.330 In fact, recruiting cadres who possessed both 
technical skills and the proper political credentials became easier in the later years when a 
generation of socialist intelligentsia had been raised. Thus, the increased recruitment of 
technocrats noticed in a number of East European countries in the late 1970s and 1980s was not 
necessarily at the expense of party loyalty. Rather the pool of technocrats among party members 
had significantly increased due, at least in the Bulgarian case, both to educational privileges for 
children with communist family background and the persistent growth of party membership. 
Hence, we cannot really speak of a conflict between “red” and “expert”, as Jack Bielasiak terms 
it, resulting in a deterministic resolution in favor of the technocratic elite.331
                                                 
329 In a study of elite recruitment in Poland, Wasilewski similarly reports lack of empirical evidence 
pointing to a shift towards meritocratic selection. In recruiting experts, he argues, political requirements 
were of greater importance. See, Jacek WASILEWSKI, “The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in 
Poland in the 1070s and 1080s,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, (Oct., 1990), pp. 743-757. 
 In Bulgaria, loyalty 
330 HANLEY, op.cit., p. 1101. 
331 BIELASIAK Jack, “Elite Studies and Communist Systems,” in Ronald H. LINDEN and Bert A. 
ROCKMAN (eds.), Elite Studies and Communist Politics: Essays in Memory of Carl Beck, Pittsburgh, PA, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984, pp. 103-124, p. 107. 
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to the party remained the most important criterion for recruitment into leadership positions 
throughout the communist period. 
In contrast to its massive membership constituting one-eighth of the population (or at 
least one BCP member in one-fourth of all Bulgarian households332), the BCP adopted very 
restricted access to leadership positions. Recruitment was almost exclusively from inside – lower 
echelons of the party and communist families. The Communist party, Carl Beck et al. argue, not 
only controlled all elements of the elite, but it also acted as the pool from which all members of 
the elite were recruited. Upward mobility, the authors further contend, was highly circumscribed 
and restricted to individuals who can qualify.333
6.1.2 Intra-elite Conflict 
 Given the pyramidal structure of the party, high-
rank party positions constituted but a fraction of overall party membership. With a top-down 
approach of leadership selection which rendered nominal democratic procedures for promotion 
into the party meaningless, the majority of BCP members, the so-called “rank and file members”, 
had little if any access to positions of authority and just as little influence over the appointment 
of people to the high echelons of the party.  
The Bulgarian Communist Party has been subject to internal conflict since the early years of its 
existence, starting with the split in 1903 into social democrats and narrow socialists (later 
communists).334
                                                 
332 MELONE, op.cit., p. 260. 
 Establishing a totalitarian, one-party regime did not purge the party from such 
333 BECK Carl et al., A Survey of Elite Studies, Research Memorandum 65-3, Special Operations Research 
Office, American University, Washington D.C., 1965, p. 23. 
334 Founded in 1891, the Bulgarian Worker’s Social Democratic Party (BWSDP) divided into BWSDP-
broad socialists and BWSDP-narrow socialists. In 1919, BWSDP-narrow socialists renamed itself to 
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conflict. On the contrary, the first years of consolidation of power were characterized by violent 
internal conflicts leading to massive purges from the party. With the seizure of power in 1944, 
Nikolov argues, tensions arose between the local communists who participated in the partisan 
movement and the cadres sent from Moscow.335 Many of the East European communist leaders 
fled during the war to relative security in Moscow,336
The most notable and extreme example of the conflict between Moscow and home 
communists in Bulgaria was the show trial and execution of Traicho Kostov. Traicho Kostov 
was a war-time activist who enjoyed great popularity at home, but his voiced criticism of Soviet 
economic policy toward Bulgaria caused him to be disliked by the Soviets and the Moscow 
cadres, namely, premier and party leader, Georgi Dimitrov, his heir apparent Vasil Kolarov, and 
his son-in-law, Vulko Chervenkov. His execution in 1949 following a forced “confession” was a 
defining moment, Crampton argues, as it solved the problem of succession to the party 
leadership.
 whereas communists back home remained 
to endure the repressions of Nazi-sympathetic governments. With the advance of the Red Army, 
the “Moscow” communists returned to their countries claiming the leadership of the newly 
imposed communist regimes, to the dismay and impotence of local communist activists.  
337
                                                                                                                                                             
Bulgarian Communist Party. Today both BSP and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) trace 
their origin to BWSDP. 
 Dimitrov’s declining health and Kolarov’s old age left contestation for the 
leadership to the popular Kostov and the Moscow-trained Chervenkov. The removal of Kostov 
secured the party leadership for Chervenkov, a.k.a. “Bulgaria’s little Stalin,” and assured a 
continued dominance of the Moscow cadres in the party. 
335 Interview with Dr. Stephan Nikolov, Sofia, March, 2007. 
336 HANLEY, op.cit., p. 1076. 
337 CRAMPTON, 2007, op.cit, p. 336. 
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Though the conflict between Moscow and home communists never again reached such 
extreme forms, it continued to be present to various degrees throughout communist rule.  Among 
the high echelons of the party there were at all times representatives either born or educated in 
the Soviet Union, or, in the case of Andrei Lukanov and Grisha Filipov, both.338 The BCP as 
well as all other East European parties, Kalinova and Baeva contend, had groups that were more 
closely related to Moscow than to the domestic leadership.339
Zhivkov’s rise to power in 1956-1962 marked an important change in BCP’s leadership 
as it put an end to the dominance of Moscow cadres. Zhivkov was a little-known war-time 
activist from the Chavdar brigade who appeared to be a temporary compromise for the leadership 
position. He received Khrushchev’s support in defeating his Moscow-trained opponent, Anton 
Yugov, who had fallen into disfavor for his criticisms of Khrushchev’s policy towards Cuba and 
China. In order to secure his position, Zhivkov immediately purged the party of the old 
communists, including Chervenkov and Yugov, and surrounded himself with trusted comrades 
from the Chavdar brigade. Throughout his rule Zhivkov managed to suppress internal conflicts in 
their early stages. He safeguarded his position by ensuring that no potential rival held the same 
post long enough to build up a solid and dependable body of support, Crampton points out, and 
for this reason he frequently shifted ministers and party leaders from one post to another.
 Tensions between those who 
enjoyed Moscow’s protection and those who did not never ceased. In fact, Zhivkov’s deposition 
is also an illustration of a clash between the Soviet-backed group, led by Lukanov, and Zhivkov 
and his most trusted comrades from the partisan movement. 
340
                                                 
338 Andrei Lukanov: minister of foreign economic relations 1987-1990, prime minister 1990, born in 
Moscow, educated at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Grisha Filipov: member of CC 
of BCP, member of the State Council, premier 1981-1986, born in Kadievka (Ukraine), educated at the 
Moscow State University. 
 
339 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 227. 
340 CRAMPTON, 2007, op.cit., 359. 
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Another secret to Zhivkov’s long tenure as a party leader was his soft treatment of his opponents.  
Instead of persecuting them, Zhivkov simply moved his rivals out of the way by stationing them 
abroad or in highly-paid sinecures, still allowing them to lead a privileged life. This strategy 
checked discontent against him within the party and prevented his opponents from banding 
together. Being very aware of the ever-present threat of Moscow cadres within the party, 
Zhivkov made sure to secure Soviet support for himself. His strongest card, Kalinova and Baeva 
posit, was Zhivkov’s “special” relationship with Soviet leaders.341 Zhivkov maintained cordial 
relations with Khrushchev, who helped him ascend to power, and was quick to gain the trust of 
his successor Brezhnev. He preserved close relations also with Andropov and Chernenko. 
Consequently, Soviet leadership did not question Zhivkov’s reshufflings and occasional 
purges.342
Zhivkov’s cunning and skill in choking internal conflict did not preclude internal 
struggles during Zhivkov’s rule. On the contrary, conflicts were numerous and on multiple 
grounds. “Being in the high ranks of the party required skills,” argues Nikolov, “It was a struggle 
for survival. They were constantly plotting against each other and competing – who would travel 
abroad, who would get a vacation or a villa and so on. This struggle was not public, but it trained 
them well. There was a myriad of conflicts and they were personal.”
 
343
                                                 
341 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 146. 
 Personal conflicts often 
resulted in strategically-motivated groupings, which, for lack of ideological grounding, 
resembled more of a clan structure rather than political factionalism. As former UDF MP 
342 In 1977, for example, Zhivkov expelled 38,000 party members, including Politburo member, Boris 
Velchev, grandfather of the current attorney general of Bulgaria also named Boris Velchev. 
343 Interview with Stefan Nikolov, Sofia, March 15, 2007. Minutes of Politburo meetings give some 
peculiar indications of these personal conflicts. Among other matters, Politburo was also engaged in 
debates on allocation of restaurant food home delivery for high-rank party members. Whenever a decision 
was made for a certain high functionary to receive restaurant food at home, heated debates ensued usually 
resulting in similar allocations for contending party members. 
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Vladimir Manolov argues, “BCP is a clan party and the various clans continue to hate each other 
throughout history.”344 Kalinova and Baeva concur that the sole goal of such small groups was to 
gain control of the party; hence, they never reached the scale of factions or dissident 
movements.345 Neither the Soviet-domestic cadres split, nor the divide between the Chavdar 
brigade people and other war-time partisan groups who were not promoted by Zhivkov had an 
ideological base. This is not to say that ideology did not play a role. Whenever conflicts became 
public, they were usually articulated along ideological lines, though ideology was rarely the main 
or only point of contention. Few groups, such as Lyudmila Zhivkova’s circle in the 1970s, had 
primarily ideological grounding.346 Zhivkova’s pro-active cultural policies gave visibility to her 
circle, but visibility was rarely characteristic of struggles within the party. Intra-elite conflict 
remained hidden for the most part and, as Baeva argues, was usually confined to the top 
leadership, not reaching lower levels of the Party.347
The nature and intensity of the intra-elite conflict drastically changed with Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s rise to power in the USSR in 1985 and the ensuing policy of glasnost and 
perestroika. “Gorbachev's perestroika irritated Zhivkov,” recounts Mihail Ivanov, Soviet cultural 
attaché at the time, “and he did not accept it.”
 
348
                                                 
344 Interview with Vladimir Manolov, Sofia, February 12, 2007. 
 Zhivkov and his loyal supporters, a considerable 
portion of the party apparatus and the nomenklatura, were terrified by the “unrestrained openness 
345 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 146. 
346 Lyudmila Zhivkova, Todor Zhivkov’s daughter, was an avid promoter of a distinct Bulgarian national 
identity, as opposed to Soviet-imposed socialist identity. Her views on national identity, as her fascination 
with mysticism and asceticism, were often in contradiction with communist ideology. Until her untimely 
death in 1981, Zhivkova had a devoted following among Bulgarian artists and intellectuals, most of whom 
prominent party members. For more on Lyudmila Zhivkova and her circle, see Atanaska NEDEVA, 
“Lyudmila Zhivkova and the Paradox of Ideology and Identity in Communist Bulgaria,” East European 
Politics and Societies, Vol. 18, No.2, 2004, pp. 278-315. 
347 Interview with Iskra Baeva, Sofia, February 9, 2007. 
348 Interview with Mihail Ivanov, Soviet cultural attaché to Bulgaria in the late 1980s and current 
professor of political science at the University for National and World Economy (Sofia), Sofia, December 
13, 2007. 
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of speech in the Soviet Union” and the unforeseen consequences of Gorbachev’s perestroika.349 
Gorbachev, in turn, considered Zhivkov a typical representative of the “old regime” and did not 
trust him to carry out the reforms. Zhivkov attempted to dodge the question of glasnost and 
perestroika by declaring that Bulgaria had already implemented similar reforms in 1956 with 
Zhivkov’s rise to power. Continued pressure from Moscow, however, made it clear that unless 
Zhivkov followed the reform path of the Soviet Union he risked losing Soviet support, thus 
making himself vulnerable to critiques at home as well. Seizing the initiative, in 1987 Zhivkov 
introduced the “July Concept,” a radical reform program instituting market mechanisms in the 
economy and massive administrative restructuring. Envisioning reforms that (at least on paper) 
far surpassed the scope of Gorbachev’s perestroika, Kalinova and Baeva contend, the July 
Concept was more than anything an illustration of Zhivkov’s incessant energy and determination 
to preserve his power.350 Zhivkov’s new initiative caused a direct clash between Zhivkov and 
Gorbachev, who was infuriated by yet another attempt to disobey Moscow’s directives.351 
Political and economic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union quickly deteriorated, 
and for the first time Zhivkov’s traditionally close relations with Soviet leaders were 
exhausted352
                                                 
349 FOTEV Georgi, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society” in Jacques COENEN-HUTHER (ed.), 
Bulgaria at the Crossroads, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996, pp.11-31, p. 17. 
. 
350 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 229. 
351 In response to Gorvachev’s attacks, Zhivkov made numerous futile attempts to convince him that the 
July Concept was in line with Soviet reforms. See, “The July Concept Follows the Reforms in the USSR,” 
Rabotnichesko Delo, January 5, 1988; “Applying the July Concept and Perestroika: Speech by Todor 
Zhivkov,” Rabotnichesko Delo, January 8, 1988. Zhivkov quotes Gorbachev all throughout this speech, 
outlining the parallels between Perestroika and the July Concept. He dedicates the 1988 BCP conference 
to the question of Perestroika. See, “Announcing the National Party Conference: For Perestroika and 
Further Building of Socialism in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,” Rabotnichesko Delo, January 25, 
1988. 
352 Though appearing friendly, Bulgarian-Soviet relations between 1987-1989 reached their lowest point 
since WWII, argue Kalinova and Baeva. Bulgaria was stripped off Soviet subsidies, Soviet raw materials, 
and Soviet markets for its low-quality products which inevitably led to political tensions. See, KALINOVA 
and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 230. 
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Glasnost and perestroika, however, found numerous supporters among the high echelons 
of the party and provoked an ideological and policy debate on the future of socialism. Diverging 
views of reform resulted in a split between advocates of glasnost and perestroika and supporters 
of the July Concept. “There was a split on the very meaning of reform,” argues BSP functionary, 
Valeri Zheblyanov, “One the one hand there were the followers of Gorbachev and on the other 
the nationalistically-oriented group.”353
Zhivkov’s falling out of grace with Soviet leadership made him unable to control rising 
tensions within the party and opposition against him. “Zhivkov enjoyed legitimacy because of 
the great power that stood behind him,” argues Petko Simeonov, “and all of a sudden he wasn’t 
legitimate anymore.”
 There were also the die-hard communists who 
prophesied strictly abiding by the principles of Marxism and Leninism and preserving the 
command economy at all cost and who, because of their distrust towards younger reform-minded 
party members, fell by default into Zhivkov’s camp. Since the call for reform came from 
Moscow and was therefore official, the debate was no longer limited to the party leadership but 
penetrated all levels of the party hierarchy and society at large. Being official, it also provided a 
convenient outlet for personal conflicts, which also fell along ideological lines. Most 
importantly, the debate on glasnost and perestroika legitimized and united Zhivkov’s opponents. 
354
                                                 
353 Interview with Valeri Zheblyanov, head of cadre policy of BSP, Sofia, May 2, 2007. 
 Zhivkov’s refusal to follow the Soviet reform path empowered his 
opponents. Supporting glasnost and perestroika in fact meant opposing Zhivkov, but at the same 
time it also meant following the Soviet line. Since Zhivkov was officially claiming to pursue 
Soviet policies of glasnost and perestroika, he had no ground for persecuting his opponents. 
Zhivkov’s opponents were further emboldened in their actions by active support from Moscow. 
354 Interview with Petko Simeonov, round table participant, UDF MP and then BSP MP, Sofia, April 24, 
2007. 
  182 
Gorbachev was eager to see Zhivkov removed from power so that Bulgaria could follow the road 
of reform. In this respect, argue Kalinova and Baeva, Gorbachev had the support not only of part 
of BCP’s leadership, but a significant part of the Bulgarian population.355
The split caused by the new policy of glasnost and perestroika reached deep into the 
party ranks. Zhivkov’s conservative and dated policy had brought apathy and alienation among 
many party members. Worsening economic conditions and international criticisms of Bulgaria’s 
policy towards its Turkish minority further eroded the regime’s legitimacy even among some of 
its loyal supporters. High-level functionaries and rank members alike understood that reform was 
not only needed but unavoidable. Critical voices within the party started organizing, and, by 
1988, communist party members formed the core of nascent dissident organizations. As 
Koshlukov points out, a big part of the internal BCP dissidents were part of the early opposition 
and the informal organizations.
  
356
Intra-elite conflict in the late 1980s took on a qualitatively different form compared to 
previous struggles within the party. Moscow withdrew its support for Zhivkov and was instead 
backing his opponents. Policies of glasnost and perestroika resulted in genuine ideological 
debate on the future of socialism.
 Thus, the argument that it was almost inevitable that a reform 
movement would initially be formed within the communist party itself is indeed valid (Moser 
1994, Nikolov 1998). 
357
                                                 
355 KALINOVA and BAEVA, op.cit., p. 227. 
 Internal conflict was no longer hidden nor limited to the 
party leadership. This combination of related factors created an opportunity for convergence of 
interests, allowing various and previously disunited opponents of Zhivkov and his regime to 
come together and stage a joint action. Thus, people in the party leadership, who hardly had 
356 Interview with Emil Koshlukov, Sofia, April 24, 2007. 
357 Russian magazines Ogonyok and Literaturnaya Gazyeta, both of which were widely read in Bulgaria 
at the time, became the main forums of this debate. 
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common interests and opposed Zhivkov for different reasons, saw an opportunity in working 
together towards his removal. Hence, Moscow-educated foreign minister, Petar Mladenov, who 
enjoyed great popularity at home and envisioned himself as Zhivkov’s successor; minister of 
foreign economic relations, Andrei Lukanov, who had close ties with Moscow as well as with 
business interests in the West and was therefore an avid promoter of economic liberalization; and 
Alexander Lilov, who embraced perestroika and alienated Zhivkov with his ideas of democratic 
socialism,358 all banded together. They were also joined by some of Zhivkov’s most trusted allies 
who had turned against him in this final hour – minister of defense Dobri Dhzurov, chair of the 
National Assembly Stanko Todorov, and prime minister Georgi Atanasov. With overt support 
from Moscow,359
There is stark disagreement among members of the Bulgarian political elite on the 
significance of November 10
 their joint action culminated in the removal of Zhivkov at the party plenum of 
November 10, 1989.  
th. UDF elite dismiss it as an intra-party coup and a preemptive 
action on behalf of the party faced with a rapidly advancing wave of democratization in Eastern 
Europe. “BCP realized that unless it did something, it would be surpassed by events,” Alexander 
Karakachanov states.360
                                                 
358 In order to eliminate Lilov’s negative influence, Zhivkov sent him to the Institute for Social and 
Economic Theory, Sofia and then on a specialization in London. 
 The ensuing process of democratization in Bulgaria, in turn, is viewed as 
a result of external processes which unleashed opposition forces in the country. Long-time UDF 
MP, Ekaterina Mihailova, expresses the prevalent view among UDF elite, “The events in 
Bulgaria are a result of world-wide processes the credit for which, if we are to name them, goes 
359 Andrei Lukanov shared his plans for Zhivkov’s removal with Soviet ambassador to Bulgaria, Victor 
Sharapov, who gave Moscow’s approval for coordinated action. The events are described in detail in the 
memoirs of Valentin Terehov, advisor to the ambassador, published in consecutive issues in daily 
newspaper “24 Chasa.” See, “The Coup,” 24 Chasa, February 4, 1999. 
360 Interview with Alexander Karakachanov, Sofia, April 3, 2007. 
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to Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.”361 By contrast, BSP elite explain November 10th as a 
continuation of political and economic changes already underway and influenced by the Soviet 
model of perestroika. Perestroika and partial reform, however, proved unfit to address the 
deepening political and economic crisis. “Everything was rotting,” argues distinguished 
diplomat, Ivan Garvalov. “The Soviet Union was rotting, we were rotting; there were no 
options.”362 There was need for profound changes. According to BSP elite, November 10th marks 
the beginning of such profound changes, the initiator of which was the Communist Party.363
While it is true that the Party was already introducing market-oriented reforms, such as 
act 56,
  
364 the perpetrators of Zhivkov’s removal hardly envisioned an end of communist party 
rule. In his closing speech at the party plenum of November 10th, 1989, Petar Mladenov assures 
that perestroika in Bulgaria will follow the Soviet line and will remain within the framework of 
socialism.365 It is in the aftermath of November 10th that the new party leadership realized 
changes were irreversible. Their initial program did not envision the abolition of socialism, 
Karasimeonov contends, but events in the following months led to a change in intentions.366 
Nevertheless, November 10th
                                                 
361 Interview with Ekaterina Mihailova, Sofia, February 8, 2007. 
 is a turning point in Bulgarian history. Let us not fall into utter 
362 Interview with Ivan Garvalov, long-time ambassador to the UN and 1st deputy foreign minister 1990 -
1992, Sofia, April 6, 2007. 
363 See for example an article in BSP official newspaper celebrating the 1 year anniversary of November 
10th, 1989, “Several Thousand People Celebrated the Birthday of Democracy, “ Duma, November 11, 1990. 
364 Act 56 envisioned transforming state owned enterprises into shareholder companies and provided for 
limited introduction of small private firms. While allowing for partial liberalization in the economy, 
argues Martin Ivanov, it did not dare cross into the ideologically condemned field of market economy. 
See, Martin IVANOV, “Act 56: the End of a System,” Business Magazine, April 8, 2008, available online: 
http://www.bm-businessmagazine.bg/bg/articles/%D0%A3%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7-56:-%D0%9A% 
D1%80%D0%B0%D1%8F%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B0-
%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0/525/index.html 
365 “Petar Mladenov Appointed for General Secretary of CC of BCP,” Rabotnichesko Delo, November 11, 
1989. 
366 KARASIMEONOV, Georgi, “The Transition to Democracy” in Georgi KARASIMEONOV (ed.), The 
1990 Election to the Bulgarian Grand Assembly and the 1991 Election to the Bulgarian National 
Assembly, Berlin, Edition Sigma, 1997, pp. 10-22, p. 14. 
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UDF-ism, cautions Alexander Karakachanov, and deny completely the importance of November 
10th.367 Zhivkov’s removal marks the peak of intra-elite conflict within the BCP with 
consequences that go far beyond simple change of leadership. November 10th
6.1.3 Transformation of the Party after 1989 
 also marks the 
beginning of profound changes within the Communist Party in its prolonged, though ultimately 
successful, transformation into a modern left-wing party. 
6.1.3.1 Political re-orientation and new structure 
BCP’s first step following the November 10th, 1989 party plenum was instituting major 
personnel changes in the Central Committee of BCP, the State Council, and the Council of 
Ministers. Zhivkov and his closest associates, among them Grisha Filipov, Milko Balev, Dimitar 
Stoyanov, and Zhivkov’s son, Vladimir Zhivkov, were excluded from the CC, whereas other 
party members repressed by Zhivkov were reinstated.368
                                                 
367 Interview with Alexander Karkachanov, op.cit. 
 In order to signal that such changes 
were not another instance of reshuffling as commonly practiced by Zhivkov, BCP’s new 
leadership took decisive action in distancing itself from Zhivkov and his regime. The Party 
created a State Commission for the Investigation of Deformations in the Social and Economic 
Life, appointing Andrei Lukanov as its chair. As already argued, the goal of the Commission was 
to blame the country’s dire economic conditions and harmed international reputation as a result 
of the renaming process on a few selected individuals, thus, relieving the Party from collective 
responsibility. Consequently, Linden argues, criticisms against former leaders were relentless 
and for the new leaders, including the new party leader Petar Mladenov, they served as a means 
368 “Changes in the CC of BCP,” Rabotnichesko Delo, November 17, 1989; “Changes in the State Council 
and Council of Ministers,” Rabotnichesko Delo, November 18, 1989. 
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of separating the new leadership from the old guard.369
Following these immediate measures, the BCP proceeded with redefining its political 
orientation and reforming its structure. At its 14
 Zhivkov was soon expelled from the 
BCP, accused of embezzlement, abuse of power, and incitement of racial hatred, and arrested on 
January 29, 1990. At the same time, Traicho Kostov and other purged communists were 
officially rehabilitated, and amnesty laws were passed releasing political prisoners, including 
ethnic Turkish activists. At a party plenum held December 11-13, 1989, the Party issued a formal 
apology for the renaming process and pledged giving up political monopoly by revoking Article 
I, effectively removed by the National Assembly on January 15, 1990. Later that month, the 
Party voted to reinstate the names of the forcefully renamed Turkish minority.  
th Extraordinary Congress held in Jan-Feb 1990, 
the Party rejected the Soviet model and adopted a Manifesto for Democratic Socialism in 
Bulgaria. With the new program, the BCP condemned totalitarianism and authoritarianism, took 
responsibility for the governance of the country for 1947-1989, and committed itself to political 
pluralism. It abolished the Central Committee and the Politburo, replacing them with a Supreme 
Party Council (now National Council) and Executive Bureau of the Supreme Party Council. 
Elected by the National Party Congress, these larger bodies of about 180 and 20 members 
respectively were intended to give party members greater control over the leadership. New 
electoral procedures allowed for members of the Supreme Party Council to be elected 
individually rather than by a slate, as had been the case with the CC.370
                                                 
369 LINDEN Ronald, “The Dynamics of Change in Eastern Europe,” Report on Eastern Europe, Radio 
Free Europe, December 30, 1989. 
 In addition, a Central 
Commission on Party Ethics and a Central Financial Control Commission (now merged into the 
Party Control Commission) were created. Under UDF pressure at the Round Table negotiations, 
370 GOLDMAN Minton, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Political, Economic, and 
Social Challenges, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997, p. 92. 
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the BCP agreed to disband its primary party organizations at the workplace, which also meant 
depoliticizing the army, and introduce a strictly territorially-based structure. The State Pioneer 
Organization “Septemvriiche” and the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (Komsomol) were 
also disbanded.371 The Party eventually formally incorporated such auxiliary organizations into 
its structures and currently has a youth, a women’s and a veteran’s movement. Following a 
January party-wide referendum, in April 1990 the BCP renamed itself to the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and changed the name of its official newspaper from Rabotnichesko Delo (Worker’s 
Deed) to Duma (Word). Thus, in the course of several months, the Communist party changed its 
leadership, its structures, its platform, and its name. Such changes, argues Valeri Zheblyanov, 
had been objectively pre-determined by the collapse of the world socialist system. As a result, 
the BSP logically proceeded to changing its political platform and accepting capitalism.372
Analysts often quote Bulgaria as a case where “unreconstructed communists” preserved 
their power and obstructed democratization efforts (Adam and Tomsic 2002, Ganev 1997, 
Vachudova 2005). Many remained skeptical of the genuine transformation of the communist 
party and viewed the changes as mostly cosmetic. Structural changes notwithstanding, the party 
preserved its hierarchical structure and maintained its dense network of regional, sub-regional, 
and local party organizations, which continued to operate in very much the same manner. BSP’s 
opposition to the introduction of basic market reforms such as price liberalization also called into 
question the sincerity of its new ideological position. Following the fiasco of the two Lukanov 
governments and the 1991 UDF electoral victory, the BSP adopted yet another new platform in 
 
                                                 
371 In Bulgaria, as in most communist societies, communist indoctrination started at early age by 
organizing children in a tier of youth organizations, membership in which was if not mandatory, strongly 
encouraged. Students who were not part of the Komsomol, for example, were not given access to higher 
education. In Bulgaria, children were admitted into the “Chavdar” organization in 2nd grade, the Pioneer 
organization in 3rd grade, and the Komsomol in 7th or 8th grade. 
372 Interview with Valeri Zheblyanov, op.cit. 
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1994, intended to move the Party closer to modern European left-wing parties. Although the new 
program contributed to BSP’s electoral victory in 1994, Videnov’s “left alternative” of “gradual 
reform” at “low social cost,” and the devastating financial crisis it produced, only confirmed the 
doubts of the skeptics. It took a long time for the BSP to recover from the after-effects of 
Videnov’s rule. In fact, it was the deep crisis in which the party fell after having to relinquish 
power in 1997 that caused it to seek a new direction and face post-1989 realities. After changes 
in its statute, leadership, and most importantly its attitudes,373
6.1.3.2 Internal conflict after 1989 
 the party emerged from the crisis 
with a victory in the 2001 presidential election. Georgi Parvanov’s ascension to the presidency 
was a signal that the BSP was moving in the right direction. In 2002, the Party put forward a 
genuine social-democratic platform, which gained it acceptance to the socialist international in 
2003, and the Party of European Socialists in 2004. Membership in these organizations 
legitimized the BSP as a modern left-wing party dedicated to the values of democratic socialism 
– a transformation that took well over a decade. 
The transformation of the party was a long and painful process, permeated with internal conflict. 
After Zhivkov and his associates were ousted, power was divided among the perpetrators of 
November 10th
                                                 
373 Sobered by Russia’s harsh terms in trade negotiations, BSP abandoned its pro-Russian position and 
ended its opposition to Bulgarian membership to NATO. 
 – Petar Mladenov becoming head of state, Andrei Lukanov prime minister, and 
Alexander Lilov leader of the party. Even though this reform-oriented group had the support of 
the majority of high-ranking party members in their effort to remove Zhivkov, that same 
majority was bent on reforming the party within the framework of socialism, not creating a 
multi-party system. While younger politicians such as Lilov and Lukanov quickly realized that 
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changes were irreversible, the old guard was committed to the party’s Marxist-Leninist heritage 
and the building of socialism. “The transformation of the party was the hardest for the older 
members who had lived their lives in this system and had reached the end of their political 
career,” recounts BSP MP Krasimir Krastanov.374 The changes set off by Zhivkov’s removal 
further deepened the divide between reformers and hardliners, already settled in during the 
debate on perestroika. “Even today there are people in the party who think socialism should have 
been preserved,” asserts Nora Ananieva, long-time BSP MP and round table participant.375
The split between reformers and hardliners was hardly the only one. After November 
10
 
th, Ananieva further contends, a process of differentiation began within the BCP. There were 
numerous disagreements within the reformist wing. Debates on the course of reforms shaped two 
distinctive groups – one around Lilov and the other around Lukanov. Lilov favored focusing on 
ideology and a big party, argues youth activist Boris Popivanov, whereas Lukanov was for a 
small party and a focus on the economy.376 This clash of ideas was also an expression of the 
personal conflict between Lilov and Lukanov, renewed after the common goal that had been the 
reason for joining forces, i.e. Zhivkov’s removal, had been accomplished.377 With Lilov 
disposing of party positions and Lukanov of positions in the government as well as connections 
in the West, each one of them quickly attracted a group of adherents. Indeed Lukanov’s 
followers were rewarded with lucrative opportunities,378
                                                 
374 Interview with Krasimir Krastanov, BSP MP and deputy governor of Sofia region, Sofia, April 26, 2007. 
 whereas Lilov’s protégés, such as Zhan 
375 Interview with Nora Ananieva, Sofia, May 8th, 2007. 
376 Interview with Boris Popivanov, BSP youth activist, Sofia, January 17, 2008. 
377 Because of his resignation as head of state on June 6, 1990, Petar Mladenov, who was a close friend of 
Andrei Lukanov, did not partake in this conflict. Following his resignation, Mladenov retired from 
political life. See, “Student Address to the Nation: We Need Your Support, We Have Been on a Hunger 
Strike, Our President Lied to Us,” Democraziya, July 6, 1990. 
378 Until Lukanov’s spell as a prime minister ended, his friends and associates took up key positions in 
state banks and industries and – under the guise of reform – diverted recourses into dozens of new 
trading companies, banks and brokerage houses, which dominated the commodity and currency markets, 
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Videnov, received positions in the party leadership.379
While personal conflicts never left the party, ideological disagreements did result in the 
emergence of several factions. The Alternative Socialist Organization (ASO) was the first faction 
to form within the BCP in December 1989. Its existence as an alternative voice within the party 
was short-lived, as ASO left the BCP in February 1990 and joined UDF.
 Thus, in the tradition of BCP’s history of 
internal conflicts, the divide between Lilov and Lukanov also took on more of a clan character 
rather than factionalism. 
380 As part of the UDF 
coalition, the now renamed Alternative Socialist Party (ASP) won six parliamentary seats in the 
1991 elections. Another group that sprang up within the party and left shortly after was the Civil 
Union for the Republic (CUR) established in May 1993 by Alexander Tomov, former BSP vice-
chair and MP.381
Disagreement on reform and policy decisions and disappointment with the slow and 
difficult transformation within the BSP were the main reasons for the emancipation of those 
factions into independent parties. “The transformation of BSP was tragic,” recounts Dragomir 
 CUR appeared in the 1994 election in a coalition with ASP, the Green Party, 
and the Social-Democratic Party (BSDP), but failed to pass the 4% parliamentary barrier. In 
1997, CUR, ASP, and several dissenters from BSDP and BSP came together to form the 
Bulgarian Euro-left party. The Euro-left won 14 seats in the 1997 elections and supported, at 
least initially, the reformist UDF government of Kostov.  
                                                                                                                                                             
transferring much of their profits to foreign bank accounts. BROWN J. F., The Groves of Change. Eastern 
Europe at the Turn of the Millennium, Durham, Duke University Press 2001, p. 99. 
379 The election of Videnov as party leader demonstrated the extent of the control of the ex-communist 
party leaders over BSP, argues Ishiyama. Many viewed Videnov as a front man for Lilov. The press often 
referred to him as “Zhan Lilov” to underscore his connection to the Lilovist camp. John ISHIYAMA, “The 
Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-
communist Politics,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1997, pp. 299-330, p. 319. 
380 “BCP Doesn’t Stand a Chance – BCP Faction, ASO, Leaves the Party,” Democraziya, February 16, 
1990. 
381 “Alexander Tomov Forms Civil Union for the Republic,” Duma, May 31, 1993; “Tomov Leaves BSP’s 
Supreme Council and Writes a Farewell Letter,” Duma, July 5, 1993. 
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Draganov, “Initially BCP was giving all signs of reform, but after it won the 1990 elections all 
attempts for reform stopped.”382  Because of their quick exit, the factions that emerged within the 
BSP had limited effect on the transformation within party. As Krasimir Krastanov argues, “I 
can't say that in 1990 several reformist wings appeared within BSP and reformed the party. On 
the contrary, those wings all left the party.  The leading bodies of the party and the personalities 
did the job.”383 Although factionalism deprived the BSP of several of its prominent members, it 
did not cause schisms within the party. On the contrary, despite ideological disagreements 
between reformers and hardliners, personal conflicts and factions, the BSP remained united.384
6.1.3.3 Recruitment 
 
With the end of its political monopoly, the BCP/BSP’s membership base started continuously 
shrinking – a logical consequence of the adoption of a multi-party system. Numbering close to a 
million in 1989, by the 1994 election, the BSP had lost 2/3rds of its members. This sharp decline 
in the early years of the transition was followed by stabilization in BSP membership base and a 
much slower rate of membership decrease (table 7). Today the BSP remains the party with the 
largest number of registered party members.385
                                                 
382 Interview with Dragomir Draganov, MP from BSP, MP form the Bulgarian Euroleft and a professor of 
history at Sofia University, Sofia, February 19, 2007. 
 Nevertheless, membership continues to decline. 
383 Interview with Krasimir Krastanov, Sofia  April, 2007. 
384 In a 1995 article, John Ishiyama qualifies BSP as “a relatively cohesive and powerful political force” 
and correctly predicts that BSP “will continue to have significant impact on the course of Bulgarian 
politics in the foreseeable future.” John ISHIYAMA, “Communist parties in Transition: Structures, 
Leaders, and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan., 
1995), pp. 147-166, p. 163. 
385 Data on BSP membership base is extremely difficult to find. The party does not publish regularly 
membership figures and such data cannot be found in the public registry. Current rough estimates of BSP 
membership are at 200,000 plus 30,000 in its youth organization. Data on BSP membership used here is 
collected from various sources, only one of which an official BSP publication. 
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In addition to decreasing numbers, the BSP has been dealing with a persistent aging problem.386 
According to 2005 BSP documents, 56.4% of BSP members are retirees and only 7.9% are under 
35.387
Table 7. Decline of BSP membership 
 Communist nostalgia and the high social cost of the transition provide logical explanations 
for the high number of retirees supporting BSP in the early years of the transition, but fail to 
explain why, after its transformation into a modern left-wing party, the BSP still struggles to 
attract young supporters and continues to be “the party of the pensioners.”   
 1990 1991 1994 2005 
BSP membership 726,000* 600,000** 324,600*** 240,000**** 
* Source: Kalinova and Baeva, op.cit., p. 254 
** Source: Duma, January 1, 1991 
*** Source: Съвременен показател, information bulletin of the Supreme Council of BSP, Vol. 8, August 2006. 
**** Source: Capital, March 5, 2005 
In an attempt to address the problem of an aging and declining membership, the BSP has 
drastically changed its recruitment strategy. As early as December 1989, the Party removed 
barriers to membership and opened its ranks to anyone willing to join.388 While party 
membership still requires approval by the local BSP organization, applicants are no longer 
subjected to lengthy background checks and screening procedures. Structural changes of party 
organs and introduction of referendums on particular issues389
                                                 
386 Ishiyama observes that in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, support for the communist 
successor parties has been associated with the elderly proportion of the population. John ISHIYAMA, 
“Introduction and Theoretical Framework,” in John ISHIYAMA (ed.), Communist Successor Parties in 
Post-Communist Politics, Huntington, NY, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1999, pp. 11-17, p. 11. 
 were intended to make 
membership more attractive by giving ordinary party members greater role in party politics, 
including leadership selection and policy formation. In 1994, the party formed a new youth 
387 “BSP Worried about Decreasing Membership Base,” Dnevnik, November 13, 2005. 
388 “New Party Members – Recruited Based Exclusively on Personal Qualities,” Rabotnichesko Delo, 
December 21, 1989. 
389 The party held a referendum in January 1990 on the change of its name. Another referendum was held 
in September 1994, when for the first and only time the party decided to have a referendum on its new 
platform. 
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organization (the Komsomol having disbanded in 1990), the Bulgarian Socialist Youth (BSM). 
BSM’s main function is to attract young people and “raise new faces of Bulgarian socialists.”390
Following 1989, there has been little change in the mode of recruitment to the BSP elite. 
BSP’s cadre policy was mainly focused on “new faces” rather than new principles of 
recruitment. Proven loyalty and communist background continued to be the determining criteria 
for entering the high ranks of the party throughout the transition period. Even today recruitment 
relies almost exclusively on families with communist traditions and party careerists. 
 
This new open and diversified strategy of recruitment is in stark contrast to recruitment practices 
before 1989. But while entering the party has become almost a matter of formality, access to 
leadership positions has remained extremely restricted. 
Personnel changes adopted immediately after November 10th and the ensuing party-
initiated investigations on the deformations of the communist regime purged the Party of 
Zhivkov and his most trusted allies, as well as a number of the remaining members of the old 
guard. Due to the overall old age of the top party leadership before 1989, many of them are 
deceased today. The high-ranking officials who “survived” the transition and preserved their 
political status were mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Ministry of Economy and Planning – in other words those close to the perpetrators 
of November 10th
New cadres, in turn, came primarily from lower party echelons. Within a couple of years, 
the ranks of the party, including the three socialist governments, were filled with less publicly 
. Access and control over well-established international and domestic networks 
were the unifying characteristic of these party functionaries, one that would give them an 
advantage in the transitioning economy. 
                                                 
390 Bulgarian Socialist Youth mission statement available online at: 
 http://www.bsm.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=41 
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known party functionaries and cohorts of the Komsomol. While the party was suffering from an 
aging membership, there was no lack of young activists aspiring to leadership positions. 
Bringing new faces to the front was a strategic move on the part of BSP. There was a great need 
to replace the old guard with young socialists who had a better understanding of the new realities 
but the party also needed to shed its communist-era image and present itself with a new “face.” 
Electing young Komsomol activist Zhan Videnov as the head of the party in 1991was intended 
to demonstrate the party’s genuine desire to reform. “Alexander Lilov [chair of BSP 1989-1991] 
didn’t have to relinquish power,” recounts Krasimir Krastanov, “but he brought forward the 
young people and let them rule the party. They had the advantage of a clean past.”391
After 1990, there was an influx of new faces in BSP’s leadership. As historian Iskra 
Baeva argues, “From the people who were in BCP's leadership in 1989, there is not a single 
person left in the leadership today.”
 Ironically, 
Zhan Videnov turned out to be more dedicated to the values of Marxism than most members of 
the BSP elite. His disastrous two-year premiership completely discredited BSP’s efforts to 
present itself as a transformed party committed to reform and made many Bulgarians wonder 
whether the difference between the BCP and the BSP was simply the letter in the middle. 
Videnov’s successor and current president of Bulgaria, Georgi Parvanov, was much more 
successful in leading the party through its transformation into a modern left-wing formation. 
Neither Videnov nor Parvanov, however, could pride themselves on a “clean past,” both being 
confirmed as collaborators of the repressive secret service apparatus. 
392
                                                 
391 Interview with Krasimir Krastanov, op.cit. 
 Although a generalization, this statement is true for the 
most part. Elite rosters indicate that only 15.32% of pre-1989 political elite preserved their 
political status after 1990. But while the new faces in the leadership were new to the electorate, 
392 Interview with Iskra Baeva, op.cit. 
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they were hardly new to the party. “They all come from the Komsomol,” Cassation Court judge 
and a former MP, Zlatka Ruseva, contends. “BSP hardly ever lets new people in.”393 If not 
strictly from the Komsomol leadership, past and present BSP leaders were loyal communist 
activists and functionaries before 1989. Starting with Pirinksi, Videnov, and Parvanov, to most 
recent former ministers Rumen Petkov and Rumen Ovcharov, new elite members are recruited 
exclusively from within the party structures.394
Generational continuity, by contrast, is prevalent among the BSP elite. As Tilkidjiev 
argues, the representatives of the old nomenklatura (often morally discredited) are themselves 
only rarely the nominal members of the new elite.
  Although there is little physical continuity within 
the communist/socialist elite, there is little change in the mode of recruitment. 
395
                                                 
393 Interview with Zlatka Ruseva, Sofia, February 7, 2007. 
 Instead, they are replaced by their children, 
grandchildren, and family members. In a 2007 interview, Emil Koshlukov keenly observed that 
the BSP-led administration at the time was a startling example of “communist family clan rule”: 
“The prime minister today is the son of a Politburo member, the general attorney is the grandson 
of a Politburo member, the European commissioner is a daughter-in-law of a member of the 
Central Committee of BCP, the director of the national television is the daughter of the same 
394 Georgi Pirinksi: deputy minister of foreign economic relations 1980-1990, vice premier in Lukanov’s 
government 1989-1990, minister of foreign affairs in Videnov’s government, MP from BSP 1990-1998 and 
2001-present, chair of Parliament 2005-2009; Zhan Videnov: Komsomol leadership positions 1986-1989, 
MP 1991-1994, leader of BSP 1991-1996, prime minister 1994-1997; Georgi Parvanov:1981 party member 
and research associate of the Institute for BCP’s History, leader of BSP 1996-2001, president of Bulgaria 
2001-present; Rumen Petkov: Komsomol leadership position 1985-1989, chair of the Pleven regional BSP 
1990-1995, secretary of BSP’s coalition policy 1999-2001, MP 2001-2005, minister of the interior 2005-
2008,  MP 2008-present; Rumen Ovcharov: leadership positions in regional BSP organizations 1984-
1900, minister of energy in Videnov’s government, minister of economy and energy in Stanishev’s 
government 2005-2009, MP 1997-present. 
395 TILKIDJIEV Nikolai, “Social Stratification in Post-Communist Bulgaria” in Jacques COENEN-
HUTHER (ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads, New York: Nova Science Pulishers, Inc., 1966, pp. 79-96, p. 
87. 
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member of the Central Committee. Those families are clans.”396  This snapshot of the current 
BSP elite reveals little change in social composition. New elite members carry the same social 
aggregate characteristics as the former communist elite, i.e. communist family background, 
education in one of the communist elite schools or in Moscow (Zhan Videnov, Sergei Stanishev, 
and Rumen Ovcharov are only the most obvious examples), and notable activism within the 
party and its surrogate structures before 1989. Despite the lack of physical continuity, there is a 
pronounced generational continuity and little change in the social composition of the 
communist/socialist elite. 
 
 *18.3% of 1997 data is missing. 
 
Figure 7. BSP place of birth as percent of total BSP elite 
                                                 
396 Interview with Emil Koshlukov, op.cit. Koshlukov refers to the 2005-2009 prime-minister Sergei 
Stanishev, attorney general Boris Velchev, EU commissioner Meglena Kuneva, and BNT director Ulyana 
Pramova. Boris Vlechev and Ulyana Pramova continue to hold their positions today. 
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A distinguishing feature of the BSP elite is that over 2/3 (67.1%) of its members come from 
small agglomerates (small towns – 32.1% and villages – 35%). By contrast, only 12.5% of the 
BSP elite come from Sofia and 17.7% from big cities. BSP members born in villages constitute 
more than half (54.4%) of the village-originating elite for the period. The village percent within 
BSP tends to rise when BSP wins the elections (1990 and 1994) and decrease when BSP is not in 
power (1991 and 1997) (fig. 7). In addition, we notice a core of Sofia-born members present in 
every parliament. There appears to be a pattern indicating that BSP draws upon its regional elites 
when winning the elections and therefore having larger numbers in parliament, whereas it tends 
to shrink to a core group of members from the capital and big cities when not in power. This 
pattern is indicative of a dense organizational network easily mobilized in the recruitment of new 
loyal cadres to the elite and a differential recruitment strategy based on anticipated election 
results. The BSP elite demonstrates a healthy influx of new cadres with each consecutive 
election. New members made up 46.6% of the BSP elite in 1991, 44.3% in 1994 and 50.7% in 
1997 (fig. 8). The BSP gradually purged itself of its oldest members as indicated by the modal 
age – 62 for 1990, but 43 and 46 for 1991 and 1994 respectively. There is a noticeable wave of 
young people entering the BSP elite with the 1997 elections as illustrated by the mean age of 47 
and the modal age, 37 (fig. 8). This change in recruitment practices reflects the overall 
transformation in the party triggered by the fiasco of Videnov government.  
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Figure 8. BSP mean and modal age 
 
Overall, we observe a stable rate of renewal of BSP elite, an extremely closed process of 
recruitment limited almost exclusively to high-ranking party functionaries and elite communist 
families, and no change in the recruitment criteria; proven loyalty and communist background 
still constitute the main factors. This lack of change in the mechanisms of recruitment deprived 
the BSP of an influx of new energy and ideas, since new cadres did not bring change in the social 
composition of the elite. The reformed, though still clumsy and extremely hierarchical structures 
posed a further obstacle to BSP’s transformation.397 An aging membership base swept by 
communist nostalgia rendered ideological re-orientation somewhat difficult.398
                                                 
397 “BSP wasn’t very successful in reforming itself,” argues Iskra Baeva, “It’s structures were in the way.” 
Interview with Isrka Baeva, op.cit. 
 This combination 
of factors made for a painful and prolonged transformation of the former communist party into a 
modern left-wing formation. Adam and Tomsic justly argue that the Bulgarian communist elite 
398 Although BSP leadership professed the “social democratization” of the party, it relied heavily on 
political nostalgia to mobilize electoral support, Ishiyama contends. John ISHIYAMA, “Discussion and 
Conclusions,” in John ISHIYAMA, Communist Successor Parties in Post-Communist Politics, op.cit., pp. 
223-230, p. 224. 
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reformed to a much less extent than its East European counterparts.399 Nonetheless, this elite was 
very successful in retaining power and dominating transition politics. “We didn’t have to do 
much to win power,” recounts Krasimir Krastanov, “In fact, we preferred not to be in power. Yet 
the moves and gaffes of UDF made it difficult for us not to win.”400
6.2 UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES (UDF) 
 The ability of the former 
communist elite to maintain stronghold on political power was indeed to a large extent due to a 
weak and disorganized counter-elite – a topic we turn to next. 
6.2.1 Organizing the Opposition 
Three characteristics describe the Bulgarian opposition that emerged after November 10th
                                                 
399 ADAM Frane and Matevz TOMSIC, “Elite (Re)configuration and Politico-Economic Performance in 
Post-Socialist Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2002, pp, 435-454., p. 437. 
 1989 – 
eclectic, united by a common anti-communist cause, and lacking a unified vision of post-
communist Bulgaria. We cannot truly speak of an organized opposition in Bulgaria before the 
establishment of UDF. Founded on December 14, 1989, UDF brought together existing dissident 
organizations (Ekoglasnost, Club for Glasnost and Democracy, Independent Association for the 
Protection of Human Rights, Club of the Repressed after 1945, etc), emerging political 
formations (the Green Party, Independent Labor Confederation “Podkrepa”, Federation of the 
Independent Student Associations, etc), and newly reinstated pre-1948 political parties, (the 
Bulgarian Socialist Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, the Radical Democratic Party, and 
the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union “Nikola Petkov”). Each organization attracted its own 
400 Interview with Krasimir Krastanov, op.cit. 
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group of supporters, but scattered as they were none of them enjoyed a large enough following to 
emerge as a natural leader of opposition forces or to face the Communist Party on its own. 
Having the example of the Polish Round Table as a mechanism of dismantling the totalitarian 
political system, the various groups decided to unite and press for Round Table negotiations. 
Since a hard-core group of activists participated in most organizations at the same time, joining 
forces did not take long.  
Ranging from the right to the left of the political spectrum and attracting very different 
constituencies, UDF-member organizations were united by their common anti-communist cause. 
There was a consensus that UDF and all of its member organizations would stand in opposition 
to the BCP and not be its partner in perestroika. This was a qualitatively different position from 
the one taken by many of the early dissidents who were set on reforming the Party, not 
abolishing communism.401 While they were united in their anti-communist stance, UDF and its 
member organizations did not have a unified vision of the direction in which the country should 
be going. That there was no plan of action was expected, but there was not even a basic 
consensus on what should constitute the transition – transition to democracy and capitalism or 
transition to something else.402
                                                 
401 “For many of the pseudo-dissidents from Ekoglasnost and the Club for Glasnost and Perestroika, the 
struggle for democracy was exhausted with the removal of Todor Zhivkov,” argues Alexander Yordanov, 
“Their goal consisted of creating an imitation of civil society and exercising pressure on the Communist 
Party so it reforms itself and continues to rule Bulgaria in a more democratic way, within the framework 
of one-party rule.” Interview with Alexander Yordanov, Sofia, April 10, 2007. 
 “We did not have a clear idea of what we ought to be doing as far 
as consistence goes,” recalls Filip Dimitrov. “We didn’t have Charter 77. The truth is that in 
Czechoslovakia the operational plan of what needs to be done wasn’t laid down either, but there 
were moral guidelines and political rules which were, it was understood, to be followed. So in 
402 “No one dared mention the word “capitalism” before 1997,” recounts Petko Simeonov. “Capitalism was 
bad. They were talking about market society, market reforms, but not capitalism….and those were the 
UDF activists.” Interview with Petko Simeonov, op.cit. 
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any case they had some idea of what to do. That wasn’t the case in Bulgaria.”403 By contrast, 
each organization within UDF had a very different and in most cases unclear idea of what post-
communist society should look like and what steps should be taken to get there. There were 
people envisioning a social welfare model, others professed British-style conservatism. 
Furthermore, the united opposition had a very unclear position on power. “We don’t aim at 
taking power,” were Zhelev’s opening words at the preliminary Round Table negotiations. “As a 
democratic opposition, the goal of our union is the democratization of Bulgaria, de-establishment 
of the totalitarian system and turning the country into a real democratic state.”404
UDF’s anti-communist stance implied that the opposition was not going to bargain with 
the BCP for a share in the spoils of power. Consequently, UDF adopted a strategy of contesting 
BCP’s power rather than seeking cooptation in the political elite. UDF attacked the very core of 
communist power – the political formula and legitimizing principle of rule, i.e. communism. 
Ending BCP’s one-party rule and instituting a multi-party system was a non-negotiable demand. 
The Round Table negotiations gave UDF the opportunity to clash head-on with BCP, negotiate 
the mechanisms of disbanding all aspects of the totalitarian regime, and schedule free democratic 
elections. The disappointing results of the elections (36.2% as opposed to BSP’s 47.1%) did not 
change UDF’s strategy of differentiation and confrontation. BSP’s repeated attempts to form a 
“government of national consensus” and share the burden of governing were rejected by UDF, 
 Somehow, 
UDF believed these goals were achievable without taking power. UDF had difficulty 
emancipating itself from its dissident origin and making a claim on power. 
                                                 
403 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, Sofia, June 15, 2007. 
404 Zhelyu Zhelev’s statement at the National Round Table from January 3, 1990, “Националната кръгла 
маса – 3 януари-14 май 1990 г.: пълни стенографски протоколи, ” Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev Foundation, 
1998, p. 29. 
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which wished neither to be associated with the BSP nor to relieve it of the responsibility for the 
imminent economic and political crisis.405
6.2.2 Structure and Mode of Recruitment 
  
UDF started off as a loosely connected coalition of political groups. Each formation within the 
coalition supposedly had its own structures. In many cases those were nothing more than 
gatherings at someone’s apartment.406 After November 10th 1989, some of the formations started 
establishing small clubs in the capital and in few major cities. No organization within UDF, 
however, had a broad national structure. UDF was founded as an umbrella body with the purpose 
of coordinating the activities of the constituent organizations which preserved their independent 
status and individual platforms. According to UDF’s founding declaration, “UDF unites the 
efforts of its constituent organizations rather than uniting the organizations themselves.”407
                                                 
405 “UDF Refuses to Take Part in a Coalition Government: Joint Declaration of UDF’s Coordination 
Council and the Parliamentarian Group of UDF,” Democraziya, September 14, 1990. While UDF rejected 
to participate in a coalition government led by BSP, it ultimately sent two ministers to the coalition 
government of the independent Dimitar Popov. 
 A 
Coordination Council was appointed to serve as UDF’s main decision-making body. The 
Coordination Council included three representatives from each member organization and was 
responsible for electing a chair, deputy chair(s), secretaries, and speakers who formed the 
Executive Council. The Coordination Council was also to represent UDF at the Round Table, 
issue declarations, organize demonstrations, comprise electoral lists, and serve as liaison between 
the member organizations. Although it held regular meetings, they were rarely attended by all of 
406 Ekoglasnost, for example, was founded in the apartment of Alexander Karakachanov, who later 
founded and chaired the Green Party. 
407 Founding declaration of UDF, available online at:  
http://www.omda.bg/BULG/inf_command/sds_uchr.htm 
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its members. “The Coordination Council,” recounts Filip Dimitrov, “was attended by whoever 
had the time and desire.”408 In subsequent years, the Coordination Council assumed a stronger 
position as a decision-making body, which brought it criticisms by some groups within the 
coalition for exercising too much control.409
Initially, UDF had no resources other than a group of like-minded people who gathered in 
the basement of the Institute of Sociology in Sofia. “We had nothing”, recalls Georgi Markov, 
former UDF MP and former constitutional judge. “I brought from home the only fax machine we 
had.”
  
410 At the preliminary negotiations for the Round Table, the united opposition managed to 
secure a building for its operations. By February 1990, UDF had already settled in its new home 
and started printing an official daily publication Democraziya. Though having official 
headquarters, UDF had no local or regional organizations. It initially relied on its member 
organizations to mobilize and organize supporters. When it started establishing local clubs and 
regional organizations, they were concentrated primarily in the big cities and could hardly match 
the dense network of BSP organizations. This weak structure made it very difficult to mobilize 
people and coordinate decisions and activities, especially outside of the capital. Public support 
for UDF was quickly growing as demonstrated by the hundreds of thousands attending UDF 
rallies.411
                                                 
408 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, op.cit.  
At the same time, the rallies were giving a wrong impression of UDF’s popularity, 
which was minimal outside the major cities. The inability of UDF to quickly build a nation-wide 
structure and reach voters throughout the country became one of the main reasons for losing the 
409 “It was all controlled from the top – the Coordination Council, whose members have all decided that 
they were the ones in charge,” recalls former MP and member of UDF-coalesced Radical Democratic Party 
Nikolai Slatinski. Interview with Nikolai Slatinski, Sofia, April 26, 2007. 
410 Interview with Georgi Markov, Sofia, February 10, 2007. 
411 “Demonstration Unites Us in Rain and Shine: 150,000 Support UDF in a Demonstration,” 
Democraziya, March 5, 1990. 
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first post-communist elections in June 1990. UDF’s organizational network gradually grew,412
Recruitment into the UDF was random and chaotic. Two groups formed the initial pool 
of recruitment into the opposition – the politically repressed and the reform-oriented party 
members. The majority of the people from these two categories were already active in the 
informal organizations. They made up a rather narrow circle of about 200 people that needed to 
be rapidly expanded. At first, recruitment took on the “bring a friend” principle. “I brought a lot 
of people,” recounts Georgi Markov. “Everybody was bringing someone.”
 
but it never reached the scale of its BSP counterpart. Although UDF eventually spread to smaller 
towns, its main base of support remained primarily within the big cities. 
413 This practice 
assured some form of selection and a certain degree of trust within the opposition, but it was not 
enough to build a mass base. When the circle of friends was exhausted and UDF realized that it 
still needed a lot more people, it started recruiting anyone willing to join. “Some of the UDF 
activists were telling me how they were recruiting people in the villages and small towns,” 
recalls Alexander Karakachanov. “They’d go in the local tavern and shout out ‘UDF’ at the 
table.  Whoever answers, they recruit him.”414
                                                 
412 By 1991, UDF had established regional, county, and local coordination councils. UDF clubs were 
founded in towns and villages where none of the UDF-member organizations had established structures. 
See, “Statute of the Union of Democratic Forces,” Democraziya, March 20, 1991.  
 Such an approach made for an indiscriminate 
mode of recruitment with no selection criteria other than taking an anti-communist stance. It 
allowed a lot of random people to enter the UDF and even reach leadership positions. Faced with 
this new problem, the UDF elite shut out the newcomers and retreated to its initial narrow “circle 
of friends.” “It was stuffy in UDF,” says Nikolai Slatinksi, “There was no way for integrating not 
only people from the provinces but younger people and newcomers. The logic was that whoever 
413 Interview with Georgi Markov, op.cit. 
414 Interview with Alexander Karakachanov, op.cit.. 
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came first became leader first. There was no mechanism for giving way to quality people which 
killed the leadership.”415
Recruitment strategy was random, chaotic and inconsistent, ranging from extreme 
openness and lack of selection criteria to obstructing newcomers and favoring a closed, Sofia-
based circle. Part of the problem originated with the specificity of the Bulgarian communist 
regime. As Nikolov argues, there was no breeding ground for a counter-elite in Bulgaria 
(Nikolov 1998). With no tradition of dissidence, no small entrepreneurs, and a co-opted 
intelligentsia, the usual pool of people supplying cadres for the opposition in other East 
European countries was very limited in Bulgaria. Forcefully expanding the pool of recruitment 
meant that rising in UDF’s leadership was often a matter of being in the right place at the right 
time. “I am an example of a career developing without any participation on my part,” asserts 
Filip Dimitrov. “There were a lot of people like this. Back then elites were forming with the help 
of accidentally good decisions at a time you had a chance to make yourself visible. It was 
spontaneous and to a large degree due to luck.”
 
416 UDF leadership consisted to a large extent of 
people who came together by accident, some of whom proved unqualified. This is the reason 
why people were reaching high positions fast and losing them just as fast, argues UDF MP 
Ekaterina Mihailova.417
Experience and expertise were scarce qualities among UDF elite. Although UDF 
attracted a lot of professionals and intellectuals, few if any had acquired knowledge and practice 
in governing. “UDF was often accused of having only repressed, depressed, and informals, but 
 Such a random mode of recruitment resulted in a serious problem of 
cadres, further aggravated by lack of expertise and lack of trust among UDF elite.  
                                                 
415 Interview with Nikolai Slatinski, op.cit. 
416 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, op.cit. 
417 Interview with Ekaterina Mihailova, op.cit. 
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the debates in parliament demonstrated that we had lawyers and economists,” objects Georgi 
Markov. “Yet, it is one thing to be a good lawyer and another to be in politics.”418
Being a young organization, UDF had no policy of training cadres. While the BCP/BSP 
has a well established mechanism of training cadres through education at home or abroad and 
gradual integration of new cadres into its structures, UDF’s new leaders had neither the training 
nor the time to adapt to their new political roles. It was not until the late 1990’s that the issue of 
training cadres appeared on UDF’s agenda. Some basic mechanisms were introduced at that time 
limited to organizing seminars and workshops and sending students abroad, with no guarantee 
that they would return and occupy party positions.  The effectiveness of these measures was 
difficult to assess. Attempts by expert groups to develop a long-term strategy for recruitment and 
training of cadres inspired no interest among the UDF elite, argues Milena Stefanova, city 
 UDF leaders 
were not prepared and qualified for the tasks facing them. Unlike their communist counterparts 
who had an opportunity to develop governing skills and gain experience over a number of years, 
members of the opposition had to learn as they went. BCP’s monopoly over expertise, with 
previously limited access to certain educational fields and a policy of co-optation, left the 
opposition struggling to find experts whose loyalty did not lie with the communists. Thus, UDF 
had to rely on the younger population which was not as connected to the former regime, 
surviving old members of the pre-1948 parties, and former nomenklatura members who had 
turned against the BCP. Consequently, the only people in the UDF elite with somewhat relevant 
experience were former low-rank communist cadres. There were a number of lawyers in the 
opposition, but fewer economists, and hardly any people with degrees in public policy or 
international relations.  
                                                 
418 Interview with Georgi Markov, op.cit. Lawyers constituted the majority of UDF elite members, whereas 
economists were rather few. 
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councilor from UDF’s civil quota.419
Another major issue for the UDF elite was the lack of networks of trust. Communist 
elites were connected through complex and dense networks built over many years of interaction.  
These networks relied not only on common interest, but on loyalty and trust. UDF was missing 
such a human resource base. Its network of people was patched together in the course of several 
months. Unlike members of the communist elite who grew up together, attended the same 
schools, and worked together, people in the UDF did not know each other. Consequently, there 
was a lot of mistrust and suspicion among them.  
 The lack of clear strategy for recruitment and training has 
been a persistent problem for UDF that has resulted in a serious shortage of qualified cadres. 
Mistrust was also due to the significant number of former BCP members in the 
opposition. “A lot of people from BCP crossed over to the opposition,” recounts Iskra Baeva, 
“The Komsomol was the most strongly divided between BCP and UDF.”420 While disillusioned 
BCP members were destroying their party cards and joining the opposition, some of the early 
dissidents were reverting back to the Party. This change of allegiance going in both directions 
raised a lot of doubts about the motivation and real loyalty of former BCP members. There was a 
lot of talk about “a scenario” and “BSP trying to raise its own opposition” or “infiltrate the 
opposition.”421
                                                 
419 Interview with Milena Stefanova, December 18, 2007. “Civil quota” refers to the practice of political 
parties (initially BSP and later on UDF and other Right parties) to include in their electoral lists 
distinguished “citizens” who are not members of a party. While in BSP such practice was used to 
demonstrate BSP’s appeal to the citizenry at large (often disguising BSP supporters as independents), in 
UDF the practice was adopted because of a shortage of political cadres. 
 If not accused of infiltration, former communist members were charged with 
opportunism. After the opposition recovered from its loss in the first elections and started 
420 Interview with Iskra Baeva, op.cit. 
421 This is the view of many members of the UDF elite. Zaltka Ruseva for example argues that, “UDF was 
intended to be an opposition created and controlled by the communists. They sent Chavdar Kyuranov to 
create UDF.” (Interview with Zlatka Ruseva, op.cit.) Another UDF activist argues that “the communists 
fabricated Zhelev and made a dissident out of him.” (Interview with Dimitar Dachkov Popov, Sofia, 
February 12, 2007)  
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gaining momentum, there was a second wave of new-comers in UDF. “When it became clear 
that we are riding the wave”, recounts Nikolai Slatinski, “a lot of people joined UDF with 
ulterior motives.”422
The UDF’s “new face” policy was another factor preventing the building of trustful 
relationships. UDF prided itself in bringing new people into parliament, which it mistakenly 
equated with increased professionalism.
 Justly or not, these late-comers were always viewed with suspicion. 
Opportunists could be found on both sides. As Ganev argues, there were a lot of “entrepreneurs” 
in BSP for whom the party was not the wellspring of cherished values but a vehicle for 
capitalizing on strategic opportunities (Ganev 1997). Penetrating the ranks of BSP, however, was 
much more difficult than rising in UDF’s leadership. Therefore, opportunism was much more 
prevalent in UDF than in BSP, further obstructing the emergence of networks of trust. 
423 The rate of renewal of the UDF elite was excessive – 
78% in 1991 election and 74.8% in 1997 (see fig.8). With 2/3rds of the elite being replaced, 
there were no conditions for durable relationships of trust to settle in. “The new faces thesis 
replaced the normal political process of building party cadres with the thesis of accidental 
political choice,” argues former chair of parliament, Alexander Yordanov. “Everyone was able to 
get to any position at any time even without being a UDF member. This had nothing to do with 
the regular renewal of a political organization.”424
                                                 
422 Interview with Nikolai Slatinski, op.cit. 
 Arbitrary political appointments, heavily 
practiced by Kostov as part of his strategy to restructure UDF, brought a lot of people in UDF 
leadership who had no prior history in the organization. Even when such appointments were 
promoting qualified people, they interrupted any kind of continuity within UDF leadership. 
Being burdened with unreasonable expectations, these “new faces” rarely had the chance to 
423 “Two Thirds of the Names in UDF’s Parliamentary Group are New: The Coalition is Renewing Itself 
and Giving Way to Professionalism,” Democraziya, October 18, 1991. 
424 Interview with Alexander Yordanov, op.cit. 
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prove their skills before being dismissed as incompetent. The “new face” policy and the ensuing 
excessive rate of renewal prevented the cultivation of loyal cadres and the building of networks 
of trust. “Gradually with time, it became clear that trust is extremely important – knowing the 
people, building an organizational structure, and creating opportunities for growth within the 
political structure,” recounts Ekaterina Mihailova.425
In 1999, Kostov attempted to address the structural and cadre problems within UDF by 
transforming the coalition into a single party, a decision that proved a double-edged sword. By 
transforming into a unified party, UDF was eliminating ever-present tensions between its 
member-organizations. Creating a hierarchical structure, however, alienated a lot of the UDF-
member organizations, particularly the bigger parties such as the Democratic Party (DP), the 
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). 
Consequently, UDF lost a large number of its supporters. This negative effect was not 
immediately felt as UDF formed a coalition with DP, BSDP and BANU – the United Democratic 
Forces – which governed between 1997 and 2001. Following the unexpected big loss in the 2001 
election, the coalition fell apart and UDF was faced with the consequences of its transformation 
into a unified party. UDF has since witnessed an ever declining support base (table 8). Many 
members of the UDF elite criticized the decision to change UDF’s structure and were even more 
critical of Kostov’s leadership. Because of his authoritative style and practice of handing out 
party positions, Kostov is frequently referred to as “the Commander,” while his 1995-2001 
tenure as chair of UDF as “the period of obedience.” Despite its undeniable success in repairing 
the economy and orienting the country towards NATO and EU memberships, Kostov’s 
government was never able to dissipate critiques of corruption, clientelism, and illegal 
 This realization took almost a decade. 
                                                 
425 Interview with Ekaterina Mihailova, op.cit. 
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privatization deals lacking transparency. Its success in bringing about political and economic 
stabilization proved insufficient to assure UDF’s unity and voter support. 
Table 8. Decline of UDF electoral support 
 1990* 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009* 
UDF 28.50% 34.36% 24.23% 52.26% 18.18% 7.68%    
6.76%** 
DSB      6.44% 
*Elections utilizing a hybrid model of proportionate and majoritarian districts 
** In the 2009 elections, UDF formed the Blue Coalition with Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB), a party that 
branched out of UDF in 2004, headed by former UDF leader Ivan Kostov. 
UDF elite is characterized by an overrepresentation from Sofia and very rapid circulation. UDF 
consistently holds the highest number and percentage of Sofia members in the elite for the 1990-
2001 period. In 1990 for example, the number of Sofia-born members of the UDF elite is more 
than double that of BSP, representing over half of total Sofia elite (40 out of 70). By contrast, the 
UDF has significantly lower percent of village-born elite compared to BSP and MRF, ranging 
between 9% and 28% (fig. 9). Such data is consistent with UDF’s structure concentrated in Sofia 
and the big cities, and UDF’s pool of recruitment focused primarily on Sofia intellectuals and 
professionals. UDF also has the youngest Sofia elites, largely because the Independent 
Confederation of Student Associations was a UDF-member organization. In terms of age, there 
are no significant fluctuations within the UDF elite. The mean age varies between 43 and 51, and 
the mode between 41 and 52 for 1990-2001. UDF elite exhibits little physical continuity and an 
excessively high rate of renewal – 78% following the 1991 election and 74.8% after the 1997 
election. The 1994 election resulted in a more moderate rate of renewal (46.7%) due to the fact 
that UDF lost the elections and the number of its representatives in the political elite (as defined 
in this study) decreased. The relatively recent formation of UDF makes it impossible to test the 
UDF elite for generational continuity.  
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Figure 9. Place of birth by party (cumulative for 1990-2001) 
 
Fast circulation and overrepresentation of Sofia intellectuals and professionals indicates a cadre 
policy that failed to create the foundation upon which a loyal, qualified and broadly supported 
elite could emerge. The lack of cadres was one of the major reasons for UDF’s inability to 
effectively challenge BSP’s power in the early years of the transition. “Unfortunately, UDF 
attracted a lot of scum,” argues Alexander Karakachanov. “It is logical. You start building an 
opposition that doesn't have an ideological base, human resources, connections, and trust built 
over the years. There were a lot of bad apples in UDF.”426
                                                 
426 Interview with Alexander Karakachanov, op.cit. 
 Such cadre policy incapacitated UDF 
and contributed to the rise of internal conflicts which have continuously ruptured the opposition.  
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6.2.3 Intra-elite Conflict 
Throughout its existence, UDF has been subject to perpetual internal conflicts. The sources of 
conflict were ideological, structural, and identity-related. Ideological disagreement was 
embedded in UDF’s eclectic and politically diverse character. Although all member 
organizations declared themselves to be anti-communist, some were far more extreme than 
others. This led to a split within UDF between moderates and radicals. Radicals took an extreme 
anti-communist position, rejecting any conciliation with the former communist party, calling for 
exclusion of the communist elite from political life, i.e. lustration, and direct confrontation with 
the BSP. Because of its repressive past, they argued, BSP was morally compromised and had 
forfeited the right to participate in democratic politics. Moderates, in turn, were more open to 
negotiation with BSP, especially in the context of political and economic crisis when, in their 
view, the national interest should precede party interests. Hence, they were willing to work with 
BSP on a “national consensus” on the future political and economic development of the country. 
“We needed to agree with the Communist Party on a program for the transition as whole,” argues 
Petko Simeonov, “reach a national consensus on the parameters of the transition. No matter who 
comes to power, we follow this program.”427
                                                 
427 Interview with Petko Simeonov, op.cit. 
 It was under the influence of the moderates that 
UDF agreed to occupy two ministerial positions in Dimitar Popov’s coalition government 
(December 1990 – November 1991). The radicals considered this decision a mistake. “Creating 
Dimitar Popov’s government, under the banner that Bulgaria is in bad condition and a 
government needs to be formed for the purpose of national salvation, blurred the line between 
those in power and the opposition,” contends Alexander Yordanov, “Educating society in the 
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spirit of democracy requires a clear distinction between who is in power and who is in 
opposition.”428
While participation in the Popov government was a point of contention between radicals 
and moderates, it was disagreement over the new constitution that resulted in the first major split 
within the opposition. Convinced that it would be victorious in a free election with BCP, the 
UDF pressed at the Round Table Negotiations for a Great National Assembly and a new 
democratic constitution. With a BSP majority in parliament, however, the radicals in UDF 
became to view the new constitution as preserving and legitimizing a political force still faithful 
to its communist agenda. A constitution adopted by a BSP-dominated parliament, they further 
argued, could not be democratic. In protest of the adoption of the new constitution, 39 MPs from 
UDF left parliament in May 1991 and declared a hunger strike. The moderates who remained in 
parliament and signed the constitution were accused of collaboration with the communists. “Our 
feeling was that the signing of the constitution is a way for the moderates in UDF to dominate 
over the more radical ones,” recalls Nikolai Slatinski.
 
429 The divide over the constitution took on 
a grotesque public form with clashes between the 39 and the police and exchange of insults in 
the media, including UDF’s own daily publication, Democraziya.430
                                                 
428 Interview with Alexander Yordanov, op.cit. 
 Although the 39 achieved 
their goal of disbanding the Great National Assembly and scheduling elections, ideological 
disagreements within UDF led to a split of the coalition to UDF-movement, UDF-center (BSDP 
and Ekoglasnost) and UDF-liberals (Green Party and Federation of the Clubs of Democracy). 
Consequently, UDF votes were dispersed in the following 1991 election, resulting in a landslide 
429 Interview with Nikolai Slatinski, op.cit. 
430 “Sofians Welcomed the MPs Who Left the Rotten Parliament: Open Letter of 159 Intellectuals,” 
Democraziya, May 17, 1991. “Address to the Bulgarian People from UDF’s NCC: the UDF MPs who 
remained in a BSP-dominated parliament are collaborating with BSP and are impeding immediate change 
of the system and instead promoting Soviet-type reforms of the perestroika kind,” Democraziya, May 31, 
1991. 
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victory for UDF-movement (rather than what could have been a convincing victory had there 
been no split) and no parliamentary seats for UDF-center and UDF-liberals. 
UDF’s division into three separate formations was also an expression of embedded 
structural conflict, namely the ever-present tension between small and large parties in the 
coalition. There was a pronounced competition between the various UDF-member organizations 
over electoral lists, parliamentary committees, nomination and electoral procedures within UDF, 
etc. Since each member organization had equal votes in the Coordination Council regardless of 
its size, large parties often felt their interests were poorly served. Convinced that the majority of 
UDF electorate carried their particular vote, large parties demanded greater say in UDF’s 
decisions. Frustrated with the Coordination Council and sure of their independent political value, 
large parties often contemplated leaving the coalition. The loss of the first elections did not help 
in curbing such tendencies. On the contrary, in subsequent elections three major parties (BSDP, 
BANU, and DP) split from the Union, a move which ultimately cost them their seats in 
parliament. Their voter support was not always large enough to secure parliamentary 
representation, but was large enough to seriously damage UDF’s vote count both in 1991 and 
1994.431
In addition to ideological and structural conflicts, UDF suffered from an identity crisis. 
UDF’s eclectic character, chaotic mode of recruitment, and lack of networks of trust made it very 
difficult for its members to develop a sense of common origin and construct an agreed-upon 
history. While BSP has accepted its long history, including the repressive communist regime it 
imposed on the country, UDF never agreed on its own origin. In the UDF, argues Koshlukov, 
 It was not until the 1997 elections that those parties rejoined UDF in the winning 
coalition of the United Democratic Forces. 
                                                 
431 In 1994, BANU and DP formed the National Union which gained 18 parliamentary seats in the 1994 
elections. 
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arguments were along the lines of who was a secret service agent, is Zhelev a Marxist, and was 
Kostov planted by the communists.432
The UDF has consistently denounced its own leaders from Zhelyu Zhelev to Ivan Kostov. 
Zhelev’s critique of Dimitrov’s government resulted in an irreconcilable conflict between the 
UDF presidency and the UDF government. Zhelev was fiercely attacked in UDF’s Democraziya 
and ultimately declared a traitor and collaborator with the communists.
 UDF was never able to accept the fact that some of its key 
founding figures were communist party members who then returned to the Party. Disagreements 
between radicals and moderates posed a further obstacle to developing a common identity. 
Consequently, we observe competing identities in UDF with groups within the coalition more 
concerned about fighting each other than their common opponent BSP. The result of the debate 
on identity led to a repeated denouncing of UDF leaders by its own cadres.  
433
Internal conflict within UDF has not served as a driver of change but rather as an obstacle 
to following consistent policy, developing common identity, and instituting a sound cadre policy. 
The public form of such conflict has further alienated voters who were disappointed by the 
 Filip Dimitrov, in turn, 
was criticized for his extreme anti-communist position both by President Zhelev and a significant 
part of UDF’s parliamentary group. Following the collapse of his government in December 
1992, 19 MPs left UDF and formed the group of the so-called “ants.” The “ants” banded together 
with MRF and BSP and became critical in getting the necessary vote count for approving the 
Berov cabinet (December 1992 – October 1994). Kostov did not escape criticisms either. He was 
accused of rampant corruption that nurtured the “Blue” mafia. This practice of “cannibalism,” as 
Emil Koshlukov terms it, has prevented the opposition from growing and keeping qualified 
people and from developing continuity in its leadership.  
                                                 
432 Interview with Emil Koshlukov, op.cit. 
433 “Zhelyu Zhelev No Longer Represents UDF in the Presidency,” Democraziya, October 30, 1992. 
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constant bickering among UDF’s leadership. Internal conflicts have also diverted precious 
energy that could have been utilized for addressing more important and immediate issues. 
6.3 MOVEMENT FOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (MRF)434
6.3.1 Organizing MRF and Mobilizing the Ethnic Turkish Vote 
 
MRF is identified with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria which traces its origins back to Ottoman 
rule. Founded in January 1990, MRF draws its roots from the Turkish National Liberation 
Movement of Bulgaria, illegally operating during the renaming process of 1984-1989. The MRF 
did not participate in the Roundtable talks. Although the question of Turkish ethnic minority 
representation was raised on several occasions, the MRF never became part of either side of the 
Round Table negotiations as both the communists and the opposition feared that affiliation with 
MRF might provoke anti-Turkish sentiments and alienate supporters.435 Furthermore, Venelin 
Ganev argues, UDF was hoping to get the ethnic Turkish vote in the upcoming elections and had 
no interest in a separate organizing of the Turkish minority.436
                                                 
434 Due to gaps in the primary sources, the analysis of MRF utilizes secondary sources more so than the 
analysis of BSP and UDF. Interview data does not include informants from MRF and draws on 
evaluations of MRF by non-MRF members of the elite. As MRF does not have an official daily publication 
like BSP’s Duma/Rabotnichesko Delo or UDF’s Democraziya, media analysis is limited to MRF coverage 
in Duma and Democraziya. Analysis of elite rosters is comparable for all political parties. Secondary 
sources include books and articles by Bulgarian and foreign scholars. These sources focus mostly on the 
renaming process and ethnic politics in Bulgaria and not as much on MRF as a political party. 
 In March 1990, MRF held a 
National Conference where the leading organs of the organization were elected – a Central 
435 MELONE, op. sit. P. 261.  
436 GANEV Venelin, “History, Politics and the Constitution: Ethnic Conflict and Constitutional 
Adjudication in Postcommunist Bulgaria,” Slavic Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, (Spring 2004), pp. 66-89, p. 70.  
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Council of 31 members and a Central Operation Bureau of seven members.437
MRF was officially registered in the Sofia District Court in April 1990 which allowed it 
to participate in the June 1990 elections for the Great National Assembly and receive 23 
parliamentary seats. In light of the law banning political parties formed on an ethnic basis passed 
by the last communist parliament, the exact circumstances surrounding MRF’s registration 
remain unclear. Although MRF is unambiguously affiliated with the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria who constitute 90% of its membership,
 The founder of 
MRF, Ahmed Dogan (a.k.a. Medi Doganov) was elected chair. 
438 the Sofia District Court authorized its 
registration. The widely shared consensus among Bulgarian political analysts regarding MRF’s 
mysterious registration, as Ganev points, is that this act was engineered by BSP leaders bent 
upon controlling the ethnic party.439 Ganev’s rationale for such argument is that in the spring of 
1990 the Sofia District Court, just like any other judicial institution in Bulgaria, was completely 
subservient to communist authorities. In his view, there is no reason to doubt that the court was 
following party orders when allowing MRF to register. Such explanation, however, does not fit 
with the fact that BSP was one of the fiercest opponents to MRF’s participation in politics as a 
legitimate political organization,440
                                                 
437 The official appearance of MRF is reflected both in BCP’s newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo and UDF’s 
daily Democraziya. See, “Demonstration in Kardzhali in support of peaceful transition organized by 
MRF,“ Rabotnichesko Delo, March 12, 1990, “One trip with Ahmed Dogan: ‘we never demanded 
autonomy, “ Democraziya, March 2, 1990. 
 In October 1992, 93 BSP MPs submitted a petition to the 
newly established Constitutional Court demanding MRF be declared unconstitutional. The 
petition rested upon the newly adopted Bulgarian Constitution which outlawed political parties 
formed on an ethnic, racial, and religious basis, and was part of a massive anti-Turkish campaign 
438 BROUN Janice, “Rehabilitation and Recovery: Bulgaria’s Muslim Communities,” Religion, State & 
Society, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2007, pp 105-138, p. 110. 
439 GANEV, 2004, op.cit., p. 70. 
440 BROUN, op.cit, p. 110. 
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launched by BSP activists, among whom current President, Georgi Parvanov. After several 
months of deliberation, the Constitutional court rejected the petition and affirmed the 
constitutionality of MRF.441
It is still plausible that, fearing escalation of ethnic tensions rather than attempting to 
control MRF, the communists influenced the decision of the Sofia District Court. BCP’s decree 
of December 29, 1989 condemning the assimilation campaign of 1984-1989 and restoring the 
names and religious freedoms of ethnic Turks was met with a wave of protest by ethnic 
Bulgarians from regions with mixed population and by party activists who had built their careers 
upon the renaming process. This nationalist mobilization of ethnic Bulgarians evoked a counter-
mobilization both of ethnic Turks and a number of human rights organizations. The series of 
protests and counter-protests continued for several weeks in January and February 1990, until a 
council was formed to draft a declaration on the “National Question” (this is how the issue of 
restoration of rights to ethnic Turks was labeled), which was then endorsed by Parliament.
  
442
With MRF officially registered, mobilizing the ethnic Turkish vote was not difficult. As 
Gruev and Kalionski justly argue, the renaming process and assimilation campaign produced a 
counter-effect in halting the gradual assimilation and integration of ethnic Turks and 
strengthening ethnic group identity.
 
Political leaders on both sides were scared by the January protests and the threat of ethnic 
conflict. In this context, communist influence over the court does seem plausible. 
443
                                                 
441 For a detailed analysis of the Constitutional Court decision see, GANEV, 2004, op.cit. 
 Soon after its start in 1984, the assimilation campaign 
escalated into what was for all intents and purposes a military operation, Ganev recounts, 
442 For a detailed account of the January protests, see, Peter STAMATOV, “The Making of a ‘Bad’ Public: 
Ehtnonational Mobilization in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Aug., 
2000), pp. 549-572. 
443 GRUEV Mihail and Alexei KALIONSKI, The “Revival Process.” Muslim Communities and the 
communist Regime: Policies, Reactions and Consequences (in Bulgarian), Ciela, 2008, p. 195. 
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resulting in several hundred civilian casualties.444 Mass beatings, imprisonment, labor camps, 
and internments constituted but a part of the methods of repression employed, yet, they failed to 
uproot resistance. The communist regime was facing increased unrest by ethnic Turks that 
culminated in the May protests. The May protests were a turning point in Bulgarian ethnic 
politics as they demonstrated both to communist rulers and the international community the 
existence of a cohesive ethnic minority which, despite continued repression, was quite capable of 
organizing politically. The immediate response was a change in government policy from forced 
assimilation to strongly encouraged voluntary exile, bordering on ethnic cleansing. The ensued 
“Great Excursion” and open anti-Turkish campaign in the state-controlled media445 only further 
politicized the Turkish minority, now the focus of international attention. Thus, by the time the 
communist regime collapsed, Bulgaria had a strongly mobilized ethnic Turkish minority waiting 
to be united under a banner. All MRF had to do is raise that banner. The unity the ethnic Turkish 
community found in 1985-89, argues Dimitrov, has provided a basis for the virtually 
unchallenged acceptance of MRF as its legitimate representative in the Bulgarian political 
system.446 In assessing the legacy of the renaming process, Gruev and Kalionski keenly observe 
that the most enduring political consequence of the campaign is the emergence of an influential 
and controversial factor in political life such as MRF.447
                                                 
444 GANEV, 2004, op.cit., p 68. 
  
445 Starting in June 1989, BCP’s newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo published daily articles criticizing Turkey 
on various issues such human rights violations against the Kurdish minority, maltreatment of Bulgarian 
“tourists,” etc. For some examples see, “Turkey returns Bulgarian tourists, “Rabotnichesko Delo , June 18, 
1990; “Turkey – public discontent with the government, “Rabotnichesko Delo, July 3, 1990; “BBC on the 
human rights violations in Turkey, “Rabotnichesko Delo, July 23, 1990; “Closing the Turkish border is 
inhumane,” Rabotnichesko Delo, August 24, 1990; “Turkey enforces new restrictions on issuing visas to 
Bulgarian citizens,” Rabotnichesko Delo, September 26, 1990; “Ivan Garvalov criticizes Turkey’s attempt 
to use UN General Assembly for a tribune to attack Bulgaria,” Rabotnichesko Delo, October 5, 1990. 
446 DIMITROV Vesselin, “In Search of a Homogeneous Nation: The Assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish 
Minority, 1984-1985,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 1. Issue 4, 2000, pp. 
1-22, p. 18. 
447 GRUEV and KALIONSKI, op.cit., p. 194.  
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6.3.2 Structure and Mode of Recruitment 
From the very first post-communist elections, MRF established itself as the third largest political 
party in the country after BSP and UDF. Today MRF continues to be the third political force in 
the country, although UDF is no longer among the top political players. MRF draws its support 
primarily from ethnic Turks who constitute 9.4% of the country’s population, but also from other 
Muslim groups such as Pomaks448 and Muslim Roma. MRF further claims to have 12,000 ethnic 
Bulgarian members, not clarifying whether the Pomaks, who are ethnically Bulgarian, are 
included in this number.449 MRF has been continuously accused of playing an unfair game by 
mobilizing Bulgarian ethnic Turks who have emigrated to Turkey but still hold Bulgarian 
citizenship and are thus eligible to vote in the country’s national elections. Although “voting 
tourism” from Turkey is a well-known fact, it is hardly the main factor contributing to MRF’s 
continued electoral success. MRF has a very disciplined and stable electorate concentrated in the 
regions with mixed population – Kardzhali, Razgrad, Silistra, Shumen, Targovishte, and 
Blagoevgrad. The majority of MRF’s voters are employed in agriculture and fall within the low-
income category. They view MRF as the only voice defending their interests. This suffering, 
uneducated electorate is easy to mobilize, argues historian Dragomir Draganov.450
                                                 
448 Pomaks are descendants of ethnic Bulgarians who were converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule. 
Though Muslim, the majority of Pomaks do not speak Turkish. 
 Indeed, its 
hard-core electorate has guaranteed MRF seats in every post-communist parliament. Fluctuation 
449 Speech by Yunal Lyutfi at the 15th anniversary of MRF. Available online at: http://www.dps.bg/cgi-
bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0022&n=&vis= 
450 Interview with Prof. Dragomir Draganov, professor of History at Sofia University and former MP from 
BSP and the Euroleft, Sofia, February 19, 2007. 
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in the electoral votes and number of parliamentary seats, however, indicates that MRF also 
attracts swing voters outside of the hard-core ethnic Turkish electorate.451
The MRF has a highly centralized structure organized on a territorial basis with regional, 
municipal, and local councils. Membership in the organization requires approval by the local 
council. MRF’s estimated membership is around 60,000. In 1997, MRF created its own youth 
organization currently enlisting 19,500 members. The Youth MRF mimics the centralized, 
territorial-based structure of its parent organization. In addition, MRF has recently developed a 
network of women’s associations whose activities complement those of the regional party 
organizations.
 
452
The MRF is a leader-centered party organized around its founder and leader, Ahmed 
Dogan. Also one of the founders and activists of the Turkish National Liberation Movement, for 
which he was repeatedly imprisoned before 1989, Ahmed Dogan has been the sole leader of 
MRF throughout its 20 year-long existence. Dogan is declared by his own party to be the main 
strategist, ideologue and generator of initiatives and ideas in MRF. The existence and success of 
MRF, in the words of one of MRF’s top leaders Yunal Lyutfi, is grounded in the personality of 
Ahmed Dogan.
 
453
                                                 
451 MRF received 23 seats in the 1990 Great National Assembly, 24 seats in the 1991 36th National 
Assembly, 17 in the 1994 37th National Assembly, and 19 in the 1997 38th National Assembly. Its electoral 
base has significantly increased in recent years. MRF has been part of the governing coalitions of two 
cabinets, holding 21 seats in the 39th National Assembly, 34 seats in the 40th National Assembly, and 38 
seats in the 41st National Assembly. 
 The statute of the party gives a wide range of prerogatives to the leader, 
including single-handed approval of candidates for parliament and county mayors, as well as 
proposing the structure and composition of the Central Operation Bureau. The broad powers 
452 “The mission of [MRF’s] Women’s Association is to actively work towards strengthening the party and 
increasing its influence in the public space,” argues the chair of DPS’s Women Association, Sevgyul 
Halilova. See, “Благотворителен Великденски концерт, организиран от женското дружество на ДПС 
в град София и Областния съвет на ДПС,” April 13, 2009. Available online at: http://www.dps.bg/cgi-
bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0031&n=000004&g= 
453 Speech by Yunal Lyutfi at the 15th anniversary of MRF, op.cit. 
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vested in Dogan as MRF’s chair, in combination with what resembles a personality cult, make 
for a party with a rather authoritarian character. A testimony to this authoritarian flavor is the 
fact that most internal conflicts within MRF’s leadership end up with the expulsion of key 
leadership figures such as Osman Oktai, Gyuner Tahir, and Mehmed Hodza, all of them formerly 
close associates of Dogan. Dogan’s eventual departure as MRF’s chair may bring in some 
changes to MRF’s structure and mode of operation. At the moment, MRF as an organization is 
far from democratic, and its operation is subject primarily to the discretion if its leader.454
The leader-centered character of MRF and Dogan’s authoritative style have also played a 
positive role in arresting internal conflicts in their early stages. MRF has remained united 
throughout its existence and has not experienced factionalism and splits among its ranks. Ahmed 
Dogan’s strong authoritative leadership has certainly been a factor contributing to MRF’s unity. 
MRF’s ethnic-based character and agenda oriented towards the ethnic Turkish minority have 
further contributed to the unity of the party. Although some alternative Turkish organizations 
have appeared in recent years, they have been unable to gather enough political clout to compete 
with MRF for parliamentary seats.
  
455 Thus, MRF is viewed by many members of the ethnic 
Turkish minority as the sole voice representing their interests. Minchev strongly criticizes MRF 
for monopolizing the ethnic Turkish vote and de facto depriving ethnic Turks of genuine free 
choice.456
                                                 
454 One informant whom I cannot identify in relation to this quote, grotesquely characterized MRF as a 
one-man party which mimics a sultanic regime and would not exist without its leader. 
 Indeed, at least 90% of the ethnic Turkish vote is cast in favor of MRF, and ethnic 
Turks are hardly found in political parties other than MRF. Given a continuously present 
455 Since 1989, four Turkish political organizations have appeared in Bulgaria – MRF, Demokratik Gelişim 
Hareketi (Democratic Development Movement), Demokratik Adalet Partisi (Democratic Justice Party), 
and Türk Demokrat Partisi (Turkish Democratic Party). Only MRF has been able to gain seats in the 
National Assembly. 
456 See, Ognyan MINCHEV, “The Case of Turkey in the EU,” Institute for Regional International Studies 
Strategic Papers Collection, 2006. 
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hostility towards MRF by one or another party in the political arena,457 ethnic Turks aspiring to a 
career in politics find few opportunities for realization outside of MRF. Hostility by other 
political parties has further contributed to an increased internal cohesion and unity.458
MRF is a closed organization with extremely restricted access to leadership positions. In 
the early years, recruitment was limited primarily to activists of the Turkish National Liberation 
Movement of Bulgaria, who had proven their loyalty and dedication to MRF’s cause through 
prison sentences and continued persecution. With the founding of MRF’s youth organization, the 
party has adopted a long-term strategy of recruitment and training of cadres. MRF invests in 
education abroad for its youth activists, runs leadership workshops, and offers opportunities for 
direct participation by young cadres in party affairs. The youth organization is actively involved 
in campaigning, program formulation, and daily operations of the party. Consequently, the MRF 
heavily depends on its youth organization for supply of new cadres. Recruitment to positions of 
leadership is almost exclusively from the inside and further conditioned upon an exemplary 
record of party activism and to a large extent upon Turkish ethnicity.
 
459
My failed attempts to secure an interview with any MRF leader is a good example of the 
degree to which this organization is closed to outsiders. Although I had approached MRF 
through several high-level channels, such as MP’s from other parliamentary groups, civil 
organizations who have worked on joint projects with MRF, and personal contacts of particular 
leaders, I have failed in the course of 18 months to schedule an interview with a single MRF 
representative. I was instead referred to a youth activist who questioned me at length about the 
 
                                                 
457 Both BSP and UDF have expressed open hostility towards MRF, BSP in 1990-1992 and UDF most 
recently in the 2009 electoral campaign. New political parties such as the nationalist Ataka and the 
current governing party GERB have launched fierce campaigns against MRF in recent years. 
458 For a theoretical explanation of the link between internal hostility and internal cohesion see Chapter 3. 
459 Of the 80 MRF MPs for the 1990-1998 period, 10 have Bulgarian names, which in light of the renaming 
process is not necessarily an indication of Bulgarian ethnicity. 
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nature and purpose of my research project, my academic credentials, and my personal interest in 
the research topic and MRF in particular, but did not assist me in getting an interview. This 
experience gave me some insight into the nature of the organization – one that is completely 
impenetrable for outsiders, has a serious approach to training of cadres through its youth 
organization which also serves as a gatekeeper, and is overly suspicious about releasing any 
information. In light of the persecutions ethnic Turkish activists were subjected to during the 
communist regime, the still prevailing general attitude of suspicion is understandable. This, 
however, does not explain the highly undemocratic, leader-centered character of MRF echoing 
that of the communist party under Zhivkov. 
 
 
Figure 10. MRF place of birth as percent of total MRF elite 
 
The MRF has been very stable in terms of composition and aggregate characteristics of its elite. 
Analysis of elite rosters indicates that MRF members of the elite are younger on average than 
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their BSP and UDF counterparts – an indication of the active involvement of youth activists (fig. 
11). Three quarters of MRF elite members came from small agglomerates – villages or small 
towns. More than half of them were born in villages and only three were born in the capital city 
Sofia (fig. 10). Such results are expected given the fact that the majority of ethnic Turks live in 
rural regions and are occupied in agriculture. MRF elite for the 1990-2001 period are almost 
exclusively members of parliament with only two representatives in appointed positions. This is 
consistent with the fact that during that period MRF did not participate in the government, except 
for one ministerial post in 1992-1994, and did not have the opportunity to make political 
appointments. Overall, there is no marked change in the composition and aggregate 
characteristics of the MRF elite for the examined period. The range, minimum and maximum 
age, as well as average age are very similar for all years.460
                                                 
460 An exception is 1997 which has a similar average age (44), but smaller range (20 as opposed to 40), 
and a higher minimum age. 
 The village remains consistently the 
modal place of birth for the entire period. The MRF’s representation in parliament consists of six 
key individuals present in every National Assembly between 1990 and 2001. In addition to this 
core, which represents a quarter to a third of MRF’s parliamentary group depending on the year, 
there is a flow of incoming and outgoing members. Thus, MRF elite demonstrates a very healthy 
combination of change and continuity in its composition. With the establishment of its youth 
organization in 1997, MRF was able to secure a steady flow of new, trained cadres and has 
managed to preserve this balance of change and continuity in its elite to the present day. 
  226 
 
 *UDF and BSP values are identical. 
 
Figure 11. MRF mean age in comparison to BSP and UDF 
6.3.3  Role in Politics 
The MRF is often viewed as a controversial factor in Bulgarian politics mainly because it has 
been in coalition with every major party in parliament, switching sides with each subsequent 
election. MRF and UDF acted as logical allies in the Great National Assembly, (July 1990 – July 
1991) united against BSP by the common anti-communist cause. During the split in UDF on the 
constitution issue, MRF sided with the radical wing and refused to sign the new constitution. 
After the 1991 UDF electoral victory, MRF supported the new UDF government, although it was 
not offered a single ministerial post in return. MRF’s support was short-lived as MRF was 
growing increasingly discontented both with UDF’s curt treatment of its coalition partner and 
UDF’s policy of privatization and land reform, which was hitting directly MRF’s electorate. The 
intent of the UDF government to open the secret service files further left MRF threatened, as half 
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of its parliamentary group turned out to be DS agents, including Dogan. Thus, MRF voted 
against UDF in a vote of confidence which led to the collapse of the first UDF government.  
UDF leaders are anything but critical of MRF’s decision. A recurring argument 
forwarded by every interviewed member of the UDF elite is that UDF should have given MRF a 
ministerial position and secured its support. “They were voting in line with us like soldiers”, 
recounts constitutional court judge, Georgi Makrov, “and we didn’t do simple things such as 
invite them for coffee. We didn’t give them due attention.”461 Filip Dimitrov in turn argues that it 
was the split within UDF that was the main reason for the fall of the government. “I didn’t fail 
because of Dogan and I can't blame him for his policy in 1992”, he holds. “Besides, I received 
120 votes in the confidence vote. That means that at least part of Dogan’s group voted for me. I 
wonder whether it is possible that Dogan’s entire group voted for me and my people didn’t.”462
The Berov cabinet was formed with MRF mandate and supported by MRF, BSP, and the 
group of the “ants” – the 19 MPs from UDF who had split from the blue parliamentary group. 
“This was a big step for MRF – receiving a mandate to form a government,” points Filip 
Dimitrov.
 
463
                                                 
461 Interview with Georgi Markov, op.cit. 
 MRF had only one representative in the new cabinet, therefore, it did not become 
identified with Berov’s rule or the ensuing criticisms of the government for protecting corporate 
and mafia interests. The Berov cabinet was subject to strong BSP influence, relying on tacit 
support from MRF. With the subsequent early elections in 1994, MRF switched sides again and 
was in strong opposition to BSP and the government of Zhan Videnov. MRF and UDF once 
again found each other to be natural allies and advocates of reform. Once again their coalition 
462 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, op.cit. UDF had 110 MPs at the time. 
463 Ibid. 
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proved fragile and MRF withdrew its support soon after UDF scored a convincing electoral 
victory in 1997.  
Thus, in the course of eight years, MRF switched its allegiance between UDF and BSP 
three times, contributed to the collapse of the first UDF government and consequently received a 
mandate to form a government. While some criticize MRF for what appears opportunistic 
behavior, many analysts view it as a balancer and mediator in the BSP/UDF-dominated political 
model which took shape during the transition (Broun 2007, Dimitrov 2000, Ganev 2006). “MRF 
has been a balancing element,” argues Draganov. “It has taken a liberal position, joining one 
group when it is short of votes then the other.”464 MRF’s tendency to switch political partners 
has been viewed as positive also in contributing to a shift from a bi-polar political model to a 
coalition-government formula. MRF has played a determining role in coalition politics, Broun 
asserts.465 Its stable representation in parliament and its internal cohesiveness has rendered MRF 
a desired political partner both for BSP and UDF. MRF’s goals as a political party, in turn, have 
been compatible with UDF’s agenda at certain times and with BSP’s at others. MRF found 
common ground with UDF in its anti-communist stance and dedication to the building of a 
democratic system, entailing protection of human rights and equal treatment of ethnic and 
religious minorities. In 1992, Dimitrov points out, MRF switched its allegiance from UDF to 
BSP in response to the latter's more gradual policies of transition which appealed to the 
overwhelmingly poor and rural constituents of the MRF.466
                                                 
464 Interview with Prof. Dragomir Draganov, op.cit. 
 Hence, MRF has found itself siding 
with BSP on issues like social policy, protection of agricultural workers, and protection of 
465 BROUN, op.cit., p. 111. 
466 DIMITROV, op.cit., p. 18. 
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agricultural land. 467 For its 20 years of existence, MRF has crystallized its political orientation 
and taken a centrist-liberal position, joining in 2003 the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in 
Europe (ALDE)468 and the Liberal International. By participating in two consecutive coalition 
governments,469 MRF has proved its role in coalition building and has indeed contributed to the 
development of a coalition model of government, which has prevailed since the 2001 
elections.470
MRF’s connection with the former security services (Darzhavna Sigurnost) has been a 
major reason for MRF’s controversial image. The MRF includes a steady number of former DS 
agents among its MPs in all parliaments. MRF also has the highest percent of former DS agents 
among its MPs, ranging from 37% to 53.3% for the 1990 –1998 period (see Chapter Seven). In 
addition to its leader, Ahmed Dogan, many of MRF’s key political figures have also been 
confirmed as former DS agents. The role of DS in the renaming process provides a logical 
explanation for the high percent of DS agents in MRF. As Gruev and Kalionski argue, DS was a 
key instrument in the preparation and implementation of the renaming process, adopting various 
methods of repression including violence, recruitment into the DS, and more, all through 
November 1989.
 
471
                                                 
467 “For the First Time MRF Betrayed UDF on Land Reform – MRF Sides with BSP on the Need to Give 
Land to Poor Peasants,” Duma, February 8, 1992. 
 The ethnic Turkish population and leaders within the Turkish community in 
particular, have been the prime target for DS persecutions but also for recruitment into the 
security apparatus. Infiltrating the Turkish community and the illegal Turkish organizations 
468 ALDE is the third largest political group in the European Parliament, holding the balance of power 
between the left and right. 
469 MRF formed a coalition government with the winner of the 2001 parliamentary elections, the National 
Movement Simeon II (NDSV). In 2005, MRF took part in a governing coalition with BSP and NDSV. 
470 Although the last Bulgarian government includes only members of the GERB party (Citizens for 
European Development of Bulgaria), the government relies on parliamentary support from the nationalist 
movement Ataka and the Blue Coalition (UDF and DSB), none of which are in a formal coalition 
agreement with GERB. 
471 GRUEV and KALIONSKI, op.cit., p. 134. 
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operating during the renaming process was a major component of the regime’s strategy of 
combating resistance. In fact, 13 of the 20 former DS agents among MRF MPs for the period had 
been active in the 1980’s through 1990. The fact that former DS agents are overwhelmingly 
more represented in MRF in comparison to other parties made MRF more vulnerable to 
blackmailing and outside pressure throughout the 1990s, when secret service files were still 
sealed.472
In recent years, MRF has been frequently criticized for taking hold of strong financial 
positions which it uses in an extremely partisan way. Minchev argues that MRF has been 
engaged in a dynamic process of concentration of economic resources, gained by corrupt 
redistribution through the power positions of the Movement, and has been cultivating a “ring of 
companies” and business people, directly subordinated to the political leadership and to the 
leader of the MRF himself.
  
473
                                                 
472 For a detailed discussion of the former secret service, see Chapter 7. 
 MRF’s hold on key ministries such as Agriculture and Forestry, 
Environment and Water, and Disaster Management between 2005 and 2009 certainly provided 
access to large resources as well as opportunities for corruptive practices. A number of 
informants on both side of the political spectrum have referred to Ahmed Dogan, and MRF 
respectively, as someone who “mixes money and power in a way it is unclear which comes 
first,” “makes active use of power,” and “takes advantage of power.” Ganev explains MRF’s 
unchecked corruptive practices as the result of a “social bribery fund.” A social bribery fund, as 
defined by Ernest Gellner (Gellner 1983), refers to “buying off social aggression with material 
enhancements.” Faced with a very real prospect of ethnic conflict in 1989-91, Ganev contends, 
473 MINCHEV, op.cit., p. 13. 
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leaders of the major parties wisely decided to rely on such a fund.474  Hence, corrupt allocation 
of market opportunities was tolerated by all sides all throughout the 1990s. With the MRF 
gaining access to ministerial positions in 2001, MRF’s financial ambitions increased as did 
Dogan’s unwillingness to share the spoils with the growing number of economic agents. This 
rather crude misuse of the social bribery fund increased tensions between MRF and other 
political parties and annoyed the population.475
The importance of the social bribery fund in preserving ethnic peace is not to be 
overstated, as Ganev himself cautions. The main factor in preventing ethnic violence during the 
transition remains MRF’s moderate and restrained policy. “Ahmed could have stirred ethnic 
conflict, but he was behaving rationally in that respect and did not allow extremism to settle in,” 
Alexander Karakachanov holds.
 
476 “The person who contributed most to preventing bloodshed 
was Dogan. Ethnic conflict was prevented because there were reasonable people on both sides, 
but also because Dogan did not allow the repressed to radicalize,” Filip Dimitrov concurs.477 
Ahmed Dogan is unanimously credited by both UDF and BSP members of the elite as the key 
figure contributing to the preservation of ethnic peace in the country. To describe Bulgaria as an 
ethnic idyll would be too simplistic and misleading, argues Zhelyazkova.478
                                                 
474 GANEV Venelin, “Ballots, Bribes, and State Building in Bulgaria,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 
1, (January 2006), pp. 75-89, p. 85. 
 Bulgaria did 
experience ethnic tensions in the case of the January 1990 protests and the campaign against 
MRF’s registration in court. Nevertheless, analysts agree that MRF leadership helped Bulgaria to 
avoid the radicalization of ethnic politics which overtook Yugoslavia (Broun 2008, Ganev 2006, 
475 The 2009 electoral campaign for National Assembly relied heavily on anti-MRF propaganda, in synch 
with the increased discontent with MRF’s corruption schemes. 
476 Interview with Alexander Karkachanov, op.cit. 
477 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, op.cit. 
478 ZHELYAZKOVA Antonina, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 
10, No. 4, Fall 2001.  
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Merdjanova 2007, Minchev 2006). MRF was careful to avoid identification with any extremist 
Islamist or pan-Turkish elements and used secular and moderate language in its program and 
statements.479 Separatism and Islamic fundamentalism were never part of MRF’s strategy of 
attracting voters. On the contrary, MRF contributed to the overcoming of the legacy of the 
renaming process and has worked with other political actors on the restoration of the names and 
civil rights of the Bulgarian Turks. MRF’s inclusion as a recognized actor on the Bulgarian 
political scene, Ganev contends, is rightfully celebrated as an important feature of the successful 
“Bulgarian ethnic model.”480
6.4 OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE IN THE PERIOD 
OF TRANSITION 
  
The most striking characteristic of the postcommunist elite of the transition is its excessive rate 
of renewal. Data indicates a renewal rate of the Bulgarian political elite of 73.6% in 1991, 52.3% 
in 1994, and 60.3% in 1997 (fig. 12). Thus, over half to almost three quarters of the elite is 
renewed following each parliamentary election.  We notice that the rate of renewal tends to 
increase when UDF wins the elections. This is consistent with the demonstrated excessive rate of 
renewal within UDF and the moderate renewal in BSP.  
                                                 
479 MERDJANOVA Ina, "Uneasy Tolerance: Interreligious Relations in Bulgaria after the Fall of 
Communism," Religion, State and Society, Vol. 35, No.  2, 2007, pp. 95-103, p. 98. 
480 GANEV 2006, op.cit., p. 85. 
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Figure 12. Renewal rate by party in percent 
The elite remained stable in terms of age with a mean ranging between 47 – 50 and a mode 
between 42 – 52. Over half of the elite come from small agglomerates (village 27.9% and small 
town 29.6), whereas 21.3% are from Sofia and 19.6% from other big cities. Thus, there is a 
roughly even distribution in terms of place of birth, accounted for by the fact that BSP and 
MRF’s high representation from small agglomerates is compensated by UDF’s high percent of 
Sofia and big city elite (fig. 14). The only exception is the General National Assembly in 1990 
with the highest percent of village elite (36.4%). This is not surprising considering that the Great 
National Assembly had 400 representatives (as opposed to the 240 in the regular assembly), the 
majority of whom were from BSP. In fact, every fifth member of the 1990 elite is a village-born 
BSP MP. Appointed (as opposed to elected) positions constitute between 20 – 30% of the elite 
with the exception of 1991, when appointed positions make up for 42%.  This higher figure is 
partly due to the specificity of the data gathering technique, which would include all individuals 
occupying a certain position within a roster’s timeframe. After coming to power in 1991, the 
UDF initiated purging of communist cadres from government institutions. This policy was then 
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reversed by the Berov cabinet who, in turn, replaced many of the deputy ministers and other 
political appointees. The elite roster for the 1991 – 1994, then, would list a higher number of 
people on appointed positions than other rosters. The elite of the transition is predominantly 
communist/socialist (42.2%), with UDF constituting 24% and MRF 3.6%. (fig. 13) Appointed 
positions account for 22.4% of the elite and the remaining percentage is distributed between 
small parties and independent candidates. Independent candidates were often BSP sympathizers, 
as one BSP strategy of attracting swing voters was nominating independent candidates (a.k.a. 
civil quota). Hence, the total percent of BSP elite is slightly higher than indicated by the data. 
 
Figure 13. Composition of the transition elite by party 
Contrary to the general notion characterizing Bulgaria as a case of elite reproduction, the 
transition elite exhibits modest levels of physical continuity.  “We had created a very shallow 
elite which was circulating very fast,” argues Dragomir Draganov.481
                                                 
481 Interview with Dragomir Draganov, op.cit. 
 Data point to a rather 
unstable elite with high rate of renewal and internal conflicts resulting in frequent splits and 
regroupings, particularly in the case of UDF. The prevalent view that the communist elite 
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preserved its position of power, however, proves to be true as demonstrated by the generational 
continuity of the BSP elite and the prevalence of BSP representatives in the transition elite. Thus, 
if we adopt a wider definition of “reproduction” considering aggregate social characteristics, we 
could argue that there is reproduction within the former communist elite, but not in the overall 
elite of the transition. 
 
Figure 14. Place of birth (cumulative for 1990-2001) 
Going back to the research questions, we can argue that there was no organized counter elite in 
Bulgaria before late 1989. Once the opposition was organized, it was too weak to effectively 
challenge the power of the communist elite. Uniting opposition movements in a coalition and 
adopting a strategy of confrontation rather than co-optation were the right choices. However, 
UDF failed to create broad and stable structures, develop a unified vision of the transition and a 
sound reform program, and attract competent and loyal cadres. UDF’s loose structure and 
chaotic mode of recruitment produced rupturing internal conflicts with numerous splits and 
excessive public bickering, which alienated supporters. Such factors further weakened an already 
frail and poorly organized opposition and limited its ability to wrest power from the communists. 
UDF’s success in 1997 is as much the result of internal restructuring and new national policy 
formulation as it is due to BSP’s catastrophic rule and the ensuing protest vote. Although UDF 
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brought the first postcommunist government that managed to fulfill its mandate and implement 
more consistent reforms, it was unable to retain voter support. Presently, UDF is but a marginal 
political force with an ever decreasing electorate. 
The MRF started as an opposition to communist power, supporting UDF in its 
confrontation strategy towards BSP, but it soon switched to co-optation, readily coalescing with 
any party that offered it political leverage. A leader-centered and strictly hierarchical party, MRF 
choked internal conflicts at early stages, preserving party unity and preventing rival ethnic-based 
organizations from emerging. Ideologically unbound, MRF relied on a hard-core ethnic-based, 
disciplined electorate, which rendered it a valuable partner. MRF quickly developed strong 
structures and sound cadre policy focused on training of cadres and exclusively internal 
recruitment. With the first postcommunist election MRF established itself as an important and 
ever-present factor in politics, often able to tilt the balance of power in one direction or another.  
The BCP/BSP is a hierarchical party with a dense network of organizations, a long 
history and capacity to adapt to different environments, rich material and human resource base, 
and a large and loyal electorate. Faced with a weak and poorly organized opposition, BSP was 
able to preserve strong positions and had little motivation to transform. Although it enjoyed an 
abundance of loyal young cadres, BSP’s mode of recruitment to the elite hardly changed. An 
aging electorate swayed by communist nostalgia and little change in elite composition proved 
obstacles to the transformation of the party into the modern social-democratic political body it 
claimed to have become. Internal conflicts were crucial in toppling Todor Zhivkov but failed to 
become a lasting driver of change. Instead, factions within the party pushing for change were 
disappointed by BSP’s slow transformation and quickly left the Party. Clumsy structures and 
ideological baggage further prevented genuine change of the party, making it difficult for BSP to 
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accept new realities and offer a viable reform program. On the other hand, the lack of rupturing 
internal conflict and the stable mode of recruitment helped the Party remain united throughout 
the transition and assured a healthy supply of new cadres. BSP remains the major Left political 
force in the country, preventing rival left-wing parties from gaining mass support and surviving 
challenges from new parties with sweeping short-term electoral successes. The deep internal 
crisis following the fall of the Videnov government led to ideological re-orientation of the party 
and its ultimate legitimation by the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists. 
Table 9. Characteristics of the dominant political organizations in the period of transition 
 BSP UDF MRF 
Structure Hierarchical, dense 
organizational network, 
youth organization 
Loose coalition, weak structures, 
lacking resources 
Hierarchical, leader-centered, 
youth organization 
Mode of 
recruitment 
Closed, mostly from inside, 
training of cadres, healthy 
rate of renewal 
Chaotic, varies with each 
organization within the coalition, 
excessive renewal rate 
Closed, ethnic-based and from 
inside, training of cadres, 
healthy rate of renewal 
Internal 
conflict 
Factional conflicts, but unity 
is preserved, strong 
common identity 
Perpetual internal conflicts, 
splits, denouncing of leaders, 
lack of common identity 
Internal conflict is repressed, 
very strong ethnic-based 
common identity 
Electorate Large hard-core electorate 
(dedicated communists, 
pensioners, swing voters), 
aging and slightly 
decreasing 
Unstable electorate (anti-
communists, repressed, Sofia 
intellectuals and professionals), 
rapidly decreasing 
Stable, disciplined, ethnic-
based electorate, growing 
The collapse of the communist regime and the establishment of a multi-party system implies by 
definition major difference in the overall composition and mode of recruitment between the 
communist and the postcommunist elite. While such change was very modest in the case of the 
former communist party, the fact that now there are opposition parties competing for political 
power qualitatively changed the process of elite formation. The composition and mode of 
recruitment of the post-communist elite varied significantly from party to party (table 9). We 
notice three distinctive elite profiles within the postcommunist elite. One is the party loyalist 
who faithfully sticks to his/hers respective party. Such figures were present on all sides – 
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Alexander Lilov from BCP, Filip Dimitrov from UDF, and virtually all members of the MRF 
elite. A second category is the party reformer. Such figures attempt to institute change within 
their respective party but ultimately remain disappointed and choose to leave the party initiating 
new political formations. The most obvious examples of this second breed are Alexander 
Tomov, who left BSP and founded the Euroleft, and Ivan Kostov, who founded DSB. Finally, 
there is the political nomad migrating from party to party either because of disappointment with 
his/hers own party or because of opportunism. A number of the early dissidents fall within this 
category482
The transformation of the Bulgarian political elite was determined by: 1) a strong but 
slowly reforming former communist party, unable to articulate a viable reform program; 2) a 
weak and poorly organized opposition torn by internal conflict and lacking a unified vision of the 
transition and sound reform policy; and 3) an opportunistic ethnic-based party acting as a 
balancer in a bi-polar political model. In the Bulgarian case this particular combination of factors 
resulted in a sequence of unstable governments, each lacking a consistent reform agenda. Elite 
transformation in Bulgaria proved unfavorable to the outcome of the transition with serious 
repercussions in terms of the country’s political and economic development. 
 mostly because of their disappointment with the radicals within UDF and their 
extreme anti-communist position. Opportunists were present an all sides but they were much 
more prevalent in UDF than in BSP or MRF. 
                                                 
482 For example, Petko Simeonov, Angel Vagenstein, Chavdar Kyuranov, Rumen Vodenicharov, Petar 
Slabakov – all Round Table participants from UDF who later rejoined BCP/BSP. 
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7.0  THE ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE BULGARIAN TRANSITION: 
MYTHS AND EVIDENCE 
7.1 THE MYTHS483
The former secret service is often blamed for Bulgaria’s difficult transition. As Hristov keenly 
observes, one of the lasting public notions in Bulgarian society is the negative role of the secret 
service in criminalizing the transition and being the sole party guilty of its failure.
 
484
                                                 
483 “Myth” here is not utilized in its anthropological meaning. The reason this word was chosen as 
opposed to “public belief,” for example, is that “myth” is the prevailing word applied in the public 
discourse on the Bulgarian secret service. The quotation marks acknowledge both the debate surrounding 
those public beliefs and the fact that, as further argued, there is some factological foundation to these 
widely accepted notions. 
 We find 
two persisting “myths” in the public discourse on the role of the secret service in the transition – 
one, that former secret service agents took active part in the political process, mainly though 
infiltrating the opposition in order to sabotage its efforts to gain political power and prevail over 
the Communist party; the other, that former secret service officers actively participated in the 
economic transformation by appropriating state capital through various schemes. These “myths” 
should not come as a surprise. That secret service agents disposed of resources allowing them to 
take active part in transition processes is a widely acknowledged fact. Assessing exactly what 
role they played and what impact their actions had on the outcome of the transition, however, is a 
different and much more difficult task that nevertheless needs to be addressed. 
484 HRISTOV Chavdar, Секретните sлужби и преходът, София, Ciela, 2004, p. 14. 
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No study of post-communist elites would be complete without reference to the secret 
service. The secret service was an important element of communist regimes across Eastern 
Europe. Not only were the secret services responsible for suppressing and uprooting dissent, but 
they were key actors in foreign relations, particularly foreign trade. Communist elites were 
closely linked with the security services, often relying on their support in order to maintain 
power. Security officers, in turn, enjoyed a privileged status in the communist regime hierarchy. 
Twenty years after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the question of the 
former security services continues to be debated in Bulgaria and across the region. An important 
issue that emerges with post-communist transitions is the handling of the files and lists of 
informers assembled by the old regime. The exposure of collaborators eventually becomes a 
public issue in every post-communist state, argues Williams, but in some it emerges on the 
agenda sooner, and more explosively, than in others.485
                                                 
485 WILLIAMS Keiran and Dennis DELETANT, Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies. The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, New York, NY, Palgrave, 2001, p. 19. 
 The treatment of the issue is closely 
related to the particular policies of transitional justice in each post-communist country. 
According to Williams, the political debate and policies towards former security agents depend 
on whether the communist regime remained consistently severe until its demise, whether the 
communists were willing to bargain a transition to democracy or resisted change, and whether 
communist successor parties performed well in the first democratic elections. Exposing the 
activities of former security services and the identities of collaborators is more than coming to 
terms with the past; it constitutes the politics of the present. What former security officers and 
collaborators are doing today might be an even more important question than what they did in 
the past. The suspected murder of Bulgaria’s head of the former secret service archive clearly 
illustrates this point. In November 2006, Bozhidar Doychev, the man who oversaw Bulgaria's 
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most sensitive secret service archives, was found dead at his desk, with a bullet in his head from 
his own handgun.486
Writing about the role of the secret service in the transition would have to include an 
account of the entire transition period, a colleague told me when discussing the topic. Thus, it is 
very important to stress upon the purpose of this chapter, which is to make a first attempt in 
applying systematic analysis to the connection between the former security service and the 
transition process. I start with a review of the former security service, followed by an analysis of 
the structural opportunities transition processes created that allowed security service officers to 
influence the economic and political developments in the country. I then examine the evidence of 
involvement of former security officers in the transition process. Because of the nature of the 
available data, I focus mainly on the role of the former secret service in the political 
transformation. A lot has been written about secret service agents exporting and appropriating 
state capital. Considering the scarce empirical data, however, few of those writings meet 
academic standards. Being unable to more fully evaluate the role of the former secret service in 
that process, I simply point to the structural opportunities the transition offered that benefitted 
former security officers. Assessing the role of the secret service in political life has become 
somewhat more viable with the recent partial disclosure of the secret service files. With the 
creation of the files commission in 2007, currently examining the archives of the secret service, 
for the first time there is a possibility for scientific inquiry. These data present a unique 
opportunity to link the personnel and role of the former security service to the question of elite 
 The archive, which remains closed to the public, obviously poses a major 
threat to powerful interests in Bulgaria’s current political life. 
                                                 
486 “Eastern Europe Still Struggles to Purge Its Security Services,” The New York Times, December 12, 
2006. 
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transformation and the process of transition in Bulgaria, an effort that could be potentially 
beneficial for examining the same topic in other post-communist countries. 
7.2 DARZHAVNA SIGURNOST: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIONS 
DS (Darzhavna Sigurnost) is the general name for the Bulgarian security services during the 
communist regime. The DS was created in 1947 and continued to exist until 1990, when most of 
its departments were dissolved and the remaining units were transformed into various security 
agencies dispersed between the interior and defense ministries, the Council of Ministers, and the 
president. The DS was a highly organized and hierarchical structure divided into seven 
departments. Each department covered a specific field and range of activities from counter-
intelligence, economic and ideological control, to surveillance and Communist party security. 
The various departments, Hristov contends, in practice controlled the entire political, social, and 
economic life of the country.487 There is no exact figure of the number of DS employees, but 
estimates point that before being dissolved in 1990, DS employed over 25,000 security officers – 
a significant number if compared to the Czechoslovak security service StB, for example, which 
employed 12,886 secret officers as of June 1989.488 The number of people (non-DS employees) 
recruited to collaborate in one form or another with the security services was considerably 
higher. According to Boncho Atanasov, a former DS operations officer, between 250,000 and 
300,000 agents were recruited for the period 1947-1989.489
                                                 
487 Ibid., p. 29. 
 Such a dense network of informers 
488 WILLIAMS and DELETANT, op.cit., p. 35. 
489 Quoted in Alexenia DIMITROVA, Войната на шпионите: Разследване на български и 
американски секретни архиви, София, Ciela, 2005, p.22. 
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was not atypical for communist security services. The Romanian Securitate, for instance, 
disposed of 400,000 informers according to conservative estimates.490
The DS was under the direct control of the Communist party, a fact that holds true of all 
East European secret services during the communist period. According to its statute, the DS was 
subordinate to the ruling Communist party and its secretary general. All major decisions required 
approval by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist party. A special 
department at the Central Committee was responsible for overseeing all DS activity. The interior 
minister, ultimately in charge of DS operations and always a high-ranking party functionary, 
reported directly to the Central Committee. Party membership was the number one condition for 
employment in the security service. All employees were expected to be “ideologically reliable” 
and “pledge full allegiance to the Bulgarian Communist Party.” Given the nature of totalitarian 
systems, it is only logical that the security services were subordinate to the orders and objectives 
of the Communist party. The DS was an inseparable part of the party and one of the party’s most 
powerful instruments of repression and control.
 Despite the lack of exact 
figures, these numbers indicate that by 1989 DS had deeply penetrated all spheres of Bulgarian 
society.  
491
                                                 
490 WILLIAMS and DELETANT, op.cit., p. 198. 
 As former general secretary of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party (BCP) Vulko Chevenkov stated at an Interior Ministry meeting in 1951, “Your 
boss is the Central Committee. You are a Politburo organ, our instrument, our eyes, ears, tools. 
You cannot think differently from the Politburo, you cannot do differently from what the 
491 Deletant similarly argues that the Romanian security police was the blunt instrument of repression of 
the Communist party. Ibid., p. 160. 
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Politburo orders you to do.”492 The DS and the Party could not be separated, argues Chanev, 
neither at functional level nor at the level of personnel.493
In time of crises, however, party control over the DS was much more nominal than real, 
Metodiev contends. During such periods, DS power tended to increase whereas party control 
over the services tended to decrease.
  
494
The DS was closely connected to the Soviet security services, another feature 
characteristic of all East European intelligence services at the time, even the Securitate.
 This is especially true of the mid and late 1980’s when 
the DS and its department for ideological control in particular, became very active. The DS was 
in control of the information flow to the party apparatus and at the same time investigated 
members of the party, including those responsible for exercising control over the service. This 
enabled it to negotiate its position of power and follow its own strategic objectives. Although the 
DS was, strictly speaking, under the control of the party and all its employees were party 
members, control over the security service was far from absolute and varied over time. 
495 
According to Manolova, there was a KGB representative in every DS department who had 
complete access to all information.496
                                                 
492 Quoted in CHALAKOV et al., Мрежите на прехода: какво всъщност се случи в България след 
1989 г., София, Изток Запад, 2008, p. 47. 
 In practice, she further argues, DS activities were 
monitored and controlled by the KGB through its representatives in the departments. Such 
practice was very common. In a study of GDR’s Stasi, Childs and Popplewell point out that all 
information obtained by the various GDR intelligence departments was sent in copy to the KGB 
493 CHANEV Stefan, Шесто за нас и ние за шесто, София, Отечество, 1999, p. 32. 
494 METODIEV Momchil, Машина за легитимност: Ролята на Държавна сигурност в 
комунистическата държава, София, Ciela, 2008, p. 252. 
495 Soviet advisors were attached to each of the Securitate national directorates to supervise the training of 
the Romanian recruits and to monitor their activity. WILLIAMS and DELETANT, op.cit., p. 164. 
496 MANOLOVA Lyuba, Външният дълг и 10 ноември 1989 в документи, София, Факел, 2002, p. 29. 
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liaison officers attached to the Stasi leadership.497 Hristov reports that until the end of 1989, 
KGB employees with the rank of advisors coordinated and controlled DS’ major intelligence and 
counter-intelligence operations.498 Many DS officers received their training in the KGB’s 
intelligence and counter-intelligence schools, something which was considered a great career 
advantage. Having officers with KGB training also made collaboration and coordination of 
activities between the two services much easier and smoother. Given the Soviet tight grip over 
the Eastern bloc, it is not surprising that security operations of East European intelligence 
services were coordinated with Moscow just as were major political decisions. It is hard to 
estimate the degree to which DS was under KGB’s control. As former DS general Todorov 
points out, the extent of control varied in each department and with each new KGB advisor.499 It 
is an undeniable fact, however, that the DS and the KGB worked closely together and regularly 
exchanged information. According to Alexenia Dimitrova, reports of such collaboration can be 
found in the U.S. secret archives as early 1948. U.S. archives, she reports, describe the DS as 
being subordinate to the KGB and BCP’s Central Committee.500
The DS had a wide range of activities both in the country and abroad. Aside from 
activities related to national security and within the prerogative of any security service, the DS 
was accused of using such means as conspiracy, terrorism, political diversions, murders, and 
sabotage.
   
501
                                                 
497 CHILDS David and Richard POPPLEWELL, The Stasi. The East German Intelligence and Security 
Service, London, MacMilllan Pres Ltd., 1996, p. 124. 
 Internationally, the DS became notorious for the murder of the Bulgarian dissident 
and writer Georgi Markov in London in 1978 and the attempt on Pope John Paul II’s life in 
498 HRISTOV, op. cit., p. 30.  
499 Interview quoted in HRISTOV, op. cit., p. 30. 
500 Alexenia Dimitrova was the first Bulgarian journalist to gain access to the U.S. secret archives and 
examine their reports on the Bulgarian security services.  See, Alexenia DIMITROVA, Войната на 
шпионите: Разследване на български и американски секретни архиви, София, Ciela, 2005 
501 CHANEV, op.cit., p. 32. 
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Rome in 1981. While Bulgarian involvement in the murder of Georgi Markov, known as the 
Bulgarian umbrella,502 has been ultimately confirmed, the Bulgarian connection in the attack on 
the Pope remains questionable. Less factologically debatable are accusations of DS involvement 
in illegal arms trade, drug trafficking, trade of regulated medicine (Captagon in particular), and 
transit trade of excise duty goods. According to a 1991 report of the interior minister Hristo 
Danov, illegal trade was a policy endorsed by the state.503 The most notable and well-known in 
Bulgarian public discourse example is the foreign-trade venture “Kintex,” created with an 
official order by the Council of Ministers, dated July 31, 1978. “Kintex” (abbreviation for 
“haberdashery” and “textile”) was a front company, run by DS officers and involved in illegal 
arms trade until the mid-1990s. There are numerous other instances of state-endorsed, DS-
operated illegal trading often involving foreign citizens, from the Middle East for example, who 
were compensated with Bulgarian citizenship and/or large amounts of money.504
In examining DS’ involvement in illegal and semi-legal activities, it is imperative to 
make a distinction between DS the institution and DS employees. Not all operations involving 
DS officers were in fact organized by the DS. On more than one occasion, DS officers had the 
opportunity to use their status and connections and engage in personally beneficial activities that 
were not necessarily endorsed or ordered by the DS institution. Such is the case with Georgi 
Naidenov, former intelligence officer, founder of “Texim.” “Texim” was the first from a number 
of companies under Naidenov’s control that ultimately grew into the “Economic Group – 
Bulgarian Trade Fleet” (EG-BTF). By 1969, EG-BTF included companies with a wide range of 
  
                                                 
502 For a detailed investigation on Georgi Markov’s murder see, Hristo HRISTOV, Убийте скитник, 
София, Ciela, 2007. 
503 Quoted in HRISTOV, op.cit., p. 37. 
504 For a detailed journalistic investigation of foreign-trade firms involved in illegal trade see, 
MANOLOVA, op.cit. 
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activities, from ground and marine transportation, ship construction and port authority, to 
insurance, agricultural aviation, dry-cleaning and grocery stores.505 Naidenov’s employees were 
similarly diverse, including party members, former Algerian terrorists, a son of a Libyan 
millionaire, Western businessmen and lawyers.506 Not strictly a state enterprise, EG-BTF 
brought in considerable amounts of foreign currency for the state, thus securing non-interference 
in its operations. The Group was controlled and operated by Naidenov who had full discretion 
over its activities. This venture, unorthodox for socialist economies, often interfered with and 
abused the state-run economy, reaping personal profit. EG-BTF was even getting in the way of 
Comecon trade, cashing in on reselling cheap Comecon raw materials and goods to Western 
companies. Naidenov was ultimately convicted on charges of corruption and embezzlement and 
sentenced to 20 years in prison, of which he served five. The question remains, however, how a 
single DS employee was able to gain such power and escape control by the state. In order to 
better understand the structural opportunities for such abuses we need to focus on the 1st
The 1
 DS 
department.  
st department was responsible for all DS activities outside of the country as well as 
operations within the country involving foreign citizens. These included intelligence and 
counter-intelligence abroad, science and technology intelligence, cultural and historical 
intelligence. According to Politburo’s directive, the 1st
                                                 
505 For a detailed account of the Naidenov case, see Dimitar IVANOV, Шести отдел, София, 
Университетско издадетлство „Св. Климент Охридски,” 2004, pp. 144- 153. 
 department was responsible for gathering 
secret political and economic information from capitalist countries, organizing intelligence 
operations abroad, acquiring scientific and technological information that had practical 
applicability for the development of the national economy, as well as information regarding new 
506 IVANOV, op cit., p. 146. 
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military technologies developed in the capitalist countries, and gathering archival sources on 
Bulgarian and Balkan history. Two main strategies were used to achieve these objectives –
recruiting foreigners visiting Bulgaria and sending DS officers to Western countries. With the 
establishment of Bulgarian export trade companies and joint ventures between Bulgarian state 
companies and Western companies in the 1980’s, DS presence abroad significantly increased. 
Manolova argues that Bulgarian foreign traders, responsible for particular foreign deals of the 
state, were working for and were accountable to the DS.507 In fact, she continues, the work of the 
ventures abroad relying on state capital, as well as the realization of specific foreign trade deals 
which secured foreign currency for the state, would have been impossible without the 
participation of the DS.508 The 1st
What distinguished 1
 DS department maintained a dense network of operative 
workers and informers in Western countries. Its people were stationed in official Bulgarian 
institutions abroad, joint ventures, international organizations, universities, research institutes, 
etc. Furthermore, officers with specific missions were regularly sent as part of official 
delegations and tourist groups, on conferences, festivals, expositions, and exchanges.  
st department officers from their colleagues was their unobstructed 
access to Western countries and their connections in the West. In fact, aside from official 
diplomatic channels, these officers were the country’s main liaison with the West. They were 
running Bulgaria’s companies abroad, representing Bulgarian interests in the joint ventures, and 
bringing in Western companies to Bulgaria. Because of the characteristics of the Cold War and 
the threat of ideological contamination, argues Chalakov et al., all Bulgarian ventures abroad 
were connected to the secret services and operated by DS officers.509
                                                 
507 MANOLOVA, op.cit., p. 84. 
 Their connections and 
508 Ibid., p. 141. 
509 CHALAKOV et al.,op.cit., p. 57. 
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position in the West were imperative for carrying out DS operations, at the same time creating 
opportunities for 1st department officers to engage in personally beneficial activities. Operating 
mostly in Western countries, these officers not only had access to information and valuable 
contacts but were also able to evade control by the state. They were often involved in lucrative 
illegal or semi-legal activities, exploiting opportunities for profiteering created by the differences 
between the socialist and capitalist systems. They were not circumventing the socialist system, 
but rather taking advantage of it by importing and exporting subsidized Comecon goods to 
Western markets, investing state capital allocated to a particular Bulgarian venture abroad and 
privatizing the profit, using Bulgarian ventures abroad as front companies for drug and arms 
trafficking, etc. It is exactly the structure of the socialist system that made such practices 
possible. 1st department officers had almost exclusive knowledge of the nature and activities of 
Bulgarian companies abroad and the amount and distribution of state capital abroad.  Their 
knowledge and contacts gave them a certain degree of independence, allowing them to do much 
more than just carry out DS orders. For example, a DS-run company expected to register $3 
million profit for the state, was able to conceal any profit above that amount and direct it to a 
personal account. Since the DS officer in charge was often the only one with full knowledge of 
the company’s activities and the state, having received the expected profit, had no reason to 
question his work, it was quite easy for him to appropriate any additional profit. In other words, 
the difference between the socialist and capitalist systems created structural opportunities for DS 
officers to engage in goal-oriented behavior for personal gain. Such behavior was not necessarily 
encouraged by the state but it was tolerated, as long as it did not interfere with bringing in 
dividends for the state. 
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Another branch of the DS meriting special attention is the 6th department in charge of 
ideological control. If the 1st department represented the main liaison with the West, the 6th 
department was perhaps the most important one in terms of DS activities at home and the one 
with the worst reputation. Its raison d’être was “the combat against ideological diversion, 
counter-revolutionary, nationalistic, and anti-state actions in the country.”510 Its activities were 
directed against all citizens and social groups potentially critical of the regime – the 
intelligentsia, students, minorities, clergy, as well as critical elements within the Communist 
party. Exact figures of the number of 6th department officers and people recruited as agents are 
again unavailable. According to 1974 reports, the department had 626 secret associates (393 
agents, 233 trustees), and 282 secret meeting places.511 This number significantly increased by 
the mid 1980’s, with the exponential growth of department 6 activities and the number of people 
being recruited to collaborate. Having a dense network of agents in every sphere of Bulgarian 
society, the 6th department maintained complete control over any attempt for dissent. As 
Metodiev argues, the carrot and stick policy of the 6th department towards the Bulgarian 
intelligentsia prevented the emergence of a real dissident movement in Bulgaria.512 DS agents 
infiltrated all organizations and circles potentially critical of the regime in order to gather 
information and obstruct organized activities through sabotage from within. Aside from detecting 
and uprooting dissident activities, 6th department officers were responsible for carrying out 
special orders and policies, most notably the infamous renaming process. A Politburo order from 
December 10th, 1984, instructed the head of the 6th
                                                 
510 METODIEV, op.cit., p. 181. 
 department to start the renaming of the ethnic 
511 Ibid., p. 185. 
512 Ibid., 179. 
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Turkish population in all parts of the country.513 Department 6th officers and their network of 
agents were instrumental in the renaming of 850,000 ethnic Turks. Finally, the 6th department 
was also entrusted with keeping a close eye on the Party. In order to prevent the formation of any 
reformist movements within the Party, the 6th department investigated high-ranking party 
members, including people from the Central Committee and the Politburo. In addition to having 
eyes and ears in every sphere of Bulgarian society, the 6th department was notorious for its brutal 
methods of repression ranging from arrests and outright violence to blackmailing and threats. 
Other means of persuasion were also employed such as granting certain privileges in exchange 
for collaboration. Travel abroad, residence in the capital city, access to academic institutions and 
degrees were often used to lure one into working for the department by simply providing 
information or carrying out specific operations. It is this carrot and stick policy and its ability to 
penetrate anywhere that gave department 6 a particularly vicious image. Even the slightest 
manifestation of ideological diversion, such as listening to Western radio stations, was 
immediately registered by department officers. It would not be unreasonable to say that at home 
the 6th
Similarly to their 1
 department was present everywhere.   
st department colleagues, 6th
                                                 
513 GRUEV Mihail and Alexei KALYONSKI, Възродителния процес: Мюсулманските общности и 
комунистическият режим, София, Ciela, 2008, p. 139. 
 department officers enjoyed a special 
position of power. They had information on every prominent member of society. They were in 
close contact with all circles of society from the intelligentsia and high party apparatus to 
minorities and political prisoners. Department 6 officers often used undercover identity, which 
gave them a special advantage in allowing them to pose as long-time dissidents. These assets 
would prove particularly useful in the transition years, granting department 6 officers 
considerable political leverage and a behind-the-scenes participation in political life.  
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7.3 THE DS IN THE TRANSITION: SUSPICIONS AND EVIDENCE 
One may wonder what role in the transition the DS could have played, considering the fact that it 
was dissolved in 1990. It is perhaps the very dissolution of DS that allotted it a particular role in 
the transition. The transformation of the security services started with the closing of the 6th 
department – the political police, and the science and technology intelligence – part of the 1st 
department. In addition to structural changes, massive cuts in personnel were undertaken in all 
departments and levels of the DS. Over 14,000 DS officers were relieved of duty for the period 
1990-1992. The cuts encompassed more that 50% of DS personnel, mainly from the 6th 
department, the science and technology intelligence, the high and middle leadership apparatus, as 
well as employees with less than 5 and more than 20 years work experience.514 DS employees 
were not only out of their job but were also publicly discredited. In the early months of the 
transition, the Communist Party was quick to declare the DS responsible for all atrocities and 
abuses of the regime. BCP’s leadership, argues a former DS officer, put the blame for the labor 
camps, political prosecutions and the renaming process entirely on the secret services, as if we 
were not following orders by the party.515
Being completely discredited, the thousands of released DS employees could seek no 
future in government service and had to look for other means and fields of realization. They 
 This strategy allowed the Party to distance itself from 
the aberrations of the regime and claim a rightful place in post-socialist politics. By contrast, the 
DS was declared the black sheep of the socialist system and blamed for all of its evils and 
failures.  
                                                 
514 HRISTOV, op.cit., p. 39. 
515 GEORGIEV Yulii, Спец службите с поглед към обединена Европа, София, Прива Консулт, 2000, 
p. 14. 
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possessed special skills and knowledge, numerous personal contacts in the country and abroad, 
and their “own” information network and database. Though no longer part of the security 
apparatus, those officers still had access to information and resources, often unavailable to 
anyone else. Thus, they quickly engaged in private business, created parallel intelligence and 
security structures outside of the control of the state, and exercised pressure on the political and 
economic life in the country. Having almost exclusive knowledge of the exact amount and 
distribution of Bulgarian capital abroad, DS officers had the opportunity to easily privatize it. 
Their contacts in the West gave them access to investors and made them the first to engage in 
profitable business with Western companies. On the other hand, access to the extensive DS files 
gave endless opportunities for kompromat. Containing the dossier of every politician in the 
country, the files enabled DS officers to offer such information to one party or another, as well as 
directly blackmail politicians. Though the DS no longer existed, DS employees were 
undoubtfully important economic and political players in the transition. They maintained a 
strong network among each other and were in a position to influence the economic and political 
processes in the country. Examining the DS, in terms of the network of former DS employees 
which continued to operate despite the dissolution of the institution itself, therefore, is crucial for 
our understanding of the Bulgarian transition. 
Studying the security services by definition entails working with very limited data. A lot 
has been written and said about the DS, but among the voluminous publications on the subject 
few provide evidence even remotely meeting scientific standards. The most reliable evidence, the 
DS files, have been and continue to be closed to the public. The partial disclosure of the files in 
2007, presents the only available hard evidence. Other sources on the topic include journalistic 
investigations, mostly in the form of newspaper articles, memoirs of former DS officers, and 
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very few attempts for a systematic analysis. Investigative journalists have dedicated enormous 
efforts to untangle the myths around the DS. As Hristov argues, the role of the secret services in 
the Bulgarian transition could hardly be examined without the media.516 Most notable in that 
respect has been the work of Alexenia Dimitrova, Hristo Hristov, and Lyuba Manolova.517 Going 
to great lengths to obtain interior ministry archives, foreign archives, and Council of Ministers 
archives, these authors examine various aspects of DS activities. Though uncovering many 
pieces of the puzzle, such writings remain within the field of journalism, focusing on specific 
cases and shying away from general conclusions. Furthermore, such investigations are not 
always free of political bias. Nevertheless, the contribution of investigative journalism to the 
topic should not be underestimated.518
If journalistic investigations are a bit biased, this is the more so true of memoirs of former 
DS employees.
 If it were not for those efforts, far less would be known on 
the subject today.  
519
                                                 
516 HRISTOV, op.cit., p. 13. 
 Though offering interesting stories from the “kitchen,” former officers 
inevitably try to portray the secret service as an honorable institution the duty of which was first 
and foremost assuring state security. Without doubt, DS was fulfilling its responsibilities in that 
respect and many of its employees were honorable officers not fitting the image of the crook, 
often associated with DS employees. Such one-sided accounts of the DS, however, are naïve to 
say the least. The fact that the DS was serving and protecting state security neither obstructed nor 
justified the numerous illegal and semi-legal activities it was involved in, nor its methods of 
517 See, DIMITROVA, op.cit, Hristo HRISTOV, op.cit., and MANOLOVA, op.cit. 
518 Bulgarian daily newspaper, 24 chasa, has been very important in that respect. 
519 See, IVANOV, op.cit., GEORGIEV, op.cit.  
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repression. Until the archival sources are opened however, Metodiev contends, the debate on the 
DS will continue to be extremely biased and dominated by former employees.520
Keeping in mind the limited and often biased data on the subject, we now turn to 
examining the role of DS in exporting and appropriating state capital. We have already pointed 
to the structural opportunities for channeling state funds from Bulgarian state-owned companies 
abroad into private accounts. With the emergence of mixed partnerships between Bulgarian state 
firms and Western private companies in the early 1980s, such practices became even more 
common yet harder to track. Joint ventures were initially established with mostly Austrian and 
Japanese partners, engaging in various kinds of import and export. This policy was motivated by 
the need to diversify foreign currency income much needed for serving the ever increasing 
Bulgarian foreign debt.
 
521 People in charge of such partnerships on the Bulgarian side were very 
well connected and well prepared, recounts an anonymous high-ranking communist party 
functionary.522
With the collapse of communism and the frequent restructuring of government 
institutions that ensued, particularly in the economic ministries, government control over 
Bulgarian ventures abroad was weakened if not completely lost. In 1990, the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations in charge of the joint ventures was closed and its entire documentation 
 Most certainly linked with the DS, they were given state funds in order to 
establish and manage the joint ventures. Money was deposited in private accounts in the name of 
the Bulgarian representatives who were free to dispose of it and needed to report on their 
activities to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. 
                                                 
520 METODIEV, op.cit., p. 11. 
521 Bulgarian foreign debt increased from $ 2.9 billion in 1984 to $ 10.7 billion in 1989. The debt serving 
coefficient rose from 41 in 1985 to 74 in 1989, thus bringing annual debt payments from $1.7 billion in 
1985 to over $ 3 billion in 1985. Source: COLANDER David, Macroeconomics, Vol.1, Sofia 1999, p. 368. 
522 Interview with P.G., Sofia, May 8th, 2007. 
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mysteriously disappeared. Joint ventures abroad remained in a grey zone in the early 1990’s, 
during which time they continued to operate and receive government funds, yet were formally 
accountable to no-longer existing government institutions. This lack of accountability allowed 
the well-situated Bulgarian representatives to intentionally withhold profits, instead of sending 
them back to the state. Parallel trading firms were quickly created using the contacts and know-
how of the state companies. In this situation whereby the institutional umbrella was no longer in 
place but the network was still operating, capital was gradually drained from the state-owned 
venture into the newly established private companies. In some cases, the state-owned venture 
was simply re-registered, with the state no longer being part of the new company. Numerous 
firms of that kind were created in the early 1990’s, such as Balkanton Trading, Virad, General 
Trading, Stratos I, Crown Company International.523 Our anonymous communist party 
functionary does not deny the prevalence of such practices, but insists that they were in no way 
planned in advance or coordinated. Former prime-minister, Filip Dimitrov, similarly argues that 
such firms were not acting in an organized manner as much as they were all stimulated by 
various marginal characters in the West.524
Appropriation of state resources was in no way unique to Bulgaria. “This was happening 
everywhere in Eastern Europe,” argues President Zhelev.
 Dimitrov makes a valid argument in pointing to the 
fact that foreign partners facilitating the registration and operation of the newly created 
companies benefitted no less than their Bulgarian counterparts from the appropriation of state 
capital.  
525
                                                 
523 MANOLOVA, op.cit., p. 72. 
 Deletant gives an example of 
Securitate’s control of foreign trade, which placed its officers in a position of privilege in post-
524 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, Sofia, June 15th, 2007. 
525 Interview with Zhelyu Zhelev, t. 
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communist Romania.526 Securitate officers, with their specialist knowledge and their foreign 
contacts, he argues, triggered the creation of a veritable economic mafia. Using their privileged 
commercial expertise, they set up private import-export businesses and by exploiting their 
positions within the Foreign Trade Ministry and other government agencies cornered a 
significant part of Romania’s export activity. Former StB officers in the Czech Republic were 
similarly making use of years of connections, launching new careers, argues Williams.527
It is beyond doubt that structural opportunities for the export and appropriation of state 
capital existed not only in Bulgaria but in all former communist countries. Venelin Ganev offers 
a hard to match analysis of the effects of the disintegration of communist institutions and the 
various opportunities for appropriation of state resources created in the process.
 
528 It has been 
widely documented that many DS officers organized and participated in schemes for exporting 
and appropriating state capital. Assessing the scale of such occurrences, however, is much more 
difficult and remains subject to speculation. We can neither estimate the amount of exported and 
appropriated capital, nor the impact this had on transition processes and the economy in 
particular. The economic power of former security officers is more stuff of fable than fact, 
argues Williams in his assessment of the issue in the Czech context.529 Moreover, former 
security officers were far from the only ones engaging in such activities.  High-ranking party 
officials were often allying with former security officers in exploiting profitable niches, points 
Deletant.530
                                                 
526 WILLIAMS and DELETANT, op.cit., p. 217. 
 As our communist party functionary points, many people from the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations were involved in the export of capital. Georgi Pirinski, head of the 
527 Ibid., p. 61. 
528 See Venelin GANEV, Praying on the State, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2007. 
529 WILLIAMS and DELETANT, op.cit., p. 61. 
530 Ibid., p. 218. 
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ministry at the time, most likely knows all of them, our source further argues. Since by definition 
such schemes remained secretive and undocumented, it is unlikely that any hard evidence on the 
subject will be revealed in the future. As interviews with members of the Bulgarian political elite 
indicate, the answer one finds to the question of the DS involvement in the transformation of the 
economy is to a large degree subject to political bias. The export and appropriation of state 
capital was hardly the only reason for the failure of the economic reform in the early years of the 
transition. Lack of a robust economic reform policy, frequent change of governments, 
considerably lower amounts of foreign aid released to Bulgaria in comparison to the Central 
European countries are but few of the numerous factors contributing to Bulgaria’s difficult and 
prolonged economic transition. Given the limited data, the most that can be argued is that DS 
officers were undeniably in an advantageous position, possessing particular skills and access to 
networks and information. It should not come as a surprise that some of them managed to cash in 
on those assets and emerge as winners in the process of economic transformation.  
7.4 NEW OPENNESS: A MINI-LUSTRATION 
Estimating the role of DS in the political transformation of the country became more viable with 
the creation of the DS files commission.531
                                                 
531 For more information on the commission and the law, visit: www.comdos.bg 
 The Commission started its work in April 2007 and 
has thus far examined over 15,000 past and present high-ranking public office holders for 
affiliation with the DS, including members of parliament, ministers, the presidential 
administration, judges and members of state agencies and the national media. Within the first 
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year of the Commission’s work, past DS involvement has been confirmed for nearly 2,000 public 
servants, considering about 1,000 office holders have been exempt from investigation. Although 
the work of the Commission is not yet completed, its reports have provided priceless and 
previously unavailable information on the subject.  
The commission reports were matched against the elite rosters which revealed how many 
former DS agents there were in each parliament, government, supreme court or state agency; 
how many former DS agents there were in each party; what are the demographic statistics of 
former DS agents and how they differ from party to party. Statistical analysis was executed in 
order to test for any significant group differences. The questions addressed in analyzing the data 
are: Which party has had the highest number and percent of former DS agents? What branches of 
government have a high percent of former DS agents among its previous and current employees? 
What is the demographic profile of the average former DS agent? Is there any evidence of DS 
infiltration in the opposition? Finally, what do the answers to these questions tell us about the 
role of the DS in the political transformation of the country? Before presenting the results, 
however, I need to point to some important data characteristics and limitations.  
The commission reports are based on the DS files for the period 1947-1991, provided to 
the Commission by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A January 1990 decision of the interior 
ministry ordered the destruction of part of the DS files. Hristov argues that actual destruction of 
the files had started several months earlier and was only later justified by the official order.532
                                                 
532 HRISTOV, op.cit., p. 59. 
 It 
remains unknown how many and which files were destroyed, though it has been argued that they 
constituted a considerable part of the archive. Thus, the number of former DS operatives in the 
various branches of government is actually higher than what is reflected in the commission 
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reports. Furthermore, we can safely conclude that the destroyed files bore the names of those in 
power at the time, namely members of the Communist party, and not of members of the 
opposition. 
The remaining files made available to the commission contain the name, period of 
involvement and function (officer, agent, safe house host, etc.) of each operative, but they do not 
account for the mode of recruitment and the kind of information one provided. This makes 
evaluation of one’s role and level of involvement difficult. For example, a particular agent might 
have been “convinced” to collaborate through blackmailing or repression, lured with privileges 
such as travel abroad or career advancement, or simply volunteered one’s services. Similarly, 
one agent might have confined himself to providing trivial reports on insignificant anti-
government jokes, whereas another was relaying information entailing significant negative 
consequences for the observed target.  
This raises the bigger and highly debated question of what constitutes the category of DS 
operative – is it people who were employed by the DS or is it also people recruited as 
informants; is it people who were in regular contact with the DS or also those who were recruited 
for a one-time operation. The Commission reports include the name of any high-ranking public 
servant who at any point in time between 1944 and 1991 was involved with the DS in any 
particular function (officer, agent, or safe house host). Realizing that such classification 
constitutes a diverse and far from coherent category, it is nevertheless utilized in the study for 
lack of a better alternative. However broad a category, this classification makes a clear 
distinction between people who were employed by or cooperated with the DS and those who did 
not. 
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An important aspect, especially for the purpose of this study, of DS statutes is that DS 
officers were not allowed to recruit party members for collaborators and informers except in 
cases when no other reliable person could be secured. Metodiev argues that this restriction was 
frequently violated, especially by the 6th department in charge of investigating, among others, 
party members for anti-government activities.533
The Commission reports are not allowed to report on deceased public officials who have 
been involved with the DS. This is particularly noteworthy when examining the 1989 elite roster 
with an average year of birth of 1932. A significant percent of the people included in the 1989 
roster are deceased and, therefore, were not investigated for involvement with the DS. For 
reasons of national security, the commission is also not allowed to declare DS affiliation of 
persons who are actively involved with the security services at present. According to Alexenia 
Dimitrova, some people might have reactivated their involvement with the security services in 
order to prevent their past affiliation with DS from being revealed.
 Regardless, this restriction limited to a certain 
degree the number of communist party members being recruited.  
534
                                                 
533 METODIEV, op.cit., p. 187. 
 Considering the destruction 
of a part of the DS files in 1990, the exemption from investigation of deceased public servants 
and office holders currently active in the security service, we should expect the number of DS 
operatives in each parliament, government, ministry or state agency to be actually higher than 
what is indicated by the commission reports.  
534 Interview with Alexenia Dimitrova, Sofia, September 26, 2008. 
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7.5 THE DS AND ELITES IN THE TRANSITION: HOW CLOSE A CONNECTION? 
According to the 1989 elite roster, the last communist parliament has a surprisingly low number 
of former DS agents – only 5 members of parliament out of a total number of 400. In the same 
roster we find 7 ministers and deputy ministers to be confirmed as former DS agents. Looking at 
the entire population,535
By contrast, the Great National Assembly, elected in 1990 to craft a new democratic 
constitution, had a significantly higher percent of former DS agents. The 1990 roster indicates 
that to be 14.7% or 75 out of 511 office holders. The BSP has the highest number of former DS 
agents – 31 agents or 41.3%. The UDF has 15 former agents or two times less than the BSP. 
Most striking is the level of DS involvement among members of the MRF – 43.5% of its 
members of parliament are former DS agents.  
 we find 12 former agents out of the 535 names in the roster or a mere 
2.2%. This low number could be a function of the policy not to report on deceased public 
servants, but it could also be a result of DS policy to refrain from recruiting communist party 
members. In later parliaments, however, BCP’s successor the BSP holds the highest number and 
percent of former DS agents. Clearly, many of the confirmed former DS agents were communist 
party members. A plausible explanation for the low number of former DS agents in the 
communist parliament then may be the fact that during the communist regime, parliament had no 
actual political power and was under the direct control of the Communist Party. Infiltrating DS 
agents into parliament then would have served no purpose and would have proved a waste of 
resources.  
                                                 
535 Population is used as a statistical term, referring to the names in the elite rosters and not to the 
population of the country. 
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The 1991 roster indicates a slightly increased percentage of former DS agents among the 
total population – 16.2% or 78 out of 481. The number of former DS agents in the BSP, 
however, has decreased by half to 15 agents or 19.2%, closing the gap with the UDF which has 
11. The MRF again holds the highest percent of former DS agents among its members – 37% or 
10 out of 27. A figure meriting attention is the 41% of former agents who have no declared party 
affiliation, which indicates that they were occupying appointed rather than elected positions. 
Also interesting is fact that a quarter of the 25 independent members of parliament are former DS 
agents. 
In the 1995 BSP-dominated parliament, we observe the highest percentage of former DS 
agents for the time period being studied (19.5%) and an increase in the number of former DS 
agents from BSP (27 or 37% of all DS agents). MRF holds a record high in the percent of former 
agents among its members (53.3%).  Again we find over a quarter of independents to be former 
DS agents. Noteworthy is the considerably low number of former DS agents from the UDF – just 
3. Lastly, 31% of all former agents are on appointed positions with no official political 
affiliation. 
The 1997 UDF-controlled parliament has the lowest percent of former DS agents from all 
post-communist parliaments under examination – 12.9% or 49 out of 380. Both BSP and UDF 
have a low number of former agents, 7 and 5 respectively. Almost half of all MRF deputies 
continue to be former DS agents (7 out of 16). Over a third of all agents are on appointed 
positions. 
An analysis of the accumulative population from all elite rosters indicates that 33.4% of 
all former DS agents are BSP deputies. By contrast, only 11.8% are from the UDF. Almost half 
of all MRF deputies and a quarter of all independents are former DS agents (see fig. 6, p. 161). 
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45.4% of all former agents come from small agglomerates, which points to over-recruitment of 
agents from villages and small cities.  
An overall analysis of the data indicates that the 1997 UDF parliament has the lowest 
percent and total number of former DS agents among the examined post-communist parliaments. 
The BSP holds the highest number of former DS agents in every parliament, except for the 1997 
parliament where it ties with the MRF. The MRF consistently exemplifies the highest percent of 
former DS agents among its members. Ranging between 37% and 53.3%, former DS agents in 
the MRF are overwhelmingly more represented than in other parties. We notice a purge of 
former DS agents in the BSP after the fall of its Zhan Videnov government in late 1996.  In the 
UDF, we observe a declining percent of former DS agents. Small parties in each parliament are 
overrepresented in terms of former DS agents, who constitute a quarter of their deputies. This is 
also true of independent members of parliament.536
 
 In terms of demographics, the average 
former DS agent appears to be a BSP member of parliament from a small town or village. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
536 BSP has often used the practice of not nominating its candidate for a particular electoral region and 
supporting an independent candidate instead. Most notable is the example with the 1992 presidential 
election, where BSP did not nominate its own candidate for president and supported the independent 
Velko Vulkanov. This raises the question of how independent is a candidate supported by BSP. Although 
we can argue that many of the independent members of parliament were BSP sympathizers, we cannot 
equate independent MPs with BSP MPs. 
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Table 10. DS agents according to party affiliation and parliament 
 No party BSP UDF MRF BAPU* Indep. Total 
1989 
% within DS agent 
% within Party Affiliation 
% of total population 
4 
33.3% 
 
.7% 
7 
58.3% 
4.7% 
1.3% 
  1 
8.3% 
7.7% 
.2% 
 12 
 
 
2.2% 
1990 
% within DS agent 
% within Party Affiliation 
% of total population 
13 
17.3% 
 
2.5% 
31 
41.3% 
14.0% 
6.1% 
15 
20.0% 
10.1% 
2.9% 
10 
13.3% 
43.5% 
2.0% 
4 
5.3% 
25.0% 
.8% 
0 75 
 
 
14.7% 
1991 
% within DS agent 
% within Party Affiliation 
% of total population 
32 
41.0% 
 
6.7% 
15 
19.2% 
13.6% 
3.1% 
11 
14.1% 
6.9% 
2.3% 
10 
12.8% 
37.0% 
2.1% 
0 6 
7.7% 
25.0% 
1.2% 
78 
 
 
16.2% 
1995 
% within DS agent 
% within Party Affiliation 
% of total population 
23 
31.5% 
 
6.1% 
27 
37.0% 
17.6% 
7.2% 
3 
4.1% 
3.9% 
.8% 
8 
11.0% 
53.3% 
2.1% 
1 
1.4% 
5.6% 
.3% 
6 
8.2% 
27.3% 
1.6% 
73 
 
 
19.5% 
1997 
% within DS agent 
% within Party Affiliation 
% of total 
17 
34.7% 
 
4.5% 
7 
14.3% 
9.9% 
1.8% 
5 
10.2% 
3.1% 
1.3% 
7 
14.3% 
43.8% 
1.8% 
1 
2.0% 
11.1% 
.3% 
8 
16.3% 
25.8% 
2.1% 
49 
 
 
12.9% 
All parliaments 
% within DS agent 
% within Party Affiliation 
% of total 
86 
 
 
3.8% 
96 
33.4% 
10.0% 
4.2% 
34 
11.8% 
6.2% 
1.5% 
36 
12.5% 
43.9% 
1.6% 
8 
2.8% 
13.1% 
.4% 
20 
7.0% 
25.0% 
.9% 
287 
 
 
12.6% 
* Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union 
Further analysis of the commission reports gives an indication of the distribution of former DS 
agents among various public offices and branches of government. Most striking is the number of 
former DS agents in the various presidential administrations. From the 105 investigated office 
holders, 22 or over 20% were confirmed as former DS agents. One president (Parvanov – BSP) 
and one vice-president (Semerdzhiev – BSP) were also confirmed as former DS agents. There 
are 125 former DS agents among the ministers and deputy ministers in the various 
administrations, including one prime-minister (Videnov – BSP). These numbers point to a strong 
presence of former DS agents in the executive branch. The legislative branch has a significantly 
lower percent of former DS agents, with 142 members of parliament affiliated with DS out of the 
investigated 1,794. Former DS agents are also present in the judicial branch, with 3 out of 36 
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constitutional court judges and 16 out of 148 supreme court judges. We observe a strong 
presence of former DS agents in several state agencies: 21 out of 71 checked in the Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency, 11 out of 59 checked in the National Agency for Refugees, and 6 out of 24 
checked in the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad. Investigation of the national radio and television 
reports 10% former DS agents from the 1,200 people checked. Noteworthy is the fact that all 3 
directors of the Bulgarian National Television for the period March 1993 - December 1997 were 
former DS agents.537
Interview data provided additional information on the subject. On the question of the role 
of the DS in the transition, most respondents expressed very strong feelings. Both UDF and BSP 
members believe that UDF was infiltrated by DS agents and agree that DS officers exported and 
appropriated state capital in the early 1990’s. Although both sides agree on the role of DS in the 
political and economic processes of transformation, their view of the DS greatly differs. UDF 
respondents unanimously equate the DS with the BSP and view it as an extension of the BSP and 
an instrument for achieving its goals. According to that view, the UDF was infiltrated by the DS 
because BSP wanted to control the opposition. As cassation court judge and former UDF deputy 
Zlatka Ruseva argues, “UDF was intended to be an opposition created and controlled by the 
communists.”
 An overall analysis of the data indicates that former DS agents are present 
in all branches of government (10% at least in each branch), with the executive branch having 
significantly higher concentration of former DS agents.  
538
                                                 
537 This period encompasses the coalition government of Lyuben Berov, formed with an MRF mandate, 
and the socialist government of Zhan Videnov. 
 The export and appropriation of state capital by DS agents, in turn, is seen as 
part of BSP’s master plan to convert its political power into economic. “I am convinced that 
there was a scenario of how to execute the transformation from a state planned economy and 
538 Interview with Zlatka Ruseva, Sofia, February 7th, 2007. 
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socialism as a political system to a market economy and democracy,” argues former chair of 
parliament and long-time UDF deputy, Alexander Yordanov. “This encompasses two aspects – 
what should happen to the capital and in which hands it would end up. I think that in that respect 
the scenario intended for the capital to remain in the hands of members of the communist party, 
people related to the party or people from DS.”539
BSP respondents view the DS quite differently. In their terms the DS is seen as the evil 
outgrowth of the socialist system, acting upon self-interest and often in disagreement with the 
party’s objectives. To the socialists, UDF is discredited and accused of being a fabricated and 
non-genuine opposition because of the presence of DS agents among its members. According to 
former BSP deputy and historian, Dragomir Draganov, UDF was solidly backed up by DS 
agents.
  
540
Analysis of the interviews only confirms how divisive and politically biased is the debate 
on the role of the security services in the transition among the political elite. Not only are views 
on the subject a function of political affiliation and ideology, but they hardly rely on facts. This 
makes the need for hard evidence the more so pressing if we are ever to disentangle the issue. 
Most importantly, the interviews prove that empirically substantiated conclusions should rely 
primarily on analysis of the commission reports, however limited and imperfect such data may 
be.  
 In that view, UDF was the means for DS agents to gain access to political power. As to 
the export and appropriation of capital, BSP respondents unanimously declared it not to be 
intentional. DS agents simply had the skills and connections and were faced with an opportune 
moment. The economic failures of the transition are not a result of their actions but a result of 
UDF’s policies of privatization and restitution.  
                                                 
539 Interview with Alexander Yordanov, Sofia, April 10th, 2007. 
540 Interview with Dragomir Draganov, Sofia, February 19th, 2007. 
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7.6 THE DS AND TRANSITION OUTCOME 
This first attempt in assessing the role of the former security service in the transition processes 
clearly demonstrates that structural opportunities were present, allowing former security officers 
to influence and benefit from the political and economic transformations in the country. Without 
a doubt, DS officers were engaged in the export and appropriation of large amounts of state 
capital. The exact amount of capital and the effect this practice has had on the economic 
transition, however, are hard to evaluate. Empirical data proves that DS agents were 
unquestionably involved in the political transformations in the country. They were present in all 
political parties in parliament and all branches of government. Due to the characteristics and 
limitations of the data, our estimate of these numbers and percentages is most likely lower than 
actual figures. Although there was DS presence in UDF, we cannot confirm that the opposition 
was intentionally infiltrated in order to obstruct it from gaining political power. As previously 
discussed, the high percent of DS agents among MRF members of parliament is rather a function 
of DS practices of infiltrating the Turkish minority during the renaming process rather than 
purposeful infiltration of MRF’s parliamentary group. The high percent of DS agents in the 
executive branch clearly speaks of the ability of former DS agents to exercise political pressure. 
The statistical profile of the average DS agent points to a BSP member of parliament, which is 
logical considering the close link between the DS and the Communist party. 
Although this brief analysis has shed some light on the subject, the role of the security 
service in the Bulgarian transition is yet to be analyzed and evaluated as more data becomes 
available. BSP’s head of cadre policy argues that the role of DS in the transition is highly 
exaggerated. “Though DS officers were in position to exercise pressure,” he contends, “it is 
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crazy to think that they controlled economic and political processes in the country.”541
It is true that DS took active part in the events, but hardly with a certain mission. 
The DS was so widespread and had so profoundly penetrated society that there 
were many people connected to DS who spontaneously and naturally rejected 
further involvement with the DS. Such people were present on both sides. Many 
fell under the DS knife not because they were purposefully sent by the DS, but 
because the DS called them back and blackmailed them…. So that is where and 
how this scenario started. I am sure that there was infiltration as well. An 
organization of that sort would not miss to infiltrate its people, but I hardly think 
that this was the most important issue.
 Former 
UDF prime-minister, Filip Dimitrov, seems to agree with that view. He argues that there is some 
truth to both “myths” and at the same time cautions against assigning too much importance to the 
DS factor: 
542
In examining the outcome of the Bulgarian transition, we need to be careful in assigning too 
much weight to the DS factor. Appetite for conspiracy theories, very prevalent in post-
communist societies, has often distorted the understanding of the former security apparatus and 
its involvement in the transition processes. At the same time, we need to be mindful of the DS 
factor when analyzing specific aspects of the transition. For example, former DS officers actively 
participated in the privatization process and in the formation of the banking sector. Corruption 
practices, which continue to be a major problem for Bulgaria today, could often be traced to 
informal networks in which formal security officers are key figures. While DS involvement in 
such areas is noteworthy, DS influence over the transition process appears less significant when 
viewed in perspective. 
  
                                                 
541 Interview with Valeri Zheblyanov, Sofia, May 2nd, 2007. 
542 Interview with Filip Dimitrov, op.cit. 
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8.0  ELITE TRANSFORMATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON TRANSITION OUTCOME 
IN BULGARIA: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
I have argued that the combination of a strong and slowly reforming communist party, a weak 
and poorly organized opposition, and an opportunistic ethnic-based party has made for an elite 
transformation that bred political instability and produced slow and inconsistent reform efforts, 
proving extremely unfavorable to the outcome of the Bulgarian transition. The link between elite 
transformation and transition outcome has been firmly established in the already reviewed 
scholarly literature (Higley & Burton 2006, Higley & Lengyel 2000, Vachudova 2005). Elites 
bore the primary responsibility for shaping the postsocialist orders, Higley and Langyel have 
argued. Fragmented elites in Bulgaria failed to achieve broad elite consensus on reform policies 
(Higley & Lengyel 2000) and have produced unstable regimes (Higley & Burton 2006). A weak 
and divided opposition allowed unreconstructed communists to preserve their power and stall 
democratization efforts that threatened to undermine their position (Vachudova 2005). Until 
1997, Ganev argues, Bulgaria could be described as a textbook example of a country where 
democratically elected neocommunist elites, playing upon popular fears, rejected “capitalism,” 
“monetarist fiscal policies,” “the egotism of the market,” and “the neocolonialism of 
international financial and political institutions” in favor of a loosely defined “left alternative” 
that emphasized “gradual reform” at “low social costs,” increased bureaucratic regulation, and 
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the benefits of international “neutrality” – a strategy that brought nothing but immiseration and 
hopelessness to millions of Bulgarian citizens.543
The change of direction that came with the 1997 election was undeniable. UDF’s policy 
towards EU and NATO membership and rapid economic reform brought significant 
improvement in Bulgaria’s political and economic development. This much-delayed start of the 
reform, however, placed the country far behind other post-communist states.  
  
The nature of elite transformation throughout the 1990s has had lasting effects on the 
political and economic conditions in Bulgaria. Even though today the country is a full-fledged 
member of the EU and NATO, it continues to struggle with problems rooted in its troubled 
transition process. Endemic corruption has been a major and persistent issue for Bulgaria. 
Headlines in recent years often report blatant corruption in the disbursement of EU funds by 
parts of Bulgaria’s state administration. Failure to address the issue has caused the EU to freeze 
funding for several programs.544 Corruption and organized crime in Bulgaria are extensive and 
strongly intertwined with political parties, the civil service and state agencies, Vachudova 
holds.545
Although the collapse of communism created spectacular opportunities for corruption 
throughout the post-communist region, post-communist states exhibit substantial variation in 
levels of corruption. Vachudova attributes the variation to the quality of democracy and the 
extent of market liberalization since 1989. The nature of political competition during and after 
  
                                                 
543 GANEV Venelin, “Bulgaria’s Symphony of Hope,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4, (1997), pp. 125-
139, p. 124. 
544  Following investigations of misuse of European funds, the European Commission froze €140 million 
allocated to Bulgaria from the SAPARD program, €217 million from the ISPA program, and an 
undetermined amount from the PHARE program. „Съдбата на замразените пари по САПАРД ясна до 
дни,” Новинар, May 22, 2009; „Замразените пари от ЕС вече официално са спрени,” Дневник, July 
23, 2008. 
545 VACHUDOVA Milada Anna, “Corruption and Compliance in the EU’s Post-Communist Members and 
Candidates,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, 2009, pp. 43-62, p 44. 
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regime change, she argues, has had an impact on levels of corruption. Corruption has been 
highest in states where a narrow group of elites initially governed with little political competition 
from other political forces and with little effective scrutiny from the media and civic groups. In 
Bulgaria the unreformed communists faced some competition but were nevertheless able to 
benefit from extensive control of the state and the economy until 1997 (and beyond). Elites of 
different stripes installed themselves as powerful economic actors in a partially reformed 
economy defined by corrupt practices, Vachudova concludes.546
In order to illustrate the impact of elite transformation on the outcome of the Bulgarian 
transition, I focus on three policy areas: 1) the privatization process as an example of failed 
domestic policy due to the lack of elite consensus on reform; 2) foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and foreign aid as an example of the response of Western governments, organizations and 
business to the failed reform policies; and 3) Euro-Atlantic integration as an example of elite 
conflict over foreign policy.  
 
8.1 PRIVATIZATION 
In the East European context, privatization refers to transferring state-owned property and 
enterprises to various forms of private control. As such, privatization is a key element in 
dismantling the centrally planned socialist economy and constitutes the essence of economic 
transformation. Viewed as the core process in institutional and enterprise restructuring in Central 
                                                 
546 Ibid., p. 45. 
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and Eastern Europe, Michailova argues,547
Privatization progressed more slowly than was originally expected by the Central and 
East European countries, a consequence which Major attributes to political clashes that 
surrounded each privatization deal.  Nevertheless, argues Major in a 1999 study comparing 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland, a large part of the formerly state-owned assets was 
turned over to private owners in Estonia, Hungary and Poland, but the process was stumbling in 
Bulgaria.
 privatization became a focal point in the political 
agenda of the transition elites. In the first decade of the Bulgarian transition every new 
government was quick to declare itself the “government of privatization.” Nevertheless, Bulgaria 
lagged behind other East European countries in privatization efforts. An unstable political 
environment with frequent change of governments subjected economic development to 
continuous political struggles. The lack of consensus and continuity in economic reform led to 
frequent changes of policy, considerably delaying the privatization process. As a result, Bulgaria 
experimented with all privatization models applied in the East European context – a policy 
yielding limited results. 
548
                                                 
547 MICHAILOVA Snejina, “The Bulgarian Experience in the Privatization Process,” Eastern European 
Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3 (May – Jun., 1997), pp. 75-92, p. 75. 
 Better performance in Hungary and Poland could be attributed to economic reforms 
in the 1980s and an already emerging private sector. Estonia with no such prior experience, 
however, still ranked higher than Bulgaria, which, by contrast, introduced modest restructuring 
of the economy in 1988. Privatization and company restructuring in Bulgaria was slower 
compared to the other countries in the study. By 1997, the private sector share of GDP had 
548 MAJOR Ivan, “Company Restructuring after Privatization in a Comparative Perspective: Lesson sfrom 
Four Central and East European Countries,” in Ivan MAJOR (ed.), Privatization and Economic 
Performance in Central and Eastern Europe, Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp. 374-
390, p. 376. 
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reached 70% in Hungary and 60% in Poland and Estonia,549  but remained below 60% in 
Bulgaria throughout the 1990s (see table 11), reaching a comparable 63% in 2001.550
Table 11. Share of private sector in percent 
 
Share of: 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP 25.6 35.3 39.4 48.0 50.0 56.5 56.7 57.1 
Employment 17.2 28.3 36.0 40.7 42.0 52.6 58.6 63.3 
Source: Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI) 
Privatization in Bulgaria was launched in 1992 with the enactment of the Privatization Law by 
the UDF Dimitrov government. The law provided a comprehensive legal framework for the 
privatization process and included the Transformation and Privatization of State and Municipal 
Enterprises Act, the Privatization Funds Act, the Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment 
Companies Act, and the Restitution of Immovable Property Act.551
The introduction of a legal framework proved insufficient for the implementation of a 
consistent privatization policy. Although the major political players BSP and UDF agreed on the 
need for privatization as a tangible step toward a dynamic and modern market-based economy, 
Michailova argues, the concrete way in which the private sector should be developed remained a 
matter of dispute.
 The privatization process was 
overseen by the National Privatization Agency (NPA) established in 1992, the various ministries, 
and the municipal councils, each responsible for a specific part of privatization deals.  
552
                                                 
549 Ibid., p. 376. 
 A testimony to the degree of disagreement between the political actors are 
the 29 amendments to the 1992 Privatization Law, ultimately replaced in 2002 by the Law on 
550 Source: Bulgaria Country Brief, the World Bank Group, September 2002. Available online at: 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Countries/Bulgaria/A45D5FD0AC7BC27B85256C24006DA5
8F?OpenDocument 
551 For a description of these laws, visit the website of the Bulgarian Privatization Agency: 
www.priv.government.bg 
552 MICHAILOVA, op.cit., p. 77. 
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Privatization and Post-Privatization Control. Conflicting visions of privatization goals and 
strategies and the change of nine governments throughout the 1990s resulted in overlapping and 
contradicting legislation. With the desire of every governing majority to control the privatization 
process, privatization policy was changing direction with each consecutive government, 
eliminating any positive effects of previous efforts.  
Taking power in October 1991, the UDF embarked on a policy of rapid privatization 
focused on foreign-investment-driven cash privatization and restitution.553
The restitution process referred to restoring property rights to real estate (urban property 
and agricultural land) that was nationalized between 1946 and 1962 by the communist regime. 
Restitution of housing and commercial property was rather successful, accounting for 87% of all 
privatized municipal and state-owned entities for 1992 – 1996.
 Such policy was 
informed on the one hand by the shock therapy model calling for rapid privatization and 
advocated by the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, and, on the other hand, by UDF’s strong anti-communist position insisting on 
retribution for the harmful actions of the communist regime.  
554
                                                 
553 Cash privatization refers to direct purchasing of state assets by private actors. 
 Land restitution, by contrast, 
proved complex and costly, moving at a much slower pace and yielding controversial results. 
Poor records of pre-nationalization land ownership and competing claims posed major obstacles. 
Restitution of original parcels, as opposed to compensation with comparable parcels, led to the 
parcellation of collective farms among numerous owners. The break-up of the collective farm 
had devastating effects on large-scale agriculture. Newly privatized farms were small and 
unsuited for combine and tractor machinery, while new land-owners were ill-equipped, both 
financially and in terms of skills, to cultivate the land. The result was large areas of uncultivated 
554 Ibid, p. 81. 
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land, a return to manual farming, over 80% decline in agricultural investments, and drastic 
decrease in agricultural production. “The worst legacy of democracy in Bulgaria is the break-up 
of the land and the destruction of agriculture,” argues former BSP MP Krasimir Krastanov.555 
Krastanov voices a major complaint against the land reform and the Dimitrov government. 
Restitution was further criticized from the Left for causing a large gap in the income distribution. 
While the left wing acknowledges the legal validity of restitution, Popov and Todorova point out, 
a considerable majority of leftists doubt its moral relevance.556 It is popular to think, they further 
argue, that incomes from restitution are unethical gains. Despite such criticisms, Krassen 
Stanchev reports that 45% of Bulgarians favored restitution as indicated by public opinion polls 
in 1993 and 1994.557
Cash privatization failed to produce significant results before 1997 – 1998. Political 
instability and lack of consistent reform policy alienated potential foreign investors. During its 
prematurely-ended rule lasting barely over a year, UDF was unable to secure a single 
privatization deal. The first privatization deal was carried out in May 1993 by the Berov 
government, successor to UDF’s Dimitrov cabinet.
  
558 Although the Berov government declared 
a commitment to continuing the privatization policy of UDF and pronounced itself “the 
government of privatization,” privatization in 1993 – 1995 did not accelerate as expected.559
                                                 
555 Interview with Krasimir Krastanov, Sofia, April 26, 2007. 
 
Berov’s privatization efforts were blocked both by BSP and UDF, who each wanted exclusive 
556 POPOV Miroslav and Elka Todorova, “Privatization and Oligarchy in the Post-Communist Bulgaria,” in 
Demterius IARTIDIS and June Gary HOPPS, Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: Perspectives 
and Approaches, Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1998, pp. 185-193, p.189. 
557 STANCHEV Krassen, „Икономическият популизъм в България” (Economic Populism in Bulgaria), 
Политически изследвания, Vol 4, No. 2, 1994, pp. 143-155. 
558 In May 1993, the Belgian company Amylum acquired 81% of the Bulgarian corn processing plant for 
$20 million. See, Krassen STANCHEV, „Политическа икономия на раздържавяването в България” 
(Political Economy of Privatization in Bulgaria), in Анатомия на Прехода: Стопанската политика 
на България от 1989 до 2004 (Anatomy of the Transition: Economic Policy in Bulgaria 1989 – 2004), 
Sofia, Ciela, 2004, pp.121-140, p.132. 
559 MICHAILOVA, op.cit., p. 82. 
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control over the privatization process, argues former President Zhelev.560 Foreign investors, 
constituting the main group of potential buyers, entered the privatization process only after the 
introduction of a currency board in 1997, viewed as a guarantee to economic stability. Among 
the ten largest privatization deals between 1989 – 2004, accounting for 38% of privatization 
income and all of which involving a foreign investor, seven were carried out during or after 
1997.561
With BSP’s rise to power in 1995, privatization policy took a sharp turn. As Bojicic-
Dzelilovic and Bojkov point out, the BSP was openly against large-scale privatization.
 Thus, the immediate benefits expected from cash privatization were considerably 
delayed. 
562 Led by 
its concept of “gradual transition” at “low social cost,” the BSP favored 1) recovery of state-
owned enterprises (SOE) before scheduling them for privatization,563
The mass privatization program was launched in 1995, following the voucher-based 
model successfully applied in the Czech Republic. About 40% of SOE were scheduled for mass 
 and 2) a “social 
privatization” model based on equal income distribution. These preferences translated into a shift 
away from restitution (a three-year freeze was imposed) and cash privatization and towards mass 
privatization and manager-employee buy outs (MEBO). Such strategy was accompanied by 
continued subsidizing of losing state-owned enterprises, a practice which significantly 
contributed to the financial collapse of 1996 – 1997.  
                                                 
560 YORDANOV Ruslan,  „Д-р Желю Желев: СДС е виновен за провала на икономическия 
преход”(Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev: UDF is to Blame for the Failure of the Economic Transition), Tema, брой 3 
(119), 26-01 Февруари 2004. 
561 STANCHEV, 2004, op.cit., p.132. 
562 BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC Vesna and Victor BOJKOV, “Informality in Post-Communist Transition: 
Determinants and Consequences of the Privatization Process in Bulgaria,” Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 69-88, p. 74. 
563 Kliment Vuchev, minister of industry in BSP’s Videnov government, was adamantly opposed to 
privatization and the expansion of the private sector. Consequently, all privatization projects in his 
ministry were put on hold and, instead, a sustained effort to recentralize the industrial sector was 
undertaken. See, Venelin GANEV, Praying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989, 
Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2007. 
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privatization. The percentage of shares to be traded for investment depended on the size and 
profitability of the SOE, ranging between 25% for large and profitable enterprises and up to 90% 
for small enterprises.564 Government was to retain control of the remaining shares. Bulgarian 
citizens over 18 were entitled to a voucher book of 25,000 investment Bulgarian leva (BGL), 
purchasable for 500 BGL. Vouchers were transferrable to relatives and exchangeable for 
privatization-fund shares. A total of 81 privatization funds were established, attracting 80% of all 
purchased vouchers.565
Mass privatization was conducted in two waves – the first wave concluded with the fall 
of BSP’s Videnov government in 1997, the second was initiated in 1999 during the second UDF 
rule of Kostov. Although the UDF initially opposed mass privatization, once in power, it was 
pressed to carry on and conclude the process. Kostov introduced changes to the program that 
were intended to speed up the process. For example, 5% of all SOE were offered for investment, 
privatization funds were excluded from the process, vouchers were no longer transferable, and 
share prices were no longer fixed. Despite such modifications, mass privatization produced 
limited results. Between the two waves, a total of 15% of state assets were privatized through 
mass privatization. Only 3 million of the eligible 6.5 million Bulgarians participated in the 
process, 2.5 million of whom transferred their vouchers to privatization funds during the first 
  Foreign investors were able to participate in the mass privatization 
program by establishing privatization funds. The mass privatization program was coordinated by 
the newly established Mass Privatization Center, assisted and advised by the PHARE-European 
Union Consortium.  
                                                 
564 MICHAILOVA, op.cit., p. 86. 
565 STANCHEV, op.cit., p. 135. The number of privatization funds in Bulgaria is considerably lower than in 
the Czech Republic – 450, and Russia – 600. See, MICHAILOVA, op.cit., p. 90. 
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wave.566 Michailova explains the low participation rate by lack of information on SOEs 
scheduled for privatization, as well as skepticism on the part of the population who viewed the 
program as a way for the state to get rid of unprofitable enterprises.567
Management-Employee Buy Outs (MEBO) refers to partial transfer of ownership of 
SOEs to managers and employees, through credit against company assets and future profits and 
through sales of preferentially priced shares (in Bulgaria, 20% of shares were offered at 50% 
discount). MEBO privatization was initiated in 1994 with the partial buy out of Bulgaria’s 
largest international trade company, Chimimport AD.
 Applying the Czech 
model of mass privatization to the Bulgarian context did not produce the same results. 
568 By the beginning of 1996, a total of 203 
MEBO deals were concluded. Although this method of privatization was favored primarily by 
the BSP, it gained prominence after 1997 when the UDF majority introduced key amendments to 
the Privatization Act. The UDF enabled, 1) MEBO participation for newly appointed managers, 
2) the creation of a manager-employee associations by 20% of the company employees (not 50% 
as previously stipulated), and, 3) a range of payment options, including installment plans. MEBO 
privatization constituted 73% of all sales in 1998 and almost 50% in 1999. 569
MEBO favored employees to a greater extent than any other type of privatization. 
Nevertheless, argues Michailova, it is mainly the managers that gained control over the 
privatized firms.
   
570
                                                 
566 Ibid., p. 133. 
 Holding key positions, managers benefited most from preferential payment 
567 MICHAILOVA, op.cit., pp. 87-88. 
568 58.7% of the company’s shares were transferred to the managers and employees of the company, using 
credit guaranteed by company assets and future profits. 20% of the shares were floated at a preferential 
price; 21.3% remained state-owned. See, Marin MARINOV and Svetla MARINOVA, “Privatization and 
Foreign Direct Investment in Bulgaria: Present Characteristics and Future Trends,” Post-Communist 
Economies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1997, pp. 101-116, p. 106. 
569 BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC and BOJKOV, op.cit., p. 80. 
570 MICHAILOVA, op.cit., p. 83. Hilary Appel reports a similar outcome in Russian MEBO privatization. 
“Owing to the transferability of worker shares and vouchers and the maneuvering of managerial and 
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conditions and loans against company’s assets and future revenues. This made them desirable 
partners for hidden investors who wished to make use of the preferential prices. MEBO 
disproportionately privileged company insiders, particularly those in managerial positions, which 
created favorable conditions for corrupt practices. The political elite was part and parcel of the 
process, argue Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Bojkov, with MPs of various parties often playing a key 
role in supporting MEBO deals and serving private economic interests.571
Corruption was inherent to the privatization process throughout the 1990s and beyond. 
As Brown argues, privatization was one of the broadest avenues to corruption.
 
572 In addition to 
MEBO, cash privatization, and mass privatization, which offered ample opportunities for 
appropriating state assets, SOEs were often subjected to the so-called hidden (a.k.a. spontaneous) 
privatization. Hidden privatization refers to the various ways of asset stripping though joint 
ventures,573 exit-entrance capture,574 debt purchase and capital increase,575 under-valuation and 
more (Alexandrova 1998, Bojicic-Dzelilovc & Bojkov 2005, Jones & Rock 1994, Marinov & 
Marinova 1997, Michailova 1997, Stanchev 2004). Such practices accounted for an estimated 
100 billion BGL of state asset stripping in the first half of the 1990s.576
                                                                                                                                                             
industrial elites, worker ownership declined somewhat over time while managerial control over 
enterprises soared.” Hilary APPEL, “The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: The Case 
of Privatization,” World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Jul., 2000), pp. 520-549, p. 534. 
 Hidden privatization 
necessarily involved political protection. It was practiced by communist leaders in the late 1980s, 
571 BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC and BOJKOV, op.cit., p. 80. 
572 BROWN, 2001, op.cit., p. 98. 
573 Joint venture asset-stripping refers to cases in which a state-owned and a private company enter into a 
contract for joint commercial activity, whereby the private company gradually siphons the profits from the 
joint venture. 
574 Exit-entrance capture refers to setting up a private company which becomes exclusive supplier for the 
SOE, selling production materials at above market value, and exclusive distributor, purchasing the final 
product at below market value. Thus, with the active participation of the manager, the SOE is “captured” 
at the entrance and exit. 
575 Debt purchase and capital increase involves purchasing the debt of a SOE and consequently increasing 
the capital, which increases the shares of the debt-purchaser. 
576 MARINOV and MARINOVA, op.cit., p. 107. 
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argues Alexandrova,577and it continued throughout 1990’s as new elites became involved as 
well. Former security officers were often key players in the process. The Orion circle is one of 
the many examples of privatization-driven corruption involving political elites and former 
security officers. Securing the protection of the Videnov government, several former security 
officers, who became known as the Orion circle, managed to take advantage of the mass 
privatization program and siphon money from agricultural cooperatives, stripping farmers of all 
of their assets.578
Privatization is by definition a political process as well as an economic one. 
Policymakers, Appel points out, could design privatization programs in ways that hold different 
distributional consequences for society and that benefit certain groups over others, i.e. one elite 
group over another, domestic investors over foreigner investors, managers over labor, etc.
 Such schemes were all too common and were a major reason for discrediting 
the elites of the transition as indicated by the poor electoral performance in 2001 of both the 
UDF and the BSP (18.18% and 17.15% respectively).  
579 
Political considerations were particularly pronounced in the Bulgarian privatization process. As 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Bojkov argue, privatization was subjected to the conflicting interests of 
various political actors who used the process as an instrument for enhancing their political and 
economic standing.580
                                                 
577 ALEXANDROVA Svetlana, “The Privatization Process in Bulgaria,” in Demetrius S. IATRIDIS and 
June Gary HOPPS (eds.), Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. Perspectives and Approaches, 
Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1998, pp.134-143, p. 41. 
 Consequently, the privatization process in Bulgaria failed to become the 
578 The Orion circle enjoyed Videnov’s protection because it had organized several pre-electoral visits for 
him in European counties. The most ingenious move of the circle was founding the Bulgarian Agricultural 
and Industrial Bank (BAIB) with money procured from the State Savings Bank. BAIB collaborated with 
the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives in Bulgaria (UACB) in pooling together privatization vouchers as 
well as any other assets from members of the agricultural cooperatives. Money deposited to UACB, 
intended for acquiring shares in agricultural sector SOEs, where channeled to BAIB and consequently 
disappeared. They farmers lost everything, while the key figures from the Orion circle evaded prosecution 
by escaping to South Africa. See Venelin GANEV, 2001, op.cit., 78. 
579 APPEL, op.cit., p. 521. 
580 BOJICIC-DZELILOVC and BOJKOV, op.cit., p. 73. 
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driver of economic transition producing instead overtly negative political and social 
consequences. The way privatization was carried out in Bulgaria undermined the legitimacy of 
post-communist governing institutions and eroded the nascent trust in the post-communist 
political elite. The 2001 election was in fact a vote against the transition elites and the extremely 
politicized and corruption-ridden reform process. 
8.2 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) AND FOREIGN AID 
Privatization is closely linked to the FDI flow in post-communist countries (Bradshaw 2005, 
Michailova 1997). The timing and openness of the privatization process, Bradshaw argues, is a 
crucial factor in explaining the dynamics and geography of FDI in Central and Eastern 
Europe.581 Another paramount factor in considering FDI, pointed out by Nowak and Steagall, is 
the political stability of the potential recipient country.582 FDI has not assisted in the early 
transition, Bradshaw contends, but it has come as the proof of the success of reform rather than 
as a catalyst of growth.583
                                                 
581 BRADWHAW Michael, “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Transformation in Central and 
Eastern Europe,” in David TURNOCK (ed.), Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Development in 
East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Burlington, VT, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, 
pp. 3-19, p. 9. 
 Hence, countries that were able to institute sound economic reform 
policies with rapid privatization and exhibited a politically stable environment witnessed a 
drastically higher level of FDI than countries where the consolidation of democracy was 
obstructed and economic reform was slow.  
582 NOWAK Alojzi and Jeff STEAGALL, “Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
Period 1990-2000: Patterns and Consequences,” in Svetlana MARINOVA and Marin MARINOV, Foreign 
Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, Burlington, VT, Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998, 
pp. 59-92, p. 61. 
583 BRADSHAW, op.cit., p. 3. 
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Bulgaria’s frequent change of governments and stumbling privatization process 
throughout the 1990s had a devastating effect on the country’s ability to attract FDI. External 
factors such as the Yugoslav Wars further aggravated the problem of Bulgaria’s limited 
attractiveness. Between 1990-1993, Bulgaria received about 1% of the total FDI flow to former 
communist countries.584 By mid-1996, the country had the lowest level of FDI per capita of all 
CEE countries ($69 per capita).585 In the first half of the 1990s, Bulgaria registered $57 million 
in FDI – a drastically lower amount than Poland’s $1,396 million, Hungary’s $1,863 million or 
the Czech Republic’s $947 million (see table 12). Although FDI increased in the second half of 
the 1990s, FDI per capita for 1997-2001 remained at a low $86.9, higher only than Romania’s 
$57.5.586 The majority of FDI in Bulgaria (65%) were small projects of less than $1,000.587
In an attempt to address the lack of FDI in the early years of the transition, the Videnov 
government founded the Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency (BFIA) in April 1995, which was 
to provide guidance and assistance to potential investors. Combined with a slowdown in market 
reform and privatization, this initiative failed to stimulate FDI growth. It was not until the 
election of the UDF government in 1997 and the consistent reform policies that ensued that FDI 
registered a marked increase. 
 
Overall, Bulgaria did not experience any substantial capital flow throughout the 1989-1999 
period. FDI inflow in Bulgaria was considerably lower than that of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, who were the major recipients of FDI in the region. 
 
                                                 
584 CARTER Francis, “Foreign Direct Investment in Bulgaria: The First Ten Years,” in David TURNOCK, 
op.cit., pp. 209-221, p. 210. 
585 MIHOV Ilian, “The Economic Transition in Bulgaria 1989-1999,” INSEAD Working Paper No. 
1999/60/EPS, September 1999, p. 11. 
586 BRADSHAW, op.cit., p. 15. 
587 MIHOV, op.cit., p. 11. 
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Table 12. FDI Inflows into Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-2001 ($mln) 
 1990-1995 
average 
1996-2001 
average 
Albania 42 91 
Belarus 12 227 
Bosnia &Herzegovina - 84 
Bulgaria 57 610 
Croatia 120 1,048 
Czech Republic 947 3,779 
Estonia 165 371 
Hungary 1,863 2,081 
Latvia 116 370 
Lithuania 36 457 
Macedonia 17 148 
Moldova 31 84 
Poland 1,396 6,869 
Romania 162 1,119 
Russia 1,167 3,128 
Serbia & Montenegro 82 231 
Slovakia 147 849 
Slovenia 100 269 
Ukraine 206 625 
Total 6,666* 22,440 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2002) 
*excludes Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 
Thus, in 2000, FDI reached $1,002 million. FDI to Bulgaria came primarily from EU member 
states and was directed mainly to the industrial sector. Bulgaria’s leading FDI countries between 
1992-1998 were Belgium and Germany with 38.1% of the total FDI.588
 
 Industry accounted for 
over half of FDI, with chemical, electronics and engineering companies attracting the chunk of 
investments (see table 13). 
 
                                                 
588 CARTER, op. cit., p. 216. 
A currency board agreement and an 
accelerated privatization policy led to 
macro-stimulation of the economy 
which in turn contributed to political 
stability. The UDF parliament adopted 
the Foreign Investment Act in October 
1997, which granted equal rights to 
foreign investors. A public-sector 
investment program was also 
implemented in 1998-2001. Such 
measures combined with improved 
economic and political conditions, 
boosted FDI and created conditions for 
sustainable economic growth. 
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 Table 13. Sectoral breakdown of FDI in Bulgaria, 1992-1998 
Sector FDI $mln Percent Companies Percent 
Industry 1,034.2 54.1 720 6.9 
Trade 362.3 19.0 8,270 79.2 
Finance 205.3 10.7 160 1.5 
Tourism 101.5 5.3 97 0.9 
Transport 89.0 4.7 199 1.9 
Telecoms 32.6 1.7 25 0.2 
Construction 17.9 0.9 113 1.1 
Agriculture 6.1 0.3 72 0.7 
Others 60.5 3.2 787 7.5 
Total 1,909.7 100.0 10,443 100.0 
 
Political instability and slow economic reform also had a negative impact on the amount of 
foreign aid589 disbursed to Bulgaria. The World Bank’s lending strategy towards Bulgaria was 
directly linked to political and economic conditions in the country. As the 2002 World Bank 
evaluation report stated, “The frequent change in governments, combined with a flagging interest 
in reforms on the part of successive governments, and expectations of financial crises, led the 
Bank to take an appropriately cautious approach in its own assistance during the mid-1990s, 
which translated into a modest lending program, focused on investments and keeping on hold a 
major adjustment loan.”590 After 1997, once the UDF government began implementing reforms, 
the Bank continued to exercise caution and only gradually launched a full lending program. By 
2002, $1.5 billion in loans were approved to Bulgaria. By comparison, the Czech Republic 
received $438 million in official aid just in 2000.591
                                                 
589 Foreign aid refers both to grants and loans from foreign governments and international organizations. 
 USAID aid to Bulgaria was similarly tied to 
590 World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department (OED) Reach, January 7, 2002. 
591 Source: World Development Indicators database, September 2009. 
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political and economic developments, reaching its highest point of $60 million in 1991 when 
prospects of reform were favorable, but decreasing to under $40 million between 1992-1997.592
EU funding for Bulgaria and PHARE
 
593 assistance in particular was also modest in 
comparison to other post-communist countries. Bulgaria became eligible for PHARE assistance 
as early as 1990 and was allocated a total of €754.5 million for the period up to 1998.594 By 
contrast, the PHARE budget for the Czech Republic for the period 1989-2001, was over €15 
billion, €841 million of which have been absorbed.595
                                                 
592 “USAID in Bulgaria 1990-2007: Seventeen Years Hand in Hand,” USAID/Bulgaria, 2007, p. 10. 
 PHARE as well as other foreign aid 
allocations were based on GDP and population, taking into account progress in implementing 
reforms, capacity to absorb funds, and past performance. Because of such conditionalities, 
rapidly reforming economies such as the Czech Republic and Poland received more official 
assistance (relative to their population and GDP) than countries like Bulgaria or Romania. The 
low amount of FDI and foreign aid to Bulgaria throughout the 1990s is directly linked to the 
country’s unstable political climate and failure to implement robust economic reform. 
593 The PHAPRE program was launched in 1989 by the European Community (now the EU) to assist post-
communist economic and social reform in Poland and Hungary. The abbreviation stands for Pologne et 
Hongrie Aide de la Reconstruction Economique, also meaning “lighthouse” in French. The program was 
gradually extended to other East European countries including Bulgaria. 
594 NIKOLOVA Pavlina, “The Implementation of Phare, Ispa and Sapard in Bulgaria,” a paper presented at 
the 2007 Workshop: A Roadmap for the Western-Balkans: Using IPA and other EU Funds to Accelerate 
Convergence and Integration, Brussels, October 2007. 
595 “An Introduction to EU-Financed Programmes in the Czech Republic,” Delegation of the European 
Commission to the Czech Republic, February 2002. 
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8.3 EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP 
Europe and the United States were enthusiastic about the changes taking place in Eastern 
Europe. In support of democratization efforts, the European Community (EC)596
In Bulgaria, throughout the 1990’s there was no political will and consensus among the 
various groups in the political elite to pursue consistent policy towards integration into the EU 
and NATO. Known as the Soviet’s most trusted ally, Bulgaria was heavily dependent on the 
Soviet Union. In addition to being Bulgaria’s main  trade partner, the Soviet Union was viewed 
as guarantor of Bulgaria’s security and territorial integrity, particularly vis a vis NATO-member 
and former belligerent, Turkey. The new post-communist realities redefined the Soviet position 
of power in the region, resulting in an irreconcilable split among the Bulgarian elite as to the 
, the United 
States, and individual European governments immediately offered aid in the form of technical 
and financial assistance. Such aid was rather modest and ill-suited according to the expectations 
of East European countries (Wedel 2001). Furthermore, both Europe and the United States were 
initially noncommittal to integrating these countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures. With the 
disbanding of the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, former communist countries were 
facing uncertainty and were in search of a new foreign policy orientation. While integration in 
the Euro-Atlantic structures was a logical choice for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, who 
demanded guarantees against a potential threat from Russia/USSR, such choice was not 
straightforward for Bulgaria. Thus, there was a wide range in the level of commitment and 
efforts of East European governments in seeking EU and NATO integration.  
                                                 
596 The European Community (EC) was the predecessor to the European Union. Established in 1967, the 
EC extended earlier cooperation within the European Coal and Steel Community and the European 
Economic Community. With the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EC was transformed into the EU. 
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country’s foreign policy orientation. BSP governments considered preserving strong ties with 
Russia/USSR a priority, Barany points out, whereas UDF governments pursued an unequivocally 
pro-Western foreign policy the key objective of which was membership in NATO and the EU.597 
The frequent change of governments between 1990-1997 translated into sharp turns in Bulgaria’s 
foreign policy, which oscillated between pro-Russian and pro-Western orientations. It was not 
until the collapse of the BSP Videnov government in late 1996 and its sobering experience in 
dealing with Yeltsin’s Russia that a consensus among the Bulgarian political elite started to 
emerge.598
The question of EU membership was far less contentious than integration into NATO. 
Since the BSP was in favor of an approach of a “dual foreign policy” that combines the interests 
of Europe and Russia, Linden argues, neither the BSP nor the UDF adopted a hostile stance to 
the country’s continued negotiations for EU membership.
 These “seven lost years” in Bulgaria’s foreign policy placed the country considerably 
behind in the process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Consequently, Bulgaria 
was not part of the first wave of expansion of NATO or the EU. 
599
                                                 
597 BARANY Zoltan, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies, New York, NY, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p. 187. 
 Economic ties between Bulgaria and 
the EC were established in May 1990, with the signature of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement. 
Bulgaria was then also included in the PHARE program. In December 1990, a resolution of the 
BSP-dominated Grand National Assembly declared Bulgaria’s will to become a member of the 
EC. A more comprehensive Association Agreement with the EC was signed in March 1993 by 
the Berov government. The Europe Agreement, Noutcheva and Bechev recount, stated explicitly 
the goal for EC membership and the support of the EC for the efforts to reach the democratic and 
598 Videnov hoped to solve the declining economic situation by securing favorable import deals with 
Russia. However, he failed to negotiate low-priced gas from Russia as well as any other preferentially 
priced deals. See, „Синият период на договорите с Русия за пренос на газ,”24 chasa, January 24, 2008. 
599 LINDEN Ronald H., “Twin Peaks: Romania and Bulgarian Between the EU and the United States,” 
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2004, p. 186. 
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economic standards that would make membership possible.600
NATO membership was a major point of disagreement among the Bulgarian political 
elite throughout the 1990s. As Linden points out, the BSP and its partners made it very clear that 
they were suspicious of NATO and wary of what its expansion would mean for the security of 
Bulgaria.
 In December 1995, the Videnov 
government submitted a formal application for membership in the European Union. The 
economic crisis and public unrest brought about by the Videnov rule, however, seriously harmed 
Bulgaria’s prospects of membership. Consequently, Bulgaria was not invited for negotiation 
talks until February 2000, when the European Commission recognized the incremental 
improvement of the economic situation in Bulgaria that ensued with UDF’s reform policies. This 
much-delayed progress was not sufficient to gain Bulgaria inclusion in the 2004 wave of 
enlargement, when eight post-communist countries joined the EU. Bulgaria, along with 
Romania, signed the EU Accession Treaty in April 2005 and became an EU member on January 
1, 2007.  
601 The socialists viewed NATO in strictly geostrategic terms, Linden argues, and 
opposed risking relationships with Russia as well as reforming the arm forces (which entailed 
reducing troops and converting from Soviet to NATO arsenal).602 By contrast, the UDF 
embraced the value orientation of the alliance and viewed NATO membership as a step towards 
EU membership.603
                                                 
600 NOUTCHEVA Gergana and Dimitar BECHEV, “The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romania’s 
Accession to the EU,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 114-144, p. 118. 
 In 2000, the BSP changed its position and acknowledged the need for NATO 
membership. Nevertheless hostility within the socialist coalition persisted. BSP ideologues 
601 LINDEN Ronald H., “Security and Identity in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, NATO, and the War in 
Kosovo,” in Ronald H. LINDEN (ed.), Norms and Nannies. The Impact of International Organizations 
on the Central and East European States, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Groups, 2002, 
pp. 179-201, p. 186. 
602 Ibid., p. 194. 
603 “Zhelev called NATO membership a “ticket” for the EU,” Duma, May 30, 1995.  
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remained staunchly anti-western, Ganev contends, and never missed the chance to vent 
animosity toward NATO.604
The first and second BSP governments did not easily recognize the passing of an era, 
Gallagher argues. In 1990, Lyuben Gotzev, foreign minister in the 1
 This profound disagreement among the political elite resulted in an 
inconsistent and erratic foreign policy that diminished Bulgaria’s international standing. 
st and 2nd Lukanov 
governments, believed the Warsaw pact would survive at least another 2-3 years.605 The Popov 
cabinet was similarly confused as to the direction of the country’s foreign policy. Popov’s 
foreign minister, Viktor Valkov, attempted to renew the old Soviet-Bulgarian Pact of 
Cooperation set to expire in 1991. His initiative was actively supported by the BSP.606 An outcry 
in the media and opposition from President Zhelev and the UDF prevented the renewing of the 
contract.607
With UDF’s Dimitrov government, Bulgaria’s foreign policy shifted to the West. 
Dimitrov immediately declared the country’s desire to participate in NATO and other peace and 
democracy-promoting structures.
  
608 He reaffirmed his position by recognizing the independence 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia609
                                                 
604 Ganev 1997, op.cit., p. 134. 
 and applying for membership 
605 GALLAGHER Tom, “Balkan But Different: Romania and Bulgaria’s Contrasting Paths to NATO 
Membership 1994-2002,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2004, 
pp. 1-19, p. 187. 
606 “Lilov considers we need to speed up the preparation of a new Soviet-Bulgarian agreement,” Duma, 
May 9, 1991. 
607 “UDF is against continuation of the old USSR-Bulgaria pact of cooperation and against signing a new 
pact for military cooperation which would be against the Helsinki process,” Democraziya, May 31, 1991. 
“Zhelev: NATO is promising security guarantees. The old contract with USSR will not be renewed,” 
Democraziya, June 15, 1991. 
608 “Sofia insists on guarantees from NATO – Filip Dimitrov on his first U.S. visit states that Bulgaria 
wants to be part of the West and participate in NATO and other structure promoting peace and 
democracy,” Democraziya, March 14, 1992. 
609 “Bulgaria recognized Macedonia – president Zhelev is convinced that all political forces will support 
the government’s decision,” “The government recognizes the independence of four former Yugoslav 
republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Socialists in parliament are not 
applauding the recognition of Macedonia,” Democraziya, January 16, 1992. 
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to the Council of Europe. The 1992 acceptance to the Council marked Bulgaria’s “return to 
Europe.”610 Bulgaria’s new orientation, continued also by the Berov government, was welcomed 
by the West. The Yugoslav conflict rendered Bulgaria an important ally that could promote 
stable environment and support NATO’s peacekeeping mission. Hence, in 1994 Bulgaria was 
invited to join the West European Union (WEU) and NATO’s Partnership for Peace.611
BSP’s return to power in late 1994 meant another sharp turn in Bulgaria’s foreign policy. 
BSP’s security doctrine called for a “foreign policy that does not harm our long-standing 
relationships with Russia, the Russian federation and East European partners” and  proposed 
“working with UN and OSCE.”
 
612 The Videnov government took on the immediate task of 
improving relations with Russia.613 Improvement was indeed needed, as the BSP, which failed to 
condemn the hard-liner’s August 1991 coup against Gorbachev and sided with the anti-Yeltsin 
insurgents in 1993, did not have many friends in Yeltsin’s Russia. Videnov and Russian prime 
minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, negotiated trade agreements as well as a supply of Russian gas, 
oil, and military equipment.614 Videnov did not take any steps to promote collaboration with 
NATO. At that time, Bulgaria was not contributing to peacekeeping operations in former 
Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian military had not established links with NATO.615
                                                 
610 “Bulgaria returned to the European family – the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
unanimously voted for admitting Bulgaria to membership,” Democraziya, May 6, 1992. 
 According to 
Barany, the BSP justified its opposition to NATO with the prospects of totally changed relations 
611 The Partnership for Peace was launched in January 1994. The program aimed at creating trust and 
establishing collaboration between NATO and the post-communist states. 
612 “National Security Doctrine,” Duma, August 28, 1993. 
613 “Bulgaria-Russia: big warm-up – liberalization of trade relations is equally important to both countries 
– the meeting of the inter-governmental commission on trade liberalization concluded yesterday,” Duma, 
May 18, 1995. 
614 “We are awaiting gas, petrol and low custom duties from Russia: Viktor Chernomyrdin is in the country 
with a powerful business team,” Duma, May 19, 1995. “We signed 15 agreements with Russia: a joint 
Bulgarian-Russian energy venture is created,” Duma, May 20, 1995. “Bulgaria and Russia agreed on the 
pipeline: “Neftochim” and “Rossneft” form a joint venture – negotiations for the Burgas-Alexandopolis 
pipeline should be underway in October,” Duma, September 19, 1995. 
615 GALLAGHER, op. cit., p. 6. 
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with Russia, involvement in conflicts with which Bulgaria had nothing to do, threats to its non-
nuclear status, and additional financial burden.616 As a reward for not pursuing NATO 
membership, Barany argues, Russia gave 100 armored vehicles to Sofia in 1996.617
The Bulgarian-Russian nexus came to an end with the fall of the Videnov government. 
After the UDF took power in 1997, Bulgarian foreign policy was completely reoriented toward 
the West. In 1998, the UDF presented its new security concept which declared EU and NATO 
membership main priorities. The Kostov government supported NATO’s military involvement in 
former Yugoslavia, despite strong public opposition. In 1999, Bulgaria denied Russia an air 
corridor and instead deployed forces with KFOR in Kosovo. BSP’s position on NATO 
membership remained overwhelmingly negative. In April 1997, BSP leader Georgi Pirinksi said 
that his party opposed joining NATO but was in favor of EU membership.
 
618 Similarly among 
the population, the level of support for joining NATO was consistently lower than for joining the 
EU, Linden states.619
                                                 
616 BARANY, 2003, op.cit., p. 193. 
 Nevertheless, the Kostov government avidly pursued integration into 
NATO, tying it to irreversible democratic changes. With its new leader and current president 
Georgi Parvanov, the BSP reconsidered its position and endorsed NATO membership in 2000. 
This much delayed consensus among the political elite ultimately led to Bulgaria’s acceptance to 
NATO in 2004. 
617 Ibid., 190. 
618 Ibid., p. 195. 
619 LINDEN, 2004, op.cit., p.51. 
  293 
8.4 ASSESSING THE ELITE FACTOR 
It is a well established fact that in comparison to other East European countries, Bulgaria lagged 
behind in every aspect of the reform process. In that respect, elite change is but one of the factors 
accounting for Bulgaria’s poor performance. In late 1980’s Bulgaria was extremely ill-equipped 
for a transition to market economy. Unlike Hungary, where small entrepreneurs were active even 
under the communist regime, or Poland, where significant part of the land remained in private 
hands, Bulgaria strictly followed the model of state-planned/state-owned economy. Modest 
changes to this model were introduced in 1987 with Act 56, which envisioned transforming 
state-owned enterprises into shareholder companies and provided for the establishment of small 
private firms. While allowing for partial liberalization in the economy, argues Martin Ivanov, 
Act 56 did not dare cross into the ideologically condemned field of market economy.620
In assessing the variance of transition outcomes, it is important to be aware that despite 
the common communist past, East European countries had different start to democratization and 
market-oriented reform. In these terms, Bulgaria was disadvantaged both economically and 
politically. The lack of market-oriented economic reform before 1989 is closely related to 
political factors, namely the absence of a strong reformist wing within the communist party and 
 Thus, on 
the eve of the 1989 revolutions, the state-planned economy model in Bulgaria was almost intact, 
there was no class of small entrepreneurs, and the managerial nomenklatura had limited 
understanding of market principles. The tremendous difficulties Bulgaria experienced in its 
transition to market economy were therefore to be expected.  
                                                 
620 Martin IVANOV, “Act 56: the End of a System,” Business Magazine, April 8, 2008, available online: 
http://www.bm-businessmagazine.bg/bg/articles/%D0%A3%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7-56:-%D0%9A% 
D1%80%D0%B0%D1%8F%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B0-
%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0/525/index.html 
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the non-existence of organized dissidence. Hence, even after accounting for other factors such as 
economic conditions, elite transformation remains a major explanatory variable. 
In the East European context, slow and unproductive reform policy is often associated 
with dominance of the former communist elite. While the Bulgarian and Romanian experience 
certainly confirm this argument, the case of Hungary puts into question such assumptions. When 
the Hungarian reformed communists came to power in 1994, they did not reverse reform policies 
but continued with rapid privatization and reduced government spending. By 1997, consistent 
macro and microeconomic reform policy placed Hungary ahead of the Czech Republic and 
Poland and made it a “model for East Europe.”621
Then how can we explain the frequent and drastic changes in policy direction witnessed 
in Bulgaria throughout the 1990s? What needs to be considered is the strong links of the 
Bulgarian communist elite with Moscow. In other words, Russia was perceived as a real 
alternative for the Bulgarian communist/socialist elite, and one that would strengthen both its 
political and economic standing. Because of traditionally strong ties with Moscow as well as 
personal networks, the BSP elite viewed Russia as the most desired security guarantor and trade 
partner.  Preserving close relations with Russia, therefore, became the priority of the BSP. 
Hence, when BSP was in power, foreign and domestic policy was reoriented towards Russia and 
away from Western alliances and partners. In that sense, Bulgarian politics in the 1990s bear 
more resemblance to contemporary Ukraine, where there is a clear division between a pro-
 Furthermore, the Hungarian socialists 
continued to pursue EU and NATO membership. Thus, dominance of the former communist elite 
alone does not explain slow progress in reform efforts or sharp turns in foreign and domestic 
policy. 
                                                 
621 BROWN J. F., The Groves of Change. Eastern Europe at the Turn of the Millennium, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 2001, p. 123. 
  295 
Russian and a pro-Western elite, than to political processes at the time in post-communist 
countries that were not part of the Soviet Union.  
To illustrate this point let us consider Romania – also a country with slow progress in 
reform efforts, where, similarly to Bulgaria, the former communist elite dominated transition 
politics. The nature of the communist regime in Romania, however, with its deviation from the 
Soviet line, meant that the former communist elite did not have close ties with Moscow. 
Consequently, Russia was not perceived as a viable alternative in terms of security or trade 
orientation. Romania did not witness such sharp turns in its foreign policy. On the contrary, 
despite a similarly difficult transition, Romanian foreign policy was consistently pro-Western.  
The particular nature of elite transformation in Bulgaria, defined by a strong former 
communist elite with pronounced pro-Russian attitudes, a weak pro-Western opposition unable 
to maintain power, and a frequent change of governments as a result, produced a sequence of 
chaotic and inconsistent policy choices throughout the 1990s. 
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9.0  HOW USEFUL A MODEL OF ELITE TRANSFORMATION? 
In this concluding chapter I would like to address the following questions: What have we learned 
about elite transformation and the transition process in Bulgaria? Is elite analysis a useful 
approach for studying major societal changes as those witnessed with the transition from a 
communist society? Is the proposed model fit for examining elite transformation in such 
moments of dramatic upheaval? Can this model be applied beyond the transition context? 
Finally, how does this study fit with other scholarship on East European elites and East European 
transitions, as well as in the broader fields of elite studies and literature on democratization? 
Compared to other East European countries, Bulgaria was not a leader in democratization 
efforts. Its transition was characterized by a stop-and-go pace and frequent change of policy 
direction. In the East European context, slow reform progress is often associated with dominance 
of the former communist elite (and electoral victory for the former communists in the first 
democratic elections in particular). Indeed, elite transformation in Bulgaria was defined by a 
strong and slowly reforming former communist party and a weak and poorly organized 
opposition. There was little change in the former communist elite in terms of its composition, 
mode of recruitment, and ideological orientation. Loyalty remained the main criteria for 
recruitment and new elite members were recruited mainly from the usual pool of elite communist 
families and elite schools. Furthermore, the communist/socialist elite remained extremely pro-
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Russian (due to traditional strong ties and personal networks) and envisioned a transition that 
would preserve Bulgaria’s close ties with Russia. 
Although dominant, the communist/socialist elite was not uncontested. However weak 
the opposition, it managed to eventually gain power. But lacking a unified vision of the transition 
and a solid reform program, and further being torn by internal conflict, the opposition was unable 
to maintain power. The communist elite was not better prepared to rule. In fact, its reluctance to 
govern is evident from its continued attempts to form coalitions and governments of “national 
consensus” that would include members of the opposition. Adding to the equation an 
opportunistic ethnic-based party changing allegiance much too often, made up for frequent 
change of governments and political instability. 
Although political stability was achieved over time in Eastern Europe, no other country in 
the region witnessed nine governments in the first seven years of the transition. Thus, we could 
hardly argue that the nature of elite transformation in Bulgaria, with frequent change of 
governments and policy orientation was simply a function of the transition from communism and 
was therefore to be expected. The Bulgarian case was also unique in that former communist 
elites in other East European countries were far less pro-Russian than their Bulgarian 
counterpart. Thus, the change of nine governments in Bulgaria also meant that, unlike in other 
East European states, Bulgarian foreign and domestic policy was violently shifting between pro-
Russian and pro-Western orientations. Such drastic policy shifts further impeded reform progress 
and contributed to political instability. 
One of the most harmful and lasting effects of the political instability throughout the 
1990s is the still persistent high level of corruption. Dominance of the former communist elite 
meant that old networks continued to operate (including the networks of former security officers) 
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and became intertwined with the new democratic institutions. Frequent change of governments 
further bred opportunistic behavior and corrupt practices as members of each governing 
majority, anticipating their power would be short-lived, were focused primarily on securing their 
standing after being ousted from power and on personal enrichment. This buffet syndrome was 
perhaps even more damaging than the persistence of old communist networks. The public 
became disillusioned by the fact that the democrats were no less corrupt than their communist 
predecessors. In fact, the main reason for UDF’s poor performance in the 2001 elections and the 
sharp decline in its power since, are the numerous allegations of corruption. Corruption was also 
one of the main reasons for Bulgaria’s belated EU membership. As Vachudova points out, 
widespread corruption was a key concern for the EU and large part of the reason why Bulgaria 
(and Romania) was held back from concluding negotiations for membership in 2002 and joining 
the EU in 2004.622
The link between elite transformation and transition outcome poses the question of 
whether elite analysis is a useful approach to analyzing political, economic and social change in 
a period of dramatic societal upheaval. Though assigning various degrees of importance to the 
elite factors, scholars across disciplines agree that elite change plays a major role in democratic 
transitions. O’Donnell and Schmitter have argued that “elite dispositions, actions and pacts” 
largely determine the prospects of transitioning to democracy, as democratic transitions represent 
“moments of plasticity, during which actors [elites] are faced with an opportunity to shape the 
course of events” (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). Higley and Burton further contend that 
 The issue of corruption clearly illustrates the negative effects elite 
transformation may have on the transition outcome. 
                                                 
622 VACHUDOVA Milada Anna, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after 
Communism, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 52-53. 
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“democratic transitions and breakdowns can be best understood by studying basic continuities 
and changes in internal relations of national elites” (Higley & Burton 1989). The elite factor 
figures prominently also in the sociology of revolutions literature. Theda Skocpol argues that 
intra-elite conflict plays at least as important a role in revolutions as participation from below 
(Skocpol 1979), whereas Jack Goldstone points to intra-elite conflict, financial crisis, and 
popular uprisings as the major factors that bring about revolutions (Golstone 1991). 
Elite change does not occur in a vacuum. Studying elites, therefore, inevitably offers a 
valuable insight into the transition process itself. In a transition context, elite action is 
responsible more than anything for shaping future institutions. The elite approach does not 
preclude the validity of other theoretical frameworks. The social movement paradigm, for 
example, has often been adopted in examining revolutionary changes. The absence of an 
organized dissident movement in Bulgaria or any mobilized social group contesting power 
renders a social movement approach inappropriate and difficult to apply to the Bulgarian context. 
Considering that changes in Bulgaria were initiated within the communist elite and that intra-
elite conflict played a major role in the collapse of the communist regime, an elite-centered 
approach is better suited for examining the Bulgarian transition. 
The proposed model drawing on classical elite theory and contemporary research on East 
European elites is particularly well-fitted for analyzing elite change in post-communist societies. 
The model’s emphasis on elite, counter elite, and contestation of power corresponds well to the 
elite configuration in Bulgaria at the start of the transition. The elite/counter-elite 
conceptualization is necessitated by the fact that 1) there are two groups that are clearly 
distinguishable and fundamentally opposed to one another, i.e. the communist elite and the 
democratic opposition; and 2) one group, the democratic opposition, is easily defined as a 
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counter-elite for it is, at least initially, completely excluded from the political process. 
Furthermore, contestation of power by the counter-elite takes the form of negotiation and 
bargaining, as well as an attack on the legitimizing principle of rule (the political formula). In 
other words, the democratic opposition was not only fighting for a share in power, but 
questioned the very foundation of communist power, i.e. communist ideology and one-party rule. 
In that sense, the model is a useful analytical tool not only for the study of post-communist elites, 
but for examining transitions from authoritarian regimes in general. Applying this model to post-
Franco Spain, for example, would be a useful and most likely productive endeavor. 
But how appropriate is this model for examining elite change beyond the transition? In 
the East European context, we can no longer speak of an elite and counter-elite. East European 
countries, including Bulgaria, have moved away from an elite/counter-elite model and towards a 
pluralistic elite structure with multiple competing elite groups. Contestation of power, in turn, is 
no longer focused on questioning the legitimizing principle of rule. Instead, competing elite 
groups struggle for share in power and attacks on rival elites are limited to criticisms of specific 
policy choices. The emergence and dominance of new parties and elite groups in Bulgaria, such 
as NDSV, ATАKA, and GERB, clearly illustrate the shift to a pluralistic elite structure.  
Despite the change in elite structure, the model still provides a useful tool for examining 
elite change. Mode of recruitment and intra-elite conflict are mechanisms of elite change that are 
at work at all times, regardless of the pace and degree of elite change or the political system. 
Although we no longer distinguish between an elite or a counter-elite, but rather speak of “elites” 
or “the Bulgarian political elite,” we can still differentiate between intra-elite conflict and 
conflict among different elite groups. The 2009 conflict between BSP President Georgi Parvanov 
and former Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev, for instance, is a clear example of intra-elite 
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conflict.623
This work makes a valuable contribution to the study of East European elites. Elite 
transformation in Bulgarian has been largely neglected in the scholarly literature. While Bulgaria 
is often referenced in comparative studies, the few available works on Bulgarian elites are not 
based on empirical data. Empirically grounding this study, therefore, was extremely important 
for developing an accurate understanding of elite change in Bulgaria. Analysis of the data 
revealed a much more complex process of elite transformation than the simplistic categorization 
of Bulgaria as a case of reproduction where the communist elite preserved its power.  
 Examining the modes of recruitment of the various elite groups, the composition of 
the elite, and the intra-elite and inter-elite conflict is very important to our understanding of 
political processes in the country and the process of policy formulation in particular. 
In addition to offering empirically-based analysis, this study aspires to make a theoretical 
contribution. Studies of post-communist elites emerged with the unfolding of events in Eastern 
Europe. Theorizations of elite change were therefore often lagging behind, as scholars were 
struggling to catch up with the rapidly changing political situation in the region. While focusing 
on gathering empirical data on elites, many scholars were neglecting the need for theory-building 
and were instead borrowing pre-existent theoretical concepts without necessarily developing a 
good understanding of the frameworks with which such concepts originated. The circulation vs. 
reproduction approach is notable in this respect. Acknowledging the significant contribution of 
this approach, I attempted to correct some its theoretical shortcomings. Bringing in classical elite 
                                                 
623 Before the 2009 parliamentary elections there was a visible conflict between Sergei Stanshev and 
Georgi Parvanov over policy within the party. See, „Бриго: Да сваляме по-бърже Станишев, Първанов 
е човекът,” Актуално, July 12, 2009. Available online at: 
 http://politics.actualno.com/news_274484.html 
  302 
theory of Mosca and Pareto and combining it with contemporary research on East European 
elites offered an improved framework for examining elite change in post-communist societies. 
In examining elite transformation in Bulgaria this study is a much needed addition to 
comparative studies on East European elites and transitions. Such topic is closely related to the 
process of democratization in Eastern Europe and the variety of transition outcomes and, thus, 
adds on to the voluminous literature on democratization. 
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